the limits of the sovereign power

if the state is a moral person whose life is in the union of its members, and if the most important of its cares is the care for its own preservation, it must have a universal and compelling force, in order to move and dispose each part as may be most advantageous to the whole. as nature gives each man absolute power over all his members, the social compact gives the body politic absolute power over all its members also; and it is this power which, under the direction of the general will, bears, as i have said, the name of sovereignty.

but, besides the public person, we have to consider the private persons composing it, whose life and liberty are naturally independent of it. we are bound then to distinguish clearly between the respective rights of the citizens and the sovereign,[1] and between the duties the former have to fulfil as subjects, and the natural rights they should enjoy as men.

each man alienates, i admit, by the social compact, only such part of his powers, goods and liberty as it is important for the community to control; but it must also be granted that the sovereign is sole judge of what is important.

every service a citizen can render the state he ought to render as soon as the sovereign demands it; but the sovereign, for its part, cannot impose upon its subjects any fetters that are useless to the community, nor can it even wish to do so; for no more by the law of reason than by the law of nature can anything occur without a cause.

the undertakings which bind us to the social body are obligatory only because they are mutual; and their nature is such that in fulfilling them we cannot work for others without working for ourselves. why is it that the general will is always in the right, and that all continually will the happiness of each one, unless it is because there is not a man who does not think of "each" as meaning him, and consider himself in voting for all? this proves that equality of rights and the idea of justice which such equality creates originate in the preference each man gives to himself, and accordingly in the very nature of man. it proves that the general will, to be really such, must be general in its object as well as its essence; that it must both come from all and apply to all; and that it loses its natural rectitude when it is directed to some particular and determinate object, because in such a case we are judging of something foreign to us, and have no true principle of equity to guide us.

indeed, as soon as a question of particular fact or right arises on a point not previously regulated by a general convention, the matter becomes contentious. it is a case in which the individuals concerned are one party, and the public the other, but in which i can see neither the law that ought to be followed nor the judge who ought to give the decision. in such a case, it would be absurd to propose to refer the question to an express decision of the general will, which can be only the conclusion reached by one of the parties and in consequence will be, for the other party, merely an external and particular will, inclined on this occasion to injustice and subject to error. thus, just as a particular will cannot stand for the general will, the general will, in turn, changes its nature, when its object is particular, and, as general, cannot pronounce on a man or a fact. when, for instance, the people of athens nominated or displaced its rulers, decreed honours to one, and imposed penalties on another, and, by a multitude of particular decrees, exercised all the functions of government indiscriminately, it had in such cases no longer a general will in the strict sense; it was acting no longer as sovereign, but as magistrate. this will seem contrary to current views; but i must be given time to expound my own.

it should be seen from the foregoing that what makes the will general is less the number of voters than the common interest uniting them; for under this system, each necessarily submits to the conditions he imposes on others; and this admirable agreement between interest and justice gives to the common deliberations an equitable character which at once vanishes when any particular question is discussed, in the absence of a common interest to unite and identify the ruling of the judge with that of the party.

from whatever side we approach our principle, we reach the same conclusion, that the social compact sets up among the citizens an equality of such a kind, that they all bind themselves to observe the same conditions and should therefore all enjoy the same rights. thus, from the very nature of the compact, every "act of sovereignty", i.e. every authentic act of the general will, binds or favours all the citizens equally; so that the sovereign recognises only the body of the nation, and draws no distinctions between those of whom it is made up. what, then, strictly speaking is an act of sovereignty? it is not a convention between a superior and an inferior, but a convention between the body and each of its members. it is legitimate, because based on the social contract, and, equitable, because common to all; useful, because it can have no other object than the general good, and stable, because guaranteed by the public force and the supreme power. so long as the subjects have to submit only to conventions of this sort, they obey no-one but their own will; and to ask how far the respective rights of the sovereign and the citizens extend, is to ask up to what point the latter can enter into undertakings with themselves, each with all, and all with each.

we can see from this that the sovereign power, absolute, sacred and inviolable as it is, does not and cannot exceed the limits of general conventions, and that every man may dispose at will of such goods and liberty as these conventions leave him; so that the sovereign never has a right to lay more charges on one subject than on another, because, in that case, the question becomes particular, and ceases to be within its competency.

when these distinctions have once been admitted, it is seen to be so untrue that there is, in the social contract, any real renunciation on the part of the individuals, that the position in which they find themselves as a result of the contract is really preferable to that in which they were before. instead of a renunciation, they have made an advantageous exchange: instead of an uncertain and precarious way of living they have got one that is better and more secure; instead of natural independence they have got liberty, instead of the power to harm others security for themselves, and instead of their strength, which others might overcome, a right which social union makes invincible. their very life, which they have devoted to the state, is by it constantly protected; and when they risk it in the state's defence, what more are they doing than giving back what they have received from it? what are they doing that they would not do more often and with greater danger in the state of nature, in which they would inevitably have to fight battles at the peril of their lives in defence of that which is the means of their preservation? all have indeed to fight when their country needs them; but then no one has ever to fight for himself. do we not gain something by running, on behalf of what gives us our security, only some of the risks we should have to run for ourselves, as soon as we lost it?

[1] attentive readers, do not, i pray, be in a hurry to charge me with contradicting myself. the terminology made it unavoidable, considering the poverty of the language; but wait and see.