the chapters collected in this book represent a running comment on the european situation during the past ten months. although in the haze that covers the continent it is difficult always to see clearly what is happening, and still more difficult to forecast what is likely to occur, i have not deemed it necessary to revise any of the estimates i made from time to time in these periodic reviews on the position. in the period covered by them peace has gone back perceptibly and unmistakably. of the years immediately after the end of the great war it may be said that up to the present year each showed a distinct improvement over its predecessor. the temper of the warring nations showed a gradual healing and improvement, and east and west there was a return to reason and calm in their attitude towards each other. in the cannes discussions of january 1922 the atmosphere of hostility which poisoned the spa discussions in 1920 had largely disappeared, and the applause which greeted herr[pg vi] rathenau's fine speech at genoa in april 1922 was cordial and general. the electric messages from paris failed to provoke a thunderstorm, and one of the speakers, at the last meeting of the assembly, drawing an illustration from the weather outside, said the conference had broken up under blue skies and a serene firmament.
that was in may 1922. those words, when used, met with cheering approval: if used to-day they would be greeted with scoffing laughter. the present year has been one of growing gloom and menace. the international temper is distinctly worse all round. a peace has been patched up with the turkish empire. no one believes it can endure long. the only question is, how long? there may be other patched-up treaties between struggling nations before the year is out. there is only one prediction concerning them which can at this stage be safely made—they will leave european peace in a more precarious plight than ever. a peace wrung by triumphant force out of helplessness is never a good peace. that is why i view with apprehension the character of the settlement which may soon be wrung out of german despair in the ruhr and imposed on greek impotence in the[pg vii] adriatic. the fiume settlement may turn out to be more satisfactory in spite of threatening omens. the jugo-slavs are a formidable military proposition to be tackled by any power. the war proved them to be about the best fighting material in europe. they are also fairly well equipped with modern weapons, and if unhappily the need arose their deficiencies in this respect would soon be supplied from the workshops of czecho-slovakia and elsewhere. i am, therefore, still hopeful that fiume may be remitted for settlement to diplomatists and not to gunmen. international right in these turbulent days seems to depend, not on justice, but on a reckoning of chances. the slavs are ready to defend their rights and can do so. there is, therefore, some talk of conferences and even arbitration in their case. germany and greece cannot put up a fight. unconditional surrender is, therefore, their lot. all the same, this is not only a wrong but a miscalculation. unjust concessions, extracted by violence, are not settlements; they are only postponements. unfortunately, the decisions at the next great hearing of the cause are just as likely to be provisional—and so the quarrel will go on to the final catastrophe unless humanity one day sees the[pg viii] light and has the courage to follow it. but that day must not be too distant, otherwise it will come too late to save civilisation. the last conflict between great nations has exposed the devastating possibilities of modern science. henceforth progress in the destructiveness of the apparatus of war has been, and will continue to be, so rapid that a conflict to-morrow would spread ten times the desolation caused by the great war of 1914-18. there is a concentration of much scientific and mechanical skill on strengthening the machinery of devastation. incredible progress—if progress be the word—has been made within the last three or four years in perfecting and increasing the shattering power of this kind of devilry. what will it be like five, ten, twenty years hence!
whilst nations are piling up, perfecting and intensifying their explosives, they are also saturating the ground with the inflammable passions which one day will precipitate the explosion. injustice, insult, insolence, distilled into the spirit of revenge, is everywhere soaking into the earth.
i have never doubted that france could impose terms on germany. it was clear that she could starve germany into submission to any conditions[pg ix] dictated to her. it is astonishing that the germans should have held out so long. what i have steadily predicted in these articles is that those terms will not produce as much reparation as a more conciliatory course would have brought—that to operate them will be a source of constant friction, and that the methods employed to impose and execute them will rouse a spirit of patriotic wrath which will in the end bring disaster to the victor of to-day.
when the invasion of the ruhr was decided upon, the shortage in the promised coal deliveries upon which default was declared was barely 10 per cent. a little better organisation of the wagon service on the french side would have made up that deficiency in a very short time. during the months of the occupation the french and belgians have not succeeded in collecting one-sixth the tonnage delivered during the corresponding months last year. it will take weeks after passive resistance has collapsed to restore railways and collieries to working order. the new régime will have to liquidate arrears of at least 15,000,000 tons before it begins its regular monthly deliveries. what about cash payments? it is not too much to say that germany is much less able to meet her obligations in this respect than she was[pg x] before the invasion. her credit has been blown out of sight into infinite space. it will take a long time to pull it back from its wanderings and set its feet once more firmly on european earth. there are only four ways in which the huge sum due from germany can be liquidated:—
(1) by handing over to the allies the gold reserves of germany and of germans either at home or on deposit abroad. the former is negligible; the amount of the latter is disputable. much of it is essential to enable germany to purchase abroad the raw material and food necessary to her existence. the worse german credit becomes the larger must this deposit be. as for the foreign securities and deposits which are not strictly necessary for trading, they cannot all be made available, for nothing will induce some of the depositors to part with the whole of these securities. the sum, therefore, derivable from this source would amount to but a small percentage of the total figure payable for reparations.
(2) deliveries of coal, timber, potash, dyes and other raw material. with the exception of timber, these deliveries have been, on the whole, satisfactory[pg xi]—since the spa agreement. it did not require the pressure of armed invasion to improve these deliveries, including the timber demands of the allies.
(3) a percentage levied on german exports. these are paid for in gold or its equivalent, and the levy would therefore be remitted in gold. a levy of 20 per cent. on german exports would have produced between ￡40,000,000 and ￡50,000,000 a year on the basis of last year's exports. when german trade returned to normal it would yield ￡100,000,000. this sum, added to the value of the material delivered, would cover interest and sinking fund on the ￡2,500,000,000 which is now the accepted maximum of german capacity.
