there is a popular philosophical joke intended to typify the endless and useless arguments of philosophers; i mean the joke about which came first, the chicken or the egg? i am not sure that properly understood, it is so futile an inquiry after all. i am not concerned here to enter on those deep metaphysical and theological differences of which the chicken and egg debate is a frivolous, but a very felicitous, type. the evolutionary materialists are appropriately enough represented in the vision of all things coming from an egg, a dim and monstrous oval germ that had laid itself by accident. that other supernatural school of thought (to which i personally adhere) would be not unworthily typified in the fancy that this round world of ours is but an egg brooded upon by a sacred unbegotten bird; the mystic dove of the prophets. but it is to much humbler functions that i here call the awful power of such a distinction. whether or no the living bird is at the beginning of our mental chain, it is absolutely necessary that it should be at the end of our mental chain. the bird is the thing to be aimed at—not with a gun, but a life-bestowing wand. what is essential to our right thinking is this: that the egg and the bird must not be thought of as equal cosmic occurrences recurring alternatively forever. they must not become a mere egg and bird pattern, like the egg and dart pattern. one is a means and the other an end; they are in different mental worlds. leaving the complications of the human breakfast-table out of account, in an elemental sense, the egg only exists to produce the chicken. but the chicken does not exist only in order to produce another egg. he may also exist to amuse himself, to praise god, and even to suggest ideas to a french dramatist. being a conscious life, he is, or may be, valuable in himself. now our modern politics are full of a noisy forgetfulness; forgetfulness that the production of this happy and conscious life is after all the aim of all complexities and compromises. we talk of nothing but useful men and working institutions; that is, we only think of the chickens as things that will lay more eggs. instead of seeking to breed our ideal bird, the eagle of zeus or the swan of avon, or whatever we happen to want, we talk entirely in terms of the process and the embryo. the process itself, divorced from its divine object, becomes doubtful and even morbid; poison enters the embryo of everything; and our politics are rotten eggs.
idealism is only considering everything in its practical essence. idealism only means that we should consider a poker in reference to poking before we discuss its suitability for wife-beating; that we should ask if an egg is good enough for practical poultry-rearing before we decide that the egg is bad enough for practical politics. but i know that this primary pursuit of the theory (which is but pursuit of the aim) exposes one to the cheap charge of fiddling while rome is burning. a school, of which lord rosebery is representative, has endeavored to substitute for the moral or social ideals which have hitherto been the motive of politics a general coherency or completeness in the social system which has gained the nick-name of “efficiency.” i am not very certain of the secret doctrine of this sect in the matter. but, as far as i can make out, “efficiency” means that we ought to discover everything about a machine except what it is for. there has arisen in our time a most singular fancy: the fancy that when things go very wrong we need a practical man. it would be far truer to say, that when things go very wrong we need an unpractical man. certainly, at least, we need a theorist. a practical man means a man accustomed to mere daily practice, to the way things commonly work. when things will not work, you must have the thinker, the man who has some doctrine about why they work at all. it is wrong to fiddle while rome is burning; but it is quite right to study the theory of hydraulics while rome is burning.
it is then necessary to drop one’s daily agnosticism and attempt rerum cognoscere causas. if your aeroplane has a slight indisposition, a handy man may mend it. but, if it is seriously ill, it is all the more likely that some absent-minded old professor with wild white hair will have to be dragged out of a college or laboratory to analyze the evil. the more complicated the smash, the whiter-haired and more absent-minded will be the theorist who is needed to deal with it; and in some extreme cases, no one but the man (probably insane) who invented your flying-ship could possibly say what was the matter with it.
“efficiency,” of course, is futile for the same reason that strong men, will-power and the superman are futile. that is, it is futile because it only deals with actions after they have been performed. it has no philosophy for incidents before they happen; therefore it has no power of choice. an act can only be successful or unsuccessful when it is over; if it is to begin, it must be, in the abstract, right or wrong. there is no such thing as backing a winner; for he cannot be a winner when he is backed. there is no such thing as fighting on the winning side; one fights to find out which is the winning side. if any operation has occurred, that operation was efficient. if a man is murdered, the murder was efficient. a tropical sun is as efficient in making people lazy as a lancashire foreman bully in making them energetic. maeterlinck is as efficient in filling a man with strange spiritual tremors as messrs. crosse and blackwell are in filling a man with jam. but it all depends on what you want to be filled with. lord rosebery, being a modern skeptic, probably prefers the spiritual tremors. i, being an orthodox christian, prefer the jam. but both are efficient when they have been effected; and inefficient until they are effected. a man who thinks much about success must be the drowsiest sentimentalist; for he must be always looking back. if he only likes victory he must always come late for the battle. for the man of action there is nothing but idealism.
this definite ideal is a far more urgent and practical matter in our existing english trouble than any immediate plans or proposals. for the present chaos is due to a sort of general oblivion of all that men were originally aiming at. no man demands what he desires; each man demands what he fancies he can get. soon people forget what the man really wanted first; and after a successful and vigorous political life, he forgets it himself. the whole is an extravagant riot of second bests, a pandemonium of pis-aller. now this sort of pliability does not merely prevent any heroic consistency, it also prevents any really practical compromise. one can only find the middle distance between two points if the two points will stand still. we may make an arrangement between two litigants who cannot both get what they want; but not if they will not even tell us what they want. the keeper of a restaurant would much prefer that each customer should give his order smartly, though it were for stewed ibis or boiled elephant, rather than that each customer should sit holding his head in his hands, plunged in arithmetical calculations about how much food there can be on the premises. most of us have suffered from a certain sort of ladies who, by their perverse unselfishness, give more trouble than the selfish; who almost clamor for the unpopular dish and scramble for the worst seat. most of us have known parties or expeditions full of this seething fuss of self-effacement. from much meaner motives than those of such admirable women, our practical politicians keep things in the same confusion through the same doubt about their real demands. there is nothing that so much prevents a settlement as a tangle of small surrenders. we are bewildered on every side by politicians who are in favor of secular education, but think it hopeless to work for it; who desire total prohibition, but are certain they should not demand it; who regret compulsory education, but resignedly continue it; or who want peasant proprietorship and therefore vote for something else. it is this dazed and floundering opportunism that gets in the way of everything. if our statesmen were visionaries something practical might be done. if we ask for something in the abstract we might get something in the concrete. as it is, it is not only impossible to get what one wants, but it is impossible to get any part of it, because nobody can mark it out plainly like a map. that clear and even hard quality that there was in the old bargaining has wholly vanished. we forget that the word “compromise” contains, among other things, the rigid and ringing word “promise.” moderation is not vague; it is as definite as perfection. the middle point is as fixed as the extreme point.
if i am made to walk the plank by a pirate, it is vain for me to offer, as a common-sense compromise, to walk along the plank for a reasonable distance. it is exactly about the reasonable distance that the pirate and i differ. there is an exquisite mathematical split second at which the plank tips up. my common-sense ends just before that instant; the pirate’s common-sense begins just beyond it. but the point itself is as hard as any geometrical diagram; as abstract as any theological dogma.
