before describing the black mountain itself and the various tribes which inhabit its slopes, it may be as well to say something about the country which encompasses it on three sides and about the men who occupy it.

allai is a valley bounded by kohistan on the north and east, by the bhogarmang valley, nandihar and deshi on the south, and by the indus on the west. the valley of allai is divided from kohistan on the north by a range of mountains rising to over 15,000 feet, and from nandihar and deshi by another range running from the british boundary to the indus above thakot. the average breadth of the allai valley is about twelve miles, and the total area about 200 square miles. wheat, barley, indian corn and rice are grown, and the mountain slopes at the eastern end are covered with forest.

the men of allai are ever engaged in internal quarrels; blood-feuds are rife, and often embroil the whole tribe. they are but little dependent on british territory; number some 9000 fighting men, 25indifferently armed; they have at times, although not of late years, given us some trouble, but have usually been coerced by means of a blockade, although a really effective one is not easy to enforce.

surrounding country

nandihar is a valley lying to the south of allai, and adjoining the british valleys of bhogarmang and konsh on the east. it is divided by a spur of the hills into two long narrow glens; the area of the valley is about ninety square miles, and its elevation is from four to five thousand feet. there are about a thousand fighting men; the people are perpetually at feud; the country is very easily accessible from british territory.

tikari is a valley lying to the south of nandihar, and between it and agror in british territory. it is about eight miles long, four broad, and lies at an elevation of about 4500 feet. there are only some 400 fighting men. supplies in tikari are plentiful, with the exception of fuel, and water is abundant. the men of tikari have not been troublesome neighbours.

deshi is the name given to the country to the north of agror, and lying to the west of nandihar. it comprises a portion of the eastern slopes of the black mountain—a succession of bold, wooded spurs with intervening watercourses, on the banks of which are the villages. the fighting men number just over 700, indifferently armed. they are a united tribe, equally among themselves and when external danger threatens, but are easily accessible and exposed to attack, although not immediately on our border. 26they gave us some trouble in 1868, but have been quiet since.

all the above-mentioned tribes are swatis; none of them, except the men of deshi, have a very high reputation for courage; they are all sunni muhammadans and very bigoted.

tanawal, an independent state, is, roughly speaking, a square block of territory in the north-west corner of the hazara district, south of the black mountain and agror. it consists of 200 square miles of hilly country, held as a jaghir by the nawab of amb, a fort and village on the right bank of the indus. little is known of the origin of the tanawalis.

we now come to the yusafzai tribes inhabiting the slopes of the black mountain lying to the east of the indus, and occupying the southern corner of the angle formed by that river and the british boundary. the total length of this mountain is about twenty-five to thirty miles, and its average height about 8000 feet above sea-level. it ascends from the indus basin at its southern end near the village of kiara, and so up to its watershed by baradar; thence it runs north-east by north to the point on the crest known as chitabat. from here the range runs due north, finally descending to the indus by two large spurs, at the foot of the easternmost of which lies thakot. the indus, after passing thakot, runs westward along the northern foot of the mountain till it washes the western of the two spurs above mentioned, when it takes a 27sharp bend to the south, and runs below and parallel to the western foot of the range.

the mountain itself

the black mountain may be described as a long, narrow ridge with higher peaks at intervals, and occasional deep passes; the general outline of the crest is more rounded than sharp. from the sides numerous large spurs project, which are often precipitous and rocky, with deep, narrow glens or gorges lying between them, in which are some of the smaller villages of the tribes, the larger ones being, as a rule, situated on the banks of the indus. the whole of the upper portion of the mountain is thickly wooded, with pine, oak, sycamore, horse-chestnut and wild cherry. the crest of the mountain is crossed by several passes. the mountain is bounded on the south by tanawal; on the east by agror, pariari, and the swati tribes of tikari, nandihar and deshi; on the northern extremity lies the indus and thakot; and on the west, between the crest and the river indus, the slopes are occupied by yusafzai pathans. these slopes fall steeply from the crest for some 2000 feet; then follows a zone of gentle, well-cultivated slopes; and then from 4000–5000 feet altitude the hill drops precipitously to the indus. the actual indus valley here varies in width from a few hundred yards to nearly two miles, being narrowest at kotkai and at its broadest at palosi. it is crossed at about eleven different points by ferries, the boats holding from twenty to thirty passengers, but the inhabitants pass over the river almost everywhere on inflated skins.

