the people (continued)
a body politic may be measured in two ways—either by the extent of its territory, or by the number of its people; and there is, between these two measurements, a right relation which makes the state really great. the men make the state, and the territory sustains the men; the right relation therefore is that the land should suffice for the maintenance of the inhabitants, and that there should be as many inhabitants as the land can maintain. in this proportion lies the maximum strength of a given number of people; for if there is too much land, it is troublesome to guard and inadequately cultivated, produces more than is needed, and soon gives rise to wars of defence; if there is not enough, the state depends on its neighbours for what it needs over and above, and this soon gives rise to wars of offence. every people, to which its situation gives no choice save that between commerce and war, is weak in itself: it depends on its neighbours, and on circumstances; its existence can never be more than short and uncertain. it either conquers others, and changes its situation, or it is conquered and becomes nothing. only insignificance or greatness can keep it free.
no fixed relation can be stated between the extent of the territory and the population that are adequate one to the other, both because of the differences in the quality of land, in its fertility, in the nature of its products, and in the influence of climate, and because of the different tempers of those who inhabit it; for some in a fertile country consume little, and others on an ungrateful soil much. the greater or less fecundity of women, the conditions that are more or less favourable in each country to the growth of population, and the influence the legislator can hope to exercise by his institutions, must also be taken into account. the legislator therefore should not go by what he sees, but by what he foresees; he should stop not so much at the state in which he actually finds the population, as at that to which it ought naturally to attain. lastly, there are countless cases in which the particular local circumstances demand or allow the acquisition of a greater territory than seems necessary. thus, expansion will be great in a mountainous country, where the natural products, i.e. woods and pastures, need less labour, where we know from experience that women are more fertile than in the plains, and where a great expanse of slope affords only a small level tract that can be counted on for vegetation. on the other hand, contraction is possible on the coast, even in lands of rocks and nearly barren sands, because there fishing makes up to a great extent for the lack of land-produce, because the inhabitants have to congregate together more in order to repel pirates, and further because it is easier to unburden the country of its superfluous inhabitants by means of colonies.
to these conditions of law-giving must be added one other which, though it cannot take the place of the rest, renders them all useless when it is absent. this is the enjoyment of peace and plenty; for the moment at which a state sets its house in order is, like the moment when a battalion is forming up, that when its body is least capable of offering resistance and easiest to destroy. a better resistance could be made at a time of absolute disorganisation than at a moment of fermentation, when each is occupied with his own position and not with the danger. if war, famine, or sedition arises at this time of crisis, the state will inevitably be overthrown.
not that many governments have not been set up during such storms; but in such cases these governments are themselves the state's destroyers. usurpers always bring about or select troublous times to get passed, under cover of the public terror, destructive laws, which the people would never adopt in cold blood. the moment chosen is one of the surest means of distinguishing the work of the legislator from that of the tyrant.
what people, then, is a fit subject for legislation? one which, already bound by some unity of origin, interest, or convention, has never yet felt the real yoke of law; one that has neither customs nor superstitions deeply ingrained, one which stands in no fear of being overwhelmed by sudden invasion; one which, without entering into its neighbours' quarrels, can resist each of them single-handed, or get the help of one to repel another; one in which every member may be known by every other, and there is no need to lay on any man burdens too heavy for a man to bear; one which can do without other peoples, and without which all others can do;[1] one which is neither rich nor poor, but self-sufficient; and, lastly, one which unites the consistency of an ancient people with the docility of a new one. legislation is made difficult less by what it is necessary to build up than by what has to be destroyed; and what makes success so rare is the impossibility of finding natural simplicity together with social requirements. all these conditions are indeed rarely found united, and therefore few states have good constitutions.
there is still in europe one country capable of being given laws—corsica. the valour and persistency with which that brave people has regained and defended its liberty well deserves that some wise man should teach it how to preserve what it has won. i have a feeling that some day that little island will astonish europe.
[1] if there were two neighbouring peoples, one of which could not do without the other, it would be very hard on the former, and very dangerous for the latter. every wise nation, in such a case, would make haste to free the other from dependence. the republic of thlascala, enclosed by the mexican empire, preferred doing without salt to buying from the mexicans, or even getting it from them as a gift the thlascalans were wise enough to see the snare hidden under such liberality. they kept their freedom, and that little state, shut up in that great empire, was finally the instrument of its ruin.
