darwesh khels.—immediately after the annexation of the punjab, the umarzai sub-division of the ahmadzai wazirs began and continued to give trouble on our border. a dispute which commenced with a disagreement with a bannuchi chief, responsible for the collection of the revenue from wazir villages in our territory, gradually developed into a grievance against the local british authority, and finally, early in 1850, men from several divisions of the ahmadzai, to the number of 1500, attacked our post at gumatti, immediately north of bannu, but were repulsed. later in the same year the umarzais, joined by the mahsud wazirs, collected a force of several thousand men, intending to make an attack upon bannu itself, but finding it too strongly defended, they dispersed. during the next two years the outposts of bannu were constantly engaged in skirmishes with the wazirs, who came down almost daily, occupying the foothills and firing at long range into gumatti. attempts were made to effect a settlement with them, but they resisted all overtures, and 436operations were then decided upon against them. before, however, these could be undertaken, the southern umarzais, living between the tochi river and the gabar mountain, made a raid towards the kurram, but were headed off by major john nicholson, then deputy-commissioner of bannu, who at once made arrangements for the punishment of this particular section.
expedition against the umarzai wazirs, 1852.—the punitive force was divided into three columns. one column, composed of the 2nd punjab infantry, was to leave bannu at 10 p.m. on the 20th december, and march through the gumatti pass upon derabina and garang, distant respectively fourteen and seventeen miles, attacking both places simultaneously at daybreak. garang was at the foot of a narrow precipitous chasm in the kafirkot range, through which ran the road to sappari, near the summit of the ridge. the gumatti pass was entered at midnight, the valley and a low range of hills were crossed, and derabina was reached and destroyed. the hills above the garang ravine were occupied just as the head of the second column was seen emerging from the village of garang.
this force—two companies 1st punjab infantry and 350 men 4th punjab infantry, and accompanied by major nicholson—had moved from latammar on sappari by the barganatu pass, which was entered at midnight, the crest of the kafirkot range being reached about daybreak. sappari was taken by surprise and destroyed, as were other encampments of 437the umarzais in the garang pass. the surprise had been complete and but small resistance was made, but none the less the force suffered a loss of twenty-three men killed and wounded.
the third column—forty sabres, 2nd punjab cavalry, fifty mounted police, and 400 of the 6th punjab police battalion—moved on the umarzai settlements at the north of the khaisora and sein passes, and these were destroyed and the cattle captured, the whole force returning to bannu on the 22nd by the kurram pass. the umarzais now appeared thoroughly humbled, and made complete submission.
expedition of 1859–60
expedition against the kabul khel wazirs, 1859–1860.—the ahmadzai were not the only clan of the darwesh khel wazirs which gave trouble in those early days, for in 1850 the kabul khel sub-division of the utmanzai clan made an audacious attack—in conjunction with some of the khattaks—upon bahadur khel and the salt mines. our troops being quickly brought up they dispersed, but they did not fail to collect again for the harassment of the working parties engaged in building a fort at bahadur khel. they joined the umarzais in 1851 in their various raids against our posts, and gave some annoyance to our troops during captain coke’s miranzai expedition of 1851. during the next two years they were particularly aggressive, committing nineteen raids and carrying off cattle, but on captain coke commencing reprisals they made terms, and for a time were more careful in their behaviour. they, however, cut up some of our cavalry 438grasscutters near thal during the miranzai expedition of 1855–6, and in 1859 some of the hathi khel sub-division of the ahmadzais, having murdered a british officer near latammar, took refuge with the kabul khels. as was only to be expected, these refused to hand over the murderers, and a force of nearly 4000 men was assembled in december of this year at kohat and marched to thal, where, on the 19th, it was joined by bangash and khattak levies, raising the strength of the force to some 5400 men: the whole was under the command of brigadier-general n. b. chamberlain, c.b. on the 20th december the force crossed the kurram river and encamped at biland khel, then in afghan territory, the ruler of which had sanctioned our movements; and it was found that the main body of the kabul khels had taken their stand on a high range of hills called maidani, whither they had removed their belongings, and where they had stored grain, and raised defences. maidani is about eight miles south-west of biland khel, near zakha narai, and consists of two parallel ranges contiguous to each other, terminating at either end in a gorge and enclosing a long, narrow valley; the inward slopes of both mountains are tolerably easy, and covered with grass and bushes, but the outward sides or faces are rugged and precipitous. the two gorges, forming the water channels, were the entrances to the valley—the one facing east being called gandiob, the one to the south zakha. the enemy were believed to be from 2000–3000 strong.
it was resolved to attack before other clans could 439join the enemy, or before the tribesmen should be led to evacuate the position by seeing the preparations made to assault it.
operations about gandiob
at 6 a.m. on the 22nd the following marched upon gandiob:
four guns, peshawar mountain battery.
three guns, hazara mountain battery.
guides infantry.
4th sikh infantry.
1st punjab infantry.
3rd punjab infantry.
4th punjab infantry.
the enemy had evidently expected the advance upon maidani by the zakha gorge, where most of the defenders had taken post, and the defences at gandiob were incomplete, consequently the resistance was comparatively feeble; the heights were taken with but small loss, and after destroying the defences, the force returned unmolested to its camp at gandiob. next day the advantage gained was followed up; the bulk of the force returned to maidani, marched down the valley near to the zakha exit, and crossed over the range into the durnani valley, where the night was passed; a large amount of kabul khel stock was captured, and on the return to shiwa, whither the camp had been moved from gandiob, representatives of the clans came in asking for terms. the utmanzais were directed to give up two of the murderers or the actual leader of the gang. on the 29th the main body moved to spinwam, whence the tribesmen could more easily be coerced, while the remainder marched 440up the river nearer to biland khel. the tribesmen now brought in a man who had harboured the murderers, and on the 2nd january the troops moved back to karera in the kurram, having now satisfactorily settled with the wazirs on the left bank of that river.
