the british government first came into contact with the mohmands during the afghan war of 1838–42, at which time one saadat khan was chief of lalpura. on the news of the approach of the british army, turabaz khan, his cousin and enemy, immediately started off to meet the army of the indus at jhelum. saadat khan thereupon espoused the cause of the barakzais, and turabaz khan was installed as khan of lalpura by colonel wade, and seems to have done loyal service for mackeson while we held afghanistan. after the disasters at kabul the whole country rose, and turabaz khan, at risk to himself, saved an english lady and her child from the pesh-bolak garrison, and took them down the river on a raft to peshawar. the officers of the jazailchis stationed at pesh-bolak escaped over the tartara hills, and turabaz khan himself took refuge in british territory. he returned with general pollock’s force, but was ousted by saadat khan on the withdrawal of our troops. he subsequently made his peace with the amir and received a jaghir, or grant of land, in kama.
228during the early years of british rule in the peshawar valley, the mohmands gave more trouble than almost any other tribe.
the michni mohmands, after annexation, were allowed to hold a fief from the british government in the doaba, of which they collected the revenue. a portion of the lands they cultivated themselves, farming out the remainder to other tribes of the plains as tenants. many of their clansmen dwelt in the plains of michni, and some in the neighbouring hills, and they traded largely in the peshawar valley. the halimzai mohmands also held panjpao in british doaba as a fief, chiefly cultivated by tenants. a few of their men lived in the plains, but the majority in the hills, and these also traded in the valley. the pandiali mohmands at a former period had held a similar jaghir in the doaba, but not since british rule. they had few relations either with the government or the people of the peshawar valley, and inhabited a very strong locality in the hills. these fiefs had originally been granted to the mohmands by former governments, as blackmail to buy off depredations.
the first inroad of the mohmands occurred in december, 1850, in an unprovoked attack on the village of shabkadar, organised by fateh khan, a son of saadat khan, who at that time was still the chief of lalpura, and who was naturally not well disposed towards us, and was doing his best to incite the tribe to hostilities. in the following year a number of outrages were committed: two attacks 229were made upon matta in march and april by the chief of pandiali; other minor depredations succeeded in july, headed by a leading man from panjpao; and in october the michni mohmands made so serious an attack upon british villages, that later in the month the supreme government directed that the mohmand fiefs in the doaba should be confiscated, our border posts strengthened, and that punitive operations should be undertaken against the offenders.
operations in 1851–52
operations against the mohmands in 1851–52.—accordingly on the 25th october of this year, a force numbering 1593 of all ranks marched out from peshawar towards the mohmand frontier. it was under the command of brigadier sir colin campbell, k.c.b., and was composed as under:
det. 3rd company 1st battalion artillery.[87]
no. 17 light field battery.[87]
two companies 61st foot.
two companies 98th foot.
2nd irregular cavalry.
2nd company sappers and miners.
66th gurkha regiment.
wing 71st native infantry.[88]
the force moved, unopposed, to the village of dab, via mian khel, and here the hamlets were destroyed, shabkadar and matta were reinforced, and a position was taken up to cover the erection of a fort at michni. in the meantime several outrages had been committed in peshawar, instigated by saadat khan, then at the 230head of a small armed force in the tartara hills; and it seeming likely that he meditated an attack upon some of our frontier villages, measures were taken by sir colin for their protection, and for that of the bridge of boats over the kabul river forming his communications with peshawar.
saadat khan continued very active; he busied himself in endeavouring to unite the mohmands; on the 26th he had moved to gandab, twenty miles north-west of shabkadar, and here on the 30th he was joined by the chief of bajaur with a large following. on the 28th and 29th the mohmands attacked two of our villages, burnt another, and finally, on the 7th december, saadat khan suddenly moved out of a gorge in the hills to the right front of camp, and took up a position with 4000 footmen and a small body of horse. at the same time the hills to the westward, near dab, had been strongly occupied by the enemy, while a party of 200 came down to the left bank of the kabul river immediately in rear of the camp. seeing the force thus displayed, the brigadier directed that a troop of horse artillery and six companies of the 53rd regiment should at once move out from peshawar to the bridge of boats on the kabul river.
on the 8th december the mohmands, to the number of 3000 or 4000, under saadat khan, advanced upon matta, but were driven off, and all this day the tribesmen were reported to be collecting in great strength in pandiali, under the chief of bajaur, and sir colin accordingly sent in to peshawar for reinforcements; 231and their arrival, after a forced march, the 53rd having covered forty-two miles in thirty hours, undoubtedly prevented an attack upon the camp near dab. the british force was now far too strong for the mohmands, whose gathering broke up, saadat khan returning to lalpura. desultory operations continued for some few more weeks, but finally the force was recalled to peshawar on the 14th february.
