chitral is the largest and the most important state on the northern part of the north-western frontier. it lies immediately to the west of gilgit, while on the other side it is divided by the hindu kush from the province of kafiristan—transferred to the dominions of afghanistan during the latter part of the reign of the late amir abdurrahman khan. south of gilgit the shandur spur and the watershed between the chitral and panjkora rivers divide the country from yasin, kohistan and dir; it is bordered on the north by the hindu kush; while to the south the watershed of the arnawai stream forms the boundary between chitral and the districts of dir and asmar. it is an especially mountainous country, “composed partly of gigantic snowy peaks, mostly of barren rocky mountains, and, in a very small degree, of cultivated land. the valleys are narrow and confined, the main ones in their inhabited portions running from 5000 to 8000 feet above sea-level. it is only in them that any cultivation at all is found, and even then it is not carried on 184very extensively.... but the whole food production is small, and barely suffices for the people of the country, leaving little to spare for outsiders. the climate varies according to the height of the valley. in the lower parts, at about 5000 feet above sea-level, it ranges from 12° or 15° in winter to 100° in summer, and higher up, at 8000 feet, it would vary from 5° or so below zero to about 90° in summer.”[78]
sir george robertson, in his chitral, says that “food is so scarce that a fat man has never yet been seen in the country; even the upper classes look underfed, and the most effective of bribes is a full meal. the hill tracks, which form the main lines of communication, are seldom easy; they are often difficult, sometimes dangerous.”
the country is watered by the river which goes in its northern course indifferently by the names of the yarkhun, the mastuj or the chitral river, and which, flowing from a glacier of the hindu kush, runs south-westerly to asmar, where it becomes known as the kunar river, and falls into the kabul river near jalalabad. during its course it receives the drainage of numerous valleys on either side, and is spanned by many rope bridges, by several untrustworthy native-built bridges, usually constructed on a rough cantilever principle, and by good suspension bridges at important crossings, such as chitral, mastuj, drosh and other places. “even when the rivers are moderately placid and shallow, the fords,” 185sir george robertson tells us, “are always bad, because of the boulders and stones in their beds; they are frequently devious also; and, consequently, always require a guide. it is dangerous to miss the proper line, for then one is liable to be carried into deep, heavy water, or to find oneself in a quicksand.”[79]
the roads to chitral
there are two main routes from chitral to india: that which has been followed in the preceding chapter, from chitral over the lowari pass, through dir and swat, and across the malakand to railhead at dargai; and another from chitral across the shandur pass to the gilgit road, and thence through kashmir and the jhelum valley to the rail at rawal pindi. those passes leading to the north or to the west are for the most part very difficult; some are impracticable for pack animals, some are only passable at all during certain brief seasons of the year; others again could only be crossed by a lightly equipped force of selected troops under unusually favourable circumstances. the baroghil pass (12,460 feet), which leads out of the yarkhun valley into wakhan, is practicable for laden animals during eight months of the year, and climbs over what holdich calls “the comparatively easy slopes of the flat-backed hindu kush.” many passes, but all more or less difficult, lead from chitral into kafiristan, while that leading from chitral to upper badakshan—the dorah pass (14,800 feet)—is much trodden, and is used by laden animals as a commercial link between the kunar valley and badakshan. it is 186open from july to september, and has been crossed as late as early in november.
chitral is an important state by reason of its situation at the extremity of the country over which the government of india exerts its influence. sir francis younghusband has described this state as “one of the chinks in the wall of defence. not a very large one, but certainly capable of being made into a considerable one if we do not look after it, and in time; for not only is there a chink just here, but the wall is thinner too. practicable roads across the mountains, especially those by the baroghil and dorah passes, lead into chitral; while the width of the mountains from the plains on the south to the plains on the north, as the crow flies, is 400 miles by the pamirs and gilgit, but through chitral only 200. so chitral is a place to be looked after and efficiently guarded.”