on the 4th january, while two battalions and a mountain battery remained on the right bank of the kurram to keep open communications, the brigadier-general marched to sappari with the hazara mountain battery, a detachment of sappers and miners, the 3rd and 6th punjab infantry, and one company 24th punjab infantry. there was no opposition, the ahmadzai maliks were told they must assist in the capture of the murderers, and the force was then broken up. as might, however, have been expected, the dispersal of the troops did not facilitate the attainment of the object for which the expedition had mainly been undertaken; but eventually, through the personal influence of lieutenant-colonel reynell taylor, the commissioner, the tribesmen were induced themselves to assemble a force, and capture and bring in one of the murderers, who was ultimately hanged on the very spot where he had committed the crime.
trouble in 1869
the next occasion when we came in contact with the darwesh khels was in 1869, when in retaliation for an attack made upon a party of them by the turis, they came down upon the village of thal, and carried off about 7000 head of cattle. they refused restitution, but on lieutenant-colonel keyes, commanding the kohat district, collecting and moving a 441strong force out to thal in april, the chief men of the division implicated tendered their submission and paid up the fines demanded. in the year following, the muhammad khel section of the ahmadzai, hitherto a well-behaved community, began to give a good deal of trouble. beginning with a grievance about a fine, and a judgment against them in regard to water-rights—oliver tells us that across the border more than half the trouble arises about women, money, land or water—it culminated in ambuscading and shooting down seven sepoys of a party marching from bannu for the relief of the kurram outpost, by a raiding party of 140 muhammad khels. the section concerned was at once outlawed; all members found in british territory were arrested, and their lands in the bannu district were sequestered until the whole clan submitted, and gave up the men who had committed this last outrage. this they refused to do, and for some fifteen months they lived among other clans, who sympathised with, and befriended them in their exile. they committed several further raids, but eventually expressed their anxiety to come to terms and surrendered unconditionally. their six headmen were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment, and the fines inflicted on the section had to be paid up before they were permitted to return to their holdings in british territory. nor did the lesson taught end here; every division which had harboured or befriended the muhammad khels was called to account, and punishments suitable to the degree of their offences were inflicted.
442for some years after this the darwesh khel wazirs gave but little trouble, but this unusual abstinence was not due to any consideration for the british government, but was necessitated by the tedious war they were engaged in against the mahsuds, and which endured—to the general disadvantage of the darwesh khels—until september 1878, when the feud was patched up.
on the outbreak of the war in afghanistan a convoy route was opened between thal and bannu, and which, following for the most part the line of the kurram river, passed through the independent territory of the utmanzais and ahmadzais; it had been traversed during the kabul khel expedition of 1859, but had not since been used by us. many detachments and contingents of all arms marched by this route during the winter of 1878–79, and wazir camels were extensively used in the carriage of supplies for the kurram valley field force. for assisting in these arrangements, allowances amounting to rs. 1000 per mensem were made to the more important utmanzai and ahmadzai chiefs, and the route remained open until the latter part of march 1880, when, in view of a fanatical excitement fanned by the mullah adkar, the road was closed.
during the time the thal-bannu route was in use, the number of offences or raids committed was particularly small, considering the number of valuable convoys passed through; but almost immediately the road was closed, a serious raid was committed on a turi caravan near thal by a mixed band of darwesh 443khels, mahsuds and dawaris, and on a khattak labour camp on the thal-kurram road. a few weeks later—on the night of the 1st–2nd may—a determined attack was made on the military post at chupri, eight miles to the north-west of thal, garrisoned by fifty bayonets and thirty sabres. the raiders were some 200 men of the darwesh khels, mahsuds and dawaris; and forty of these, having by some means gained access to the enclosure of the post, inflicted upon our troops a loss of eleven killed (including a british officer), and sixteen wounded before they were beaten off. no reparation for this outrage ever appears to have been exacted.
expedition of 1880
expedition against the malik shahi wazirs, october 1880.—by october 1880, the fines due from the kabul khel and malik shahi wazirs had amounted to a considerable sum, chiefly on account of thefts committed by them in the kurram and near thal during the afghan war; and there appearing to be some difficulty in collecting the amount, a force, under brigadier-general j. j. h. gordon, c.b., entered the kabul khel hills on the evening of the 27th october. the force was composed of:
two guns, 1/8th royal artillery.
250, 85th king’s own light infantry.
250, 18th bengal cavalry.
250, 20th punjab infantry.
the object of the expedition was to seize men and cattle of the malik shahi section as security for their share of the fine. these people are almost entirely nomadic, spending the summer on the slopes of the 444siah koh mountains, and wintering on both banks of the kurram river between the ninth and sixteenth milestones on the thal-bannu road. in order to reach them it was necessary to traverse the whole of the kabul khel settlements; and the difficulty, therefore, of the enterprise lay in moving through kabul khel country without warning reaching the malik shahi section, and so giving them time to escape from the comparatively open country watered by the kurram river, into the more intricate hill country to the west in the direction of the siah koh.
the force left thal at 9.30 p.m.; the advance party surrounded the malik shahi encampment at the south-west of the valley, another party, detached to the left, surrounded other settlements on the charkhanai plateau; while a third small party went to the right to try and capture some noted wazir thieves; the supports remained at drozanda on the thal-bannu road. the surprise was complete, 2000 head of cattle and 109 prisoners were taken, and the force returned to thal on the 28th, where, two days later, the jirgahs came in, and within a few weeks the whole of the fines due had been realised from the malik shahi and kabul khels; their conduct did not, however, materially improve, despite the punishment they had received and the knowledge they had acquired of our ability to exact reparation from them whenever it should suit us to do so.
our later dealings with the darwesh khel wazirs will be described further on in this chapter.
