1783—1785
sultan tippoo sahib of mysore—operations in southern india—death of sir eyre coote—attack on cuddalore—peace with france—tippoo makes peace—strained relations between civil and military in india—the e. i. company’s military establishment—the king’s troops in india—misconduct of madras government—quarrel between council and general stuart—complaints of council against burgoyne—arrest of stuart—council appoint lang to supersede burgoyne—burgoyne refuses to give over command of the king’s troops—strange delusions of the council—imminent conflict between king’s and company’s troops—unworkable arrangement—fresh quarrel—burgoyne arrested—mutiny of native cavalry—court martial on burgoyne—his acquittal—his death—end of the quarrel—burgoyne justified.
in little more than a month after the regiment landed, the death of hyder ali occurred. it brought no relief to british interests. his son and successor, tippoo, was an experienced soldier, though inferior to hyder in ability. he was noted for his religious fanaticism and a violent temper, joined to a most barbarous cruelty of disposition. to this was added a spirit of implacable hostility to the english, the only european power in the country that appeared formidable to him. possessed of a full treasury and a powerful army, he at once took the field with a force that contained 900 european troops, 250 topasses,[9] and 2000 french sepoys, besides many thousands of his own mysore troops. to oppose him, the madras government could dispose only of some 2950 european, and 11,500 native troops. with this force, major general[36] stuart took the field in january, and made his way by slow marches to vellore. meanwhile, tippoo was forced to withdraw to the westward to defend mysore from an attack on that side. on the arrival at bombay of reinforcements in sir richard bickerton’s convoy, about 500 of the company’s recruits, destined for madras, were detained, and, on the arrival of the king’s troops at madras, about 400 of them were at once sent back to bombay. out of this material a force had been organized, under major general matthews, to advance against mysore from the west coast. after the capture of several places, the force was hemmed in at bednore, and obliged to surrender to tippoo, on 30th april 1783. a great loss was experienced at this time in the death of sir eyre coote at madras, on 27th april, three days after his return to resume command of the operations. after this nothing was done till june, when an ineffective attack was made on cuddalore by major general stuart. the french were on the point of striking a counter blow which would probably have proved successful, when the announcement of peace in europe changed the complexion of affairs. the french force with tippoo was withdrawn, but otherwise the war continued. at this point the mahrattas intervened. tippoo’s character and his great power rendered him a menace to the other native princes, and it was no part of the mahratta policy that he should be allowed to crush the english. they therefore called on him to desist from hostilities. on his refusing to comply, they signed a treaty of alliance against him with the english. in the meantime, a successful expedition under colonel fullarton, strengthened by the troops set free by the peace with france, had penetrated into mysore, from the south, and threatened seringapatam. under these circumstances, lord macartney and the madras council induced tippoo to sign a treaty of peace, 11th march 1784; a treaty discreditable[37] to themselves, and disapproved of by warren hastings.
in a letter, dated 6th september 1783, addressed to the court of directors, the select committee of the madras council states that sir john burgoyne’s regiment, being reported fit for service, had been ordered to take the field. but the regiment did not move from san thomé. the council desired to send the regiment into the field without burgoyne. on the latter notifying his intention of accompanying his regiment, under orders from general stuart, the move was countermanded. the incident was part of the fast ripening quarrel between the civil government and the king’s officers, which must be mentioned on account of the serious results it had on the fortunes of the colonel of the 23rd light dragoons.