importance of chitral
gilgit and chitral seemed to the government of india to afford good watch-towers whence the country south of the hindu kush might be guarded and controlled, since the northern passes provide a difficult but by no means impracticable route for the incursion of a hostile force large enough to cause trouble, or at least excitement, upon this portion of the border. but our occupation of chitral is not universally approved. sir thomas holdich[80] has said that “the retention of chitral may well be regarded as a doubtful advantage.... as an outpost to keep watch and ward for an advance from the north, chitral is useless, 187for no serious menace is possible from the north. as a safeguard otherwise, it is hard to say from what it will protect us. it is in short the outcome of political, not of military, strategy. as a political centre it must be remembered that it possesses an outlook westwards over the hills and valleys through which the amir’s great commercial roads have been projected, as well as northwards to the hindu kush passes. but it is at best an expensive and burdensome outpost, and is, on the whole, the least satisfactory of all the forward positions that we have recently occupied.”
elsewhere,[81] however, sir thomas holdich seems in some degree to qualify these opinions. writing of these northern mountain approaches to india, he says, “we cannot altogether leave them alone. they have to be watched by the official guardians of our frontier, and all the gathered threads of them converging on leh or gilgit must be held by hands that are alert and strong. it is just as dangerous an error to regard such approaches to india as negligible quantities in the military and political field of indian defence, as to take a serious view of their practicability for purposes of invasion.... the dorah pass ... is the one gateway which is normally open from year to year, and its existence renders necessary an advanced watchtower at chitral.”
the country is divided into the nine districts of laspur, mastuj, torikho, mulrikho, kosht, owir, khuzara, chitral and drosh. the population totals something over seventy thousand, and the fighting 188strength is estimated at six thousand men, armed for the most part with matchlocks of local manufacture or imported from badakshan. there are also in the country under a thousand sniders and muzzle-loading enfield rifles, presented at different times to the mehtar or ruler by the indian government.
the chitralis are the only non-pathan tribe described in this book and are a mixed race of aryan type, of whose origin little is known: the language of the country is chitrali, and persian is also spoken by some of the upper classes. the people are all muhammadans, mostly sunnis, but by no means of a particularly strict or fanatical type; and while the priests have a certain amount of influence, they are unable to work their flocks up into any high degree of religious frenzy as is possible with certain pathans. the people of chitral are splendid mountaineers with great powers of endurance, and have fought well on occasion. sir george robertson has thus described their characteristics:[82] “there are few more treacherous people than the chitralis, and they have a wonderful capacity for cold-blooded cruelty; yet none are kinder to little children, or have stronger affection for blood or foster-relations when cupidity or jealousy do not intervene. all have pleasant manners and engaging light-heartedness, free from all trace of boisterous behaviour, a great fondness for music, dancing and singing, a passion for simple-minded ostentation, and an instinctive yearning for softness and luxury, which is the mainspring of their intense cupidity and avarice. 189no race is more untruthful, or has greater power of keeping a collective secret. their vanity is easily injured, they are revengeful and venal, but they are charmingly picturesque and admirable companions. perhaps the most convenient trait they possess, as far as we are concerned, is a complete absence of religious fanaticism.... sensuality of the grossest kind, murder, abominable cruelty, treachery or violent death, are never long absent from the thoughts of a people than whom none in the world are of simpler, gentler appearance.”
early history
the early history of chitral is a record of intrigue, civil war and assassination—“a monotonous tale of murder and perfidy—the slaying of brother by brother, of son by father,” and each successive mehtar appears to have waded to the throne through seas of blood. the founder of the chitral royal family was shah katur, whose descendants, dividing into two branches, parcelled the mountainous country from kafiristan to gilgit between them—the khushwakt branch ruling the eastern portion, while the katur branch governed in the west, or lower chitral. at the time of the british occupation of the punjab, one gauhar aman reigned in the khushwakt district, while shah afzul ii. ruled in lower chitral. about 1854 the kashmir state, having long suffered from the encroachments of the ruler of upper chitral, appealed to shah afzul for assistance, and he, induced thereto far more by hatred of his kinsman than by any wish to oblige the kashmir authorities, seized, in 1855, mastuj, then the headquarters of the khushwaktia chief. possession was, however, regained 190in the year following, but the place was again captured by the chitralis in 1857.