the mahsud wazirs
mahsud wazirs.—the reputation of the mahsuds 445has never been good; they have from the earliest days been notorious robbers, and their raids upon british territory have been frequent and serious. the powindah caravans of the warrior traders, mostly ghilzais, which pass to and fro by the gomal pass between afghanistan and india, bringing central asian merchandise as far as the markets of benares and patna, have ever been the objects of constant attack and harassment by the mahsuds, whose country commands the gomal; and both in 1855 and 1857 john lawrence, the chief commissioner, urged the government to undertake retributive measures against them. again, in 1859 and 1860, brigadier-general chamberlain, commanding the punjab frontier force, made similar appeals, but lord canning, to whom the matter was then referred, decided against an expedition as not being actually urgent at the moment.
in march 1860, however, the mahsuds committed a most serious and unprovoked act of aggression. this was nothing less than the arrival before tank of some 3000 wazirs, under one jangi khan, with the intention of sacking the town, which stands on the plains some five miles from the foot of the hills. warning of the intended attack had, however, been received, and ressaldar saadat khan, of the 5th punjab cavalry, commanding the post, had taken the necessary steps to oppose the tribesmen. he had called in mounted men from other posts in the neighbourhood, and had collected levies and horsemen in the service of the nawab of tank, and on the 13th march he moved out towards the hills at the head of 158 sabres of his regiment and 446thirty-seven mounted levies. he found the wazir lashkar drawn up near the mouth of the tank pass, and, feigning retreat, he drew the enemy after him into the plains. the cavalry then turned and, having cut off the enemy’s retreat, saadat khan charged in the most dashing manner. the wazirs were cut down, ridden over and put to flight, leaving 300 dead on the ground, including six leading maliks, and having many more wounded. the ressaldar’s force had only one man killed and sixteen wounded.[137]
expedition of 1860
expedition against the mahsud wazirs, 1860.—it was now felt that operations must be undertaken against the mahsuds, and brigadier-general chamberlain was accordingly ordered to take a force into their hills. the general decided to advance by way of tank; this line was better known than that via bannu, and it led more directly to the country of the tribesmen concerned in the recent outrage; he intended, moreover, should the mahsuds not early come to terms, to advance to their chief places, kaniguram 447and makin, returning to british territory by the khaisora defile debouching near bannu. it was expected that the mahsuds would probably make a stand, either at an advanced position at hinis tangi or at the more retired shingi kot, protecting the actual entrance to their country. as a matter of fact, however, they did not seriously defend either position, and as this was the first occasion upon which operations in the mahsud country had been undertaken, there was no precedent to guide the commander and troops as to the amount of resistance which was to be expected, or where it would most probably be met.
a large number of levies—about 1600,—chiefly drawn from the hereditary enemies of the mahsuds, were called up to take part in the expedition, while the regular portion of the force, assembled on the 16th april at tank, was composed as under:
three guns, no. 2 punjab light field battery.[138]
three guns, no. 3 punjab light field battery.[139]
four guns, peshawar mountain battery.
three guns, hazara mountain battery.
108
sabres, guides cavalry.
131
sabres, 3rd punjab cavalry.
100
sabres, multani cavalry.[140]
60
bayonets, 1st company sappers and miners.
407
bayonets, guides infantry.
427
bayonets, 4th sikh infantry.
448
397
bayonets, 1st punjab infantry.
684
bayonets, 2nd punjab infantry.
373
bayonets, 3rd punjab infantry.
381
bayonets, 4th punjab infantry.
400
bayonets, 6th punjab infantry.
207
bayonets, 14th punjab infantry.[141]
418
bayonets, 24th punjab infantry (pioneers).[142]
464
bayonets, hazara gurkha battalion.[143]
394
bayonets, 6th police battalion.
the force started on the 17th, and arrived unopposed at palosin kach next day, a party being detached to destroy shingi kot. a halt was made during the 20th to give the mahsuds an opportunity for submission; but nothing resulting, the headquarters and main column moved on the 20th to haidari kach, so as to survey the country and punish certain especially troublesome sections, leaving a small force at palosin and at jandola (the latter a batanni village) to keep open communications with the plains. from haidari kach the brigadier advanced as far as barwand, meeting with no opposition and seeing few of the enemy; and on the morning of the 24th returned to palosin, where in the meantime the camp under colonel lumsden, with six guns, some 200 sabres and about 1400–1500 bayonets, had been very seriously attacked.
the camp had been placed on the kach[144] land, on the left bank of the tank stream, with its right resting 449on an old tower (distant some 800 yards) overlooking the stream; the left was protected by a picquet on an abrupt peak to the south-east, having the scarped bank of the river in its front and the edge of the high table-land immediately in the rear. on the night of the 22nd, the outlying picquets were at their posts on the ridge behind the camp; a complete company occupied the tower, three other parties, each of a havildar and eight sepoys, were posted along the rear, while one of thirty men was on the high peak above mentioned. each picquet had a support of equal strength close in rear.
a night attack
no information as to any tribal gathering had been received, and the night had passed quietly enough, when just at reveille the rear picquet fired a volley, and a rush of 3000 wazirs overpowered and nearly destroyed the picquets holding the high bank. fortunately the whole body did not come on; some 500 swordsmen stormed into the camp, while the remainder kept up a heavy fire from the ridge. for some little time confusion reigned in the camp, but then discipline prevailed, and the guides, 4th sikhs and gurkhas drove out the enemy at the point of the bayonet, pursuing them for three miles and punishing them heavily. our losses had been serious—63 killed and 166 wounded—but those of the enemy were even more so. the attack had been a complete surprise, and was carried out with great gallantry and determination: we shall see another instance of such an attack further on in this chapter.