from the time of their first military establishment in india, the company had always evinced great distrust of their military officers, a feeling that was not without some justification in view of the character of the adventurers, who at first took service with the company. the company’s troops on their part were under the influence of the feeling, prevalent in england, that the exercise of sovereign rights by a company of merchants was derogatory to the dignity of the crown. hence it arose that the company’s officers were less deferential to the authority of the company, than they should have been, while the company became more exacting of the respect due to them, and made it their policy to keep down the army, in numbers, in rank, and in authority. this feeling of jealousy became intensified when the services of king’s troops were placed at the disposal of the company; and many quarrels detrimental to the public service ensued. at the time we are treating of, the king’s troops in india were the mainstay of the company’s power. the company was under stringent engagements to pay them[38] regularly, instead of allowing their pay to fall into arrears, as was always the case with their own troops. they were to be commanded as far as possible by king’s officers only, and the commander in chief at each presidency was appointed by the crown. every king’s officer, whatever the date of his commission, took rank above all company’s officers holding similar commissions, and every field officer of king’s troops, while in india, was given a step of brevet rank above his regimental rank. this naturally caused some ill feeling between the king’s and company’s officers. the arrangement had first been made when there was only a single battalion of king’s troops in india. as the number of king’s troops increased, the extra rank given to the officers became a very serious grievance to the company’s officers, which was further aggravated by the company’s policy of maintaining a very small number of field officers, and of having their regiments commanded by captains. the instructions for avoiding disputes with the company’s officers, that were issued to sir john burgoyne, before sailing from england, had been a stereotyped formula of orders for all officers sent with troops to india for more than twenty years past: but such admonitions were of little use under conditions that made friction inevitable.
the madras government was possessed at that time of a perverse spirit, that led them into all kinds of extravagancies and never ending quarrels. the members of the council fought amongst themselves; they evaded or disobeyed the orders of the court of directors, and ignored the authority of the governor general. individually, they commanded little respect. collectively, they mismanaged everything. they interfered in military matters, that in a time of war were peculiarly in the province of the chief military authority; and they frittered away the forces at their disposal in ill-conceived and[39] badly equipped expeditions that frequently ended in disaster. finally, they quarrelled with everybody who was not immediately under their orders, and wrote long winded complaints to the court of directors and to bengal, instead of doing their best under the trying circumstances of the time. the king’s officers on their side were also difficult to deal with. they asserted their right to direct how and where the king’s troops should be employed, and, in other respects, claimed an independence of the civil government incompatible with public interests. in 1780, when the commander in chief, sir eyre coote, had been sent down from bengal, after the disaster to colonel baillie’s army, he was furnished with orders for the suspension of the acting governor, mr whitehill, against whom the gravest charges had been made, and he was specially invested with powers that to a great extent made him independent of the madras council, including the exclusive direction of the treasure transmitted for the prosecution of the war. the temporary grant of such powers was necessary under existing circumstances, but was none the less resented by the madras council; though there was little active opposition till the assumption of the governorship by lord macartney in june 1781. the council complained that more was not accomplished, sir eyre coote complained that his troops were sent into the field without supplies; the council sent an expedition against the dutch settlements, without consulting the general, and an open rupture occurred, in which the admiral took part, in consequence of dispatches addressed to both commanders being opened by the resident at tanjore. at this stage of the quarrel, sir eyre coote’s health forced him to leave for bengal. the command devolved on major general stuart, and the quarrel went on worse than ever.
lord macartney at once assumed the direction of the[40] campaign, and made himself ridiculous by forcing stuart to destroy three of his own forts, the preservation of which was anxiously desired by sir eyre coote. stuart, on his side, claimed the right of exercising the special powers that had been conferred on sir eyre coote. stuart’s position was a peculiar one. while on the king’s half pay list, in 1775, his services were lent to the company, who conferred on him the rank of brigadier general. in october 1781, the crown gave him the commission of major general in india, and, three months later, his commission was antedated. his position, however, differed from that of other general officers, in that he was not borne on the strength of any regiment, and his status in england was only that of a half pay colonel. he had done good service already in the campaign against hyder, in which he had lost a leg by a cannon shot.
in december 1782, stuart withdrew the garrison of masulipatam for service elsewhere, without consulting the government, and at once both parties entered into a paper war, that absorbed all the energies that should have been devoted to the war with tippoo and the french. each party bombarded the other with notes and minutes, that continued to be exchanged after the army had taken the field for cuddalore, and the council wrote to london and calcutta in the gloomiest terms, expressing their fears of general stuart’s designs.[10] in neither quarter did they elicit any sympathy. in terms of measured sarcasm warren hastings pointed out that their “collected mass of complaint and invective” was directed in turn against every single british authority in india except themselves, including the naval commander in chief,[41] as well as against the nawab of arcot and his ministers.