in this year shah afzul ii. died quietly in his bed—the demise of a ruler from natural causes was almost unprecedented in this country—and was succeeded by his second son, aman-ul-mulk, known as “the great mehtar.” in 1860 the eastern chief also died, being succeeded in the mehtarship of khushwaktia by mir wali, who was deposed and slain by his own brother; while in 1880 aman-ul-mulk invaded and possessed himself of the eastern portion of chitral, uniting the whole country under his sovereignty. not long after this, during the viceroyalty of lord lytton, it was decided that the policy of the government of india should be so extended as to control the external affairs of chitral in a direction friendly to our interests; so as to secure an effective guardianship over the northern passes, and to keep watch over what goes on beyond them. to initiate and carry out this policy, major biddulph was sent to gilgit in 1877 and spent some years there, succeeding in entering into relations with aman-ul-mulk, then mehtar of chitral. no very definite arrangement was come to at this time, the position was considered rather too isolated, and major biddulph was withdrawn. then in 1885 lord dufferin despatched the late general sir william lockhart at the head of an important mission, to enter into more definite and closer relations with the mehtar of chitral, and to report upon the defences of the country. colonel lockhart, as he then was, spent 191more than a year in chitral; he wintered at gilgit, traversed the state of hunza, crossed the hindu kush, passed through wakhan down the southernmost branch of the oxus, and travelled over chitral territory from one end of the country to the other. similar visits were paid to chitral by colonel durand in 1888 and 1889, and in this latter year the agency at gilgit, withdrawn in 1881, was re-established, and certain allowances, doubled in 1891, were granted to the mehtar, aman-ul-mulk.
beginning of trouble
in the following year the thirty-two years’ reign of “the great mehtar” came to an end, he dying suddenly of heart failure while in durbar. his eldest son, nizam-ul-mulk, was away in yasin at the time, and the second brother, afzul-ul-mulk, seized the fort at chitral with its arsenal and treasure, and sent off urgent demands to the agent at gilgit that he might at once be recognized as mehtar. nothing was to be feared from nizam, who was no fighter and fled to gilgit, leaving afzul to return triumphant to chitral. afzul had, however, apparently overlooked or disregarded the fact that there was another candidate for the mehtarship in one sher afzul, fourth son of shah afzul ii., and consequently a younger brother of aman-ul-mulk and uncle to afzul-ul-mulk. sher afzul seems to have left kabul, where he had been living, directly he heard of his brother’s death, crossed the dorah pass from badakshan at the head of a handful of followers, and, marching rapidly, surprised the fort at chitral, afzul-ul-mulk being shot down in the ensuing mêlée.
192sher afzul, who seemed to have many adherents in the country, was now proclaimed mehtar, but his reign was a very short one. nizam-ul-mulk, plucking up courage, determined to proceed to chitral and turn out the new pretender. he was joined by a hunza chief of considerable military capacity and force of character, while his advance appears to have been preceded by extravagant rumours that his candidature was supported by the british authorities; and sher afzul then, losing heart, fled back to kabul by way of the kunar valley.
nizam-ul-mulk was now formally recognised as mehtar by the british government, and two of the political officers of the gilgit agency visited the new ruler in chitral and promised him that, under certain conditions, the same allowances and support would be given to him as had been afforded to his father, aman-ul-mulk. so far as could be seen, it appeared that the new ruler was in the way to be fairly well established on the throne.
it is now necessary to revert to umra khan of jandol, of whom some mention has already been made in the last chapter, and whose actions and aggressions were largely responsible for the troubles which now arose upon this part of the frontier.
at the end of 1894 the situation here was as follows: umra khan had at last made friends with his old enemy, the khan of nawagai; he had established his authority over a considerable portion of swat, the greater part of bajaur, and the whole of dir; while he had possessed himself of the strip 193of country known as narsat, hitherto claimed alike by chitral, dir and asmar. he had attacked some villages in the bashgul valley, claimed by chitral; had commenced to build forts at arnawai and birkot, in the kunar valley; and had encroached upon chitral territory, and demanded the payment of tribute from chitral villages. the ex-khan of dir was at this time a refugee in upper swat. nizam-ul-mulk was proving himself a fairly efficient and popular, though not a strong, ruler; sher afzul was believed to be safely interned at kabul; and nizam’s younger brother, amir-ul-mulk, who had at first fled from chitral, had now returned there and been well received by the new mehtar.