450it had been intended to commence the march on kaniguram on the 2nd may, forcing en route the position at the ahnai tangi, which the wazirs were said to have occupied; but on the 1st some mahsud maliks arrived in camp, purporting to represent the whole tribe, and expressing their anxiety to make terms. they were offered the option of a heavy fine, with security for its payment and hostages for good behaviour, or the unopposed passage of the force to their capital, kaniguram. neither alternative recommended itself to the maliks, who asked for a day to consider the matter, and the general decided to move the camp on to shingi kot for greater convenience of supply, and here the maliks were to bring their decision on the 2nd. nothing, however, was heard from them this day, and on the 3rd the onward march was resumed, the ahnai gorge being found abandoned, and the force encamped at zeriwam, where another, and an unsuccessful, attempt was made to effect a peaceful settlement with the mahsuds. next day the troops moved on, the defile becoming narrower and the barari gorge turning out to be the most difficult of any that had been yet seen, being a narrow cleft cut by the tank stream through a chain of mountains crossing its course at right angles. both sides of the passage are perpendicular cliffs of forty or fifty feet in height, from which the mountains slope upwards at a considerable incline, while the actual mouth of the pass was hidden by a thick grove of trees.
it was soon abundantly evident that here the enemy 451had made every preparation for defence, while the position itself was one of great natural strength. both sides of the pass-mouth were very steep, while everywhere sangars had been placed in terraces, and there was a safe line of retreat, but the ground to the north seemed just practicable for infantry and mules. there was, however, a ravine which joined the tank stream at the mouth of the pass on this side, and there was no means of knowing whether, after the northern heights had been seized, the actual position might not still be inaccessible owing to the presence of this ravine.
general chamberlain’s operations
general chamberlain decided to attack on both sides, and formed two columns for this purpose, the left under colonel lumsden, the right or northern under colonel green. on the right the attack was at first conducted without loss, but thereafter the advance became difficult, the ground was much cut up by ravines, the fire was very heavy, and the men attacking became a good deal exposed and dispersed. there was something of a check, and the wazirs, leaping out of their sangars, charged down upon the 3rd punjab infantry sword in hand. these gave way and fell back upon the support, which also retired, and the mahsuds prepared to charge the guns and the reserve. the 1st punjab infantry, under captain keyes, now stemmed the tide; the enemy, met by these men and by the fire of the guns, fell back in their turn hotly pursued. the 1st punjab infantry followed them into the breastworks, the other troops rallied, and the right of the position was now taken.
452colonel lumsden’s party had an easier task; disheartened at seeing the northern part of their position in our hands, and fired on by colonel green’s guns, the mahsuds on this flank offered but a feeble resistance, and the force marched through the gorge and camped three miles beyond it. our losses in this affair were thirty killed and eighty-six wounded.
on the 5th the force arrived, unopposed, at kaniguram, remaining there until the 8th, and receiving the expression of a desire for peace from the mahsud maliks, but nothing satisfactory was arranged. on the 9th a move was then made to makin, which was reached with but little opposition on the following day. next to kaniguram, makin is the most important and best built town in the mahsud country, the seat of their iron trade; it is situated at the point where the mountains of shuidar and pirghal close in upon each other, a spur from each forming its northern and southern face. as the mahsuds still failed to come to terms, towers were destroyed and villages burnt; but the state of the supplies rendering it impossible for the force to remain longer in the country, the general directed the return march on bannu to commence on the 12th. moving by razmak, razani and saroba, on the 20th bannu was reached, and the force was broken up.
although the operations had been successful, they had not resulted in the submission of the mahsud wazirs; the tribe was therefore put under blockade, thus inflicting increased financial loss on them, and at last in june 1862 they gave in, agreed to the 453principle of sectional responsibility for outrages committed, and gave hostages, but they had hardly concluded this treaty before they broke it.
the next sixteen years form a continuous record of raids on the bannu and dera ismail khan borders; attacks on posts, cattle-lifting, highway robbery, abduction, murder and wounding. the offenders were punished when they could be met with, and the divisions and sections to which they belonged were made to suffer for their misdeeds; blockades were imposed, additional posts were built for the overawing of the mahsud wazirs, service was offered to them in the frontier militia, and at last, in 1878, it was reported that the tank border had never before been in so settled a condition, or life and property so secure. within a year, however, the peace of this part of the frontier was rudely broken by a raid on a large scale and of a particularly audacious character.
descent upon tank
about christmas 1878 rumours of an intended attack upon tank reached the local authorities, and precautions were accordingly taken. all the posts on this border were doubled, and in some of the more important the strength of the garrison had been trebled, so that when, on new year’s day 1879, the attack, instigated by emissaries of the amir sher ali, actually commenced, nearly half the available force in the district was concentrated in the tank valley. all the villages had also been warned.
on the 1st january, however, the mahsuds descended from their hills to the number of between 2000 454and 3000, brushed aside the opposition met with from the post at the mouth of the pass, and, descending upon tank, burnt the bazaar and many houses, and finally regained the hills before they could be intercepted, carrying off a considerable amount of property with them.
the mahsuds engaged in this affair belonged chiefly to the alizai clan; but men from all the country round, within and without our border, joined the marauders, being unable to resist so unusually favourable an opportunity for fomenting disorder and obtaining plunder, and lawless and predatory bands destroyed and robbed several border villages.
the news of the outrage did not reach dera ismail khan until the morning of the 2nd, when a force of cavalry and infantry at once moved out to tank, came up with some clansmen about four miles from that place, took a number of prisoners, recovered a certain amount of plunder, and reached tank the following night, having marched nearly fifty miles. during the next fortnight minor operations were carried out from tank and from the border posts with the comparatively small force available, and the enemy were everywhere driven from the positions they took up and suffered considerable loss, order being eventually restored on this border. all the local tribesmen implicated in the recent attacks had now been punished, with the exception of the mahsuds, and these were offered certain terms for acceptance, failing which a punitive expedition was to be sent into their country so soon as a favourable opportunity 455should occur. meanwhile a strict blockade was enforced.