28there are many routes by which the mountain can be ascended, and most of these have been used by our troops in different expeditions: from british territory all of them start from either tanawal or agror.

the western face of the black mountain is inhabited by three clans:

1.

the hassanzais.

2.

the akazais.

3.

the chagarzais.

on the eastern face are the saiyids of pariari, besides the men of deshi who have already been described.

the hassanzais are a division of the isazai clan of yusafzai pathans, and live on either side of the indus; those cis-indus occupy the most southern portion of the western slopes of the black mountain, while those trans-indus live immediately opposite to them. the former are bounded on the north and east by the akazais, on the west by the indus, and on the south the hassanzai border adjoins the territory of the nawab of amb. the hassanzais are divided into ten sub-divisions with a total fighting strength of something under 2000 men, who are not, however, specially noted for their bravery. in the event of attack the hassanzais could probably depend for assistance upon two other divisions of isazai yusafzais, the akazais and the mada khels, of whom the last named live on the right bank of the indus. of the ten sub-divisions of the hassanzais that known as the khan khel is the most troublesome, so far 29as we are concerned, but the whole clan is constantly engaged in internal feud.

during the days of the sikh rule, the famous sikh general, hari singh, with two regiments, made an expedition into the hassanzai country via darband and baradar and burnt some of the villages.

akazais

the akazais, like the hassanzais, are the descendants of isa, and are also a division of the isazai clan of yusafzais, inhabiting a portion of the crest and western slopes of the black mountain to the north of the hassanzais, having on the east a part of agror and the pariari saiyids, to the north the chagarzais, and on the west the indus. they have no territory trans-indus, with the exception of part of one village which they share with the hassanzais. their chief villages are kand, bimbal and biliani, the two first being nearest to the crest of the black mountain, and situated on flat, open ground, with difficult approaches. the akazais are divided into four sub-divisions, and can probably put some 1100 men in the field. neither this clan nor the hassanzais are dependent on british territory, but so far as the akazais are concerned we possess the power to attack them, while we know all about the rich and accessible rice and wheat crops which they cultivate round the villages which they own, or in which they hold shares, in the tikari valley. during the sikh rule, and up to 1868, the akazais held the village of shatut in the agror valley. it is only within the last twenty-five years or so that this clan has begun to give trouble.

30the chagarzais are a division of the malizai clan of the yusafzai pathans, claiming to be descended from chagar, the son of mali, who was one of the sons of yusaf. they occupy the country on either side of the river, those cis-indus being located on the western slopes of the black mountain, to the north of the akazais. they are divided into three sub-divisions, and could probably call together from both sides of the river some 4600 armed men—the larger body from across the indus.

the southern boundary of the cis-indus chagarzais is contiguous with that of the akazais, and follows the spur of the black mountain running from the machai peak to the indus bank—the southern face of the spur belonging to the akazais and the northern to the chagarzais. on the west and north the indus forms the boundary, while on the east the chagarzais are bounded by the country of the deshiwals and of the pariari saiyids.

the chagarzais are considered braver than the hassanzais and akazais, who would, however, probably unite with them if attacked, as would also contingents from swat and buner.

little is definitely known about the communications in the interior of the country. the crest of the mountain and the machai peak may be gained by advancing up the kungali spur to chitabat; but owing to the steep and rugged nature of the country, and the thick forest clothing the whole of the upper portion of the hill, an active enemy, well acquainted with the ground, would have every facility for annoying 31the troops and opposing the advance. about three miles north of machai is the high peak of ganthar, and the pass leading from pariari to pakban—one of the principal villages—lies on the crest between these two points. here the ground is broken and precipitous, flanked by thick pine forests, and in all probability forms a strong position from which the advance of a force moving from machai upon ganthar could be disputed. from this point, which lies in a deep hollow on the crest, the ascent to ganthar, though steep in places and everywhere flanked by forest, is not of any great difficulty. beyond ganthar the advance along the crest would be easier.