action near shabkadar
on the 30th march news was received at fort shabkadar that the mohmands were collecting in the high ground in front to the number of between 400 and 500, and troops were moved out from the post, causing the enemy’s retreat to the hills. it was known that saadat khan was making great efforts to unite the various clans in view of again attempting the recovery of the lands we had annexed; and finally, on the 15th april, the mohmands debouched from the hills, in numbers not less than 6000 matchlock men with some eighty horsemen, and moved along the foot of the hills in front of shabkadar, taking the direction of matta. sir colin campbell had himself gone out to shabkadar, where he had gathered some 600 troops, and he speedily issued from the fort with two horse artillery guns and 266 sabres of the 7th light cavalry[89] and 15th irregular cavalry,[89] and dispersed the enemy, causing them considerable loss.
in the month of july following this affair, the michni and panjpao mohmands, exiled from house and lands and cut off from trade, tendered their submission 232and prayed for the restoration of their fiefs, which were handed back on payment of a nominal annual tribute. the panjpao or halimzai mohmands gave no further cause for dissatisfaction, but the men of michni fell into arrears in the payment of their tribute, and their chief, when invited into peshawar to make an explanation, fled instead to the hills. it was therefore necessary to attach the property of the tribesmen to the extent of the amount of tribute and, further, to inflict and recover a fine. to assist the civil authorities in enforcing these measures a small force of all arms proceeded to michni, a company of infantry was sent to mian khel, and patrols so arranged as to seize all cattle moving off to the hills. it was proposed to transfer the michni jaghir to some of our own subjects, but it was obvious that these could not hold the lands and be responsible for the revenue, unless they were secured from all chance of raids from the independent border villages beyond michni. it was therefore resolved to destroy the three villages particularly concerned, and to prevent their being ever reoccupied; for such measures it was necessary to obtain the assistance of a military force strong enough to meet any resistance the mohmands of that part of the border might make.
operations against the michni mohmands in 1854.—for this purpose, while the garrisons of the forts and posts at abazai, shabkadar, mian khel and michni were strengthened, a force as below enumerated was concentrated at michni, under command of colonel cotton, 22nd foot:
233two guns 1st troop 3rd brigade horse artillery.
2nd company 2nd battalion artillery with mountain train battery (4 howitzers and 4 guns).
two companies 22nd foot.
2nd company sappers and miners.
one squadron 10th light cavalry.[90]
one squadron 1st irregular cavalry.[91]
three companies 1st native infantry.[92]
9th native infantry.[93]
1st sikh infantry.
operations in 1854
the advance commenced on the 31st august along the left bank of the kabul river in the direction of shahmansur khel, which was captured after some opposition. while the destruction of the village and the removal of grain stores was in progress, the heights above had to be seized and held, and the troops engaged on this duty were exposed to an unceasing and galling fire, and suffered several casualties, but the subsequent retirement to camp was practically unmolested. on the 2nd september colonel cotton again moved out, and destroyed the villages of dab and sadin, when the troops returned to peshawar, and the well-affected among the michni mohmands paid up their share of the tribute due.
after this the mohmands continued to commit outrages, issuing in large bodies from the hills and harrying the border, and between march, 1855, and july, 1857, no fewer than thirty-six serious raids, 234having plunder and murder for their objects, were committed by the mohmands of pandiali. the commissioner, colonel edwardes, had been supported by the chief commissioner, sir john lawrence, in recommending punitive operations in the pandiali valley, but the government were unwilling to undertake them at the time, and when the mutiny broke out in 1857 our attention was at once more pressingly directed to other quarters.
during this period the mohmands failed, by any concerted action, to avail themselves of an unusually favourable opportunity of increasing their annoyance, but raids and outrages did not cease, while there were no troops available on the frontier to move out against them. from the beginning of september 1857 to march 1860, thirty-nine serious outrages were committed by members of this tribe. within five years eighty-five raids had been conducted by parties of an average strength of seventy-five men, in which fourteen british subjects had been killed, twenty-seven wounded, and fifty-five carried off, while over 1200 head of cattle had been plundered. this was exclusive of forty minor raids in which thirty-five british subjects had been killed or wounded and 267 head of cattle driven away, but though an expedition was urged by the local authorities, the government still refused to sanction one. at last, about the end of march 1860, nauroz khan, an adopted son of saadat khan of lalpura, sent in seeking for peace, and finally it was agreed that bygones should be bygones, that the chief of lalpura should be responsible for the 235future peace of the frontier, that there should be something of a general amnesty, and that the blockade of the country should be raised.
unrest in 1863
soon after this the khans of lalpura and pandiali came into peshawar in person and made their submission to the commissioner. for three years there was peace on the border, the mohmands desisting from troubling until the ambela expedition in 1863, described in chapter iv., when the emissaries of the akhund of swat were sent all over the hills bordering the peshawar valley, but were successful in exciting disturbances among the mohmands only. sultan muhammad khan, another son of saadat khan, chief of lalpura, owned the akhund’s religious supremacy, and was, moreover, ill-disposed towards the british. collecting a body of mohmands, joined by a miscellaneous rabble of safis, bajauris and the like, he came down to our frontier on the 5th december, 1863, at the head of some 500 men. the officer commanding fort shabkadar at once turned out with fifty-five sabres and ninety-six bayonets, and drove the enemy back beyond our frontier, inflicting some loss. the shabkadar garrison was reinforced from peshawar, and the mohmands again advancing on the 7th from the shelter of the hills, were again forced to retire. nauroz khan now, however, joined his brother, and, supported by the priesthood, the two managed, by the beginning of the new year, to collect a miscellaneous assemblage of close upon 6000 armed men—mostly mohmands and mainly represented by men from the halimzai and khwaezai clans—and with 236these it was now proposed to meet the british troops stationed at shabkadar.