murder of nizam
on the 1st january, 1895, nizam-ul-mulk was shot dead while out hawking by one of the servants, and at the instigation, of amir-ul-mulk, who at once caused himself to be proclaimed mehtar, but his recognition was delayed for reference to simla. there can be little doubt that this fresh murder was the outcome of a conspiracy between amir-ul-mulk, sher afzul and umra khan, and that the object was to remove nizam and cause him to be temporarily succeeded by amir, who was then to resign in favour of sher afzul. umra khan was to be called in merely to help the furtherance of the schemes of the other two: but umra khan had his own personal interests to consult, and on hearing news of the murder he at once crossed the lowari pass with between 3000 and 4000 men, and occupied the southern chitral valley. he sent on letters stating that he had come to wage 194a holy war against the kafirs of the bashgul valley, that he had no hostile designs against chitral, and that if amir-ul-mulk did not join and help him he must take the consequences. umra khan now advanced on kila drosh, twenty-five miles below chitral fort.
at this date there were rather over 3000 troops garrisoning posts in the upper indus, gilgit and chitral valleys, and of these roughly one-third were regular troops of the indian army, the remainder belonging to regiments of the kashmir durbar. when the murder of nizam took place, lieutenant gurdon was in political charge at chitral, accompanied by no more than eight men of the 14th sikhs, drawn from a detachment of 103 posted at mastuj under lieutenant harley. there were no other troops of any kind in chitral, and the nearest garrison was at gupis, far on the eastern side of the shandur pass. the nearest regular troops were ninety-nine men of the 14th sikhs at gilgit, while the 32nd pioneers, rather over 800 strong, were employed on the bunji-chilas road. gurdon at once drew upon mastuj for fifty sikhs of its garrison, and these reached him unhindered and unmolested on the 7th january. in anticipation of possible trouble, the following moves then took place: mastuj was reinforced by 100 men of the 4th kashmir rifles from gupis, 200 men of the same regiment moved up to ghizr, while gupis was strengthened by 150 men of the 6th kashmir light infantry from gilgit.
shortly before this surgeon-major robertson—now 195sir george robertson—had relieved colonel bruce in charge of the gilgit agency, and he now at once left for chitral, taking with him some of the 4th kashmir rifles under captain townsend, central india horse, and the remainder of the 14th sikhs from mastuj—100 in all. before he reached there, however, the chitralis, who had at first evinced some intention of opposing umra khan, had been driven from a position they had taken up in front of kila drosh; while a fortnight later—on the 9th february—the fort of drosh was surrendered, without any pretence of resistance, to umra khan, with all its rifles and stores. about the 18th the situation, already sufficiently complicated, was rendered even more so by the news that sher afzul, probably the most generally popular of all the claimants to the throne, had arrived at drosh. he was at once joined by some of the lower class chitralis, and by the end of february nearly all the adamzadas (members of clans descended from the founder of the ruling family) had also gone over to him. on the 1st march the british agent withdrew his escort—now numbering 100 of the 14th sikhs and 320 of the 4th kashmir rifles—into the fort at chitral; and on the following day in durbar, it being patent that amir-ul-mulk, listening to the promptings of ill-advisers, had been intriguing with umra khan, amir was placed under surveillance, and his young brother, shuja-ul-mulk, was formally recognised as mehtar, subject to the approval of the government of india.
the new mehtar
the number of followers with which umra khan 196had entered chitral territory had been gradually increasing, as his star appeared to be in the ascendant, and his total strength was now estimated at between 5000 and 8000 men. on the afternoon of the 3rd march sher afzul reached the neighbourhood of chitral at the head of an armed force, and took up a position in some villages about two miles to the south-west of the fort. at 4.15 two hundred men of the kashmir rifles were sent out, under captains campbell, townsend and baird, to check the enemy’s advance.