the madras government had become contemptible alike in the eyes of friends and enemies, and it was impossible to work with them. lost to all sense of public duty, they formed the project of refusing to place the troops under command of sir eyre coote on his return in april. sir eyre coote was, on this occasion, nominated by the bengal government to take the command of all the troops on the coast, except the garrison actually required at madras. not an unreasonable arrangement, as sir eyre coote was commander in chief in india, and the madras government was dependent for money on bengal. the madras government sent peremptory orders for stuart to hasten his march, in order that the troops might be far distant when sir e. coote arrived, and passed a resolution that he should not have the command. a letter addressed by the madras council to sir eyre coote when he was dying, drew down upon them a censure from warren hastings that was calculated to penetrate the most pachydermatous self-conceit, but it had apparently no effect on lord macartney and his council. even before sir eyre coote’s death, the feeling of lord macartney and the council against the king’s officers was shown by a minute of the council, at the time of the preparation of the army for the siege of cuddalore, wherein an attempt was made to deprive the generals bearing the king’s commission of any employment in the field. in it, an endeavour was made to elicit from major general stuart an opinion that the public interests would be best served by leaving those officers, five in number, in garrison. this idea was resisted by stuart, and major general bruce was sent with the army to cuddalore. the frigate that conveyed the news of the cessation of hostilities with france, to[42] the army before cuddalore, brought also peremptory orders to stuart to embark at once for madras, to answer charges of misconduct. bruce was forced by ill health to return a few days later.
the command of the force in the field then devolved temporarily on colonel gordon, till sir john burgoyne took command of the returning army on 13th august. but sir john burgoyne had likewise come under the displeasure of the select committee. in the same letter[11] to the court of directors in which they announced the supersession of stuart, and their intention to give the command to burgoyne, they wrote—
“sir john burgoyne expecting a preference to be given to his men in point of accommodations and every other respect above all other corps of his majesty’s or the company’s troops, and making no allowance for the calamities of the times and the exigencies of our situation, has been loud and frequent in his complaints, and the utmost endeavours on our part to show attention to himself as well as to his regiment have fallen short of the sense he entertained of the claims of both.”
in another part of the same letter they stated that burgoyne had claimed to be a major general, but they had only his word for it, as the fact had not been notified to them. yet, in the directors’ letter of 25th january 1782, burgoyne’s rank as major general in the east indies from 1st june 1781, is precisely stated.
burgoyne was justifiably angry at the treatment his regiment had experienced. nothing had been done by the madras government to have horses in readiness for the regiment on arrival. the quarters in which the men were first placed were so unhealthy, that by the middle of july, less than nine months after landing, 78 had died. his own claims to the rank and allowances of a major general[43] were challenged; while, in common with all the senior officers of king’s troops, he was exasperated by the animus displayed against them by lord macartney and the council, and the openly avowed intention to ignore their just claims, in defiance of the intentions of the crown. in a letter, dated 3rd september 1783, in which he reports to the ministry at home, the fact of his having assumed the command of the army returning from cuddalore, he dwells on the grievances of the king’s general officers, especially “the declaration of the governor, who says no king’s officer shall ever command in chief here, let his rank be what it may; and that a junior officer in the company’s service should have rank given him superior to what any king’s officer may have to entitle him to command.” it is evident that the violent measures shortly afterwards taken by lord macartney, were in pursuance of a long contemplated scheme for getting rid of the king’s general officers.
from the beginning, stuart had been quarrelsome and unreasonable in his dealings with the rest of the council. the council complained loudly of the slowness of his advance on cuddalore. for this he does not appear to have been responsible, as the delay was caused by his having to wait for the squadron and store ships which did not arrive before cuddalore till after the army had encamped before the place. among other causes of quarrel was the desire of the general to give effect to the views of the bengal government in the affairs of the nawab of arcot; views which were strenuously opposed by the rest of the council. soon after the return of the army to madras the council passed a resolution dismissing stuart from the service, and conferring the commander in chiefship on burgoyne. on the 17th september this was announced to burgoyne, who was addressed as commander in chief, and requested to attend the council[44] immediately. in a general order of the same date, the council, anticipating objections, justified their action by arguing that stuart held only a half pay commission from the king, and that the company could do as they pleased with him as he held no position under the crown in india.
