i am frankly delighted that negotiations between lord curzon and the soviet government seem to indicate a genuine desire on the part of both parties to establish a more satisfactory understanding between this country and russia. the bolshevist episode, like all revolutionary terrors, has been at times a shrieking nightmare which has made the world shudder. it did render one supreme service to civilisation—it terrified democracy back into sanity just at the time when the nervous excitability that followed the war was bordering on mental instability. in our attitude towards the soviet government we must, however, constantly bear in mind one consideration. what matters to us is not so much the russian government as the people of russia, and for the moment the bolshevist administration represents the only medium for dealing with that mighty nation. as long as it [pg 302]remains the only constituted authority in russia, every act of hostility against it injures russia. as we discovered in 1919, you cannot wage war against the government for the time being of a country without devastating the land and alienating its people. you cannot refuse to trade with it now without depriving its people of commodities—and especially of equipments—essential to their well-being. it is the people, therefore, who would suffer, and it is the people who would ultimately resent that suffering. governments come and go, but the nation goes on for ever.
the russian people deserve—especially at the hands of all the allied nations—every sympathetic consideration we can extend to them. not only because they have to endure the sway of a tyrannical oligarchy imposing its will by ruthless violence, but even more for the reasons that led to the establishment of that tyranny. if the fruit is bitter we must bear in mind how the tree came to be planted in the soil. it may sound like quoting ancient history to revert to the events of eight or nine years ago, but no one can understand russia, or do justice to its unhappy people, without recalling the incidents that led to the great catastrophe.
[pg 303]
those who denounce any dealings with the existing order seem to have persuaded themselves that pre-revolutionary russia was governed by a gentle and beneficent despotism which conferred the blessings of a tolerant and kindly fatherland upon a well-ruled household. in no particular is this a true picture of the ancien régime. the fortress of peter and paul was not erected, nor its dungeons dug, by the bolshevists. siberia was not set up as a penal settlement for political offenders for the first time—if at all—by the bolshevists. in 1906 alone 45,000 political offenders were deported to endure the severities of siberia. persecution of suspected religious leaders was not started by the soviets. to them does not belong the discredit of initiating the methods of pogromism. under the "paternal" reign of the tsars dissent from the orthodox faith was proscribed and persecuted, and the jews were hunted like vermin.
let us not forget also that beyond all these circumstances the revolution was rendered inevitable by the ineptitude and corruption of the old system, and especially by the terrible suffering and humiliation which that state of things inflicted on russia in the great war.
[pg 304]
any one who has read the memoirs of an ambassador, by m. paléologue, will find a complete explanation in its pages of the savage hatred with which the russian revolutionaries view all those who were associated in any degree with the old order. he tells the story of how the gallant army found itself at the critical hour without ammunition, rifles, transport, and often without food. no braver or more devoted men ever fought for their country than the young peasants who made up the russian armies of 1914-15-16. with little and often no artillery support, they faced without faltering the best-equipped heavy artillery in the world. they were mown down by shell fire and machine guns by the million. their aggregate casualties up to september, 1916, even according to the reluctant admissions of the tsarist generals of the day, were five millions. in reality they were much heavier. often they went into action with sticks, as the russian war office had no rifles with which to arm them. they picked up as they advanced rifles dropped by fallen comrades. there is nothing in the war comparable to the trustful heroism of these poor peasants. we know now why there were no rifles, or shells, or wagons. the wholesale [pg 305]corruption of the régime has been exposed to the world by irrefutable documentary evidence.
here are a few extracts from m. paléologue's interesting book. one extract from his diary reads:—
"the lack of ammunition means that the r?le of the artillery in battle is necessarily insignificant. the whole burden of the fighting falls on the infantry and the result is a ghastly expenditure of human life. a day or two ago one of the grand duke sergius's collaborators, colonel englehardt, said to major wehrlin, my second military attaché: 'we're paying for the crimes of our administration with the blood of our men.'"
about the same date talking about the deplorable state of things, the grand duke sergius, who was inspector-general of artillery, said to the french ambassador, "when i think that this exhibition of impotence is all that our aristocratic system has to show, it makes me want to be a republican."
when a grand duke talked like that early in 1915, what must a peasant soldier have thought by the spring of 1917, after many more millions of his[pg 306] comrades had been slaughtered as a result of the same "exhibition of impotence."
it is no use pointing to the fact that our army was also short of ammunition at that date. the british army was a small army organised on the basis of a maximum expeditionary force of six divisions. the russian army was a great conscript force organised on the basis of a hundred divisions in the field.
