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CHAPTER XI CONCLUSIONS

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it might be supposed that, from the experience of two expeditions to mount everest, it would be possible to deduce an estimate of the dangers and difficulties involved and to formulate a plan for overcoming the obstacles which would meet with universal approval among mountaineers. but, in fact, though many deductions could hardly be denied, i should be surprised to find, even among us of the second party, anything like complete agreement either in our judgment of events or in our ideas for the future. accordingly, i must be understood as expressing only my personal opinions. the reader, no doubt, will judge the book more interesting if he finds the joint authors disagreeing among themselves.

the story of the first attempt to climb the mountain in 1922 will have no doubts on one point. the final camp was too low. however strong a party may be brought to the assault, their aim, unless they are provided with oxygen, must be to establish a camp considerably higher than our camp at 25,000 feet. the whole performance of the porters encourages us to believe that this can be done. some of them went to a height of 25,000 feet and more, not once only, 288but thrice; and they accomplished this feat with strength to spare. it is reasonable to suppose that these same men, or others of their type, could carry loads up to 27,000 feet. but it would be equally unreasonable to suppose that they could reach this height in one day from the camp on chang la at 23,000 feet. no one would be so foolish as to organise an attempt on this assumption. two camps instead of one must be placed above the chang la; another stage must be added to the structure before the climbing party sets forth to reach the summit.

but how exactly is this to be done? it is to this question that one would wish to deduce an answer from the experience of 1922. it is very unlikely that any future party will find itself in the position to carry out any ideal plan of organisation. ideally, they ought to start by considering what previous performances might help or hinder the aim of bringing the party of attack in the fittest possible condition to the last camp. what ought they to have done or not to have done, having regard to acclimatisation? it is still impossible to lay down the law on this head. after the first expedition, i supposed that the limit of acclimatisation must be somewhere about 21,000 feet. it now seems probable that it is higher. one of the physiologists who has been most deeply concerned with this problem of acclimatisation considers that it would probably be desirable, from the physiological point of view, to stay four or five days at 25,000 feet before proceeding to attempt the two last stages on consecutive days. those of us who slept at camp v for 289the first attempt would certainly be agreed in our attitude towards this counsel. the desire to continue the advance and spend another night at a higher elevation, if it persisted at all for so long a time at 25,000 feet, would be chilled to tepidity, and the increasing desire to get away from camp v might lead to retreat instead of advance. the conditions must be altogether more comfortable if the climbers are to derive any advantage from their rustication at this altitude. it would not be impossible, perhaps, if every effort were concentrated on this end, to make a happy home where the aspiring mountaineers might pass a long week-end in enjoyment of the simplest life at 25,000 feet; it would not be practicable, having regard to other ends to be served by the system of transport. but it might be well to spend a similar period for acclimatisation 2,000 feet lower on the chang la. there a very comfortable camp, with perfect shelter from the prevailing wind and good snow to lie on, can easily be established. noel actually spent three successive nights there in 1922, and apparently was the better rather than the worse for the experience.

no less important in this connection is the effect of exertions at high altitudes on a man’s subsequent performance. we have to take into account the condition of the climbing parties when they returned to the base camp after reaching approximately 27,000 feet. with one exception, all the climbers were affected in various degrees by their exertions, to the prejudice of future efforts. it would seem, therefore, that they cannot have had much strength to 290spare for the final stage to the summit. but there was a general agreement among the climbers that it was not so much the normal exertion of climbing upwards that was in itself unduly exhausting, but the addition of anything that might be considered abnormal, such as cutting steps, contending with wind, pushing on for a particular reason at a faster pace, and the many little things that had to be done in camp. it is difficult from a normal elevation to appreciate how great is the difference between establishing a camp on the one hand and merely ascending to one already established on the other. if ever it proves possible to organise an advanced party whose business it would be to establish at 25,000 feet a much more comfortable camp than ours in 1922, and if, in addition, a man could be spared to undertake the preparation of meals, the climbers detailed for the highest section of all would both be spared a considerable fatigue and would have a better chance of real rest and sleep.

the peculiar dangers of climbing at great altitudes were illustrated by the experience of 1922. the difficulty of maintaining the standard of sound and accurate mountaineering among a party all more or less affected by the conditions, and the delays and misfortunes that may arise from the exhaustion of one of the party, are dangers which might be minimised by a supporting party. two men remaining at the final camp and two men near camp v watching the progress of the unit of assault along the final ridge, and prepared to come to their assistance, might serve to produce 291vital stimulants, hot tea or merely water, at the critical moment, and to protect the descent. it is a counsel of perfection to suggest providing against contingencies on this lavish scale; but it is well to bear in mind the ideal. and there is, besides, a precaution which surely can and will be taken: to take a supply of oxygen for restorative purposes. the value of oxygen for restoring exhausted and warming cold men was sufficiently well illustrated during the second attempt in 1922.

