"the problem is a very urgent problem. the necessity of going forward is an urgent and vital necessity in the economical condition of the country. i will tell the house why in a sentence. the mines are 30,000 natives short of the number engaged in the pre-war period."
these were the words subsequently used by mr. lyttelton, the colonial secretary. the matter was urgent. already protests were pouring in from every part of the empire. imperial meetings, white league meetings, anti-slavery meetings, political meetings—all the machinery, in short, of protest and obstruction was being got under weigh, and to the rand lords it seemed as if the ideal of slavery for which they had struggled so long and so hard was to be denied them at the last hour. the anguish of sir lancelot when a vision of the holy grail was denied him after all his trials and tribulations was not greater or more poignant than the trepidation of the mine owners. it became, indeed, a very urgent[pg 28] problem for them, for unless they could bring the matter to a head, not even the strongest government of the century could hope to withstand the popular will when once it was organized sufficiently to voice its petition loudly enough.
but of economical necessities there were none.
it was natural after such a devastating war that some time should elapse before the mines could get into full working order and attain that wonderful output of gold which prevailed immediately before the outbreak of hostilities. the progress of the gold industry after the war had to be gradual; but so far from it being depressed or showing signs of being stagnant, it had, as i have already shown, increased enormously. already it was within measurable distance of the output of the pre-war period. the economical necessity was not the necessity of importing cheap labour, but the necessity of paying a proper wage to the kaffir and of treating him well.
already dr. jameson, who in no sense was a partisan opponent of the rand capitalists, had declared in november 1903 that the de beers company would not employ chinamen—that they had plenty of labour, white and black, because they treated their people well.
but the rand mine owners not only did not pay their kaffirs a proper wage, but meted out to them such treatment that the death-rate among them had increased since 1902 to an[pg 29] extent which, to express it in mild terms, was appalling. i quote the figures below—
native mortality on mines
this was the economical necessity that should have occupied the attention of his majesty's government, and not the question of introducing chinese indentured labour into the colony. that the mine owners have successfully baulked in the past all inquiry as to their treatment of natives is proved conclusively by the fact that even these statistics did not draw forth a commission from the government to inquire into such a terrible state of affairs. instead of the question being, "why is it kaffirs die at the rate of seventy per thousand per month?" the problem they set themselves was how to provide an alternative to these[pg 30] quick-dying wage-wanting niggers. attempts had been made to procure coolie labour from india, and lord curzon never did a greater or a nobler thing than when he refused the sanction of his government to such a step.
mr. chamberlain said in the commons that lord curzon should have been overruled; an inexplicable remark from a man who had had the courage to say to the miners that it was better they should be governed from downing street than from park lane.
in december 1903 general ben viljeon informed a labour commissioner that a petty chief had told him recently that if he sent 100 boys to the rand only 66 returned, and some of them had scurvy. it was not wonderful, therefore, that black labour was scarce; but it was wonderful that his majesty's government did not take steps to put an end to a state of things which they must have known to be terrible, instead of merely substituting for the ill-used, underpaid, criminally-treated but free labouring kaffirs chinamen who were to be nothing better than slaves.
but the drawing up of the draft ordinance went forward. it was hurried on at an incredible rate. until the last minute it was kept back from parliament, and the blue-book dealing with the alleged necessities for introducing yellow labour was only placed in the hands of the members of the house of commons a few days before mr. herbert samuel moved his famous amendment to the[pg 31] king's address—"it is highly inexpedient that sanction should be given to any ordinance permitting the introduction of indentured chinese labourers into the transvaal colony until the approval of the colonists has been formally ascertained."
at one end of the cable sat lord milner, pricked on by the rand lords, at the other end sat the colonial secretary, anxious to be fair, anxious to be humane, anxious to do nothing contrary to the historic principles of british rule, but bemused by the clamour of the transvaal, and seeing in the protests against the ordinance only party moves and party partisanship. the clamour for the ordinance increased day by day.
sir h. campbell-bannerman had managed to extract a pledge from the government, by which lord milner was instructed to introduce into the ordinance a clause suspending its operation pending further instructions from home. but it was pointed out that the matter was of such great urgency that his majesty's government could not undertake to postpone their decision longer than the termination of the debate on the address.
as a matter of fact, they had already made up their minds. it was stated that if a colony desired chinese labour it was not for the imperial parliament to interfere. to have done so would have been contrary to the traditions of imperial government. but when mr. herbert samuel asked that the ordinance[pg 32] should not be permitted until the approval of the colonists in the transvaal had been formally obtained by the natural expedient of a referendum, lord milner asserted that to hold a referendum was impossible—it would occupy too much time, that at any rate it was an expedient unknown in any part of the british empire.