this force had recently been very considerably strengthened, and now numbered some 1800 of all ranks, with three horse artillery guns, under colonel macdonnell, c.b.
on the morning of the 2nd january, 1864, the enemy made their appearance, debouching from a gorge north-west of shabkadar, and formed up in something of the appearance of a crescent. the action which resulted was on our side almost entirely confined to the cavalry and guns. the british commander succeeded to some extent in drawing the enemy into the plain, where they were repeatedly charged by the cavalry and finally driven beyond the border, having sustained about eighty casualties.
the effects of this check were felt throughout the mohmand country, at least 1000 men departing next morning to their homes, while in a few days the gathering completely dispersed.
the amir sher ali khan now took the mohmands in hand, ejecting and imprisoning saadat khan and his son, nauroz khan, and replacing the former in the chieftainship by a son of his ancient rival, turabaz khan. eventually, however, nauroz khan came to his own again, returning from afghanistan in 1870 and assuming the khan-ship.
during the years immediately following the operations near shabkadar in 1864, the mohmand border was not disturbed by anything more than isolated outrages—sufficiently serious though these were; and 237it was not until the invasion of afghanistan in 1878 that the independent mohmands began again to be really troublesome. at this time a grandson of saadat khan was chief of lalpura, and he sent a mohmand contingent to co-operate with the amir’s troops at ali musjid. these, however, fled without firing a shot, and the khan then came in and tendered his submission to sir s. browne at dakka. the khan of goshta refused to come in, and it was believed to be at his instigation that a raid was made by hill mohmands on the village of sarai, on the left bank of the kabul river, in the kama district. a small column was sent out from jalalabad, and some of the ringleaders were captured.
on the 6th february a mixed force of 12,000 mohmands and bajauris made an attack upon the village of a friendly chief, one azim khan, who had been placed by us in charge of the two districts of goshta and chardeh. on the next day general macpherson, v.c., c.b., took out a small force of some 900 cavalry and infantry from jalalabad, intending to act in combination with another body moving from basawal by chardeh upon goshta, and which was to intercept the mohmands in their retirement; but the enemy having received notice of the proposed operations, retreated hurriedly to the hills, and the two columns returned to their respective stations.
affair at kam dakka
affair at kam dakka in 1879.—after this some of the tarakzais and halimzais were implicated in an attack upon a surveyor’s party near michni, for which 238the divisions concerned were fined; and then in april of this year there was a more serious gathering of mohmands brought together by a notorious mullah, for the purpose of raiding into british territory or making attacks on our posts in the khyber. on the night of the 20th april between 200 and 300 khwaezai and halimzai mohmands began to cross the kabul river from palosi to shinpokh—from the left to the right bank. the khan of lalpura sent the news in to dakka that a large body of mohmands was within three miles of that place and had already engaged his outposts. he asked for help, as he expected a night attack. arrangements were made for rendering such assistance as could be afforded, but no attack was delivered. the officer commanding at dakka moved out on the 21st with a small mixed force, found the kam dakka pass clear, and also that the village of that name, on the right bank of the kabul river and seven miles east of dakka, was unoccupied by the enemy. it was reported here that the mohmands were in great strength in the vicinity of the north bank, and the villagers appeared alarmed and seemed unwilling that major barnes’ force should be withdrawn. the troops, however, returned the same day, unopposed, to dakka, but on arrival here it was decided to send infantry to kam dakka, and 130 rifles of the mhairwara battalion[94] started thither at 5 p.m., reaching the village at 11.15 p.m. this detachment, commanded by captain o’moore creagh, was to protect kam dakka from an attack from the 239north bank of the river, and was to hold the village for three days.
the villagers, however, appeared unwilling to be compromised by harbouring british troops, said they were quite capable of taking care of themselves, objected to the troops entering their village, and seemed, in fact, anything but friendly.
relief of detachment
early next morning captain o’moore creagh took up a position partially covering the village, and then, finding crowds of mohmands crossing the river and threatening his flank, he withdrew to a better position near a graveyard and on the river bank, where he hastily threw up an entrenchment. he had by this time been reinforced by thirty-six rifles of his regiment from dakka. scarcely had this entrenchment been completed, about 9 a.m., and followers and baggage animals been brought under cover, water stored, etc., when the enemy came down from the hills and completely surrounded the detachment. they persistently attacked from 9 a.m. to 3 p.m., frequently getting to the closest quarters, and having to be repulsed with the bayonet. the ammunition now began to run low, the enemy had closed in all round to within sixty to a hundred yards, and the situation became most critical, when it was relieved by the opportune approach of reinforcements.