as burgoyne entered the fort a salute was fired from the ramparts, but he at once informed the council that, while they could dispose of the command of the company’s forces as they pleased, he had no power to supersede stuart who held the king’s commission of major general, and the command of the king’s troops de jure, and, so long as he was able to act, could only be deprived of his command by the king’s order. on this he was told that, if he did not accept the command, it was intended to make lieutenant colonel lang a company’s officer, a lieutenant general, and appoint him commander-in-chief. burgoyne continued firm in his resolve, but was detained till 8 in the evening on various pretexts. meanwhile, without his knowledge, arrangements were made for stuart’s arrest, and a letter was sent to lieutenant colonel lang appointing him commander-in-chief of the army with the rank of lieutenant general. the order issued a few hours previously, appointing burgoyne commander-in-chief, was ignored as if it had never existed. burgoyne was then told that he might retire. on leaving the council room, he found the gates closed and the drawbridges drawn up, and learned that stuart had been arrested by a company of sepoys, in his own house, and brought, a close prisoner, into the fort, under circumstances of much indignity. the excuse afterwards assigned by the select committee for this extraordinary proceeding was, that they believed stuart was about to seize the government by force.
on the following day burgoyne wrote to the select committee, expressing his intention of taking command of the king’s troops, since stuart was incapacitated from[45] acting. he received no reply, and, on arrival at the camp he found two orders, one constituting lang a lieutenant general, and the other directing lang to take command of the whole army; thus superseding burgoyne and four other major generals and several lieutenant colonels, who had been senior to lang.
burgoyne at once assembled the king’s officers in his tent, and related to them what had passed. for his own part, he said, he should consider himself wanting in his duty, to pay obedience to any other than a senior officer of the king’s appointment: that general stuart being deprived of the possibility of acting, the command of the king’s troops devolved on himself. he did not attempt to bias the opinions of any of the gentlemen present: he recommended the avoidance of altercation or even discussion with the company’s officers, lest unforeseen consequences might ensue. the officers present said they would obey no orders but those of the commander-in-chief representing the king, viz.: sir john burgoyne.
the same afternoon lang arrived in camp, and met the king’s officers in burgoyne’s tent, where he delivered an order from the council instructing burgoyne to surrender the command of the army to him. burgoyne replied that he would give over the command of the company’s troops to whomsoever the council chose to appoint, but that his duty to the king required that he should not deliver over the command of the king’s troops to any person not regularly authorized by his majesty: he placed his tents at colonel lang’s service. lang replied that he had a house at the mount, and remained silent some time, till, on the officers calling out that they would obey sir john burgoyne only, he got up and went away. on the same day a letter was addressed to the admiral by sir john, asking for advice and support, and requesting an asylum on board the flag ship, in the event[46] of any attempt being made on his person. the admiral was so situated that he might have discreetly acted as mediator between the contending parties had he been so disposed; but, perhaps, his previous experiences of the madras council made him unwilling to be mixed up in the quarrel. anyhow, he refused to have anything to do with the matter.
very little was needed to produce a conflict between the king’s and company’s troops that night. the king’s troops had been exasperated at the animosity displayed by the council towards sir eyre coote and the king’s officers in general. they were alarmed at the violence offered to general stuart, and were resolved to repel by force any repetition of this violence in burgoyne’s case. in order to prevent surprise, guards were posted round the camp. the council, on their part, had been haunted all along by the idea that the king’s officers aimed at subverting the government. two battalions of bengal sepoys with some guns were ordered down to protect lang’s house, and the gates of the fort were kept shut. each party expected to be attacked, and, for the next forty-eight hours, a very slight occurrence might have precipitated a disastrous conflict.