captain campbell proposed to attack the position in front, while fifty men under captain baird made a flank attack along some high ground to the west. the enemy were found to be well armed and strongly posted; the kashmir troops were met with a very heavy fire, and the attempts to carry the position by assault failed. it was rapidly getting dark, and captain campbell commenced to retire, being followed up closely by the enemy. the main body sustained heavy losses, but gained the fort under cover of the fire of a party of the 14th sikhs; captain baird’s detachment became, however, isolated, baird himself was mortally wounded, being carried back by surgeon captain whitchurch, and this party only made its way back to the fort after desperate fighting, in which several were killed and many wounded. on this day, out of 150 men actually engaged, twenty-five were killed and thirty wounded. captain campbell was severely wounded, and the command of the troops in chitral fort now devolved upon captain townsend. 197on this day the siege of chitral fort may be said to have commenced, and for many weeks no news of the garrison reached the outer world.
the chitral-gilgit line
events on the chitral-gilgit line.—we may now conveniently describe the events which took place on the line of communications between chitral and mastuj, and all that befell the small bodies of reinforcing troops and the convoys, which were struggling westward through a very difficult and actively hostile country.
on the 26th february the following instructions had issued from the british agent: “lieutenant edwardes, commanding at ghizr, to hand over that garrison to lieutenant gough, and to come on to chitral, there to take command of the puniali levies which had been ordered up from gilgit; lieutenant moberley, commanding at mastuj, was directed to order lieutenant fowler, r.e. (expected shortly to reach mastuj with a party of bengal sappers and miners), to continue his march to chitral; and to send on a supply of snider ammunition to chitral by a suitable escort making ordinary marches.” these two last-mentioned orders were received at mastuj on the 28th february, and on the following day the ammunition was sent off to chitral under escort of forty of the kashmir rifles. on the 2nd march, however, disquieting news reaching mastuj as to the state of affairs on the road, lieutenant moberley was in doubt as to whether he should not recall the ammunition escort, but it was ultimately permitted to proceed. on this date captain ross was expected 198at laspur with 100 of the 14th sikhs, and lieutenant moberley wrote asking him to come straight through to mastuj in a single stage; this captain ross did, reaching mastuj on the 3rd.
he marched on again the following day to support the ammunition escort, which had been obliged to halt at buni owing to the onward road having been broken down; and on the 5th the force at buni was further strengthened by the arrival there of twenty men of the bengal sappers and miners, accompanied by lieutenants fowler and edwardes.
the possibility of the road being designedly broken had been foreseen by the british agent, who had caused certain orders to be issued to meet such an eventuality; but as these never reached lieutenant moberley, to whom they had been addressed at mastuj, it seems unnecessary here to recapitulate them.
the fighting at reshun
on the 5th march captain ross returned with his sikhs to mastuj, while on the next day the combined detachment—two british officers, twenty bengal sappers and forty of the 4th kashmir rifles—marched on to reshun, a large, straggling village situated on a sloping plain on the left bank of the chitral river. here news came in of fighting at chitral, but the night passed quietly, and at noon on the 7th the two officers, with the twenty sappers, ten rifles and a number of coolies, moved off to repair a break reported about three miles distant. reaching a narrow defile near parpish, sangars were noticed on the high cliffs; these were at once occupied by the tribesmen, firing became general, four of the little 199party were hit, one being killed, and a retirement on reshun was now ordered.
eight more men were hit during this retirement. on arrival at an entrenchment which had been thrown up by the rest of the party near the village, the position was found too exposed, and a cluster of houses—affording better cover—was seized, and the work of improving the defences was at once proceeded with.
a fierce but unsuccessful attack was made just before dawn, and firing was kept up during the 8th from a large number of martini and snider rifles; at the end of the day the total losses of the defence—including the casualties near parpish—amounted to seven killed or died of wounds and sixteen wounded. for the next five days the little garrison defended its post with conspicuous gallantry against heavy odds and repeated attacks from the enemy, who had succeeded in establishing themselves under cover close up to the walls. lieutenant fowler specially distinguished himself in making several successful sorties to obtain water. on the 13th the enemy opened negotiations, stating that all fighting at chitral had ceased, and that sher afzul was engaged in friendly correspondence with the british government. by the 15th, it seeming that matters were in course of arrangement, the two officers were persuaded to leave their defences, and were then treacherously seized, while the chitralis succeeded in rushing the defences. lieutenants edwardes and fowler were now taken in charge by some of umra khan’s men, 200and proceeding by chitral and drosh to jandol, were eventually released and sent in to sir robert low’s camp at sado in april.