in march 1880 the mahsuds, stirred up by the preachings of a fanatical mullah, commenced hostilities against the british government, and collected up the tank stream within ten miles of our border. a force was at once—on 5th april—moved out from dera ismail khan (3 guns, 50 sabres, 300 bayonets) and marched to tank. the mahsuds could not make up their minds where their blow should fall, and many consequently returned to their homes, while the remainder, moving south, attacked the town of gomal, but, being driven off, dispersed. as it was apparent that the batannis of jandola had given passage to this raiding party, the dera ismail khan force advanced on jandola from kot khirgi on the morning of the 12th, forced the hinis tangi and, having destroyed jandola, returned unopposed to tank.
renewed outrages
during 1880 the mahsuds, associated with the darwesh khels and dawaris, committed several serious outrages on our border, and, with the termination of the operations in afghanistan, the government now found itself able to send the long contemplated expedition into the mahsud country. accordingly, early in 1881 arrangements were put in hand for coercing that tribe. while the force was in process of assembly, the mahsuds, who had been offered a final opportunity of peaceful submission, sent in certain headmen to make terms and thus avoid punishment; but these belonged almost exclusively 456to clans living immediately without our borders, while those sections among the more inaccessible hills, and which had for long been opposed to peace with the british government, were still entirely unrepresented among those suing for peace.
during the third week in april, after a great council at kaniguram, our terms were to some extent complied with, but the submission of the tribe generally was still incomplete. several important sub-divisions, notably the nana khel division of the bahlolzais, were still defiant, and it was decided that this division must be coerced. the force assembled at tank, composed entirely of troops of the punjab frontier force with some additions, was placed under command of brigadier-general t. g. kennedy, c.b., and consisted of twelve guns, 290 sabres and 3662 bayonets; while a reserve brigade—eight guns, 326 sabres and 3380 bayonets—under brigadier-general j. j. h. gordon, c.b., was formed at bannu.
expedition of 1881
expedition against the mahsud wazirs, 1881.—the main force moved from tank by kot khirgi to jandola, which was reached on the 23rd april, when the pass leading to the shahur valley was reconnoitred without opposition. the column then moved on by haidari kach and turam china to barwand, and so far, although the rearguard was always fired on, there had been no casualties and nothing in the way of serious opposition had been experienced, while some of the headmen had already submitted. the force now moved on towards the khaisora valley, and on arrival in this neighbourhood 457the alizais made terms, but the troops were now in the country of the nana khels, who showed a good deal of hostility. on the 5th may general kennedy arrived at kaniguram via kundiwan, having had a sharp affair with some 500 bahlolzais holding the densely wooded slopes about shah alum. makin was reached on the 10th, by which date the bannu column was encamped at razmak, only seven miles distant.
on the 16th april this brigade had moved from bannu and had taken up a position on the right bank of the tochi river near miriam, commanding the entrances of the khaisora, tochi and shakto valleys. general gordon, in compliance with instructions received from general kennedy, marched up the khaisora valley to razmak via saroba and razani practically unopposed, being accompanied by representatives of the sections inhabiting the valley. a convoy of supplies was passed from here to makin, and on the 12th may the bannu column began to retire, visiting the shakto valley en route and having only one casualty in the force. on the next day general kennedy marched from makin via janjal to jandola, and arrived on the 18th unmolested at tank, where the column was broken up. the total british casualties during these operations only amounted to thirty-two killed and wounded.
the mahsuds seemed now ready and eager to make peace, but still our terms remained uncomplied with, and the blockade consequently was reimposed; and it was not until september of this year, and after 458several fruitless attempts to play off the amir against the british government, that the mahsuds finally gave in. they surrendered the remaining ones among the proscribed ringleaders in the 1879 outrages, but since the aggregate of the fines accumulated against them now appeared quite beyond their powers of payment, it was agreed that the amount should gradually be liquidated by a tax imposed on all mahsud goods imported into our territory, and for a breathing space at least quiet reigned on this portion of the border.
mahsud and darwesh khels.—the behaviour of all the wazirs, mahsuds and darwesh khels, may be said to have been uniformly good for a further period of ten years, dating from the conclusion of the expedition of 1881. in 1883 the mahsuds gave facilities for the survey of the country about khajuri kach; in 1889 the zhob valley was traversed by us; the gomal pass was opened up, and our protectorate extended over the zhob valley and the country between the gomal and pishin; a railway survey was carried out in the gomal; and our influence was strengthened among the mahsuds and the wazirs of wana by the granting of new or increased allowances. there had, of course, been periods of disquiet, occasioned and accentuated by the fact that at this time there was no definite boundary line demarcating british and afghan spheres of influence. the difficulty of restraining the tribesmen within limits and of inflicting punishment for outrages was increased, and a delicate situation thereby created, owing to 459the fact that it was often impossible to determine whether offenders were subjects of the amir of afghanistan, or came within the pale of british influence. it was then, in october 1893, that, after long negotiations, sir mortimer durand went to kabul and returned with an agreement signed by the amir. by this settlement the respective spheres of influence of the british government and of the ruler of afghanistan were carefully defined. the amir agreed to retire from chageh in baluchistan, and withdrew his objections to the extension of the railway to new chaman, west of the kwaja amran range, and to the establishment of a british cantonment at that place; the bajauris, afridis and wazirs were left outside the limits of his influence, but asmar, and the kunar valley above it as far as chanak, and the tract of birmal, bordering on the wazir country, were included within his territory; on the other hand, a somewhat clumsy arrangement, and one almost certain to be fruitful of future trouble, had been come to, whereby the country of the mohmands had been arbitrarily divided by the watershed of the kunar and panjkhora rivers.
delimitation commission
early in 1894 the government of india began to make preparations for the demarcation, in co-operation with the commissioners appointed by the amir, of the western boundaries of waziristan; and the attitude of the wazirs being, as ever, uncertain, it was decided to maintain a considerable force on the frontier. work was to commence at domandi on the 15th october, and some weeks prior to this a proclamation was 460issued to the tribesmen, fully explaining the objects and limitations of the expedition; the news seemed to be generally received in waziristan in a friendly spirit.
the following troops under brigadier-general turner were detailed to form the escort:
129
sabres, 1st punjab cavalry.
