the social compact
i suppose men to have reached the point at which the obstacles in the way of their preservation in the state of nature show their power of resistance to be greater than the resources at the disposal of each individual for his maintenance in that state. that primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence.
but, as men cannot engender new forces, but only unite and direct existing ones, they have no other means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of forces great enough to overcome the resistance. these they have to bring into play by means of a single motive power, and cause to act in concert.
this sum of forces can arise only where several persons come together: but, as the force and liberty of each man are the chief instruments of his self-preservation, how can he pledge them without harming his own interests, and neglecting the care he owes to himself? this difficulty, in its bearing on my present subject, may be stated in the following terms—
"the problem is to find a form of association which will defend and protect with the whole common force the person and goods of each associate, and in which each, while uniting himself with all, may still obey himself alone, and remain as free as before." this is the fundamental problem of which the social contract provides the solution.
the clauses of this contract are so determined by the nature of the act that the slightest modification would make them vain and ineffective; so that, although they have perhaps never been formally set forth, they are everywhere the same and everywhere tacitly admitted and recognised, until, on the violation of the social compact, each regains his original rights and resumes his natural liberty, while losing the conventional liberty in favour of which he renounced it.
these clauses, properly understood, may be reduced to one—the total alienation of each associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community for, in the first place, as each gives himself absolutely, the conditions are the same for all; and, this being so, no one has any interest in making them burdensome to others.
moreover, the alienation being without reserve, the union is as perfect as it can be, and no associate has anything more to demand: for, if the individuals retained certain rights, as there would be no common superior to decide between them and the public, each, being on one point his own judge, would ask to be so on all; the state of nature would thus continue, and the association would necessarily become inoperative or tyrannical.
finally, each man, in giving himself to all, gives himself to nobody; and as there is no associate over whom he does not acquire the same right as he yields others over himself, he gains an equivalent for everything he loses, and an increase of force for the preservation of what he has.
if then we discard from the social compact what is not of its essence, we shall find that it reduces itself to the following terms—
"each of us puts his person and all his power in common under the supreme direction of the general will, and, in our corporate capacity, we receive each member as an indivisible part of the whole."
at once, in place of the individual personality of each contracting party, this act of association creates a moral and collective body, composed of as many members as the assembly contains votes, and receiving from this act its unity, its common identity, its life and its will. this public person, so formed by the union of all other persons, formerly took the name of city,[1] and now takes that of republic or body politic; it is called by its members state when passive, sovereign when active, and power when compared with others like itself. those who are associated in it take collectively the name of people, and severally are called citizens, as sharing in the sovereign power, and subjects, as being under the laws of the state. but these terms are often confused and taken one for another: it is enough to know how to distinguish them when they are being used with precision.
[1] the real meaning of this word has been almost wholly lost in modern times; most people mistake a town for a city, and a townsman for a citizen. they do not know that houses make a town, but citizens a city. the same mistake long ago cost the carthaginians dear. i have never read of the title of citizens being given to the subjects of any prince, not even the ancient macedonians or the english of to-day, though they are nearer liberty than any one else. the french alone everywhere familiarly adopt the name of citizens, because, as can be seen from their dictionaries, they have no idea of its meaning; otherwise they would be guilty in usurping it, of the crime of lèse-majesté: among them, the name expresses a virtue, and not a right. when bodin spoke of our citizens and townsmen, he fell into a bad blunder in taking the one class for the other. m. d'alembert has avoided the error, and, in his article on geneva, has clearly distinguished the four orders of men (or even five, counting mere foreigners) who dwell in our town, of which two only compose the republic. no other french writer, to my knowledge, has understood the real meaning of the word citizen.