when, on the 6th march, lieutenant edwardes heard of the gathering below reshun, he had at once sent back news to mastuj, where it arrived the same evening, and captain ross thereupon started next morning with his party—two british officers, one native officer and ninety-three of other ranks—to bring lieutenant edwardes’ detachment back to buni. reaching buni late on the night of the 7th, he there left his native officer with thirty-three rank and file, and pushed on next morning for reshun with the remainder of his party. at 1 p.m. the koragh defile was reached; as described by robertson, “the defile is the result of the river cutting its winding course through terrible cliffs. a goat, scuttling along the high ridges, might start a thunderous avalanche of boulders down the unstable slopes. at the lower end of this frightful gorge the pathway begins to ascend from the river above some caves, and then zigzags upwards. there the ‘point’ of the advance guard was fired upon, and hundreds of men disclosed themselves and set the very hillsides rolling down.” the small party were in a trap. several men were at once hit, and captain ross then decided to occupy some caves in the river bank. he made several attempts to scale the cliffs and to force his way back to buni, but was everywhere met by a heavy fire from both banks of the river, and by a deadly hail of rocks from the cliffs above. captain 201ross was killed, and eventually his subaltern, lieutenant jones, with only fourteen men, ten of the party being wounded, reached buni on the evening of the 10th. here he occupied a house and held it until the 17th, when lieutenant moberley marched out from mastuj with 150 men of the kashmir troops, and relieved and brought in the remnants of captain ross’ party.
from the 22nd march until the 9th april mastuj was invested by the enemy, but on this latter date they began to retire owing to the advance of the gilgit column under lieutenant-colonel kelly. the mastuj garrison had only one man wounded.
the gilgit column
advance of the gilgit column.—during the first week in march reports of the serious state of affairs in the chitral valley began to reach gilgit, whence a few days later the assistant british agent sent down a request to lieutenant-colonel kelly to bring to gilgit a wing of the 32nd pioneers, then engaged in road-making between bunji and chilas. in peace time this officer commanded no more than his own regiment, but on hostilities occurring he automatically became the military head of the whole district, and all military responsibility rested on him alone. the message reached colonel kelly on the 14th, and by the 22nd the wing (strength 403) had arrived at gilgit; on the same day colonel kelly was informed by telegraph from the adjutant general that he was in military command in the gilgit agency, and was also chief political officer so long as communications with chitral were 202interrupted; in regard to operations he was to use his own judgment but was to run no unnecessary risks. he was also informed of the advance of a relief force via swat about the 1st april. lieutenant-colonel kelly now issued the following orders: 200 men to start early on the 23rd for chitral, followed on the next day by the remainder of the wing, accompanied by two guns of no. 1 kashmir mountain battery. of the other half battalion 200 were called up to gilgit from the indus valley, while the remainder of the regiment (242) was to proceed to chilas.
at this time the various happenings on the gilgit-chitral road were known, except that no tidings had come in of the disaster to the party under lieutenant edwardes. colonel kelly’s command now extended from astor to chitral, and contained, exclusive of the troops in the mastuj and chitral districts, four mountain guns, 845 of the 32nd pioneers, about 1250 rifles of the kashmir infantry, and 160 kashmir sappers. but in deciding upon the numbers of which the relief column was to be composed, with which he intended to force his way to chitral, it was necessary also to provide for the safety of gilgit and for keeping open the line of communications. there was nothing to be feared from the people of hunza and nagar, whose chiefs at once furnished 1000 men for employment as levies; but the people of chilas required watching, though apparently submissive, while those of yasin were sure to be in sympathy with their near neighbours of chitral. from gilgit to chitral was 220 miles, and between the two posts 203was the shandur pass (12,250 feet), at this season deep in snow. as far as gupis there was a made mule road, but thence forward the road was a mere track; while throughout its length there were many places where it might be easily blocked, and where an enemy might take up an almost impregnable position. the supply question was further one of great anxiety, especially should the country prove hostile, but it was known that reserve supplies were stored at gupis, ghizr and mastuj. bearing all these points in mind, lieutenant-colonel kelly decided to limit the strength of the relief column to 400 men of the 32nd pioneers, two guns of the kashmir mountain battery, 40 kashmir sappers and 100 of the hunza and nagar levies. the column started in two parties. as far as gupis, which was reached on the 26th and 27th, mule transport was used, but this was here exchanged for coolies and ponies; owing, however, to desertions among the coolies the loads had to be reduced—there were no tents and each man had an allowance of 15 lbs. of baggage—while only six days’ supplies could be taken with the column.