6
guns, no. 3 punjab mountain battery.
189
bayonets, no. 2 company sappers and miners.
748
bayonets, 1st battalion 1st gurkhas.
744
bayonets, 3rd sikh infantry.
741
bayonets, 20th punjab infantry,
while, in addition, the following units were held in readiness at multan and dera ismail khan to form a reserve brigade, viz.:
2nd battalion border regiment.
one squadron 1st punjab cavalry.
no. 8 mountain battery.
4th punjab infantry.
38th dogras.
on the 1st october the escort was concentrated at dera ismail khan, and within ten days the ahmadzai clan of the darwesh khels from wana had sent in their jirgah, unanimously repeating a previous invitation to the british government to take over their country and permit them to become british subjects.
operations of the waziristan field force, 1894.—the escort finally left dera ismail khan on the 13th october, concentrating again at khajuri kach and reaching wana—via spin and karab kot—on the 25th. a jirgah of the wana ahmadzai came in here 461and expressed pleasure at the arrival of the troops, but none the less the camp was fired into two nights in succession, and it was reported that the mullahs were endeavouring to stir up strife and to prevent a really representative jirgah from coming in.
the camp at wana
the plain of wana is about 13 miles long, 11 broad, and very stony; the camp was placed at the eastern end of it, the ground in the vicinity being much cut up by ravines. the position, moreover, which had been chosen for the camp of the british joint commissioner, was a source of weakness and of anxiety to the general in command of the escort, having been pitched some 210 yards from the south-east corner of the military camp, so as to afford the jirgahs free access to the political officers. up to the end of october there was no reason to anticipate an attack upon the escort by any large body of mahsuds; but on the 1st november it became known that the mullah powindah, a noted firebrand, was in the neighbourhood with not less than 1000 followers, and that he had expressed his intention of attacking the wana camp. picquets were accordingly doubled, the defences were strengthened, and the troops ordered to be under arms at 4 a.m. every day.
the camp was surrounded by some thirteen picquets, furnished by the 3rd sikhs, 20th punjab infantry and 1st gurkhas, in addition to an old darwesh khel fort held by 100 rifles of the last-named regiment; but, contrary to the procedure usually followed in frontier warfare, the majority of these picquets were no more than observation posts, and were not intended 462to hold their own in any serious attack, but were to fall back, in some cases on their supports, in others on their regiments in camp.
at 5.30 a.m. on the 2nd november, while it was still dark, the camp was suddenly aroused by three shots, and a desperate rush of some 500 fanatics, supported by fire from the left front, was made on the left flank and left rear of the camp, held by the 1st gurkhas. it appears that the enemy—consisting for the most part of mahsuds, with a few darwesh khels—had crept up two large ravines on the west, overwhelmed the picquets there posted, from one of which the three warning shots had issued, and came on so rapidly that the leading assailants had climbed the camp defences and penetrated into the middle of the camp, before the defenders had turned out of their tents. another party, swinging round to the right, made their way into the camp by the rear or south, did much damage among the transport animals, and cut loose some of the cavalry horses.
by this time the troops had turned out and got to work. the gurkhas stopped the main rush down the centre of the camp; reinforced then by two companies of the 20th and one of the 3rd sikhs, the men swept through the camp, clearing it with the bayonet; and though two further but less determined attacks were made, no second rush followed the first, and soon after 6 a.m. the enemy were in full retreat. they were followed by a small column for six miles, and were charged into again and again by the cavalry, who inflicted serious loss upon them. our casualties were 463forty-five killed and seventy-five wounded, while the enemy carried off many rifles and much loot, but left some 350 killed behind them in camp or on the line of their retreat, out of 3000 who were present, but not all of whom joined in the actual attack on the camp.
on the 18th a jirgah came into camp but nothing resulted, and on the 27th a large tribal meeting, attended by the mullah and some 2000 or 3000 men, took place in shakai, where the government terms were fruitlessly discussed. the maliks then returned to our camp at wana, stating they could not carry our terms out at once, but that if given until the 12th december all demands would be met. the extension was sanctioned, but the headmen were informed that on that date our troops would move forward unless all claims had been satisfied. all preparations were also made for the prosecution of further operations.
the punitive force
on the 2nd december the formation was ordered of a punitive force, under the command of lieutenant-general sir william lockhart, k.c.b., consisting of three brigades, the first being composed of the original escort, strengthened by the inclusion of the 2nd battalion border regiment, and later by the arrival of the 1st battalion 4th gurkhas.
the composition of the second brigade, under brigadier-general w. p. symons, was as under:
no. 8 mountain battery.
one squadron 1st punjab cavalry.
one squadron 2nd punjab cavalry.
33rd punjab infantry.[145]
46438th dogras.
4th punjab infantry.
1st battalion 5th gurkhas.
no. 5 company bengal sappers and miners.
one maxim gun.
this brigade concentrated at tank for jandola.
the third brigade was under the command of colonel c. c. egerton, c.b., and assembled at miriam, near bannu; it was made up as follows:
no. 1 kohat mountain battery.
3rd punjab cavalry.[146]
1st sikh infantry.
2nd punjab infantry.
