by this elaborate historical example we have endeavoured to make it clear that tragedy perishes as surely by evanescence of the spirit of music as it can be born only out of this spirit. in order to qualify the singularity of this assertion, and, on the other hand, to disclose the source of this insight of ours, we must now confront with clear vision the analogous phenomena of the present time; we must enter into the midst of these struggles, which, as i said just now, are being carried on in the highest spheres of our present world between the insatiate optimistic perception and the tragic need of art. in so doing i shall leave out of consideration all other antagonistic tendencies which at all times oppose art, especially tragedy, and which at present again extend their sway triumphantly, to such an extent that of the theatrical arts only the farce and the ballet, for example, put forth their blossoms, which perhaps not every one cares to smell, in tolerably rich luxuriance. i will speak only of the most illustrious opposition to the tragic conception of things—and by this i mean essentially optimistic science, with its ancestor socrates at the head of it. presently also the forces will be designated[pg 121] which seem to me to guarantee a re-birth of tragedy—and who knows what other blessed hopes for the german genius!

before we plunge into the midst of these struggles, let us array ourselves in the armour of our hitherto acquired knowledge. in contrast to all those who are intent on deriving the arts from one exclusive principle, as the necessary vital source of every work of art, i keep my eyes fixed on the two artistic deities of the greeks, apollo and dionysus, and recognise in them the living and conspicuous representatives of two worlds of art which differ in their intrinsic essence and in their highest aims. apollo stands before me as the transfiguring genius of the principium individuationis through which alone the redemption in appearance is to be truly attained, while by the mystical cheer of dionysus the spell of individuation is broken, and the way lies open to the mothers of being,[20] to the innermost heart of things. this extraordinary antithesis, which opens up yawningly between plastic art as the apollonian and music as the dionysian art, has become manifest to only one of the great thinkers, to such an extent that, even without this key to the symbolism of the hellenic divinities, he allowed to music a different character and origin in advance of all the other arts, because, unlike them, it is not a copy of the phenomenon, but a direct copy of the will itself, and therefore represents the metaphysical of everything physical in the[pg 122] world, the thing-in-itself of every phenomenon. (schopenhauer, welt als wille und vorstellung, i. 310.) to this most important perception of ?sthetics (with which, taken in a serious sense, ?sthetics properly commences), richard wagner, by way of confirmation of its eternal truth, affixed his seal, when he asserted in his beethoven that music must be judged according to ?sthetic principles quite different from those which apply to the plastic arts, and not, in general, according to the category of beauty: although an erroneous ?sthetics, inspired by a misled and degenerate art, has by virtue of the concept of beauty prevailing in the plastic domain accustomed itself to demand of music an effect analogous to that of the works of plastic art, namely the suscitating delight in beautiful forms. upon perceiving this extraordinary antithesis, i felt a strong inducement to approach the essence of greek tragedy, and, by means of it, the profoundest revelation of hellenic genius: for i at last thought myself to be in possession of a charm to enable me—far beyond the phraseology of our usual ?sthetics—to represent vividly to my mind the primitive problem of tragedy: whereby such an astounding insight into the hellenic character was afforded me that it necessarily seemed as if our proudly comporting classico-hellenic science had thus far contrived to subsist almost exclusively on phantasmagoria and externalities.

