cast your eye round the room in which you sit, and select some three or four things that have been with man almost since his beginning; which at least we hear of early in the centuries and often among the tribes. let me suppose that you see a knife on the table, a stick in the corner, or a fire on the hearth. about each of these you will notice one speciality; that not one of them is special. each of these ancestral things is a universal thing; made to supply many different needs; and while tottering pedants nose about to find the cause and origin of some old custom, the truth is that it had fifty causes or a hundred origins. the knife is meant to cut wood, to cut cheese, to cut pencils, to cut throats; for a myriad ingenious or innocent human objects. the stick is meant partly to hold a man up, partly to knock a man down; partly to point with like a finger-post, partly to balance with like a balancing pole, partly to trifle with like a cigarette, partly to kill with like a club of a giant; it is a crutch and a cudgel; an elongated finger and an extra leg. the case is the same, of course, with the fire; about which the strangest modern views have arisen. a queer fancy seems to be current that a fire exists to warm people. it exists to warm people, to light their darkness, to raise their spirits, to toast their muffins, to air their rooms, to cook their chestnuts, to tell stories to their children, to make checkered shadows on their walls, to boil their hurried kettles, and to be the red heart of a man’s house and that hearth for which, as the great heathens said, a man should die.

now it is the great mark of our modernity that people are always proposing substitutes for these old things; and these substitutes always answer one purpose where the old thing answered ten. the modern man will wave a cigarette instead of a stick; he will cut his pencil with a little screwing pencil-sharpener instead of a knife; and he will even boldly offer to be warmed by hot water pipes instead of a fire. i have my doubts about pencil-sharpeners even for sharpening pencils; and about hot water pipes even for heat. but when we think of all those other requirements that these institutions answered, there opens before us the whole horrible harlequinade of our civilization. we see as in a vision a world where a man tries to cut his throat with a pencil-sharpener; where a man must learn single-stick with a cigarette; where a man must try to toast muffins at electric lamps, and see red and golden castles in the surface of hot water pipes.

the principle of which i speak can be seen everywhere in a comparison between the ancient and universal things and the modern and specialist things. the object of a theodolite is to lie level; the object of a stick is to swing loose at any angle; to whirl like the very wheel of liberty. the object of a lancet is to lance; when used for slashing, gashing, ripping, lopping off heads and limbs, it is a disappointing instrument. the object of an electric light is merely to light (a despicable modesty); and the object of an asbestos stove... i wonder what is the object of an asbestos stove? if a man found a coil of rope in a desert he could at least think of all the things that can be done with a coil of rope; and some of them might even be practical. he could tow a boat or lasso a horse. he could play cat’s-cradle, or pick oakum. he could construct a rope-ladder for an eloping heiress, or cord her boxes for a travelling maiden aunt. he could learn to tie a bow, or he could hang himself. far otherwise with the unfortunate traveller who should find a telephone in the desert. you can telephone with a telephone; you cannot do anything else with it. and though this is one of the wildest joys of life, it falls by one degree from its full delirium when there is nobody to answer you. the contention is, in brief, that you must pull up a hundred roots, and not one, before you uproot any of these hoary and simple expedients. it is only with great difficulty that a modern scientific sociologist can be got to see that any old method has a leg to stand on. but almost every old method has four or five legs to stand on. almost all the old institutions are quadrupeds; and some of them are centipedes.

