1803–1804

capture of ahmednuggur—battle of assaye—death of lieut. colonel maxwell—honorary colour granted to 19th—battle of argaum—capture of gawilghur—berar rajah makes peace—scindia makes peace—march against banditti—their dispersal—grant of badges for assaye.

wellesley reached ahmednuggur on the 8th august. the fort was an exceedingly strong one, and the pettah or fortified town was also strongly held. an immediate assault on the pettah was ordered, which was completely successful. the town was taken, at a cost of 27 killed and 92 wounded: the 19th light dragoons had one man wounded. this was a brilliant opening to the campaign, which impressed friends and enemies alike. a mahratta chief, commanding a body of the peishwa’s horse in wellesley’s camp, wrote to his friends in poona: “these english are a strange people, and their general a wonderful man: they came here in the morning, looked at the pettah wall, walked over it, killed all the garrison and returned to[137] breakfast!” in attacking fortified places that did not require regular siege operations, wellesley successfully followed the plan, both in 1800 and on this occasion, of attacking by escalade directly he appeared before the place.

at daybreak on the 10th, a battery was opened against the fort, which surrendered on the 12th.

after arranging for the settlement of the ahmednuggur district, wellesley crossed the godavery at toka, and advanced to aurungabad, which he reached on the 29th august. the crossing of the godavery took seven days to complete. scindia’s force meanwhile had entered the nizam’s territory by the ajunta pass, and had taken jaulna. the mahratta army then moved southwards, as if intending to cross the godavery and attack hyderabad, but were baffled by wellesley moving southward along the left bank of the godavery. they therefore turned northward again, from partoor, towards the ajunta pass, and encamped in the neighbourhood of bokerdun and assaye. in the interval, stevenson, who had been operating to the north-eastward, returned and retook jaulna on the 2nd september. on the 6th, and again on the 9th, he surprised the camps of two parties of mahratta horse, after which he halted at budnapore, near jalgaum. wellesley was delayed on the godavery till the 18th, pending the arrival of a large convoy.

on the 21st, he reached jalgaum, where he concerted a plan of operation with stevenson. according to the best information, the enemy was believed to be at bokerdun and jaffirabad, about thirty miles distant, but the enormous numbers of the enemy’s cavalry made it impossible to procure trustworthy information by reconnoissance. it was agreed that the two forces should advance next day by separate roads, and fall on the enemy on the 24th. at the end of the first day’s[138] march, on the 22nd, news was brought to wellesley, at paugri, that the enemy was moving westward, and was making for the ajunta pass. the news was false. stevenson’s line of march lay about fifteen miles westward of wellesley’s. on the 23rd, wellesley made a fourteen-mile march to naulniah. on arriving there, he found that, instead of being ten or twelve miles from the enemy, as he had anticipated, he was only half that distance from them. he was also told that their cavalry had moved off, and the infantry were about to follow. it was necessary to ascertain the truth at once. the baggage was accordingly left at naulniah, under charge of a battalion of native infantry and the rearguard picquets,[44] and the rest of the force moved forwards. the general, at the same time, pushed on ahead with the cavalry. without counting the force detached to guard the baggage in naulniah, wellesley’s force consisted of nearly 6000 men (of whom about 1600 were europeans), and 14 guns, of which eight were the 6 pr. galloper guns of the cavalry. there were also contingents of the mysore and peishwa’s horsemen. after going about three miles, he suddenly, about one o’clock, came in sight of the enemy’s camp beyond the kaitna, near the village of assaye, in a peninsula formed by the junction of the kaitna and juah rivers. the kaitna was only passable at certain points; the juah had less water in it, but had very steep banks. along both rivers the ground was much broken by ravines.

walker & boutall sc.

battle of assaye

23rd. september 1803.