as a matter of fact, a referendum has been put in practice in south australia, in new zealand, in new south wales, and was used more recently to decide upon the important question of the australian commonwealth. that it would have occupied six months to take such a referendum, during which period the gold of the transvaal would have vanished, everybody would have refused to work, and the kaffir market would have been blotted out, was preposterous. yet, at the moment when lord milner made this statement, a census of the colony was taken, which only occupied seven weeks. it is not unreasonable to assume that such a referendum would have occupied more than a month.
all the arguments of the opposition were in vain against such plausibility. it was useless to point out that while the educated chinese were good citizens, the bitter experience of australia, canada, the united states and new zealand proved conclusively that the uneducated chinamen, wherever they went, were vicious, immoral and unclean, hated by the white man, loathed and feared by every decent white woman. the government admitted the danger[pg 33] of allowing 50,000 chinamen to be planted down in a colony without any restrictions. their introduction was a regrettable necessity; and so it was proposed to keep them in compounds, to round them up every night like sheep, to make them liable to heavy penalties if they wandered abroad without a permit. this was the only way, they declared, in which these necessary evils could be used. of the necessity of utilizing the evil at all they were convinced, and no argument succeeded in shaking their faith. it was pointed out to them that this would be semi-slavery, if not indeed actual slavery. the chinaman was not to be employed in any position but that of a miner; he could not improve his position; he could not give notice to one employer and go to another. he could never leave the compound without permission. if he struck work he could be imprisoned. he was bound to reside on the premises of his employer, in charge of a manager appointed for the purpose. permission to leave these premises might or might not be granted; but in any case he could never be absent for more than forty-eight hours at a time. if he escaped, he could be tracked down, arrested without a warrant and imprisoned by a magistrate, while anybody who harboured or concealed him was fined ￡50, or imprisoned in default of payment.
the ordinance was without parallel in the empire. because the chinese were competitors, because they were a moral and social[pg 34] danger, the supporters of the ordinance were compelled to devise some system under which it could become law in the transvaal, and by which they could yet prevent any one of the chinamen brought in being able at any time to leave his employment and turn to other and more profitable undertakings.
only a casuist could call this anything else but slavery. one of our most unsuccessful ministers tried to find a parallel between this system and the life of our soldiers—a parallel so bright and so pleasing that no one, i think, has yet attempted to spoil the bloom of this flower of grim humour by disclosing its absurdity. the transvaal government had, in fact, gone to the statute books of the slave states of america for a model for their ordinance.
it was soon seen and realized that any attempt to negative the ordinance must prove abortive. all that the opposition could do was to render it as innocuous as possible, and to secure as many guarantees as they could for the proper moral and physical treatment of the unfortunate chinamen. they extracted pledges and promises galore, most of which have been completely broken.
on march 21, 1904, mr. lyttelton, after stating that the average kaffir wage was 50s. for thirty days' work, made this statement in the house of commons—"chinamen would receive in the transvaal at least 2s. a day. i stand here and give the house my assurance that the[pg 35] chinese will receive at least the amount i have specified."
at that time, when this well-meaning pledge was made, the kaffir was only receiving 33s. per month. but even had he been receiving 50s. a month, which mr. lyttelton in his ignorance imagined, was it at all likely that the rand owner would pay the chinaman 2s. a day, or 60s. a month, that is to say, 10s. a month more than they were presumably paying the kaffirs? of course, the mine magnates were not going to pay the chinaman more than the 33s. they were paying the kaffir.
mr. lyttelton's pledge was summarily disposed of by lord milner and the mine owners.
after at first insisting on a minimum of 1s. a day instead of 2s., lord milner finally made this plausible promise, that if within six months the average pay was not more than 50s. for thirty days' work, the minimum should be raised from 1s. to 1s. 6d. a day. mr. lyttelton's maximum of 2s. a day was thus reduced to a possible minimum of 1s. 6d. a day.
another delightful pledge was also given. it seemed almost indeed as if the transvaal government were continually advising lord milner to cable, saying, "promise anything in heaven or earth, but let's get this ordinance through."
with somewhat unusual consideration, the opinion of the chinese government had been asked on the subject. speaking through their[pg 36] ambassador, the chinese government insisted that the immigrant should have free access to the courts of justice to obtain redress for injury to his personal property.
on march 10, 1904, mr. lyttelton stated that the chinese labourers would have the same right of access to the courts as all the other subjects of his majesty's dominions. any subject of his majesty's dominions has the right to appear before a court when he has any grievance. that is the right of all subjects of his majesty's dominions. the chinaman, according to mr. lyttelton, was to have the same right. as a matter of fact, he has no right of access to the courts, except by leave of an inspector.