chagarzais and saiyids

the chagarzais also are not in any way dependent upon british territory. it is only since 1863 that they have given us any trouble, and on the few occasions when they have opposed us, their operations have not been long protracted nor of a very serious character.

colonies of saiyids, religious adventurers—theoretically those who are the direct descendants of ali, the son-in-law of the prophet—occupy several of the glens on the mountain itself, and have caused much of the bloodshed and trouble which have stained and disturbed these parts. in two of these glens on the eastern slope of the black mountain are the pariari saiyids. on the western face, among the hassanzais, are the saiyids of tilli; one or two more such colonies are scattered through the chagarzai country; while a rather formidable 32religious body, the akhund khels, holds the glens and spurs on the extreme north-west corner down to the indus. numerically all are more or less insignificant, but they exercise considerable influence.

neither the extent nor the population of this black mountain country warrant its being ranked as of any exceptional importance. as oliver reminds us, “the tribes are not numerous, nor particularly warlike, and most of them are miserably poor, but they, and the nests of fanatical hornets they shelter, have for long proved capable of inflicting an altogether disproportionate amount of annoyance.”

operations.

the first time the hassanzai clan came into notice was on the occasion of the murder by them of two officers of the indian customs department.

shortly after the annexation of the punjab a preventive line was established along the left bank of the indus, so far as british jurisdiction extended, to prevent trans-indus salt being smuggled into the punjab. in 1851 this line was extended five miles beyond torbela to a point on the indus where the cis-indus territory of the nawab of amb commenced. in november of that year two of our customs officials, visiting this portion of the border, were murdered by a band of armed hassanzais, when actually within the bounds of the nawab of amb. the nawab was at once called to account, and delivered up such hassanzais as happened to be within his territory, for which act the hassanzais made war upon him, 33laid waste his border villages, and seized two of his forts: upon this, british interference became necessary, and orders were issued for the assembly of a punitive force.

expedition of 1852–53

expedition against the black mountain hassanzais, 1852–53.—in december 1852 the troops, as enumerated below, were concentrated at shergarh on the north-western border of the hazara district under the command of lieut.-col. mackeson,[5] c.b., commissioner of peshawar.

four guns, 5th troop, 1st brigade, h.a.

six guns, mountain train battery.

16th irregular cavalry.[6]

7th company sappers and miners.

3rd native infantry.[7]

kelat-i-ghilzie regiment.[8]

four companies corps of guides.

1st sikh infantry.[9]

176 men rawal pindi police.

two regiments kashmir dogras.

levies (1760 men).

the force was divided into three columns with a reserve, occupying respectively chatta, shingli, shoshni and shergarh. the fort at shingli, which was one of the two that had been captured by the hassanzais from the nawab of amb, was recovered without loss, and while our troops were engaged in 34making it defensible, the hassanzais and akazais occupied the crest of the black mountain, and advanced their picquets close up to chatta. the authorities had forbidden the employment of the regular troops with the force on the top of the mountain at so late a season of the year, so that they were thereby restricted to the duties of a reserve at shergarh—where, confined in a narrow valley and incumbered with all kinds of impedimenta, they were of little or no assistance to a force engaged in mountain warfare. col. mackeson consequently decided to move the reserve of regular troops round to the banks of the indus, behind the black mountain, and thus to turn the position on the heights; and to let each column of attack trust to a small reserve of its own, and to the fort at shergarh in the rear, if all were beaten back.

the regular troops accordingly marched on the 24th and 25th december from shergarh to darband, behind the screen formed by the irregular portion of the force at chatta, shingli and shoshni. on the 27th, as the result of a reconnaissance, col. mackeson decided to alter his plans, and to place the main part of the regular troops at baradar, with four companies in chamberi, to make demonstrations on the heights in front of the last-named place—for to move them to the rear of the enemy’s position would have involved them in difficult ground.

on the 29th, these dispositions having been completed, orders were issued for the advance of the remaining three columns, panj gali being named as 35their ultimate objective; in the event of a repulse they were to fall back either upon chamberi or baradar.