wellesley’s position was a difficult one. he had unexpectedly come into close contact with a vastly superior force ready to receive him, instead of being in the act of moving off, as he had been led to expect. stevenson’s[139] force, in co-operation with which he had intended to fight the action, was ten or twelve miles away. should he retreat to naulniah and wait for stevenson, he would be followed and forced to fight under disadvantageous circumstances, and, owing to the enemy’s great superiority in cavalry, would probably lose a portion of his baggage. he resolved to cross the river and attack at once. he saw that if he could carry his force across the kaitna anywhere near its junction with the juah, the great superiority in numbers of the mahrattas would be to a certain extent neutralized by the narrower front on which they would be obliged to engage. at the same time, should his attack fail, wellesley was liable to be forced back into the acute angle formed by the two rivers, and be destroyed, like charles xii. at pultava. it was a choice of risks, and wellesley chose the smaller one. the direct ford was commanded by the powerful mahratta artillery, which made crossing at that point extremely hazardous. examining the ground with his glasses, wellesley noticed the two villages of peepulgaon and waroor close together on opposite sides of the river, and, in spite of the denial of his guides, jumped to the conclusion that there must be a ford there. a search showed that he was right, and word was sent back for the infantry to direct their march on peepulgaon. meanwhile the cavalry (a. in plan) remained facing a large body of the enemy’s cavalry (b. in plan), that had crossed the river. by this time, the mahratta camp had been struck, and their army appeared drawn up in a long line (c. in plan), covered by the kaitna, with a great mass of cavalry on the right, and the guns on the left.

as the british force moved across the enemy’s front, part of it came within range of the mahratta artillery, but beyond a staff officer being slightly wounded, and the general’s orderly dragoon having his head carried off by[140] a round shot, no loss was incurred. the crossing of the kaitna was effected without opposition, and the british force was drawn up across the fork between the two rivers in three lines (f. in plan). the first two lines, with an interval of about 300 paces between them, were composed of infantry, h.m.’s 78th regiment being on the left of the first line, and h.m.’s 74th on the right of the 2nd line. the cavalry formed the third line. the peishwa’s and mysore cavalry remained on the south side of the kaitna (d. in plan), to keep in check a large body of the enemy’s cavalry. there was a good deal of delay in crossing the kaitna, which was taken advantage of by the enemy to change front to the left of their first line, and they now occupied a long line (e. in plan), with its left resting on the village of assaye, and defended along the whole front by upwards of one hundred guns. the village of assaye was occupied with infantry, and had a number of guns disposed in front of it. the mahratta line of battle, exclusive of a large body of troops detailed to guard stores and baggage, consisted of thirteen battalions of disciplined infantry, one hundred and fifteen guns, and over thirty-five thousand horsemen. there were also a large number of undisciplined infantry.

while the british lines were forming, the movement was covered by artillery fire. this was quickly responded to by the mahratta guns, which caused such severe losses among the british gun bullocks, that the guns had to be left behind when the advance was made.

wellesley had not given the enemy credit for being able to change their front with so large a force, without falling into disarray. on perceiving the alteration in the enemy’s position, he saw that it was necessary to extend his front. he accordingly ordered the picquets, which formed the right of the first line, to move obliquely to the right, so as to allow the native infantry battalions[141] in the second line to come up on the right of the first line, h.m.’s 74th being directed to take the right of the whole. wellesley’s intention was to force back the enemy from their guns, then, operating by his left, to throw them back on the juah, and complete their destruction with his cavalry. wellesley himself led the left of the line, while lieutenant colonel maxwell and the cavalry were ordered to support the right, which was still greatly outflanked. particular orders were given to the officer in command of the picquets, which formed the battalion of direction, to keep out of gunshot of assaye. but the losses caused by the mahratta artillery were so severe, that the advance became necessary before the formation was complete. every shot told, knocking over men, horses, and bullocks, and putting several of the british guns out of action. wellesley on the left, impatient to advance, sent repeated messages to the officer commanding the picquets. he was told that the guns were disabled, to which he replied “well, tell him to get on without them.”