6th punjab infantry.
in the meantime the mahsuds had added to their already long list of offences, and finally, on the 12th december, the jirgah came in and admitted that there appeared no hope of the tribe complying with our terms. consequently, on the 16th, sir william lockhart was ordered to advance, when the following instructions were issued by him: the first brigade to move from wana by the tiarza pass and the sharawangi kotal on kaniguram; the second brigade to advance on makin from jandola by the tank stream; the third to proceed by the khaisora valley, in darwesh khel limits, to razmak. each column to arrive at its destination on the 21st december.
before leaving wana the officer commanding first brigade established there a military post in a fortified 465village, occupying it with two guns, twenty sabres and a battalion of infantry. moving then by the tiarza pass, the column arrived at kaniguram on the 21st, encountering only slight opposition en route, but the road was found to be very bad, and the rearguard never reached camp before midnight. meanwhile the second brigade, accompanied by sir william lockhart, marched from jandola via marghaband, shilmanzai kach and janjal, and reached makin on the 21st, having en route destroyed the mullah’s village at marobi. the camp was fired into every night, but no really active opposition was met with, and the mullah was reported to have fled to the darra valley, north of pirghal.
kaniguram and makin
the third brigade, marching on the 17th, was at razmak on the 23rd—the rearguard having been fired at from one village only—and arrived on the following day at makin. the force was now split up into a number of smaller columns, and all parts of the country were visited—the baddar, shakto, sheranna, shinkai, nargao, tangai and janjara valleys—and only in the first of these was opposition experienced. cattle were driven in, forage collected, and towers destroyed; nearly all the divisions implicated in the attack on wana camp had been punished, our terms had to some extent been complied with, and by the last week in january the delimitation party was able to commence work. on the 4th march the last of the mahsud hostages required were surrendered, and the force was then gradually reduced, troops remaining in occupation of jandola, barwand, wana, and in the 466tochi valley—this last offering the means for maintaining a hold over the darwesh khels. by the end of the operations all concerned in the attack on wana had been punished, our terms had been fully complied with, and the boundary from domandi to laram had been demarcated.
in 1895 there were several murderous attacks upon individuals, chiefly in the tochi valley, and it was evident that the establishment of military posts, and the permanent military occupation of the tochi valley, had done little to counteract the natural lawlessness of the inhabitants.
in the summer of 1896 a british subject had been murdered at sheranni in the tochi, and the madda khel, who inhabit maizar in the lower part of the shawal valley, considered they had been unfairly treated in the apportionment of the blood money, levied according to tribal custom for the murdered man. the matter was still unsettled in june of the following year, when the political officer gave notice that he would visit maizar to discuss the case, and further to select a site for a new levy post, the construction of which had been decided upon. on the 10th june, then, mr. gee, the political officer, left datta khel, which since the autumn of the year previous had been the civil and military headquarters of the district, with an escort of two mountain guns, twelve sabres, and 300 rifles under lieutenant-colonel bunny, 1st sikhs. on arrival at maizar the maliks evinced every sign of friendship, pointing out a halting place, and, with an excess of treachery unusual even 467among pathans, provided food for the muhammadan soldiers of the escort. the halting place chosen was close to a madda khel village and commanded by other villages from 100 to 400 yards distant, but, so far as the position admitted, all possible precautions were taken. the meal promised was produced and partaken of, and then, while the pipers of the 1st sikhs were playing for the benefit of the villagers, a hubbub suddenly arose in the village, from the top of a tower in which a man was seen to wave a sword. the villagers quickly drew off, and firing at once commenced on the escort from the houses on three sides.
the maizar outrage
colonel bunny and three officers were hit almost immediately, and the baggage animals, carrying most of the reserve ammunition, stampeded; but the guns at once came into action, driving back into the village the men who seemed upon the point of charging, and giving time for preparations for the retirement of the escort, now inevitable. the circumstances were trying in the extreme for the troops, and their staunchness is worthy of the highest praise. by this time every one of the british officers had been hit, two of them mortally, but the native officers of the 1st punjab infantry and 1st sikhs nobly filled their places. getting together a party of men, a most determined stand was made by a garden wall, whereby the first withdrawal was covered, the wounded were helped away, and the guns were able to retire to a fresh position, whence they fired “blank” to check the enemy, the small number of service rounds brought out having now been exhausted. the retirement was continued, 468the enemy coming on and enveloping the flanks, until the sheranni plain was reached; and about 5.30 p.m., reinforcements coming out from datta khel, the enemy were at last beaten off, and the further withdrawal to camp was unmolested.
operations of the tochi field force, 1897–98.—the decision to send a punitive expedition into the tochi was arrived at on the 17th june, and by the 8th july the concentration at bannu was completed. the force was placed under command of major-general corrie-bird, c.b., and comprised two brigades.
first brigade.
colonel c. c. egerton, c.b.
2nd battalion argyll and sutherland highlanders.
1st sikh infantry.
1st punjab infantry.
33rd punjab infantry.
one squadron 1st punjab cavalry.
no. 3 peshawar mountain battery.
no. 2 company bengal sappers and miners.
second brigade.
brigadier-general w. p. symons, c.b.
3rd battalion rifle brigade.
14th sikhs.
6th jats.