(4) the restoration of german credit with a view to the immediate raising of a loan on reparation account. this would help the allies over their urgent financial difficulties.
these four methods of payment are the only known and knowable means of obtaining reparations. they would have been more immediately fruitful if so much time, money and resource had not been wasted over this ill-judged invasion.
[pg xii]
the apologists of french action in the ruhr contend that france was driven to these extremes by the refusal of britain to co-operate with her in bringing legitimate pressure to bear on germany to carry out the treaty. those who put forward this contention argue in ignorance of the proposals submitted by the british government to the allied conference in august 1922. these would have exploited all the methods above set forth to the limit of their productiveness. these proposals were substantially accepted by all the allies except france. repeated efforts have been made this year in parliament to induce the government to publish this scheme. both the present and the late prime minister gave favourable if not definite answers to the request for publication. but so far the august proceedings have not made their public appearance. why this reluctance to give the whole facts to the public? the discussions at the november and january conferences have been published in full. these meetings were only adjournments from the august conference. the story of the fateful conference is, therefore, incomplete if august is suppressed. ought not the world to know the proposals which france rejected in august 1922? in[pg xiii] the absence of official publication i will take the responsibility now of giving a summary.
it was proposed:—
(1) that germany should be called upon to take such measures as the reparations commission should stipulate, in order to balance her budget and restore her financial stability.
(2) that the reichsbank should be made independent of government control.
(3) that 26 per cent. of the total value of german exports should be collected in gold or foreign currencies and paid into a separate account in the reichsbank in the name of the sub-committee of the reparations commission known as the committee of guarantees.
(4) that the produce of all german import and export duties other than the levy should be paid monthly to a special account at the reichsbank, which should be under the scrutiny of the committee of guarantees. the german government should have the disposal of the sums standing to the credit of this account so long as the reparations commission was satisfied that it fulfilled the obligations imposed upon it. if at any time the [pg xiv]commission was not satisfied that this was the case the committee of guarantees should have the right to take over the sums standing to the credit of this account and to secure the payment to it of the produce of these duties thereafter.
(5) there were stern provisions for supervision of german finance by the committee of guarantees and for preventing the export of german capital.
(6) there were provisions for supervision over state mines and forests in the event of their being a failure in delivery of coal or timber as the case might be.
a moratorium up to december 1922 was to be given conditionally on the acceptance of the above terms by the german government, and the reparations commission were then to proceed to fix the further annual payments.
had these drastic proposals been adopted and enforced by the allies, what would have been the result? deliveries of coal and timber would have been ensured up to the full quota arranged. by means of the levy on exports, ￡50,000,000 would have been already collected in gold and paid into allied account. the mark would have been [pg xv]stabilised, and could have been made the basis of a considerable loan. as german trade gradually recovered the export levy would bring in larger amounts. this year would certainly have produced a yield of between ￡60,000,000 and ￡70,000,000. this is what would have been effected for reparations if the plan put forward by the british government had been accepted and put into execution in august. by the settlement of this most troublous question, the great cost and the still greater irritation of the ruhr episode would have been avoided, trade would have continued its convalescence, and the peace of europe would have been established.
what would have happened if germany had refused these terms? we should certainly have heard what objections or counter-proposals germany had to offer. but we were resolved to have a settlement that would put an end to the fiscal chaos inside germany, and having thus put her in a position to pay we were equally resolved that she should pay up to the limit of her capacity. we, therefore, undertook, if germany rejected the terms finally agreed upon, to join france and the other allies in any coercive measures deemed advisable to compel acceptance. m. poincaré refused to agree. his [pg xvi]refusal alone rendered that conference fruitless. over a year has elapsed since then. he has pursued a different policy. so far it has brought him nothing. i am bold enough to predict that in future it will bring france considerably less than the august 1922 plan would have yielded.
if he is out for reparations his policy will inevitably fail in comparison with that he so rashly threw over. but if he is out for trouble it has been a great success, and in future it will be an even greater triumph for his statesmanship. a permanent garrison in the ruhr has possibilities of mischief which it does not require any special vision to foresee.
enduring peace can only rest on a foundation of justice. it is just that germany should exert herself to the limit of her strength to repair the damage wrought by her armies. she was the aggressor; she was the invader. her aggression inflicted serious hurt on her neighbours. by the established precepts of every civilised law in the world she ought to pay up. a peace which did not recognise that obligation would be unjust and provoke a righteous resentment in the breasts of the wronged. that sentiment would have been inimical to the good[pg xvii] understanding that is one of the essentials of peace. moreover, it is not conducive to good behaviour amongst nations that they should be allowed to ravage and destroy without paying the penalty of their misdeeds. that is why i do not agree with those who would wipe out the claim for reparations entirely. on the other hand, civilised jurisprudence has also advanced to the stage where it forbids the creditor to attach his debtor's freedom and independence as security for the payment of the debt. the law that permitted a debtor to be sold into bondage for an unliquidated liability has now been voted barbarous by the more humane usage and wont of the day. that is why i protest against using armed force to occupy and control a country whilst the scourge of starvation is being used to whip its workmen into toiling for payment of a foreign debt. as mr. gladstone once said: "justice means justice to all." the main difficulty of a just settlement of reparations comes from the growing disposition to take sides blindly in this dispute. one party sees nothing but the outrage of 1914-18, the costly vindication of right, and the just claim of the victims to compensation for their losses. the other party sees nothing but the harsh fury with which the [pg xviii]victors in the cause press their verdict to execution. peace can only be restored by a full recognition of the equities as well as the humanities—of the humanities as well as the equities. i have sought in these pages to deal fairly with both.
d. lloyd george.
september 13th, 1923.