as the line advanced, the mahratta infantry gave ground, abandoning their guns. by mistake, the officer commanding the picquets continued his oblique movement too far, and led direct on assaye, masking the 74th; a mistake that had an important influence on the course of the battle. this caused a great gap in the british line, separated the picquets and h.m. 74th from the rest of the line, and brought them under a tremendous fire of artillery and small arms. they were further impeded in their advance and thrown into disarray, by having to pass some cactus hedges. the mahratta infantry, as they fell back from their guns, separated into two distinct bodies. the greater number threw back their right, forming a second line (h. in plan), with the juah river at its back, and its left still resting on[142] assaye; while one whole brigade, under a german named pohlman, continued to retreat directly to its rear (m. in plan). at the same time, great numbers of the enemy threw themselves down, pretending to be dead, and allowed the british line to pass over them. the british line swung round to its right (i. in plan), to attack the enemy’s second line, and, here the first critical period of the battle occurred. the picquets and h.m. 74th foot were no longer able to advance under the terrible fire to which they were exposed. numbers fell at every step; all formation was lost, and a body of mahratta horse, wheeling round the village of assaye, charged the 74th in flank, sabreing numbers of them. they also recaptured some of their own guns, and gained possession of some of the british guns that had not been able to keep up with the advance, killing the gunners and turning the guns against the british rear. it was a critical moment, and, with a soldier’s instinct, maxwell saw that the time for action had come. advancing with his brigade, maxwell charged the enemy’s left, driving them into the juah with great slaughter: then, as the rest of the line advanced and drove the enemy into the nullah, the cavalry crossed the juah, and charged the broken masses of the enemy (j. in plan), making a horrid slaughter of them, and driving them off the field.

“the 19th light dragoons, who only drew 360 swords, received the intimation with one loud huzza! accompanied by the 4th native cavalry who emulated their conduct throughout this arduous day, the 19th passed through the broken but invincible 74th, whose very wounded joined in cheering them as they went on, cut in and routed the horse, and dashed on at the infantry and guns. never did cavalry perform better service or contribute more to the success of a battle.”[45]

[143]

but the battle was not yet over. a great body of the enemy still remained, holding assaye and the ground between the village and the juah, while the guns they had got possession of in different parts of the field played on the rear of the exhausted british troops. pohlman’s brigade also was unbroken, and threatened an attack. two sepoy battalions sent successively against assaye were repulsed. maxwell’s cavalry were still across the juah in pursuit of the broken mahratta battalions, and, had the mahratta horsemen behaved at this juncture with the same spirit that had led them to charge the 74th, the day might have been theirs. at this crisis, maxwell with the cavalry returned from across the juah, and formed up on the left of the british line. directing maxwell with the 19th light dragoons and two of his native regiments to face pohlman’s brigade, wellesley took h.m.’s 78th and a regiment of native cavalry, and moved against assaye. the enemy did not await the attack, but retreated across the juah in tolerable order. in this movement, the general had his horse killed by a cannon shot. then, moving along the whole line first occupied by the enemy (e. in plan), he recaptured all the guns, not without some severe fighting. meanwhile, maxwell led the 19th light dragoons and the two native regiments (l. in plan), to charge pohlman’s brigade. both men and horses were exhausted with the efforts they had made, and the attack, instead of being delivered perpendicular to the enemy’s front, was made obliquely against pohlman’s left. the well disciplined mahrattas reserved their fire till they could deliver it with good effect, and maxwell fell dead pierced by a grape shot. the fall of their leader checked the squadrons almost at the moment of contact, and the british horsemen swept to the left, receiving the fire of the mahratta infantry as they passed, at so close a distance, that several of the squadron officers had their[144] horses wounded with bayonets. no further effort was made, the squadrons “halted, and then walked, and then trotted back.”[46] the british troops were so few in numbers, so weakened and fatigued by their exertions, as to be incapable of farther efforts, and pohlman marched off the field without farther molestation. thus ended the conflict. the mysore and friendly mahratta horse, who throughout the contest had only one casualty, would not pursue without the british cavalry, and the british cavalry were too exhausted to give them a lead. out of the small british force, there were, among the europeans, 198 killed, 442 wounded, and 4 missing; among the natives, 230 killed, 696 wounded, and 14 missing. the 19th light dragoons, who had the greatest share of casualties among the cavalry, lost two officers killed, lieutenant colonel maxwell and captain boyle, four officers wounded, captains cathcart and sale, and lieutenants wilson and young; fifteen rank and file and eighty-seven horses killed, thirty-six rank and file and thirty-six horses wounded, two horses missing. of the enemy, it was computed that twelve hundred lay dead on the field, and four thousand eight hundred were wounded. one hundred and two guns,[47] seven stands of colours, and a vast quantity of ammunition and stores remained in the hands of the victors.

it was eight o’clock in the evening before the field was entirely clear of the enemy. the cavalry were then sent back to naulniah to bring on the camp equipage, &c., which they did the following morning. the rest of the force bivouacked as best they could on the bloody field. wellesley, who had had one horse killed, and another[145] wounded with a spear, passed the night on the ground, close to an officer whose leg was shot off, and within five yards of a dead officer.