the right column, under lieut.-col. r. napier, arrived, after a considerable amount of opposition, near the summit of the mountain at a point where a broad spur, forming the top of the range occupied by the akazais, branched off at an elevation of some 9000 feet. by this ridge the enemy retired, and no further defence of the hill was made. shortly before sunset the guides, under lieut. hodson, arrived at the shoulder of the mountain above panj gali, which was still occupied by the tribesmen, but on the appearance of our troops they rapidly retreated, and the right column bivouacked here for the night.

the centre column, under major j. abbott, had ascended about halfway to panj gali when the troops suddenly came upon the main body of the hassanzais, consisting of about 600 matchlock men, strongly posted upon a steep eminence in the centre of the main ravine. this position having been turned, the enemy fell back upon another equally strong at the head of the pass, but even after being joined by the left column under captain davidson, lieut.-col. mackeson did not feel himself strong enough to attack, so awaited the appearance of col. napier’s force in rear of the position, when the hassanzais retreated, as already stated.

mackeson’s operations

the left column was accompanied by col. mackeson, and marching by agror and pabal, was fired at from a hill overlooking tilli, but the enemy were immediately 36dislodged and the column effected its junction with the centre one, as described, close to panj gali.

on the 30th the hassanzai villages about here were destroyed, and the force moving on the next day to the tilli plateau burnt all the villages between that place and abu, while those along the indus between kotkai and baradar were destroyed by the nawab of amb’s men.

on the 2nd january the whole force retired to baradar, being followed up by the enemy and their allies, and the expedition was at an end. the hassanzais had made no submission, but it was considered that they had been sufficiently punished for the murder of the two british officers by the destruction of their villages and grain, and for some time after this lesson the hassanzais remained fairly quiet, and the raids made by them in 1863 were directed chiefly against the nawab of amb’s territory, and no doubt partook of the nature of reprisals for the assistance the nawab had afforded us ten years earlier.

our casualties in the 1853 expedition were about fifteen killed and wounded.

in november, 1867, it was determined to establish a body of police in the agror valley, and this was temporarily located in the village of oghi until a fortified police post could be built. at daylight on the morning of the 30th july, 1868, this body of twenty-two policemen was attacked by some 500 men belonging to almost all the tribes, including the pariari saiyids, mentioned in this chapter. the 37enemy were driven off, but troops being called for from abbottabad, a force composed of the peshawar mountain battery and 350 of the 5th gurkhas, under lieut.-col. rothney, reached oghi before midnight on the 31st, having marched forty-two miles in twenty-five hours, and here this force was joined on the 2nd august by the levies of the nawab of amb. it appearing that the attack had been instigated by the khan of agror, that chief was promptly arrested and sent in to abbottabad.

during the next few days there were signs of serious unrest in the agror valley; the tribesmen refused to meet the deputy-commissioner, many villages were burnt by them, and on the 7th a general advance of the enemy took place, when all the neighbouring tribesmen joined them, while our own levies deserted in numbers to their homes. on the 12th, col. rothney, who had been reinforced, moved out from oghi, and drove the enemy out of the agror valley. by this engagement, by the arrival of troops at abbottabad, of further reinforcements at oghi, and the presence of some kashmir regiments in the pakli valley, the safety of the hazara district was now secured, and brig.-gen. wilde—who was now in command—only waited for more troops to carry out any punitive operations which might be ordered.

up to this date twenty-one british villages had been burnt by the tribesmen, who had also caused us sixty-four casualties.

expedition of 1868

expedition against the black mountain tribes, 1868.—an expedition was now sanctioned, but in 38view of the generally disturbed state of this portion of the frontier, it was decided to draw the required troops from cantonments further down country, leaving the garrisons of peshawar and of other border posts as far as possible intact. considering that some regiments had come from as far south as cawnpore, the concentration by the 24th september of the following force at agror, darband and abbottabad, may be considered a very satisfactory piece of work:

at agror:

d. f. royal horse artillery.

e. 19th royal artillery.

2. 24th royal artillery.

peshawar mountain battery.

hazara mountain battery.

1st battalion 6th foot.

1st battalion 19th foot.

guides cavalry.

16th bengal cavalry.[10]

det. telegraph sappers.