these had been sent off from dakka and lundi kotal so soon as the situation at kam dakka had become known at divisional headquarters. under cover of the fire of the reinforcing troops, and some dashing charges by a troop of the 10th bengal 240cavalry, the mhairwara detachment was withdrawn from the entrenchment, and the retirement on dakka was commenced. this was reached about 8.30 p.m., the enemy pressing the rearguard closely, but being unable, owing to the darkness, to cause more than a very few casualties. a strong force of all arms moved out on the next day to kam dakka, but few of the enemy were met with.
in april, 1879, the same month as the kam dakka affair above related, muhammad sadik khan, the eldest son of nauroz khan, who was with the british force at gandamak, fled from the camp and joined the amir yakub khan—whose mother was a sister of nauroz khan—and, as soon as our troops left dakka in june, 1879, he was appointed khan of lalpura in the place of the khan installed in 1875. when the second invasion of afghanistan took place, the khan of lalpura hesitated for some days as to what action he should take, but at length appeared at dakka, and for two months all went well at lalpura and also at goshta.
action on the gara heights, january 1880.—the journey of the amir yakub khan to india gave the first shock to the mohmands, and further agitation was produced by the news of the fighting at kabul. the mullahs began to arouse the fanaticism of the tribesmen, and the khans of lalpura and goshta placed themselves at the head of the movement and collected large numbers of men at palosi and rena. on the 11th january the mohmands began to pass the river, and three days later about 2415400 men under the khan of lalpura had crossed and taken up a strong position on the gara heights, about two miles from fort dakka and between that place and kam dakka. fortunately, this move had been anticipated, and nearly all the officers at fort dakka had made themselves thoroughly familiar with the features of the position. arrangements were now made to attack the enemy on the gara heights in front from dakka, while another column from lundi kotal attacked them in flank and rear, so that, beset on three sides and with the unfordable kabul river on the other, escape would be impossible and destruction almost certain.
the gara heights
on the 15th the dakka column moved out and was drawn up in position facing the gara heights by 11 a.m. it was commanded by colonel boisragon, 30th punjab native infantry, and was composed as under:
four guns i bty. c. bde. royal horse artillery.
94
sabres 6th dragoon guards.
50
sabres 17th bengal cavalry.[95]
110
bayonets 1st battalion 25th foot.
100
bayonets 8th native infantry.[96]
500
bayonets 30th punjab native infantry.
it had been arranged that the force from lundi kotal should start six hours previously, and it was hoped that by this time it was in a position to enable it to cut off the enemy’s retreat. the dakka force advanced to the attack covered by the fire of the four 242guns, and the heights were taken without any very serious opposition, the enemy evacuating one position after another, until, utterly routed, they fled down the reverse slopes towards kam dakka. as soon as the guns of the lundi kotal column were heard, about 5 p.m., colonel boisragon pressed on and joined hands with brigadier-general doran, commanding the troops from lundi kotal, in kam dakka. in the meantime the enemy had made good their escape, either towards rena or across the river.
brigadier-general doran had left lundi kotal at 4.30 a.m. with the undermentioned troops:
two guns 11–9th royal artillery.
20
sabres 17th bengal cavalry.
200
bayonets 5th fusiliers.
200
bayonets 25th foot.
30
bayonets madras sappers and miners.
300
bayonets 1st madras native infantry.[97]
200
bayonets 4th madras native infantry.[98]
300
bayonets 31st punjab native infantry.
progress, via the inzari kandao, was very slow, the troops could move only in single file, the battery mules could hardly be got along, some baggage animals fell over the precipices and were lost, and the rearguard was sixty-seven hours in covering seventeen miles. the gorge of the shilman gakhe was forced after but a feeble resistance, and eventually brigadier-general doran was able to join colonel boisragon as already related; but all the baggage of the lundi kotal column, owing to the extraordinary 243difficulties of the road, did not reach the bivouac until the morning of the 18th. meanwhile, on the 16th january, 500 men had been passed over the river on rafts and destroyed the village of rena, whereafter the columns returned unmolested to dakka and lundi kotal.
the operations, though a failure in regard to combination, had not been without effect; the tribesmen had suffered a severe defeat and had sustained many casualties; and nearly all the clans having been represented in the force opposed to us, the moral effect of the defeat was felt throughout the tribe, and for some months the mohmands remained quiet. the success of ayub khan at kandahar excited a rising which collapsed on the news of his subsequent defeat, and during the next sixteen years or more there was no recrudescence of large-scale trouble among the mohmands on our border.