“the general was so overcome by his great and gallant exertions throughout the day, so overpowered both in mind and body, that during the greater part or whole of the following night he sat on the ground with his head bent down between his knees, and said not a word to any one!”[48]

long after his victorious career was ended, he spoke of assaye as the bloodiest battle for the number engaged that he ever saw. of the ten officers forming the general’s staff eight were wounded or had their horses shot. the 74th and the picquet battalion were almost annihilated; one picquet half company alone had 21 killed, 22 wounded, and three missing. the 74th lost 401 of all ranks, killed and wounded. two of the native cavalry regiments, being newly raised, were not as forward as they should have been, so that the brunt of the cavalry work was borne by the 19th light dragoons and the 4th native cavalry. much of the heavy loss suffered by the british troops was due to the misunderstanding of wellesley’s orders by the officer commanding the picquets, though, as wellesley generously said, in a letter written a month later, “i must acknowledge that it was not possible for a man to lead a body into a hotter fire than he did the picquets on that day against assaye.” the early use of the cavalry, however, prevented the total destruction of the enemy that he had intended. the exhaustion caused by their efforts too early in the battle, prevented them from entirely breaking up and routing the disciplined mahratta infantry.

a singular circumstance is said to have occurred after[146] the battle. each of the commanders of the three armies, put to death his head spy.

“colonel stevenson, because he suspected or believed his own to have led him intentionally astray from the road: general wellesley, by reason of his own having given him false intelligence respecting the march of the mahratta army to pass the ajunta ghaut; and scindia, from his man not having made him acquainted with the separation of the two divisions of the british army.”[49]

ample testimony has been borne to the conspicuous gallantry of the 19th in this hard fought field.

“nothing could exceed the zeal of some of the cavalry, particularly the 19th dragoons; every officer and man fought as if on his arm depended the victory. as instances may be mentioned, lieutenant nathan wilson, who with his arm shattered by a grape shot, and dangling by his side, charged on at the head of his troop. lieutenant alex. grant of the madras native infantry, major of brigade to colonel maxwell, observing a gun pointed ready to discharge on the flank of the 19th dragoons, the match suspended on the touch-hole, with a noble impulse, in hopes of preventing it, darted forward almost on its muzzle, and with such force, that his horse stuck between the cannon and its wheel: in this situation the gun went off, as he was in the act of endeavouring to prevent it, by cutting down the artillery man. captain george sale was attacking a man who defended himself with a pike or short spear, a weapon with which all scindia’s artillery men were armed; the man’s comrade standing on a gun, made a thrust from above at captain sale, but it was turned off by the breastbone and glanced off diagonally across his chest; his covering serjeant named strange, laid the man dead who wounded his officer, but in the act was himself speared through the lungs, by another man from below the gun. captain sale went on but begged the serjeant to fall in the rear; this however he gallantly refused, and rode out the day. captain sale and others afterwards saw him when in hospital, blow out a candle from his lungs—the reader will be pleased to learn that the gallant serjeant recovered.”[50]

[147]

among other incidents may be mentioned the case of cornet serle of the 19th who was under arrest at the time of the action, for some disagreement with his commanding officer. at the commencement of the battle he broke his arrest, and joined his corps, and, by his gallant behaviour throughout the day, regained permission to wear his sword again.

lieutenant colonel maxwell’s splendid service was fittingly recognized by the east india company, who granted a pension of ￡300 to his widow, “although we find that there is no example of the company’s making any allowance to the widow of a king’s officer.”[51]

“as long as the word assaye exists, and has a meaning will the valiant deeds and reckless bravery of the old 19th light dragoons the 74th and 78th highlanders be remembered.”[52]

in his dispatch to the governor general, dated the day after the battle, wellesley wrote: “i have also to draw your excellency’s notice to the conduct of the cavalry commanded by lieutenant colonel maxwell, particularly that of the 19th dragoons”: and, in a general order published in calcutta on the 30th october, it was said, “the governor general in council has remarked with great satisfaction the gallant and skilful conduct of the cavalry, commanded by lt. colonel maxwell and particularly of his majesty’s nineteenth regiment of light dragoons, a corps distinguished in india by a long and uninterrupted course of arduous service and of progressive honour.” honorary colours in commemoration of the battle were granted to the 19th light dragoons, the 74th and 78th “to be used by those corps while they shall continue in india, or until his majesty’s most gracious pleasure be signified through his excellency the commander-in-chief.”