perhaps we may lead up to this primitive problem with the question: what ?sthetic effect results when the intrinsically separate art-powers,[pg 123] the apollonian and the dionysian, enter into concurrent actions? or, in briefer form: how is music related to image and concept?—schopenhauer, whom richard wagner, with especial reference to this point, accredits with an unsurpassable clearness and perspicuity of exposition, expresses himself most copiously on the subject in the following passage which i shall cite here at full length[21] (welt als wille und vorstellung, i. p. 309): "according to all this, we may regard the phenomenal world, or nature, and music as two different expressions of the same thing,[20] which is therefore itself the only medium of the analogy between these two expressions, so that a knowledge of this medium is required in order to understand that analogy. music, therefore, if regarded as an expression of the world, is in the highest degree a universal language, which is related indeed to the universality of concepts, much as these are related to the particular things. its universality, however, is by no means the empty universality of abstraction, but of quite a different kind, and is united with thorough and distinct definiteness. in this respect it resembles geometrical figures and numbers, which are the universal forms of all possible objiects of experience and applicable to them all a priori, and yet are not abstract but perceptiple and thoroughly determinate. all possible efforts, excitements[pg 124] and manifestations of will, all that goes on in the heart of man and that reason includes in the wide, negative concept of feeling, may be expressed by the infinite number of possible melodies, but always in the universality of mere form, without the material, always according to the thing-in-itself, not the phenomenon,—of which they reproduce the very soul and essence as it were, without the body. this deep relation which music bears to the true nature of all things also explains the fact that suitable music played to any scene, action, event, or surrounding seems to disclose to us its most secret meaning, and appears as the most accurate and distinct commentary upon it; as also the fact that whoever gives himself up entirely to the impression of a symphony seems to see all the possible events of life and the world take place in himself: nevertheless upon reflection he can find no likeness between the music and the things that passed before his mind. for, as we have said, music is distinguished from all the other arts by the fact that it is not a copy of the phenomenon, or, more accurately, the adequate objectivity of the will, but the direct copy of the will itself, and therefore represents the metaphysical of everything physical in the world, and the thing-in-itself of every phenomenon. we might, therefore, just as well call the world embodied music as embodied will: and this is the reason why music makes every picture, and indeed every scene of real life and of the world, at once appear with higher significance; all the more so, to be sure, in proportion as its[pg 125] melody is analogous to the inner spirit of the given phenomenon. it rests upon this that we are able to set a poem to music as a song, or a perceptible representation as a pantomime, or both as an opera. such particular pictures of human life, set to the universal language of music, are never bound to it or correspond to it with stringent necessity, but stand to it only in the relation of an example chosen at will to a general concept. in the determinateness of the real they represent that which music expresses in the universality of mere form. for melodies are to a certain extent, like general concepts, an abstraction from the actual. this actual world, then, the world of particular things, affords the object of perception, the special and the individual, the particular case, both to the universality of concepts and to the universality of the melodies. but these two universalities are in a certain respect opposed to each other; for the concepts contain only the forms, which are first of all abstracted from perception,—the separated outward shell of things, as it were,—and hence they are, in the strictest sense of the term, abstracta; music, on the other hand, gives the inmost kernel which precedes all forms, or the heart of things. this relation may be very well expressed in the language of the schoolmen, by saying: the concepts are the universalia post rem, but music gives the universalia ante rem, and the real world the universalia in re.—but that in general a relation is possible between a composition and a perceptible representation rests, as we have said, upon the[pg 126] fact that both are simply different expressions of the same inner being of the world. when now, in the particular case, such a relation is actually given, that is to say, when the composer has been able to express in the universal language of music the emotions of will which constitute the heart of an event, then the melody of the song, the music of the opera, is expressive. but the analogy discovered by the composer between the two must have proceeded from the direct knowledge of the nature of the world unknown to his reason, and must not be an imitation produced with conscious intention by means of conceptions; otherwise the music does not express the inner nature of the will itself, but merely gives an inadequate imitation of its phenomenon: all specially imitative music does this."

we have therefore, according to the doctrine of schopenhauer, an immediate understanding of music as the language of the will, and feel our imagination stimulated to give form to this invisible and yet so actively stirred spirit-world which speaks to us, and prompted to embody it in an analogous example. on the other hand, image and concept, under the influence of a truly conformable music, acquire a higher significance. dionysian art therefore is wont to exercise—two kinds of influences, on the apollonian art-faculty: music firstly incites to the symbolic intuition of dionysian universality, and, secondly, it causes the symbolic image to stand forth in its fullest significance. from these facts, intelligible in themselves and not inaccessible to profounder observation,[pg 127] i infer the capacity of music to give birth to myth, that is to say, the most significant exemplar, and precisely tragic myth: the myth which speaks of dionysian knowledge in symbols. in the phenomenon of the lyrist, i have set forth that in him music strives to express itself with regard to its nature in apollonian images. if now we reflect that music in its highest potency must seek to attain also to its highest symbolisation, we must deem it possible that it also knows how to find the symbolic expression of its inherent dionysian wisdom; and where shall we have to seek for this expression if not in tragedy and, in general, in the conception of the tragic?

from the nature of art, as it is ordinarily conceived according to the single category of appearance and beauty, the tragic cannot be honestly deduced at all; it is only through the spirit of music that we understand the joy in the annihilation of the individual. for in the particular examples of such annihilation only is the eternal phenomenon of dionysian art made clear to us, which gives expression to the will in its omnipotence, as it were, behind the principium individuationis, the eternal life beyond all phenomena, and in spite of all annihilation. the metaphysical delight in the tragic is a translation of the instinctively unconscious dionysian wisdom into the language of the scene: the hero, the highest manifestation of the will, is disavowed for our pleasure, because he is only phenomenon, and because the eternal life of the will is not affected by his annihilation. "we believe in eternal life,"[pg 128] tragedy exclaims; while music is the proximate idea of this life. plastic art has an altogether different object: here apollo vanquishes the suffering of the individual by the radiant glorification of the eternity of the phenomenon; here beauty triumphs over the suffering inherent in life; pain is in a manner surreptitiously obliterated from the features of nature. in dionysian art and its tragic symbolism the same nature speaks to us with its true undissembled voice: "be as i am! amidst the ceaseless change of phenomena the eternally creative primordial mother, eternally impelling to existence, self-satisfying eternally with this change of phenomena!"

[20] cf. world and will as idea, i. p. 339, trans. by haldane and kemp.

[21] that is "the will" as understood by schopenhauer.—tr.