the following day, burgoyne summoned major generals bruce, campbell, ogle, and adams to confer with him, and a remonstrance, signed by the five, was drawn up and forwarded to the council; to the effect that they were determined not to act under lang’s orders. lang had meanwhile issued orders for the army to march on the following day, in order to test their obedience. lieut. colonel floyd was also senior to lang by the date of his commission. several regiments gave assurances of support to burgoyne and floyd. at a conference of the senior officers a course of action was determined on, and burgoyne withdrew from the camp, at midnight, to his house in[47] madras. the vedettes round the camp were at once withdrawn. the next morning, floyd likewise withdrew from the army; handing over his command to lt. colonel mackenzie of the 73rd, who was junior to lang by date of commission. the force marched, and took up fresh ground in rear of their former position.
on reaching madras, burgoyne addressed a letter to the select committee notifying his withdrawal from the camp, and offering himself for arrest if government had a mind to seize his person. the offer was somewhat embarrassing to the select committee, who evaded the point by saying that, as burgoyne had refused to take command of the army, lang had been appointed in his place, and there was nothing more to be said in the matter. on this, burgoyne deputed floyd to carry a letter to lord macartney, in which he asserted his position as senior officer bearing the king’s commission, and pointed out that he alone had power to convene courts martial.[12]
lord macartney was a man of violent temper and overbearing disposition that kept him in continual hot water. he demanded unhesitating submission to his views from all with whom he came in contact. his relations with the supreme government at calcutta were as unyielding as with those in immediate contact with him at madras. his chief merit was his personal honesty in money matters, at a time of great laxity; a merit on which he was by no means silent, and which he did not insist on in his colleagues. he threw himself with ardour into the chronic quarrels carried on by the madras council with the bengal government and the military authorities, and, in pursuit of the quarrels, lost sight of the great interests at stake, and brought the madras settlement to the verge of anarchy.[48] even before sir eyre coote’s death he had been induced to believe that general stuart had designs against the government. this belief, for which not a scrap of evidence was ever brought forward, led him into a line of conduct that brought about corresponding and increasing opposition from stuart. after stuart’s arrest, the same suspicion was transferred to burgoyne, with even less presumption of justice than had existed in stuart’s case. burgoyne proposed an interview in the presence of witnesses. had lord macartney been less bent on the quarrel, he would have grasped the opportunity of coming to some understanding. instead of this he used the most uncompromising language to floyd. “government would not recede; government must be peremptory;” and he still affected to treat burgoyne as having refused the command of the army. the following day, burgoyne received a letter from the select committee arguing the old point of general stuart’s commission, and asserting that burgoyne had acknowledged the validity of lang’s promotion to the rank of lieutenant general, in spite of which he had withdrawn from camp without lang’s permission. the committee would not contest with him about any authority he might undertake to exercise, unless it endangered the public safety, but would not countenance his resumption of command. lang’s command extended to the king’s as well as the company’s troops, and they (the committee) would convey dispatches addressed to either commander in chief, to lang. if sir john burgoyne thought proper to act as commander in chief, and to convene courts martial, the committee had no objection “unless their duty forced them to interfere.” such unworkable arrangements were bound to lead to further quarrels. on the same day, as previously proposed by him, sir john burgoyne had an[49] interview with lord macartney, major general bruce and lt. colonel floyd being present. throughout the quarrel, burgoyne had been actuated by a desire to arrive at some working arrangement that would enable the public service to be carried on, while preserving the rights of the king whose senior representative he was. in this spirit he sought an interview with the governor. but there was no corresponding desire for peace on the side of the governor and council, and lord macartney’s behaviour was disingenuous. burgoyne asked for explanations to some parts of the select committee’s letter, which he discussed generally. lord macartney would give no direct answer, and was very guarded in what he said. he was only a member of the government, not authorized to decide, but only to speak their sentiments, and to represent matters to the other members. would sir john put down in writing what questions he pleased, he would engage to lay them before the select committee, and obtain replies to them. lord macartney’s intention was to obtain the same control over the king’s troops, as he exercised over the company’s troops. to gain this end he was resolved to give the command to a company’s officer, who would naturally be more pliable than a king’s officer, though it was a recognised principle with the british government to keep the command of the king’s troops under an officer of their own appointment. it is almost incredible that this miserable quarrel should have gone on at a time of the greatest public distress, when tippoo was triumphant in the field, and it was still uncertain that the mahrattas would not take up arms again.