consider these cases, old and new, and you will observe the operation of a general tendency. everywhere there was one big thing that served six purposes; everywhere now there are six small things; or, rather (and there is the trouble), there are just five and a half. nevertheless, we will not say that this separation and specialism is entirely useless or inexcusable. i have often thanked god for the telephone; i may any day thank god for the lancet; and there is none of these brilliant and narrow inventions (except, of course, the asbestos stove) which might not be at some moment necessary and lovely. but i do not think the most austere upholder of specialism will deny that there is in these old, many-sided institutions an element of unity and universality which may well be preserved in its due proportion and place. spiritually, at least, it will be admitted that some all-round balance is needed to equalize the extravagance of experts. it would not be difficult to carry the parable of the knife and stick into higher regions. religion, the immortal maiden, has been a maid-of-all-work as well as a servant of mankind. she provided men at once with the theoretic laws of an unalterable cosmos and also with the practical rules of the rapid and thrilling game of morality. she taught logic to the student and told fairy tales to the children; it was her business to confront the nameless gods whose fears are on all flesh, and also to see the streets were spotted with silver and scarlet, that there was a day for wearing ribbons or an hour for ringing bells. the large uses of religion have been broken up into lesser specialities, just as the uses of the hearth have been broken up into hot water pipes and electric bulbs. the romance of ritual and colored emblem has been taken over by that narrowest of all trades, modern art (the sort called art for art’s sake), and men are in modern practice informed that they may use all symbols so long as they mean nothing by them. the romance of conscience has been dried up into the science of ethics; which may well be called decency for decency’s sake, decency unborn of cosmic energies and barren of artistic flower. the cry to the dim gods, cut off from ethics and cosmology, has become mere psychical research. everything has been sundered from everything else, and everything has grown cold. soon we shall hear of specialists dividing the tune from the words of a song, on the ground that they spoil each other; and i did once meet a man who openly advocated the separation of almonds and raisins. this world is all one wild divorce court; nevertheless, there are many who still hear in their souls the thunder of authority of human habit; those whom man hath joined let no man sunder.

this book must avoid religion, but there must (i say) be many, religious and irreligious, who will concede that this power of answering many purposes was a sort of strength which should not wholly die out of our lives. as a part of personal character, even the moderns will agree that many-sidedness is a merit and a merit that may easily be overlooked. this balance and universality has been the vision of many groups of men in many ages. it was the liberal education of aristotle; the jack-of-all-trades artistry of leonardo da vinci and his friends; the august amateurishness of the cavalier person of quality like sir william temple or the great earl of dorset. it has appeared in literature in our time in the most erratic and opposite shapes, set to almost inaudible music by walter pater and enunciated through a foghorn by walt whitman. but the great mass of men have always been unable to achieve this literal universality, because of the nature of their work in the world. not, let it be noted, because of the existence of their work. leonardo da vinci must have worked pretty hard; on the other hand, many a government office clerk, village constable or elusive plumber may do (to all human appearance) no work at all, and yet show no signs of the aristotelian universalism. what makes it difficult for the average man to be a universalist is that the average man has to be a specialist; he has not only to learn one trade, but to learn it so well as to uphold him in a more or less ruthless society. this is generally true of males from the first hunter to the last electrical engineer; each has not merely to act, but to excel. nimrod has not only to be a mighty hunter before the lord, but also a mighty hunter before the other hunters. the electrical engineer has to be a very electrical engineer, or he is outstripped by engineers yet more electrical. those very miracles of the human mind on which the modern world prides itself, and rightly in the main, would be impossible without a certain concentration which disturbs the pure balance of reason more than does religious bigotry. no creed can be so limiting as that awful adjuration that the cobbler must not go beyond his last. so the largest and wildest shots of our world are but in one direction and with a defined trajectory: the gunner cannot go beyond his shot, and his shot so often falls short; the astronomer cannot go beyond his telescope and his telescope goes such a little way. all these are like men who have stood on the high peak of a mountain and seen the horizon like a single ring and who then descend down different paths towards different towns, traveling slow or fast. it is right; there must be people traveling to different towns; there must be specialists; but shall no one behold the horizon? shall all mankind be specialist surgeons or peculiar plumbers; shall all humanity be monomaniac? tradition has decided that only half of humanity shall be monomaniac. it has decided that in every home there shall be a tradesman and a jack-of-all-trades. but it has also decided, among other things, that the jack-of-all-trades shall be a jill-of-all-trades. it has decided, rightly or wrongly, that this specialism and this universalism shall be divided between the sexes. cleverness shall be left for men and wisdom for women. for cleverness kills wisdom; that is one of the few sad and certain things.

but for women this ideal of comprehensive capacity (or common-sense) must long ago have been washed away. it must have melted in the frightful furnaces of ambition and eager technicality. a man must be partly a one-idead man, because he is a one-weaponed man—and he is flung naked into the fight. the world’s demand comes to him direct; to his wife indirectly. in short, he must (as the books on success say) give “his best”; and what a small part of a man “his best” is! his second and third best are often much better. if he is the first violin he must fiddle for life; he must not remember that he is a fine fourth bagpipe, a fair fifteenth billiard-cue, a foil, a fountain pen, a hand at whist, a gun, and an image of god.