1st gurkhas.

2nd gurkhas.

3rd sikhs.[11]

2nd punjab infantry.[12]

4th gurkhas.

20th punjab native infantry.[13]

24th punjab native infantry.[14]

5th gurkhas.

39at abbottabad:

2nd and 7th companies sappers and miners.

at darband, in support of the nawab of amb:

38th foot.

9th bengal cavalry.[15]

31st punjab native infantry.[16]

composition of force

this force was divided into two brigades, under colonels bright and vaughan, the whole under command of brigadier-general wilde, c.b., c.s.i., and numbered some 9500 of all ranks. in addition, a contingent of 1200 troops was furnished by the maharaja of kashmir, but these, though present on the border, did not take any active part in the operations.

the overawing effect of the assembly of so large a force was immediately apparent in the petitions to be permitted to treat which now began to come in from the swatis, the hassanzais and the men of tikari and nandihar, and these were granted in the case of those clans which had not been specially hostile, or which it was considered particularly desirable to detach from the general coalition. the force which had been concentrated in hazara had still, however, a sufficiently formidable task before it, having to deal with the chagarzai and akazai clans, with the swatis of deshi and thakot, with the pariari saiyids, and not improbably with the hindustani fanatics (of whom more will be said hereafter), and large bodies of trans-indus pathans.

40on the 3rd october the force moved out from the camp at oghi; brigadier-general vaughan, with the second brigade, advancing by bagrian, occupied with but insignificant opposition the kiarkot mountain, and closed up his brigade to kilagai. brigadier-general bright at the same time advanced on kungali and thence on mana-ka-dana, which he occupied after some little fighting, and which was found to form an excellent temporary base for operations against the chitabat and machai peaks. the second brigade was now ordered to support the further advance of the first, leaving the levies to move up the barchar spur. on the next day—the 4th—the chitabat position was carried with small loss—the road having, however, been found to be almost impracticable—and was put in a state of defence. the second brigade closed up this evening to mana-ka-dana. on the following day the first brigade advanced against the enemy holding the machai peak. this was naturally a very strong defensible position, the ascent being steep and rugged in the extreme, only to be climbed on a narrow front, as the ground on the left was precipitous, and on the right thickly wooded. the accurate and effective covering fire of the mountain batteries enabled the troops to capture the position with only eight casualties, the enemy not holding out to the last, but flying down the spurs into the indus valley.

major-general wilde was now in possession of the most commanding plateau of the range, he had ample supplies, his communications were secure, and he was 41able to inflict considerable damage on the mountain villages of the neighbouring pathan tribes. jirgahs of the clans now began to come in and make formal submission, and by the 12th the machai peak was evacuated, the force finally reaching oghi, via tikari and nandihar, on the 22nd october, with the objects of the expedition satisfactorily attained.

our casualties totalled five killed and twenty-nine wounded.

raids and outrages

raids did not, however, entirely and immediately cease, and in the autumn of 1869 a force of some 700 men had to be moved out from abbottabad to assist in the establishment of a blockade against the hassanzais, akazais and others who had raided into agror. in april of the following year a party of akazais attacked barchar, and burnt sambalbat and bholu, despite the presence in the agror valley of a small british garrison.

during the years 1871–75 offences continued to be committed on the agror border by the tribesmen, and another expedition seemed inevitable, when, in september 1875, a settlement was arrived at, all the black mountain tribes agreeing in submitting to the british government, and for some few years this part of the frontier was free from any serious trouble.

up to 1884 there was no real cause for complaint; it had been found necessary in this year to blockade the chagarzais, akazais and pariari saiyids, and the same punishment was extended later to the hassanzais; but it was not until june 1888 that a 42serious outrage occurring on the agror frontier necessitated the despatch of another expedition to the black mountain. on the 18th of this month an attack was made upon a small party of british troops within british territory by akazais, hassanzais and pariari saiyids, and two british officers and four men were killed. immediately upon this, large bodies of these tribesmen assembled with the intention of attacking agror, but dispersed again without taking any further offensive action; the indian government now once more took into consideration the question of punitive measures against the black mountain tribes, and on the 29th august an expedition was decided upon.