crossing the shandur
ghizr was reached on the 30th and 31st march, and the march to the shandur pass was commenced. the snow was now so deep that the battery mules and the ponies could not proceed; colonel kelly therefore withdrew 200 of his men under captain borradaile to teru and returned himself with the rest of the column to ghizr where the supply question did not present such difficulties. borradaile was next day to attempt to cross the shandur pass, 204reach and entrench himself at laspur, return the transport, and try and open communications with mastuj.
snow fell heavily during the next twenty-four hours and no start could be made until 11 a.m. on the 3rd, by which time the guns and a detachment of the kashmir rifles had joined borradaile. the pass was crossed under extraordinary difficulties, the infantry reaching laspur on the night of the 4th, and the guns and kashmir infantry the following afternoon. a reconnaissance on the 6th revealed the presence in the neighbourhood of the enemy, who were reported also to be entrenched near the chakalwat defile some thirteen miles further on. on this day colonel kelly arrived with fifty nagar levies, and next day fifty puniali levies also came in. some idea of the severity of the climate may be gathered from the fact that among the troops there were sixty-three cases of snow blindness and forty-three of frost-bite.
the second part of the column, delayed at ghizr, was unable to reach laspur until the 9th, but colonel kelly, considering it inadvisable to wait, pushed on to gasht with the remainder of his party, and after reconnoitring the enemy’s position, determined to attack. the enemy’s position was naturally very strong and the sangars well placed; these blocked the valley on either side of the river and were continued up to the snow line, while the right of the position was further protected by a mass of fallen snow descending into the water. on the 9th colonel 205kelly advanced towards the enemy’s position at chakalwat; the hunza levies were sent up the heights on one side to get above and fire into the sangars; while the puniali men ascended on the other flank to drive the enemy from their stone shoots on the slopes above the river.
the force deployed on a gentle slope facing the right-hand sangars, and the two guns opened fire at 800 yards range. this shell-fire and the volleys of the infantry cleared the enemy out of the right sangar, while the hunza levies had already driven them from those higher up. the next line of sangars was attacked in the same manner, and the enemy now began to give way and were soon in full flight, having lost between fifty and sixty killed. our casualties were only four men wounded.
forcing the nisa gol
colonel kelly now moved on to mastuj, where the rest of his column closed up on the 11th, and the three days spent here were occupied in the collection of transport and supplies and in pushing out reconnaissances. these disclosed the presence of the enemy in a strong and well-fortified position, where the chitral river valley is cleft by a deep ravine known as the nisa gol, 200 or 300 feet deep, with precipitous sides. the defence was prepared on much the same lines as at chakalwat, but the sangars were of better construction, being provided with head cover, while their front was covered by the precipices of the nisa gol.
it was decided to attack on the 13th and to try and turn the enemy’s left. colonel kelly pursued 206the same tactics as in the earlier action, bringing his artillery fire to bear on the sangars while keeping up a heavy rifle fire, his levies climbing the precipitous hillsides and turning the flank. the guns silenced sangar after sangar, gradually moving in closer; a place was discovered where the ravine could be crossed, and a party reached the opposite side just as the levies had turned the position. the enemy now evacuated their defences and fled, fired on by the guns and the infantry. our loss was seven killed and thirteen wounded.
there was no further opposition to the advance of the gilgit column, beyond such as was experienced from broken bridges and roads, and on the 20th april colonel kelly’s force marched into chitral and joined the garrison.