[148]

the damage inflicted on the mahratta host was far in excess of that indicated by their loss in men and material. many of the disciplined battalions had been destroyed, and hearty co-operation between the leaders was at an end. they fled northwards through the ajunta pass, abandoning some guns which were afterwards picked up by stevenson, and then separated. scindia, who believed that he had not been loyally supported by the berar rajah, retreated to thalnair in khandesh; the berar rajah retired to his fortress at gawilghur, while five battalions belonging to the begum somroo, four of which had been employed to guard the mahratta camp, and therefore took no part in the action, retreated to burhanpore, whence they made their way back to sirdhana in the north west, and took no further part in the campaign.

the sound of wellesley’s guns at assaye was heard by stevenson, who at once broke up camp and attempted to join him; but being without information, and misled by his guides, he marched first on bokerdun, which he did not reach till next day, being entangled in a nullah during the night. his force was greatly harassed by night marching and want of rest, so that he did not join wellesley till the evening of the 24th. all the 25th he remained at assaye, in order that his surgeons might assist the wounded, and, on the 26th, marched in pursuit of the enemy. wellesley remained encamped near the field of battle till the 8th october, to make arrangements for the care of his numerous wounded, and for the captured guns and stores. nor was there urgent necessity for an immediate move, till something was known of the movements of the enemy. the general’s first movements after the battle were in the direction of aurungabad, as scindia showed an intention of marching on poona. then, learning that scindia had turned back towards burhanpore, on which place stevenson was advancing, wellesley turned northwards to[149] ajunta. stevenson meanwhile had occupied burhanpore on the 15th, and attacked the fortress of asseerghur, which surrendered on the 21st. wellesley, hearing that scindia and the berar rajah had joined forces again, and were threatening stevenson, descended the ajunta pass on the 18th, and moved northwards; but, on receiving news that asseerghur had fallen, and that the confederates had again separated, he retraced his steps, ascended the pass on the 25th, and marched to aurungabad to protect some convoys which were threatened by the berar rajah. from aurungabad he made several attempts to surprise the bhonslay’s camp without success, although he forced him to move his camp five times between the 29th and the 31st.

wellesley continued moving slowly eastwards, to cover the nizam’s territory, till the 11th november, when he struck northwards from patree to rajoora, which he reached on the 23rd. for some days, scindia, under the influence of his defeat at assaye in conjunction with bad news from his forces in the north west, had made overtures for a cessation of hostilities, and, on the 23rd, an armistice was agreed on; the principal condition of which was that scindia should separate himself from the berar rajah, and take up a position fifty miles east of ellichpore.

the agreement was not however faithfully observed by scindia, some of whose troops took part in the subsequent battle. the berar rajah, meanwhile, had entered his own territories, and was encamped at argaum. on the 27th, wellesley reached akola, and, about 2 o’clock in the afternoon on the 29th, he joined stevenson at parterly, for the purpose of undertaking the siege of gawilghur with their united forces.

the berar rajah, who was encamped at argaum about six miles from parterly, had meanwhile opened negotiations with stevenson for a suspension of hostilities, so preparations were made for encamping at parterly. on putting[150] out the picquets to take up the ground, they were molested by parties of the enemy, and, a reconnoissance showed the mahratta army drawn up in battle array, on an extensive plain in front of the village of argaum. the troops were at once ordered to fall in, and the two divisions moved to the front in parallel columns. at about 1000 yards in front of the enemy was the village of sirsoni. it was wellesley’s intention to pass by the left of the village, and then, wheeling to the right, to form line in front of it, parallel with the mahratta line of battle. the column was led by the native infantry picquets, accompanied by some field pieces drawn by bullocks, followed by two native infantry battalions, all of whom had taken part in the battle of assaye. on the head of the column clearing the village, the mahratta guns opened fire with great effect. the bullock drivers lost their presence of mind and the management of their cattle, which turned round and threw into confusion the ranks behind them. the troops coming up in rear, not knowing the cause of the confusion, and suffering from the cannonade, were seized with panic, and fell back in disorder, to seek shelter behind the village. wellesley, who was close by, giving orders to the brigadiers, seeing what had happened,