again, mr. lyttelton declared, when the chinese government raised the point of flogging, that there was no power in the ordinance to impose flogging. there was not at that time. but four months later, on july 28, an ordinance was assented to by which the resident magistrate had the right to flog in cases where the conviction was a conviction of robbery, in cases of any statutory offence for which flogging could be only given for the second conviction, in cases of assault of a grave character or intended to do serious bodily harm, or, indeed, to commit any offence.
i shall deal later in detail with the punishments that have been inflicted on the yellow slaves that work in their slavery under the union jack. it is at present only my object to[pg 37] outline the policy of promising anything and making all sorts of preposterous pledges in order that the clamours of the rand lords might be gratified. in johannesburg they knew well that if once indentured labour was agreed to in principle, it would be easy to make what alterations they wished in the spirit or the letter of the ordinance.
in february 1904 mr. lyttelton stated with regard to the importation of women with the chinese—"we are advised in this matter by men of the most experience in the whole empire on the subject of chinese labour. we are advised that the coolies would not go without their womenfolk. manifestly it would be wrong that they should go without their womenfolk if they were desirous of taking them with them."
to quiet the lethargic conscience of that adept courtier, his grace the archbishop of canterbury, it was declared that the interests of public morality demanded that the chinamen should be accompanied by their wives, and that this was one of the essential conditions of the ordinance. it was pointed out at the time that once the mine owners had 5000 indentured labourers, they would not take upon themselves the burden of supporting their wives, with an average of three children apiece. it would mean 250,000 women and children. and it is almost inconceivable that even mr. lyttelton could have imagined that the cosmopolitan proprietors of the transvaal would have taken[pg 38] upon themselves the superintendence of human beings utterly incapable of dragging gold from the earth.
as a matter of fact, chinese have never taken their wives into foreign countries, and therefore the moral question, which so concerned dr. davidson for one brief day, was not settled. as a matter of fact, it was stated at the beginning of this year by the colonial secretary that while 4895 wives were registered as accompanying their husbands, only two women and twelve children had actually been brought over!
it was stated by mr. lyttelton, at the same time as he satisfied the conscience of the most reverend primate, that the chinaman would be so well fed and so lightly worked that in the interests of morality it was physically necessary that he should be accompanied by his wife. in explaining the fact that only two women and twelve children had accompanied the thirty or forty thousand chinamen up to the beginning of 1905, the colonial secretary remarked in effect that this fact would not lead to immorality, because the chinaman's food was so frugal and his work was so steady that he would be almost physically incapable of those passions which are a source of so much trouble, of so much crime, of so much happiness, and of so much beneficence to the white man, the black man, the red man, and the brown man. life under the rand lords, in short, was practically emasculating, and therefore immorality was impossible.
[pg 39]
i shall deal with this subject later on. for the present i will point out that this was the fourth pledge that had been given in the house of commons, only to be broken, not, i admit, by mr. lyttelton and the government, but by their masters, the mine owners on the rand.
the opposition steadily opposed the government in the house.
major seely and mr. winston churchill left the conservative party, major seely resigning his seat to test the temper of his constituents in the isle of wight on this very subject. the electors in the isle of wight were of no uncertain temper. they returned major seely to the house, thereby proving, as all subsequent by-elections have proved, that the chinese labour ordinance is bitterly opposed by the vast majority of freedom-loving britons.
it had been the custom during the war to submit very largely to the opinion of the colonies. in fact, the influence of colonial opinion had partly directed the policy of the government for several years. mr. chamberlain constantly submitted to it, before, during, and after the war. he had based his bold venture of tariff reform on this very opinion. it was because the colonies would think this or would say that, that the british workman was to submit to a tax upon corn, a tax upon clothes, a tax upon everything else. it was reasonable to expect, therefore, that on such an important imperial question, touching the welfare of a[pg 40] colony, to possess which the whole of the empire had risen in arms, and men had poured from the snows of canada and the rolling plains of the bush, the opinions of the five nations would have been consulted. but even if the government did not submit to this recognition of their services, to this acceptance of a common imperial interest, it was only natural to have supposed that they would have at least taken into account the advice of canada, australia, and new zealand, who had experienced the evils of chinese immigration.
i have travelled all over the orange river colony, natal, cape colony, and the transvaal, and the colonial people and the dutch were all unanimously against the introduction of the chinese on the rand. i have never yet met one person in favour of the ordinance. and since the ordinance became law, and the yellow slaves began their work at the mines, nearly every person i have met in south africa has openly regretted the war, and declared that they preferred the days of paul kruger, whose government may have been corrupt, but was at any rate based on the principle that it is the duty of a white government to look after the moral and social welfare of its white subjects.
mr. chamberlain himself declared that there was considerable indignation expressed throughout south africa at the proposal to introduce chinese labour, and that a vast majority of the people throughout south africa were bitterly opposed to the ordinance.