chang la and north-east shoulder of mount everest

the question as to whether the use of oxygen will otherwise help or hinder climbers is one about which opinions may be expected to disagree. anyone who thinks that it is impossible to get up without oxygen can claim that nothing has shown it to be impossible to get up with its aid. for my part, i don’t think it impossible to get up without oxygen. the difference of atmospheric pressure between 27,000 feet and the summit is small, and it is safe to conclude that men who have exerted themselves at 27,000 feet could live without difficulty for a number of hours on the summit. as to whether their power of progress would give out before reaching 29,000 feet, it is impossible to dogmatise. i can only say that nothing in the experience of the first attempt has led me to suppose that those last 2,000 feet cannot be climbed in a day. i am not competent to sift and weigh all the evidence as to whether, how much, and with what consumption of gas it was easier to proceed up the slopes of mount everest with oxygen so far as finch and bruce went on that memorable day. but i do venture 292to combat the suggestion that it is necessarily easier to reach the top in that manner. i think no one will dispute the statement that the final camp for the second attempt was too low, as it had been for the first, to enable the oxygen party to reach the summit. with the same apparatus it will be necessary in this case also to provide a second camp above the north col. and the question for the moment will ultimately be, is it possible to add to that immense burden of transport to 27,000 feet the weight of the oxygen cylinders required?

the weather in all probability will have something to say to this problem. the expedition of 1922 was certainly not favoured by the weather. there was no continuous spell of calm fine days, and the summer snows began a week earlier than the most usual date. one wonders what sort of weather is to be expected with the most favourable conditions on mount everest. it is conceivable that a series of calm fine days sometimes precede the monsoon. but when we consider the perpetual winds of tibet at all seasons, it seems unlikely that mount everest is often immune from this abominable visitation. it is far more likely that the calm day is a rare exception, and only to be expected when the north-westerly current is neutralised by the monsoon from the south-east. the ill-luck of 1922 may probably be computed as no more than those seven days by which the monsoon preceded expectation. with so short a time for preparations and advance, we were indeed unfortunate in meeting an early monsoon. and it is hardly 293possible considerably to extend the available time by starting earlier. there was only the barest trickle of water at the base camp on may 1, 1922, and the complications involved by the necessity of melting snow for water, both here and at all higher stages, for any considerable time, would be a severe handicap. but it must be remembered that the second attempt was made a week before the monsoon broke. time appeared short on the mountain chiefly from the threat of bad weather and the signs showing that the majority of days were, to say the least, extremely disagreeable for climbing high on the mountain. if others are confronted by similar conditions, they too will probably feel that each fine day must be utilised and the attack must be pressed on; for the fine days past will not come back, and ahead is the uncertain monsoon.

a final question may now be asked: what advantages will another expedition have which we did not have in 1922? in one small and in one large matter the next expedition may be better equipped. it was disappointing, after so much time and thought had been expended upon the problem of foot-gear, that nothing was evolved in 1922 which succeeded in taking the place of alpine boots of well-known patterns. the great disadvantage of these sorts of boot is that one cannot wear crampons with them at these high altitudes, for the strap bound tightly round the foot will almost certainly cause frostbite; either different boots or different spikes must be invented if the climbers are to have crampons or their equivalent. it is essential that they 294should be so equipped to avoid the labour of step-cutting, and the lack of this equipment might well rob them of victory on the steep final slopes below the summit. this matter of foot-gear is not so very small, after all. but a still more important one is the oxygen apparatus. it is conceivable, and i believe by no means unlikely, that a different type of cylinder may be used in the future, and capable of containing more oxygen, compared with the same weight, than those of 1922. a 50 per cent. improvement in this direction should alter the whole problem of using oxygen. with this advantage it might well be possible to go to the top and back with the four cylinders which a man may be expected to carry from a height of 25,000 feet or little higher. if a second camp above the north col becomes unnecessary in this way, the whole effort required, and especially the effort of transport, will be reduced to the scale of what has already been accomplished, and can no doubt be accomplished again.

the further advantage of a future expedition is simply that of experience. it amounts to something, one cannot say how much. in small ways a number of mistakes may be avoided. the provision of this and that may be more accurately calculated according to tried values. the whole organisation of life in high camps should be rather more efficient. beyond all this, the experience of 1922 should help when the moment comes towards the making of a right plan; and a party which chooses rightly what to do and when to do it, and can so exclude other possibilities as to 295be certain that no better way could be chosen, has a great advantage. but, when all is said as to experience and equipment, it still remains true that success requires a quality. history repeats itself, perhaps, but in a vague and general fashion only where mountains are concerned. the problem of reaching the summit is every time a fresh one. the keen eye for a fair opportunity and resource in grave emergencies are no less necessary to the mountaineer everywhere, and not least upon mount everest, than determination to carry through the high project, the simple will to conquer in the struggle.

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