partition of their country
the difficulty of restraining and punishing the mohmands had for years been intensified by the doubts which existed as to the respective spheres of influence of the british and kabul governments; it had been hoped that the durand agreement of 1893 had helped to smooth these difficulties away; but the agreement, although apparently concurred in by the amir, did not commend itself to his judgment on reconsideration, so far at least as the partition of control over the mohmands was concerned. at last in 1896 the government of india, with a view of terminating a state of indecision which had become intolerable, resolved to make an attempt to bring certain of the 244mohmand clans more immediately under british control. the efforts made in this direction were so far successful that, despite certain hostile influences—religious and political—the halimzais, tarakzais, utmanzais, dawezais, and also the pandiali sections, were held to be henceforth in british territory, and seemed themselves cordially to concur when the new arrangement was announced to them.
when the frontier disturbances commenced in 1897 the above-named clans evinced no disposition to take part, although the hadda mullah, an especially notorious agitator, himself lived in the mohmand country and had acquired a commanding influence over the clans, with some of whom he was said to have helped to defend the malakand in 1895; and when in july the rising occurred among the men of swat, some of the leading mohmands among our new subjects offered their assistance to the representatives of the british government.
eventually the hadda mullah succeeded in stirring up the tribesmen, who, while unwilling to assist their co-religionists in swat, had no objection to raid in the vicinity of their own border; and accordingly by the 7th august information had reached the authorities at peshawar that some 3000 mohmands were marching from gandab to attack shabkadar. the general officer commanding at peshawar proposed reinforcing fort shabkadar with regular troops, but this proposal was negatived by the commissioner, who was in hopes that the halimzais, who had so recently accepted our 245protection, would be able and willing to prevent the advance of the raiders.
it was, however, speedily apparent that measures so heroic were quite beyond the power of the halimzais; they temporised, they gave information of the hostile movement, but they did not oppose the forces of the hadda mullah; and eventually, as was almost to be expected, many of the halimzai fighting men enlisted under his banners.
on the afternoon of the 7th august the attack was delivered, both the fort of shabkadar and the neighbouring village of shankargarh being the objects of the assaults of the tribesmen, who, to the number of nearly 5000, now descended from the hills. the village was burned, but the attack on the fort was easily beaten off, and by next morning many of the enemy had retired whence they came. the news of the projected attack had reached peshawar on the night of the 7th, and about midnight a force as under started for shabkadar under lieutenant-colonel woon, 20th punjab infantry:
four guns 51st field artillery.
two squadrons 13th bengal lancers.
two companies somerset light infantry.
20th punjab infantry.
action at shabkadar
the cavalry went on in advance and reached shabkadar early on the morning of the 8th, but the guns and infantry were much delayed in crossing the kabul river, then in flood, by the ferry at hajizai, and did not reach the scene of action until some hours later. with the troops available, lieutenant-colonel woon 246moved out against the enemy, but finding them in considerable strength and occupying a favourable position, he decided against attacking, and withdrew to the fort. early on the 9th the shabkadar troops again advanced to the attack; the enemy, who had been reinforced during the night, had now taken up a line about two miles in length, occupied by some 6000 men, whose right rested on the higher hills; their centre extended across the low hills; while the left stretched into the cultivated ground in the plain itself. colonel woon began his attack in front with the infantry, intending to turn the enemy’s left with the cavalry and artillery, but he could effect little or no impression on the mohmand position, and the enemy now making a determined attempt to turn our left, colonel woon began to withdraw towards the fort to avoid being completely enveloped.
at this moment brigadier-general elles arrived upon the scene from peshawar, and finding that most of the enemy had hurried down from the high ground and were engaged with our infantry in the open, he directed the two squadrons of the 13th bengal lancers to charge from right to left along the whole line of tribesmen. charging down upon the left rear, the squadrons rode down the whole line, clearing the front; the infantry then again advanced, the mohmands were driven back and pursued to the high ground, and in a short time not a man of them was to be seen.
our loss was nine killed and sixty-five wounded, while among the enemy more than 200 were killed and many wounded.
247the gathering seems to have been representative of almost every tribe living north of the kabul river and between our border and that of afghanistan, from the banks of the swat, panjkora and kunar rivers, with perhaps the single exception of the tarakzais.
a cavalry reconnaissance was made next day, the 10th, some miles up the gandab valley without seeing anything of the enemy; but as the gathering, so far from having dispersed, was reported as intending to return to the attack after replenishment of ammunition and supplies, the troops at shabkadar were made up to 2500 men, a bridge of boats was substituted for the ferry at hajizai, telegraphic communication was established between peshawar and shabkadar, and fresh troops were sent up to fill the gaps in the peshawar garrison.
while the necessity for the early chastisement of the mohmands was recognised by the indian government, it was considered that, in view of the generally disturbed state of the north-west frontier, the moment was not propitious for such action, and consequently it was decided merely to concentrate two strong moveable columns, the one at peshawar and the other at shabkadar, ready for eventualities.
expedition of 1897
expedition against the mohmands, 1897.—signs of restlessness were now being daily reported from the afridi and orakzai country, and finally, on the 23rd and 24th august, the smouldering embers of fanaticism in this direction burst suddenly into flames, and the khyber forts were attacked as described in chapter xiii. the hadda mullah was once again rumoured 248to have taken the field with 4000 baizai mohmands, intending another attack upon shabkadar; his other plan of attacking dir, in retaliation for the friendly attitude towards us of the khan of that country, having come to naught by reason of operations which have been elsewhere described. in consequence of these reports the government now, during the first week in september, sanctioned extensive punitive operations against the various tribes on the peshawar border, and decided that the mohmands should be the first tribe to be taken in hand. everything pointed to the operations being short and decisive, as two powerful bodies were about to move into the mohmand country from opposite directions. sir bindon blood was to act from the north and east, while brigadier-general elles (with the rank of major-general), with two brigades under brigadier-generals westmacott and macgregor, would move from shabkadar.