[pg 41]
the colonies were not slow in sending passionate protests to the colonial office against the ordinance. mr. seddon wired—"my government desire to protest against the proposal to introduce chinese labour into south africa. they foresee that great dangers, racial, social and political, would inevitably be introduced by chinese influx, however stringent the conditions of introduction and employment may be."
mr. deakin, the premier of australia, declared that australia had been told that the war was a miners' war, but not for chinese miners; a war for the franchise, but not for chinese franchise. the truth, if it had been told, would have presented a very different aspect, and would have made a very different appeal to australia.
cape colony, which was more intimately concerned with the welfare of the transvaal than any other portion of the empire, passed a resolution in the cape parliament, "that this house, taking cognizance of the resolution passed at the recent conference held at bloemfontein on the subject of the qualified approval of the importation of asiatic labour, desires to express its strong opposition to any such importation as prejudicial to the interests of all classes of people in south africa."
this last resolution had been sent to the government as long before as july 1903, when the first steps were being taken to pave the way for yellow slavery.
but of all these protests the government[pg 42] took no notice whatever. they met all questions with a statement that the transvaal was to be allowed to decide on its own internal affairs; and when the opposition demanded that the opinion of the transvaal should be taken, so that these principles could be carried into effect, they replied that a referendum, the only means of ascertaining this opinion, would take six months, during which time the transvaal would be ruined.
never was the logic of any of the characters in alice in wonderland so unanswerable.
in the transvaal itself loud and indignant protests were made against the proposal. but the rand lords asserted their supremacy with ruthless severity. the transvaal leader, the transvaal advertiser, and the johannesburg star all opposed the introduction of asiatic labour. their respective editors, mr. r. j. pakeman, mr. j. scoble, and mr. monypenny, were compelled to resign because they refused to sacrifice their opinions for their proprietors. some idea of the pressure that was brought to bear, may be seen in the valedictory editorial which mr. monypenny wrote on retiring from the editorship of the johannesburg star:—
"to the policy of chinese immigration, to which the chamber of mines has decided to devote its energies, the present editor of the star remains resolutely opposed, and declines in any way to identify himself with such an experiment. to the ideal of a white south africa, which, to whatever qualifications it[pg 43] may necessarily be subject, is something very different from the ideal of a chinese south africa, he resolutely clings, with perfect faith that whatever its enemies may do to-day that ideal will inevitably prevail. but as the financial houses which control the mining industry of the transvaal have for the present enrolled themselves among its enemies the present editor of the star withdraws."
it is not difficult to read between the lines here and see the determination of the mining magnates to crush every opposition to their will.
mr. cresswell, who had stood out for white labour on the village main reef mine, and had proved conclusively that white labour could be employed at a profit greater than that at which black labour was employed, was compelled to resign his general managership. mr. wybergh, commissioner of mines, and for long a distinguished servant of the government, had dared to protest against chinese serfdom, and was forced also to resign.
every day it became more clear that the transvaal was to be no place for an englishman. the white man's blood and the white man's treasure may have been spent to win it for the one-time flag of freedom, but the englishman was not to make his home or earn his living upon the land. "we want no white proletariat," lord milner had said.
but the magnates did not stop at merely coercing the press. indignation meetings were held at cape town and kimberley, and they[pg 44] employed men to break them up at 15s. per head.
at a meeting at johannesburg, held by the african labour league, it was arranged that a proposal should be put to the vote deploring the importation of asiatics, and protesting against the action of the government, and demanding a referendum in the colony. at this meeting several men were present, paid by a certain mr. b. of johannesburg to create a disturbance. their efforts were so successful, they shouted so long "you want the chinese," that the meeting became an uproar, and the speakers were unable to be heard.
but all protests were unavailing and futile. all opposition was considered as a party move. the cry of "yellow slavery" was attributed to shameless radical tactics. the liberal party, it was said, would stoop to anything with which to besmirch the fair name of the conservative party. the ordinance passed the house after having been debated at length. it has since been altered in some of its most important details, thereby emphasizing the fact that in permitting the question to be debated in the house the government only regarded the discussion as a sham.
but even in the conservative party there were men whose consciences pricked them over the ordinance. one old respected member, who has recently died, declared privately on the day that the vote was taken that for the first time in his life he had voted against his[pg 45] conscience, at the urgent instance of the conservative whips. he for one realized, when it was too late, that the introduction of the chinese on the rand was—as mr. asquith lately remarked at leven—"a most gigantic and short-sighted blunder."