expedition of 1888

expedition against the black mountain tribes, 1888.—the force was formed on the 7th september, 1888, and consisted of three mountain batteries, one company sappers and miners, four battalions of british, nine of native infantry, with two battalions of kashmir infantry and the khyber rifles, and was placed under command of brigadier-general (temporary major-general) j. mcqueen, c.b., a.d.c. the total strength was 9416 of all ranks, and the force was organised in two brigades under brigadier-generals channer and galbraith, each brigade being sub-divided into two columns. there was further a reserve composed of a regiment of cavalry and two battalions of infantry. headquarters and the first, second and third columns were directed to concentrate at oghi in the agror valley by the 1st october, and the fourth column at darband on the indus on 43the same date; and the object of the expedition was stated to be the coercion into submission of the akazais and the khan khel division of the hassanzais, with the punishment of any clans or divisions which might assist these tribesmen in their opposition to our troops.

the following were the orders issued for the advance of the four columns:

no. 1 column to move on the 4th to mana-ka-dana, and the following day to chitabat, leaving a sufficient force at mana-ka-dana to protect its line of communications.

no. 2 column to advance up the barchar spur on the 4th, occupying barchar; thence moving on the 5th to the crest of the ridge, one regiment being at once detached to the left to meet no. 3 column.

no. 3 column to advance up the sambalbat spur to the village of the same name, which was to be occupied on the 4th. the advance to be continued to the crest on the 5th. the 24th punjab infantry and two guns derajat mountain battery to move up the chatta spur, meeting the remainder of no. 3 column on the morning of the 5th at the junction of the sambalbat and chatta spurs. the khyber rifles to advance up the chajri spur between nos. 2 and 3 columns on the 5th.

no. 4 column to advance on the 4th to the neighbourhood of kotkai on the indus.

44the first three columns carried out their orders on the 4th and 5th, the 2nd and 3rd columns practically unmolested, the 1st with but slight opposition, which chiefly took the form of firing into the bivouacs after nightfall; but the opposition experienced by the 4th, and more isolated, column was of a considerably more serious character.

this column, under colonel crookshank, and accompanied by the brigadier, crossed the frontier on the morning of the 4th and advanced to bela on the indus by a road which had been made practicable the previous day. the river bank was reached at 8 a.m., and a halt was made to allow the column to close up. on the advance being resumed, the village of shingri was carried with but trifling opposition, but about a mile beyond large numbers of the enemy were found in occupation of a strong position about the villages of towara and kotkai, with both flanks held by skirmishers and even defended by guns. the flanks were turned by the 34th pioneers and 4th punjab infantry,[17] but the advance was necessarily very slow, and the line was suddenly charged by a body of ghazis who had been concealed in a nullah on the left flank of the royal irish regiment; they were, however, nearly all shot down before they arrived at close quarters. the enemy now began to break, and by 3.30 p.m. were in full retreat towards kanar, when kotkai was occupied.

on the 6th the other three columns were engaged 45in collecting forage, improving their water supply, and in safeguarding their communications, and during the 7th they remained respectively at chitabat, nimal and kain gali.

work of the columns

from the 5th to the 10th october the 4th column was engaged in reconnaissances to kanar, tilli, kunari, garhi and ghazi kot, and on the 13th the settlements and forts at maidan, on the further bank of the indus, of the hindustani fanatics—many of whom had opposed us at kotkai—were destroyed. these operations were nearly always opposed, but with the destruction of maidan the active services of this column came to an end. later on in the month a hassanzai village on the right bank of the indus was burnt, as were also garhi, bakrai and kotkai, after which this clan sent in their jirgah, made submission and paid up their fine.

during this period the agror columns remained on the crest of the black mountain above the lands of the hassanzais and akazais, exploring the surrounding country and destroying villages of offending clans. these measures were successful; by the 19th the akazai jirgah had come in and had unconditionally accepted our terms. the hassanzais too, although they did not actually make submission until the 30th, had ceased to be actively hostile, and general mcqueen was therefore now able to devote his attention to the coercing of the pariari saiyids and the tikariwals. on the evening of the 20th october the divisional headquarters and no. 1 column were at mana-ka-dana, no. 2 column was in occupation 46of chitabat, no. 3 was distributed between karun, akhund baba, nimal and tilli, and no. 4 was at ledh, kanar, kotkai, shingri and darband.