1st (westmacott’s) brigade.
1st battalion somerset light infantry.
20th punjab infantry.
2nd battalion 1st gurkhas.
2nd (macgregor’s) brigade.
2nd battalion oxfordshire light infantry.
9th gurkhas.
37th dogras.
divisional troops.
13th bengal lancers.
no. 3 mountain battery r.a.
no. 5 mountain battery r.a.
24928th bombay pioneers.[99]
patiala regiment, imperial service troops.
nabha regiment, imperial service troops.
two maxim guns, devonshire regiment.
combined operations
marching out of shabkadar on the 15th september, general elles reached ghalanai next day with the 1st brigade, the 2nd brigade getting no further than dand, as the road, especially over the kharappa pass, required much work on it to make it practicable for baggage animals. on the 17th a small force under general westmacott moved on to katsai, two and a half miles south of the nahaki pass, which was reconnoitred and reported very difficult. on this day communication was established with sir bindon blood, and measures were concerted for the attack on the bedmanai pass which the hadda mullah was said to be holding with a large force; the gandab halimzais came in at nahaki and agreed to comply with our terms. on the 19th westmacott’s brigade was concentrated at nahaki, and that of general macgregor began to close up from dand to ghalanai.
on the 21st september general elles with the 1st brigade arrived at lakarai, where general blood was met; and on the day following general elles moved his force on to khazina, where he was joined by the 3rd brigade of the malakand field force, placed at his disposal by general blood, to enable him to deal with the gathering at the bedmanai pass and to clear the mitai and suran valleys. the nahaki pass, dominating the whole of this part of the mohmand 250country, was now held by troops of macgregor’s brigade.
the bedmanai pass lies some five miles west-south-west of khazina. the track leading thence to the pass runs along the bed of a broad dry nullah, and about a mile and a half further on, a narrow gap, between the gharibai hill and the northern end of a spur jutting out from the yari sar mountain, gives entrance to a broad valley. crossing this, four small villages are passed, and the path winds upwards along the nullah through a narrow gorge, until the summit of the pass, commanded from the highest point of yari sar, is reached.
on the morning of the 23rd the troops moved forward and, after some opposition, carried the bedmanai pass, the capture of which, contrary to expectation, proved tolerably easy of accomplishment, as not more than 700 or 800 mohmands, chiefly baizais, were present. as to the actual assault, the 20th punjab infantry led and were opposed on every ridge, and the men of this regiment particularly distinguished themselves in clearing the heights, well supported by the fire of the guns and maxims. the attached brigade meanwhile moved in support of general westmacott up the centre and guarding the right flank, and was only slightly engaged, our casualties totalling no more than four. this easy victory was attributable to the heavy losses which the men led by the hadda mullah, had already experienced in their attack upon general blood before described. that, their real effort, had failed, and they had very little heart for 251further fighting; also general elles had previously so disposed his cavalry as to prevent any help reaching the defenders of the bedmanai pass from the mitai and suran valleys.
during the two following days these valleys were visited and towers were destroyed. the attached brigade now left to join the tirah expeditionary force, marching via nahaki and gandab to peshawar; and general elles prepared to move on jarobi, where, in the most rugged and inaccessible part of the baizai mohmand country, a glen at the head of the shindarra valley, was the home of the hadda mullah. the road thither was found to be very difficult, but the opposition was not formidable, only some nineteen casualties being experienced.
the clans give in
during the next few days the troops were employed in marching through the bohai dag and adjacent valleys, demolishing the defences of the baizai mohmands and exacting submission. the opposition here was rather more formidable but was easily broken down. the clans now began to give in: the khwaezai, halimzai, utmanzai, dawezai jirgahs arrived asking for terms, the acceptance of which was expedited by the troops continuing to visit the uttermost parts of the country; and by the 3rd october all our claims had been met and the force returned to peshawar, where, on the 7th, it was broken up.
the objects of the expedition had been accomplished. all concerned in the raid on shabkadar had been punished; the hadda mullah had been 252discredited, his dwelling destroyed and he himself driven into afghan territory; and the mohmand country had been traversed from end to end.