i recollect well our own military reports from the russian fronts. they provided much distressing reading. they filled you with compassion for the millions of gallant men who were the victims of corruption and stupidity in high places. i recall one statement made to our general which betrays the callous indifference with which men in authority seemed to treat the appalling sacrifice of life amongst loyal soldiers who were facing death without a murmur, because the "little father" willed it. whenever anxious inquiries were directed by our officer as to the gigantic losses in men which filled him with dismay as well as horror, the usual reply was, "don't worry yourself. thank god, of men at all events we have enough." an answer which sends a thrill of horror through you when you[pg 307] read it. that is why at the end of two and a half years the patient men in the field at last mutinied. that is why their parents and brothers in the fields supported them. the "little father" had failed them, and his minions had betrayed them. it is a sordid and horrid tale of peculation, maladministration, and cruel treachery. millions of british and french money went in shameless and open bribery, whilst the soldiers in the field, for need of what the money could buy, were opposing bare breasts covering brave hearts to the most terrible artillery in the world. if the rest of the money had been well spent, what was left after providing for profuse graft would still have sufficed to save that gallant army from destruction. but unhappily no real interest was taken in anything beyond the amount and the payment of the pocket-money. that seemed to be the main purpose of the transaction. nothing was well managed except the inevitable bribe. there were honourable and upright men who did their duty by their distracted and plundered country, but they were helpless in the torrent of corruption.
no wonder a great russian industrialist engaged in the ministry of war, in dwelling on the sad [pg 308]failure of tsarism and its probable results in june, 1905, predicted a revolution with "ten years of the most frightful anarchy." "we shall," he added, "see the days of pugatchef[11] again and perhaps worse"—a striking prophecy verified with appalling accuracy.
it is not pleasant to recall these dreadful episodes, which reveal the betrayal of a devotion faithful unto death. but this story is essential to the right appreciation of events. there is no savagery like that of a trustful people which finds that its trust was being imposed upon the whole time. here the retribution has been hideous in all its aspects. but the provocation was also revolting from every point of view. to judge russia fairly that must be taken into account.
i think the government are, therefore, taking the right view of their responsibilities when through their foreign secretary they open negotiations with the representative of the soviet government in this country. you can easily evoke resounding cheers amongst the thoughtless by declaring [pg 309]melodramatically that you will never "shake hands with murder." in practice this policy has always been a failure. mr. pitt in a famous passage declined to assent to that doctrine when he was attacked for trying to open negotiations with the "assassins" of the french revolution. he was driven out of this calm and rational attitude by the inflammable rhetoric of burke, aided by the arrogance of the victorious revolutionaries. nevertheless, the sequel proved he was right. french bolshevism was not defeated by foreign armies, nor starved out by the british blockade. but it was driven into the arms of napoleon, and europe suffered bitterly for the folly of the hotheads on both sides. it would have been better for that generation had it listened to the wise counsel of william pitt.
if you decline to treat with russia as long as its present rulers remain in power, then you ought to place turkey in the same category. the military junta that governed turkey has been guilty of atrocities at least as vile as any committed by the bolshevists. but at lausanne we ostentatiously stretched the friendly hand of britain to the authors of the armenian massacres. and france,[pg 310] italy—yes, and america also—tendered the same warm handshake. i am not criticising the offer of amity made as a condition of peace. we must make peace in the world, and you cannot do so if you put whole nations off your visiting list because of the misconduct of those who govern them. once you begin you are not quite sure where it will end.
in these cases the innocent suffer the most. a refusal to trade with russia would not deprive the soviet commissaries of a single necessity or comfort of life. the communists are quite strong enough to take care of themselves. but the peasants—who are not communists—would continue to suffer, and their sufferings would increase as their reserves of clothing and other essentials became completely exhausted. and the people of this country who need the produce of russia for their own use would also suffer to a certain extent. america can afford this exalted aloofness. she does not need the russian grain and timber. she is an exporter of those commodities. but we cannot do as well without them, and we also sadly need russian flax for our linen industries, which are languishing for the want of it. last year there were quite considerable imports of russian produce[pg 311] into this country. this year owing to the prospects of an improved harvest these imports will be much larger. they are greatly needed here for our own consumption, and they pay for exports of machinery and textiles which the russian on his part urgently requires.
but beyond and above all these material considerations, the world needs peace. in the old days conveyancing attorneys in this country kept a property transaction going by interminable requisitions on the title of the other party. they exercised all their ingenuity and invoked the added ingenuity of trained counsel to probe for defects in the right of the vendor to deal. those were leisurely days, and men could afford to dawdle. even then these exercises often ended in ruinous litigation. to-day time presses and the atmosphere is dangerous for the plying of irritating interrogatories. it is time we made up our minds that the soviets have come to stay, whether we like it or no, and that one or other of the formidable men who rule russia to-day are likely to rule it for some time to come. the sooner we have the courage to recognise this fact, the sooner will real peace be established.