“stepped out in front hoping by his presence to restore the confidence of the troops; but seeing that this did not produce the desired effect, he mounted his horse, and rode up to the retreating battalions; when, instead of losing his temper, upbraiding them and endeavouring to force them back to the spot from which they had fled, as most people would have done, he quietly ordered the officers to lead their men under cover of the village, and then to rally and get them into order as quickly as possible. this being done, he put the column again in motion, and leading these very same runaways round the other side of the village, formed them up on the very spot he originally intended them to occupy, the remainder of the column following and prolonging the line to the right.”[53]

[151]

the lesson is one to be borne in mind by those to whose lot it may fall to rally troops thrown into disorder under fire.

in order to cover the formation, some guns were brought into action on each side of the village, and, as each battalion came into position, it was made to lie down, which further helped to steady the troops. the infantry were formed into a single line, with stevenson’s division on the left, while the six cavalry regiments of the two divisions, under command of lieutenant colonel the honble. arthur st leger, were formed in two lines in rear of the right. the british left was covered by the native auxiliary horse. the mahratta line was about five miles in length, the infantry and guns in the centre, with cavalry on both flanks.

it was half past four in the afternoon before the british line advanced. on the signal being given, the british cavalry moved rapidly forward, and brought their galloper guns into action against a great body of the enemy’s cavalry and rocket men. meanwhile, the infantry advanced steadily against the mahratta centre. when almost within musket shot, a body of the enemy’s infantry, nearly a thousand strong, composed of arabs or pathans, dashed forward against the 74th and 78th, and perished almost to a man under the highland musket and bayonet. almost at the same moment, a body of scindia’s cavalry charged the british left, and were repulsed with loss, while the 19th and the five native regiments on the right charged the cavalry in front of them. the mahrattas did not stand the shock, but broke and fled, and at once the whole of the enemy’s force was dissolved in flight. the cavalry pursued for many miles, killing great numbers, and capturing many elephants and camels, and much baggage. thirty-eight guns and many standards fell into the hands of the victors. the british loss amounted to 46 killed,[152] 308 wounded and 7 missing. as at assaye, the principal loss fell on the 74th and 78th, who, between them, lost 13 killed, and 84 wounded. the 19th light dragoons had 6 men wounded. the battle of argaum was fought on a perfectly level plain intersected by small water courses, without any buildings or other natural obstacles between the two lines, after they had been formed, and was carried out exactly like a field day as then practised. the pursuit of the enemy by the british cavalry was maintained for six miles, and was then taken up and continued by the allied mysore and nizam’s horse for another twenty miles. the loss of the enemy, in the battle and subsequent pursuit, was estimated at five thousand men. at assaye, the principal mahratta loss fell on scindia’s troops; at argaum the loss fell chiefly on the berar forces.

the victory at argaum effected a complete separation of the mahratta confederate chiefs. scindia still had a considerable force in the field, but it had ceased to be formidable after assaye. the berar rajah’s field army had disappeared, and his territories lay open to the invading british force. scindia’s capital was far off, and he might yet give trouble, so wellesley determined to finish once for all with the berar rajah, in order that he might be able to devote undivided attention to scindia afterwards.

the day following the battle, stevenson marched in pursuit of the enemy: wellesley followed a day later, and the two divisions were re-united at ellichpore on the 5th december. thence they marched on gawilghur, a fortress of great strength, regarded as the key of the deccan, in which the defeated infantry from argaum had taken refuge. the place was taken by assault on the 15th, with the loss of 13 killed, no wounded, and three missing. fifty-two guns, together with a great quantity of small arms and military stores, fell into the hands of the victors.[153] nagpore, the berar rajah’s capital, now lay open to the british troops, and the rajah hastened to sue for peace. the negotiation was conducted with the decision that characterized all wellesley’s actions, and peace was concluded at deogam, on the 17th, two days after the fall of gawilghur. his hands being now free on this side, wellesley gave notice to scindia, that, on the 27th, he should regard the agreement for suspension of hostilities at an end, unless that chief came to definite terms. left without an ally, with his armies defeated both in the north-west and in the deccan, scindia had no hope of continuing the struggle with success, and peace was signed in wellesley’s camp on the 30th december, at surjee anjengaum.

thus triumphantly ended a war which for boldness of conception of campaign, rapidity of execution, the great extent over which it was waged, and the hard fighting that characterized it both in the north and south, stands in marked contrast to any war we had previously waged in india.