that these operations did not, however, immediately initiate a period of absolute quiet on the border, goes without saying. there were outbreaks and raids upon villages close to our frontier and within the territories of tribes which had come under our protection; and it was very apparent that the indian government could exercise but little more than a nominal authority over any of the clans of the mohmand tribe. still, some advance had been made, and when in 1906 an extension of the railway was commenced from peshawar to the afghan frontier through shilman, the mohmands did not offer any really serious opposition to the undertaking.[100]
in march, 1908, three rather serious raids were carried out in our territory by mohmand tribesmen—at the village of marozai, six miles north-east of shankargarh (shabkadar); at mirzadhar, two miles from marozai; and at chikkar, nine miles south-east of shankargarh.
all three raids were believed to be the work of men of the mohmand gathering which collected at the end of the zakha khel expedition, as mentioned in chapter xiii.; in consequence of these outrages the posts at abazai and shabkadar were strengthened. early in april, however, the mullahs began to preach against the british in ningrahar, and within a few 253days had succeeded in collecting a large following of mohmands with the reported object of attacking shabkadar. the movement spread, villagers in masses joined the force, and by the 17th it was computed that some 5000 men, including 2000 afghans, were gathered together under hazrat mullah in kamali, to the north-west of halimzai territory. it is not surprising under the circumstances that the chief commissioner, north-west frontier province, detected danger of a fanatical outbreak.
fresh trouble
within four days the numbers of the mohmand lashkar had increased to 10,000 men, our post at matta was fired into, and on the 21st general anderson, with two guns and 1000 bayonets, moved out from peshawar, to which place troops were sent forward from nowshera. at matta and shabkadar, and towards the mohmands generally, general willcocks, commanding at peshawar, occupied, according to instructions, a purely defensive advanced position, the object being to prevent any collision and to offer no possible ground for mohmand attack. it was, however, abundantly clear that the fanatical feeling against us was spreading, that ghaza was being preached, and that men were flocking to the standards of the mullahs from bajaur, utman khel territory, asmar, kohistan and kunar, while grain, ammunition and money were being sent down to the mohmands from ningrahar.
on the 23rd considerable bodies of the enemy occupied the foothills just across our border opposite abazai, and general willcocks accordingly, considering that 254the mohmands probably intended assuming the offensive, ordered up additional troops from peshawar to shabkadar, and with their arrival he had, on the line abazai-shabkadar-michni, 2700 infantry, 520 sabres and twelve guns.
expedition against the mohmands, 1908.—the authorities at home and at simla now concurred in thinking that no good purpose was likely to be served by the maintenance of the mere defensive, and that it would probably be a safer policy to advance and disperse the gathering before it became larger and led to a big fanatical outbreak. the immediate mobilisation of two brigades with divisional troops and a reserve was ordered. general willcocks was placed in command, and directed to cross the border and assume the offensive. the force was thus composed:
first brigade.
brigadier-general anderson.
1st battalion northumberland fusiliers.
53rd sikhs.
57th wilde’s rifles.
59th scinde rifles.
second brigade.
major-general barrett.
1st battalion seaforth highlanders.
guides infantry.
28th punjabis.
55th coke’s rifles.
255reserve brigade.
major-general ramsay.
1st battalion royal munster fusiliers.
21st punjabis.
22nd punjabis.
40th pathans.
this brigade to proceed to peshawar.
divisional troops.
21st cavalry.
no. 8. m.b.r.g.a.
23rd peshawar mountain battery.
28th mountain battery.
no. 6 company sappers and miners.
no. 1 company sappers and miners.
34th sikh pioneers.
expedition of 1908
the troops being for the most part all on the spot, in consequence of the conclusion, then just arrived at, of the zakha khel expedition, no time was lost, and on the 24th april an advance was made with all troops available at shabkadar and matta, when the enemy’s positions to the west of these posts were attacked and captured. a heavy blow was inflicted on the mohmands, and a reconnaissance, carried out on the following day, found no signs of them about their former positions or in the gandab valley. it was, however, very clear that the rising was not crushed; the mullahs were doing their best to enlist recruits in dir and swat, and an attempt was also being made to induce the zakha khels to join, so far, 256however, without success; but there seemed small doubt that all branches of the mohmands were represented in the recent actions with our columns from matta and shabkadar. for some few days after the dispersal of the gathering in front of shabkadar, the british troops remained inactive, in order to see whether the assembly of the tribal jirgah, which had been arranged for, would enable general willcocks to arrive at reasonable terms.
it had been hoped that the disinclination shown by the tribes of dir, swat, bajaur and the bazar valley to make common cause with the mohmands, and the difficulty of keeping the lashkar in the field, would have led to the gradual dispersal of the whole gathering, especially in view of the projected meeting of the jirgah on the 4th may.
on the 2nd may, however, the viceroy telegraphed to the india office explaining that the centre of unrest had now shifted to the khyber, where for some time past at pesh-bolak one sufi sahib, a noted firebrand, had been collecting a force of afghans. this army, whose numbers were estimated at anything between 13,000 and 20,000 men, had already passed lundi khana, and was believed to intend an attack on the fortified serai at lundi kotal that evening, and possibly also on ali musjid and the fort at chora belonging to the malikdin khel chief, who had often proved himself our friend.