on a small force moving forward from dilbori towards chirmang, the tikariwals at once came in and hurriedly paid up their fines, leaving now only the pariari saiyids to be dealt with; and on the 24th troops were sent into their country, garhi was destroyed, thakot was then entered, via chanjal and karg, without opposition, and preparations were now made for visiting allai, the khan of which had begged that his country should not be visited, but who had made no signs of submission. allai was entered, via the ghorapher pass, by a force of six guns and some 2400 rifles under brigadier-general channer, divided into two columns. the ascent was found to be very difficult and precipitous, and the crest held in some force, but the enemy made no serious stand, and our casualties in the capture of the position were only one killed and one wounded. the crest of the chaila mountain was held during that night and the 2nd, and on the 3rd november the force marched to pokal, the khan’s headquarters, destroyed it and returned to camp, having experienced some opposition in the advance and being persistently followed up in the retirement. late this evening the allai jirgah came in, followed on the next day by that of the pariari saiyids, and by the 13th the whole of the force had been withdrawn to british territory. the british casualties during the operations amounted to twenty-five killed and fifty-seven wounded.

47the objects for which the expedition had been undertaken had been attained; the offending clans had met with severe punishment, and had made their submission; hostages had been given for future good behaviour; and some roads had been made, while a large extent of hitherto unknown country had been surveyed and mapped. for a year affairs on this border remained quiet, but the government of india considered it necessary to take measures to secure its control over the clans and to make roads into their territories. to the construction of roads, however, the hassanzais, akazais and pariari saiyids made objections, and on major-general sir john mcqueen moving a small force along the border to prove our rights under the treaty which had been made, a considerable amount of opposition was shown by the clans immediately concerned, and the general withdrew his troops in accordance with his instructions, and to make way for a larger expedition now projected.

expedition of 1891

expedition against the hassanzais and akazais, 1891.—the objects of these operations were to assert our right to move along the crest of the black mountain; to inflict punishment upon the clans which had recently shown hostility to the force under sir john mcqueen; and to occupy the country until complete submission had been made. in consequence of the experience gained in 1888 it was decided that oghi, tilli and pabal gali should be occupied, but that the advance should be made only by the indus line, whence the hassanzai and akazai villages and 48lands could most easily be reached, and where the conditions of warfare would be more favourable to the british troops.

the force detailed was placed under command of major-general w. k. elles, c.b., and was directed to advance from darband in two columns, one via baradar and pailam to tilli, the other by the river via kotkai and kanar. the concentration was to be effected by the 1st march, 1891, as detailed below.

left or river column, at darband:

three guns no. 1 m.b.r.a.

three guns derajat mountain battery.

2nd battalion seaforth highlanders.

headquarters wing 32nd pioneers.

37th dogras.

guides infantry.

4th sikhs.[18]

right or tilli column, at darband:

no. 9 m.b.r.a.

1st battalion royal welsh fusiliers.

11th bengal infantry.[19]

wing 32nd pioneers.

2nd battalion 5th gurkhas.

khyber rifles.

divisional troops at darband:

one squadron 11th bengal lancers and no. 4 company bengal sappers and miners.

49at oghi:

one squadron 11th bengal lancers.

three guns derajat mountain battery.

28th bengal infantry.[20]

in reserve at rawal pindi:

one squadron 11th bengal lancers.

1st battalion king’s royal rifle corps.