siege of chitral fort
the siege of chitral fort.—this commenced, as has been said, on the 3rd march, after the action of that date wherein the british troops had suffered many casualties; and when, in consequence of captain campbell having been severely wounded, the command of the troops devolved upon captain townsend. the garrison of the fort consisted of six british officers, of whom five only were fit for duty, ninety-nine men of the 14th sikhs, and 301 of all ranks of the 4th kashmir rifles. there were in addition fifty-two chitralis—men whose loyalty was at best dubious—and eighty-five followers. the supplies, on half-rations, could be made to last two and a half months, while of ammunition there were 300 rounds per martini-henri rifle of the sikhs and 280 rounds per 207snider of the kashmir troops. the fort was about seventy yards square with a tower at each corner, and a fifth guarded the path to the river; the walls of the fort were some twenty-five feet in height and from eight to ten feet thick; it was practically commanded on all sides, and surrounded on three by houses, walls, and all kinds of cover. the number of british officers was so small and the kashmir troops, who composed three-fourths of the fort-garrison, were so shaken by their losses on the 3rd, that captain townsend resolved to remain as far as possible on the defensive. he confined his energies, therefore, to devising measures of defence, to the provision of cover within and the demolition of cover without the walls, to arranging a system for quickly extinguishing fires, and to providing as far as possible for proper sanitation.
the garrison was therefore engaged in real fighting on two occasions only during the forty-eight days that the siege lasted, and the losses incurred in the passive defence of the fort were not heavy; there was, however, much sickness, and at the end of the first week only eighty sikhs and 240 of the kashmir rifles remained fit for duty. from the 16th to the 23rd there was a truce, during which sher afzul did his best to persuade the british agent to agree to withdraw the garrison to mastuj, or to india by way of jandol. during the suspension of hostilities captain townsend effected many improvements in the defences. the guard duties were very heavy, half the effectives being on duty at a time, and the 208defenders were harassed day and night by a desultory rifle fire.
on the 7th, under cover of a heavy rifle fire, a party of the enemy crept up to the tower at the south-eastern corner and managed to set it on fire. a strong wind was blowing, and for some time matters looked very serious, as the tower, being largely composed of wood, burned fiercely. no sooner did the fire seem to be mastered than it blazed up again; the enemy, occupying the high ground, were able to fire upon men going in and out of the tower with water and earth; the british agent and a sikh soldier were here wounded, while a sentry of the kashmir rifles was killed. on the 10th an attack was made on the waterway, and on the morning of the 17th the enemy could distinctly be heard at work upon a mine, leading to the same tower as that attacked on the 7th. it was clear that the entrance of the mine was in a summer-house about a hundred and fifty feet from the tower, and which there had been no time to demolish; while from the distinctness with which the sound of digging could be heard, the mine had evidently reached within a few feet of the base of the tower. it was decided to make a sortie, carry the summer-house where it was thought the mine shaft would be found, and destroy the mine, since matters had gone too far to counter-mine.
harley’s sortie
for this duty forty men of the 14th sikhs, with their jemadar, and sixty of the kashmir rifles, with a native officer, were placed under command of lieutenant 209h. k. harley, 14th sikhs, with orders to leave the fort at 4 p.m. by the east gate, rush the summer-house, and hold it on the enemy’s side, while the rest of the party destroyed or blew in the mine gallery. the summer-house was taken with a loss of two men killed, the defenders—some thirty pathans—bolting to the cover of a wall and opening fire from thence upon harley’s party. leaving some men to keep these in check, harley led the remainder to the mine shaft, just outside the summer-house. thirty-five chitralis, armed with swords, came out and were at once bayoneted. harley now cleared the mine, arranged powder and fuse, but it was untamped and the charge exploded prematurely; none the less the effect was excellent, the mine being burst open right up to the foot of the tower, and lying exposed like a trench. two prisoners were brought in, two of the enemy were killed in the mine by the explosion, two pathans were shot in the summer-house, and many of the enemy were shot down by the covering fire from the walls of the fort. harley’s party had eight men killed and thirteen wounded.
the enemy now seemed to have made their last effort; they had learnt that the defenders were still able to assume a vigorous offensive, and they knew that help was drawing nearer from the direction of gilgit. on the night of the 18th–19th the investing force quietly withdrew and abandoned the siege; sher afzul and the jandol chiefs fled that night to bashkar and asmar, and on the afternoon of the 20th the gilgit force marched in.
210during the siege the loss of the garrison of chitral fort amounted, exclusive of the casualties on the 3rd march, to seventeen killed and thirty-two wounded.