stuart was, shortly afterwards, shipped off to england under close arrest, in a ship specially purchased for the purpose, though, for want of funds, the pay of the troops was in some instances over two years in arrears. during[50] imprisonment, he was denied the use of pen and ink, and was only allowed to see burgoyne on public business in presence of the officer on duty over him. at the time of his embarkation, he believed that it was intended to put him to death at sea.
burgoyne assumed the command of the king’s troops without further direct opposition, but the council lost no opportunity of thwarting him and lowering his authority, while they encouraged others to resist it. burgoyne, on his part, cast moderation aside, and was bent on pushing his claims to extremity. he ignored general lang, and issued orders that clashed with those of the civil government, producing confusion, perplexity, and relaxation of discipline in every rank. the major generals, who had joined in signing the protest against lang’s promotion, and several others among the officers commanding regiments withdrew their support from burgoyne. in october, burgoyne placed lieutenant colonel sterling of the 36th under arrest for disobedience of orders: the select committee released him. the soldiers too had their grievances about batta which should have been paid to them, but was withheld by lord macartney. the men of the 98th were on the eve of mutiny, and the men of burgoyne’s own regiment formed the project of going to the fort in a body to ask redress. burgoyne sternly repressed both movements, but the select committee gave him credit for causing them. a fresh crisis in the quarrel was inevitable.
in december, general ogle reported certain matters seriously affecting the private character of an officer of the 73rd. the rest of the officers of the regiment refused to allow the matter to be patched up, as general ogle desired. burgoyne had no option but to convene a general court martial, which he did, appointing lieutenant colonel straubenzee of the 52nd as president. the court was also[51] to try two soldiers of the 98th, who had appealed from a regimental court martial. on such occasions it was customary for the council to appoint the judge advocate. they refused to nominate one for this or any court martial sir john might order to assemble, and refused to grant a place in the fort for the court to assemble in. they also forbade straubenzee to leave poonamallee where he was commanding. burgoyne then arranged for the court to assemble at poonamallee, but without making the change known, and ordered straubenzee still to hold himself in readiness to preside. he also ordered colonel sterling to appear for trial before the court. the select committee thereupon, on the 31st december, issued an order placing burgoyne under arrest for disobedience of orders in september, and for exciting mutiny and sedition, and appointed major general alan campbell to command the king’s troops. no attempt was made on this occasion to place the king’s troops under lang.
the absurdity of the select committee’s action, both in stuart’s and burgoyne’s cases, was shown by their inability to form a court martial for the trial of those officers. they tried to get burgoyne to proceed to england, but he refused to go. he proceeded, for a time, to pondicherry under open arrest, while the dual commands of the king’s and company’s forces continued. for the next eighteen months lord macartney’s quarrels and intrigues, added to his unjust measures touching the pay and allowances of the army, produced results that bid fair to end in the ruin of the british government on the coast.
in april 1784, a mutiny occurred among four newly formed native cavalry regiments at arnee. arrears of pay for twelve months were owing to them, and they likewise had unsatisfied claims on the nawab of arcot, from whose service they had been transferred. they seized the fort of arnee, and imprisoned their officers. a month’s pay was[52] given them, but they held out for the whole arrears. the 36th foot and one hundred men of the 23rd light dragoons were dispatched to arcot, to join general lang. on the night of the 15th may they marched for arnee, which they reached soon after daybreak, and after a brief parley the mutineers laid down their arms.[13] in october, one of the king’s infantry regiments at arcot broke out into open mutiny, but were overawed by the men of the 23rd, and the two other regiments in garrison, who stuck to their officers. these were by no means the only instances of grave insubordination both among king’s or company’s troops, due to lord macartney’s ill-advised measures. the officers had to complain of broken faith as well as the men.