19th bengal infantry.[21]

27th bengal infantry.[22]

advance of the force

the weather was bad for some days after the concentration was effected, but good roads had been made to the frontier and to bela, and both phaldan and bela had been occupied by our troops. general elles proposed first to establish posts in kanar and tilli, and then with the left or river column to occupy the lower hassanzai country on both banks and the diliarai peninsula of the akazais, while the right column, moving by ril and kungar, occupied the khan khel territory, and thus by degrees complete the occupation of the lands of both clans.

the advance commenced on the morning of the 12th, and pailam and kotkai were occupied by either column without any more opposition than was occasioned by some desultory firing at the river column from across the indus. on the next day the right column moved on to and halted at tilli, while the river column visited the palosi plain and also nadrai on the right bank, experiencing some 50opposition, but reconnoitring the road between kotkai and kanar. by the 15th it was reported that while the hassanzais and akazais were anxious to submit, other clans were gathering against us—mostly in the trans-indus chagarzai country.

about 3 a.m. on the 19th a weak company of the 4th sikhs, providing an outpost at the small village of ghazi kot, on the left bank of the indus, was heavily attacked by a large body of hindustani fanatics. reinforcements, however, furnished by the 4th sikhs and 32nd pioneers, were quickly on the scene, and the enemy were driven off with considerable loss. the following night there was a good deal of firing at kanar; on the 21st the river column had reached palosi via pirzada bela; and the right column occupied ril the same day, destroyed seri on the next, and then returned to tilli.

on the 23rd the establishment of a bridge at bakrai was covered by a party of the 4th sikhs, who were opposed by a large gathering of the enemy on the diliarai hill, overlooking bakrai and about one mile to the north-west of that place. the enemy were driven off the hill, but on the sikhs and guides withdrawing to a position lower down, they were followed up so determinedly that lieut.-colonel gaselee of the 4th sikhs again advanced, and cleared and reoccupied the hill for the night. the fighting had been hand-to-hand, and the enemy—chiefly chagarzais and hindustanis—suffered rather heavily.

on the 24th brigadier-general hammond took a small force from tilli to palosi, and thence next day 51advanced up the shal nala against darbanai—a village on a knoll jutting out from the main spur into the indus valley. the enemy were driven off this commanding position, and on the 27th general hammond moved into lower surmal and burnt some of the chagarzai villages.

gathering of the clans

the gatherings of the tribesmen had now increased. there were a number of bunerwals at baio and in this neighbourhood, and in the chagarzai country to the north there appeared to be a coalition of all the clans from thakot to the peshawar border—from buner, chamla, and from the amazai and gadun country. in consequence of these concentrations of clans, a regiment of cavalry and a battalion of infantry were ordered up from nowshera to mardan, and, with the troops already in garrison at the last-named place, were held in readiness for service against the bunerwals; and the reserve brigade from rawal pindi was concentrated at darband. at the same time representations were made to the buner jirgah that we had no intention of invading either their country or that of the chagarzais, but that they would be attacked if their forces did not disperse. these warnings had the desired effect, and the bunerwals returned to their homes, while the lower hassanzais had already made their submission. towards the end of april the whole of the country of the akazais, who still remained recalcitrant, was visited, and shortly after darband was evacuated and the base transferred to oghi; but it was not until a month later that the akazai jirgah at last came in 52and tendered the unconditional submission of the tribe. the three isazai divisions, with the saiyids and chagarzais of pariari, consented to the perpetual banishment from their territories of a notorious disturber of the peace, one hashim ali, and promised generally to be of good behaviour and to exclude the hindustani fanatics from their country.

early in june the bulk of the troops composing the force returned to india, but some remained until the end of november in occupation of seri and oghi and of the crest of the black mountain.

in these operations—which cost us nine killed and thirty-nine wounded—we had a larger coalition against us than in any other expedition, with the exception of the ambela outbreak of 1863 and the pathan revolt of 1897.

in march 1892 the hassanzais and mada khels broke the engagement into which they had entered with the british government, by permitting hashim ali to return to their country and settle at baio; and accordingly in october a force of 6250 men and two guns, organised in two brigades, advanced from darband under major-general sir william lockhart. the indus was crossed at marer, and on the 6th october the two brigades advanced on baio—the first brigade from wale and the second brigade from manjakot. baio was found deserted, and was destroyed, as was also doba, a mada khel village. demolitions were also carried out in manja kot, karor, garhi and nawekili, and the force was back on the 11th october at darband, where it was broken 53up. none of the tribesmen offered any resistance, and there were no casualties, but the troops suffered a good deal from fever and also from cholera.

end of the operations

since this expedition the black mountain clans and their neighbours have given no serious trouble.