25th punjab infantry.
one squadron 1st punjab cavalry.
four guns no. 6 bombay mountain battery.
punitive operations
469the field force concentrated at datta khel on the 19th july, and on the next day the first brigade marched to sheranni, finding that place and maizar deserted, the madda khel being reported to have fled to the hills preliminary to seeking a refuge in afghanistan. all the defences in the neighbourhood were destroyed, and a proclamation embodying our terms was issued, but to these the maizar and sheranni maliks on the 3rd september definitely refused to agree. the kazha, shawal and khina valleys were visited by columns, and strong places were destroyed, but with the exception of some sniping into camp there was no sign of opposition. it was not, however, until the 31st october that the head of the madda khel gave himself up, and a fortnight later the whole tribe formally submitted, paid up a first instalment of all fines, including the overdue blood money which had occasioned the outrage, and early in 1898 the field force began to be gradually broken up.
the total casualties at maizar and in the subsequent operations amounted to twenty-nine killed and forty wounded; but during this expedition the troops suffered to an altogether unusual extent from sickness, chiefly diarrhoea and dysentery. the climate of the tochi valley is always trying, while the forced march in the hot weather from khushalgarh to bannu had no doubt affected the men’s constitutions.
operations against the mahsuds in 1900–1901.—no sooner were operations concluded in the tochi valley than the mahsuds began again to be troublesome. during 1898 and 1899 raids were of frequent 470occurrence, and in the year following a levy post at zam and a police post near tank were attacked. the maliks seemed quite unable to restrain, still less to coerce, the tribesmen. the fines for past offences now amounted to no less a sum than rs. 100,000, and, no portion of it being forthcoming, a blockade was declared, which came into operation on the 1st december, 1900. to ensure its effectiveness movable columns were mobilised from bannu and dera ismail khan, and by their means cordons were drawn on the east and south of the mahsud country. these measures were so far effectual that the mahsuds made a commencement with the payment of their fine, but in january 1901, fresh offences were committed, raids continued, and more serious attacks were not infrequent.
a new procedure was now introduced into the ordinary measures of a purely passive blockade. hitherto the tribesmen had invariably received notice prior to the commencement of active operations—they had always been afforded an opportunity of coming belatedly to terms—but it was now decided that, while the blockade should continue, it should be varied and accompanied by sharp attacks, carried on during three or four days by small mobile columns acting simultaneously and by surprise. the first series of such operations, for which preparations had been made in secret, commenced on the 23rd november, and was directed against the mahsuds of the khaisora and shahur valleys, combined with demonstrations from jandola into the takhi zam, and from datta 471khel against the north-west portion of the mahsud country; the general object being to demolish all defences, capture prisoners and cattle, and destroy grain and fodder. four columns, each consisting almost exclusively of infantry, and varying in strength from 900 to 1250 men, started from datta khel, jandola, sarwekai and wana; all were opposed, and each suffered some loss, but the combined operations were very successful. moreover, no sooner were these at an end than a further series was projected. on the 4th december brigadier-general dening left jandola with 2500 rifles and four guns and moved to shingi kot, where he divided his force into two columns. marching north-west up the tazar tang, dwe shinkai and guri khel were visited, and the force returned by way of marghaband to jandola. the enemy fought fiercely, following up the columns and driving home their attacks with great determination; their losses were consequently very severe.
mobile columns
the third series of operations began on the 19th december, and was undertaken by two columns starting from jandola and sarwekai converging on dwe shinkai, where, as well as in the spli toi algad, there were now known to be many mahsud settlements. the jandola column under general dening (four guns, thirteen sabres, and 2052 rifles, exclusive of the south waziristan militia), marched via shingi kot and umar ragzha to paridai up the tre algad, destroyed all defences, and joined the other columns at dwe shinkai on the 21st. the sarwekai column under colonel hogge (two guns and three battalions) had marched 472to dwe shinkai by way of the shahur nala, badshah khan, nanu narai and the spli toi algad. on the 22nd the whole combined force, told off into three columns, raided up the dwe shinkai, and, after destroying a number of fortified towers and other defences, returned on the 24th to jandola.
the mahsuds still, however, evinced no inclination to submit, and a fourth series of operations was consequently planned against them, the object of these being the punishment of the sections living in the shakto, sheranna and shuza algads. for this three columns were formed, based respectively on jandola, jani khel and datta khel, and varying in strength from 2500 to 1400 men, and their operations were uniformly successful, resulting in the capture of a large number of cattle and the destruction of many fortified places. standing camps were now formed at zam, miramshah and baran, whence it was intended that punitive measures should be resumed so soon as the troops had enjoyed a much needed rest. the mahsuds had by this, however, lost heavily in men and cattle, and had throughly realised that the innermost parts of their country could be reached and traversed by our troops. they consequently opened negotiations for peace and for the removal of the blockade, and after the usual delays they paid up their fines in full, restored all the rifles they had captured, and gave hostages for the return of all plundered cattle.
our casualties during these operations had amounted to thirty-two killed and 114 wounded.
the punishment inflicted on the mahsuds did not, 473however, appear to have had any particular effect upon all wazirs, and before the end of 1901 another expedition became necessary against the kabul khel sub-division of the utmanzai darwesh khels, who inhabit the wedge of hilly country lying between the kohat and bannu districts and east of the kurram river.
expedition of 1901–02
expedition against the kabul khels (darwesh khels) in 1901–1902.—during the years between 1896 to 1899 many outrages were committed upon our border by men living at the village of gumatti, some eight miles north of bannu. in february of the latter year this village was surrounded by our troops and the surrender of all outlaws demanded. this was refused, and some of the men “wanted” shut themselves up in two strong towers, from which, owing to the short time available, it was not found possible to dislodge them. the force had consequently to withdraw with its object only partially accomplished, and its retirement was harassed by the tribesmen all the way back to bannu. crimes of all kinds continued to be committed on this part of the border, and it was finally decided to send an expedition into the district. four small columns directed by major-general egerton were accordingly formed, comprising all three arms, and varying from 600 to 1000 men in numbers. these concentrated at thal, idak, barganatu and bannu, and started, the idak column on the 17th november and the others on the next day. by these forces the kabul khel country was traversed in all directions, many of the outlaws 474were killed or captured, over 5000 head of cattle were carried off by us, and a large number of fortified towers were destroyed. since the close of this expedition the darwesh khels have given us but little trouble, the mahsuds continuing, however, to be almost as turbulent as ever.