sir john burgoyne’s arrest did not prevent him from looking after the welfare of the regiment. there had been many casualties among the horses,[14] as well as among the men; and lord macartney is said to have conceived the idea of gradually allowing the 23rd light dragoons to disappear from want of horses and men, and of raising a corps of european cavalry in their place. as the men died, the extra horses were taken from the regiment, and lt. colonel floyd was forbidden to entertain recruits, of whom a certain number were procurable, probably from infantry regiments on the spot. sir john thereupon addressed the bengal government, by whom a reference was made to madras recommending the deficiencies to be made good. the madras government thought the regiment was very well as it was, and demurred to corresponding with sir john while he was under arrest. the bengal[53] govt. pointed out that that need not prevent them from corresponding with the next officer in the regiment. they dwelt on the importance of maintaining the regiment in an efficient state, and expressed their sense of the value of the services rendered by the regiment in dealing with the mutiny of the native cavalry at arnee, and their “desire of giving the company’s service the full benefit of the good discipline of h.m.’s 23rd light dragoons.” the madras government replied that they would be glad if the bengal govt. would take over the whole of the charges of the regiment. for their part, they thought it useless to recruit for the regiment, when there were already more men than horses, and it would be better to transfer the superfluous men to the infantry, as horses were expensive, and a diminution in their number was a useful economy. warren hastings brushed all such cobwebs aside, and sent 147 horses from hyderabad to remount the regiment. in spite of their protests, the madras government entered into a correspondence with sir john which was characterized on both sides by much bitterness. a detachment of the regiment was at this time at ellore in the masulipatum district.
there seems to have been some expectation at this time that the regiment would be recalled to england, probably on account of lord macartney’s recommendations to the court of directors. anyhow, a madras letter, dated 26th may 1785, published in the calcutta public advertiser, says: “the 23rd regiment is to remain in india. the appointments and recommendations of sir john burgoyne, are approved of.” in the middle of july, a detachment of the regiment was sent to arcot, but was almost immediately recalled to san thomé.
meanwhile, sir john burgoyne’s troubles were coming to an end. on the news of the quarrels, resulting in burgoyne’s arrest, reaching england, much interest was[54] excited in the highest quarters. the matter was twice discussed in the house of commons, on the 19th july and 9th august, and it was generally recognised that the trouble had primarily arisen from a faulty system. burgoyne was held to have been correct in his behaviour, and received reassuring letters, written by the king’s commands, pending the official settlement of the question. it was determined to appoint at once a new commander in chief of madras, besides filling the vacancy caused by the death of sir eyre coote, and to remove the chief actors in the quarrel on both sides. burgoyne continued under arrest till the nearly simultaneous arrival in madras, at the beginning of june, of lieut. general robert sloper as commander in chief in india, and lieut. general sir john dalling as commander in chief in madras. general sloper brought with him instructions to convene a court martial for burgoyne’s trial, and for burgoyne’s return to england after the trial, whatever its result might be. lord macartney, at the same time, received orders for the surrender of the assignment to the nawab of arcot, and private intelligence of the appointment of his successor. he had been severely wounded, a few months before, in a duel with one of the council, due to his own overbearing temper, and his health was bad. believing that he was about to be recalled, he resigned his post, and sailed for calcutta to confer with the bengal government before sailing for europe. while in calcutta, he received news of his appointment to succeed warren hastings; but his health would not permit him to stop in india, and he sailed for england.[15]
general sloper appointed a court martial on burgoyne, with sir john dalling as president. the madras council[55] at once claimed the right to appoint the prosecutor, which being disallowed, they wrote complaints in their usual style to the court of directors. another grievance with the council was, that they were not given a copy of the proceedings. their desire apparently was to prosecute the quarrel through lord macartney in england. the wish of the government in england, and of the court of directors, was to bury the unseemly quarrel as speedily as possible, and the proceedings were withheld. a year and a half later, the madras government were still writing to the governor general for a copy. the exact charges, of which there were nineteen, cannot now be ascertained, but they partially related to sir john burgoyne’s behaviour in september 1783, more than three months before the date of his arrest, and charged him with causing and exciting mutiny and sedition, and refusing to take command of the king’s troops. on the 11th july, after sitting for nineteen days, the court came to the following resolutions—
1st.
that major general sir john burgoyne did not refuse to take upon him the command of the king’s troops after major general stuart was put under an arrest; but that he declined superseding that major general, so long as he viewed him especially appointed by the king, and he remained in the capacity of acting as such.