“the seat of war, extending over the continent of india exhibited in the short space of four months as many general battles, eight regular sieges and storming of fortresses, without including that of gwalior, which was not captured till the beginning of the next year; in all of which british valour prevailed over accumulated obstacles, the combination of formidable powers, and every advantage arising from local position, military means and numerical strength.... their (the mahratta) numerous armies, amounting on an average to two hundred and fifty thousand men, were defeated in every engagement; while the corps organized by their french auxiliaries, consisting at the least of forty thousand more, and upon whom the fullest reliance was placed, were completely destroyed; in all which reverses the confederates left in the hands of the victors upwards of one thousand pieces of cannon, with ammunition, treasure and stores in proportion.”[54]

[154]

but the most valuable result to england was that she learned from the assaye campaign that she had in her army a general who was fit to cope with the best generals of europe.

the war was over, and arrangements were made for the return of the troops to their quarters. leaving stevenson’s division, wellesley turned southwards to jaulna, which he reached on the 19th january 1804. a few days before the conclusion of peace, in writing to the commander-in-chief, wellesley remarked: “the 19th dragoons have now better horses than i have ever seen with them.” it was well that it was so, for a severe effort was still required of them. the nizam’s dominions were at that time infested with banditti, mostly disbanded soldiers, who plundered the country in all directions, and had become so daring that they had not hesitated to attack detachments of british troops. on reaching jaulna, news was brought to wellesley of a large body of freebooters who were plundering the country to the southward. crossing the godavery, he marched to neemgaum, where, on the 2nd february, he received information of the whereabouts of the marauders. he accordingly made up a light flying column consisting of the 19th light dragoons and the rest of the cavalry that had been with him at assaye, the remnants of the gallant 74th, a sepoy battalion, and details from other sepoy regiments, 150 pioneers, and four guns,[55] and marched on the 3rd, reaching sailgaon on the 4th, a distance of about thirty miles in a direct line. marching again the same night, he came up with the freebooters about 9 a.m. on the 5th. the cavalry charged at once, slaying great numbers[155] and dispersing them, at the same time capturing their guns, camp, and stores. an unfortunate mishap occurred on this occasion. the 19th mistook some of the allied mahratta horse for the enemy, and charged them, cutting down two or three of them, and having one of their own number cut down, before the mistake was discovered. the achievement was remarkable for the long and rapid marching performed by the troops. writing of it, two days later, wellesley says:

“the exertion made by the troops is the greatest i ever witnessed. everything was over by 12 o’clock on the 5th, and, i think that, by that time, the infantry must have marched 60 miles from six in the morning of the 4th. we halted from 12 in the day till 10 at night on the 4th, so that we marched 60 miles with infantry in twenty hours.”

well might he add:

“i think we now begin to beat the mahrattas in the celerity of our movements.”

the force then marched for poona.

hardly had peace been secured, when holkar, who had hitherto held aloof, took the field. the 19th light dragoons took, however, no part in the campaign that followed, but remained encamped at panwell near bombay till the end of 1804, when they marched for arcot.

in 1807, the royal permission was given to the regiment to wear a badge of the elephant with the word “assaye,” on colours and appointments, in commemoration of the gallantry displayed by the regiment in the battle and during the campaign. nothing can be traced of the honorary standard presented to the regiment for assaye[156] there can be no doubt that it was given to the 19th as it was to the 74th and 78th.

horse guards,

15th april 1807.

my lord

i have received the commander in chief’s directions to inform you, that the marquis of wellesley and major general the honble. sir arthur wellesley have represented to h.r.h. the distinguished services of the 19th light dragoons in the course of the arduous campaigns which occurred during the period of his lordship’s government in india, and have earnestly solicited permission, that the regiment may be distinguished by some emblematical badge.

the commander in chief has with great satisfaction submitted this representation to the king, and his majesty has in consequence thereof been most graciously pleased to approve of the “elephant” being used in colours and appointments of the 19th light dragoons with the word “assaye” superscribed, in commemoration of the gallantry and good conduct displayed in the action fought at that place on the 23rd of september 1803.

i have the honour to be &c.

harry calvert,

a.g.

general visct. howe, k.b.

or o.c. 19th light dragoons.