the khyber danger
in consequence of the threatening aspect of affairs troops were despatched to jamrud with a view to rendering assistance, and the mohmand field force 257was directed to remain strictly on the defensive. the general officer left in command was further instructed, when the jirgah assembled, to observe a temporising policy, encouraging attendance and requiring an explanation of past conduct, but neither announcing terms nor making any definite communication. recognising also that the greater danger was now threatening from the khyber, the larger part of the force present under general willcocks at shabkadar and peshawar was drawn to the pass.
the reserve brigade, under general ramsay, reached lundi kotal on the 3rd may, while that under general barrett marched to ali musjid; general anderson remained at shabkadar with his brigade in observation of the mohmands.
on the night of the 2nd may repeated efforts had been made by the khyber gathering (which appeared to be entirely composed of afghans, no afridis having joined it), to capture our post of michni kandao, which was ably defended by subadar tor khan of the khyber rifles. lundi kotal was also fired into, and several attempts made to burn the serai, but these were all beaten off, although firing took place daily. on the 4th general willcocks felt himself strong enough to attack, and moved out from lundi kotal in two columns against the enemy, who occupied the shinwari villages about 4000 yards to the west. one column consisted of ramsay’s infantry brigade, with the 80th battery r.f.a. and the 28th mountain battery, while the other was under 258colonel roos-keppel, and was composed of fifty dismounted men 19th lancers, two companies 21st punjabis, and 500 of the khyber rifles. the enemy were driven from their sangars and the shelter of the villages, and, having suffered severely, disappeared over the afghan boundary. it being apparent that nothing further was to be apprehended on this part of the frontier, the troops left lundi kotal on the 7th, and were back in peshawar on the 8th and 9th, having left behind two mountain guns at lundi kotal and the 54th sikhs at jamrud.
during the absence of the force all had remained quiet on the mohmand-peshawar border from michni to abazai, but there were signs of a general disinclination to send tribal representatives to a jirgah; and finally, on the 9th may—by which date the limit of time allowed had expired—news arrived of the refusal of some maliks to come in, and of the receipt of insulting messages from others. it was therefore decided, on the 10th may, to send troops into the mohmand country, and the advance commenced accordingly on the 13th.
in the meantime cases of cholera had occurred among the troops, and certain changes became inevitable in the composition of the mohmand field force. in the 1st brigade the 22nd punjabis replaced the 1st battalion northumberland fusiliers; in the 2nd brigade the 54th sikhs replaced the guides infantry, relegated, with the 21st punjabis, to the lines of communication beyond shabkadar; while in the 3rd brigade the 1st battalion west yorkshire 259regiment and the 19th punjabis replaced the munster fusiliers and the 22nd punjabis.
the troops advance
nahaki was occupied on the 14th by part of the 1st brigade without opposition, but a reconnaissance made to the khapakh pass was fired on, and it was found to be held in strength. both brigades closed up on the 16th at nahaki, and while here the camp of the 1st brigade was attacked in a most determined manner on the nights of the 16th and 18th. the enemy lost heavily on both occasions, but inflicted considerable loss upon our troops. on the 17th all the force was engaged in destroying the towers of villages belonging to kandahari safis and halimzais; and on the next day the 2nd brigade proceeded up the bohai dag to destroy the headquarters of the hazrat mullah, and met with strong opposition from the khwaezais, baizais and others near zarawar china, the hills on both sides of the valley being held. the enemy were dislodged, with heavy loss, by the 28th and 55th. this brigade returned to nahaki on the 20th, and the 1st moved north towards lakarai, and found the enemy holding in considerable strength the village of umra kilai, with a deep and very intricate nullah behind and hills beyond. they were driven off after a stubborn resistance, during which their leaders repeatedly led charges with swords. the mohmand losses were consequently very heavy, but none the less they made some half-hearted attacks on the bivouac during the night. our casualties were five killed and seventeen wounded.
during the next day several towers between 260nahaki and lakarai were destroyed, a measure which resulted in some of the clans beginning to come in and submit.
on the 23rd the 1st brigade moved from lakarai to shato khel with only slight opposition, and on the day following to kargha; the enemy had prepared and held a strong position at the entrance to ambahar, but on their left flank being turned they fled, pursued by the cavalry, and heavily punished by the fire of the infantry. on the 27th general willcocks returned, via mulla kilai, to nahaki, and by this day the recalcitrant utmanzai, dawezai and khwaezai had sent in jirgahs and submitted. there only remained the khuda khel baizais, and their country was visited by the 2nd brigade from nahaki on the 28th, and this division was severely punished.
the force began its retirement to india on this date, and on the 1st june the last troops of the mohmand field force had recrossed the border. our casualties had been rather heavy for so short a campaign—38 killed or died of wounds and 184 wounded; 51 succumbed to disease.
there does not appear to be any reason to believe that the continuation of the work on the loi-shilman railway had any connection with the mohmand rising of 1908. the tarakzai mohmands are the only clan whose country abuts on the proposed line, and these do not seem to have taken any part in the fighting of that year.