2nd.
that the line of conduct pursued by major general sir john burgoyne on the 19th september and quitting camp the eve of that day, was productive of the happiest consequences.
3rd.
that in no instance whatsoever did major general sir john burgoyne disobey any orders immediately proceeding from the government.
4th.
that the equivocal situation of lieut. general lang, from his standing in both services,[16] and[56] this government having at present no charter rights to confer such high ranks, well warranted his majesty’s general officers in witholding from him their obedience.
5th.
that the orders sent to lieut. colonel sterling by major general sir john burgoyne, seem to be solely for promoting good discipline in his majesty’s troops, and to respect only their internal economy, which, as the king’s commander in chief, he had not only a right to give, but enforce also.
6th.
that in the instance for which major general sir john burgoyne was originally put in arrest, it appears the government acted from half information, not having before them the postscript to the general orders of major general sir john burgoyne.
7th.
that the letters before the court from major general sir john burgoyne to lord macartney or the presidency, so far from being mutinous or seditious, are not even disrespectful. the facts which they assert are strong; but in the manner and expression they are as decent and proper as the circumstances which gave them birth could reasonably admit.
sentence.
the court having thus maturely considered of the evidence and records in support of the prosecution, and likewise the defence and those in support of it, is of opinion that the prisoner major general sir john burgoyne bart. is not guilty of the charges alledged against him; and doth therefore most fully and honorably acquit him of all and every part of the same.[17]
(signed)
john dalling,
lieut. general & president.
[57]
immediately on the close of the proceedings, the council addressed burgoyne in peremptory and discourteous terms, desiring him to leave the country; and there appeared every chance of a fresh quarrel arising, when some influence (probably sir john dalling’s) intervened, and thenceforward there was peace. burgoyne’s claims for arrears of pay and allowances, for himself as commander in chief, his aide-de-camp, and his secretary, for the period he had been under arrest, were admitted; his passage money was advanced to him, and he was preparing to sail, when death overtook him on the 23rd of september at the age of forty-six. a tablet to his memory was placed in st. mary’s church in the fort, by the officers of the king’s troops. lang was withdrawn from the service by the court of directors who granted him a special pension of one thousand a year. stuart, a few years later, was given the colonelcy of h.m.’s 31st. in consequence of these disputes, the offices of governor and commander-in-chief were, soon after, vested in the same person, in each of the presidencies. in order to prevent a recurrence of the dispute in general sloper’s case, it was ordered, at the time of his appointment, that in the event of the company ceasing to employ him, his right to command the king’s troops should also cease. a project for amalgamating the king’s and company’s forces in india, in order to put an end to the rivalry between the two services, was seriously considered two years later, but the only change made was to put an end to the supersession of the company’s by the king’s officers.
in studying the details of this unhappy quarrel, the conviction forces itself upon one that there were persons in the background, who, for their own purposes, fomented the dispute, and aggravated the differences between the principal parties, by filling their minds with suspicions and ideas that were equally groundless and mischievous. this[58] is plainly stated to have been the case by an officer of the 73rd highlanders who published a narrative of the war with hyder. “had it not been for the cordiality and good fellowship which universally subsisted betwixt the king’s and company’s officers, who had shared the fatigues of war together, notwithstanding the artful steps that had been taken to sow the seeds of dissension amongst them, these broils might have terminated in a manner very fatal to the settlement.”[18] long afterwards, lord macartney acknowledged his mistake. in december 1797, speaking to sir david baird, he said, “had i known as much of you military gentlemen, when i was in india, as i have learned since, we never should have had any difference.” sir john burgoyne’s justification was complete.
