the vanquished have returned to their spiritual home at angora throwing their fezzes in the air. the victors have returned with their tails well between their legs. all tragedies have their scenes of comedy, and the lausanne conference is one of those amusing episodes interpolated by fate to relieve the poignancy of one of its greatest tragic pieces—the turk and civilisation.
the turk may be a bad ruler, but he is the prince of anglers. the cunning and the patience with which he lands the most refractory fish once he has hooked it is beyond compare. what inimitable play we have witnessed for six months on the shores of lake leman! once the fish seemed to have broken the tackle—that was when the first conference came to an abrupt end. it[pg 323] simply meant, however, that the wily oriental was giving out plenty of line. time never worries him, he can sit and wait. he knew the moment would come when they would return with the hook well in their gullets, and the play begin once more—the reeling in and the reeling out, the line sometimes taut and strained but never snapping. time and patience rewarded him. at last the huge tarpon are all lying beached on the banks—britain, france, italy, and the united states of america—high and dry, landed and helpless, without a swish left in their tails, glistening and gasping in the summer sun.
it is little wonder that ismet had a smile on his face when all was over. reports from angora state that the peace is hailed there as a great turkish triumph; and so it is. the turk is truly a great fisherman. if he could govern as well as he angles, his would be the most formidable empire in the world. unfortunately he is the worst of rulers, hence the trouble—his own and that of those who unhappily have drawn him as governor in the lottery of life.
the able correspondent of the daily telegraph at the lausanne conference has supplied us from[pg 324] time to time with vivid pen pictures of the four greatest powers of the world struggling in the toils of the squalid and broken remains of an empire with an aggregate population equal to that of a couple of english counties that i could name. this is what he wrote about this conference, which constitutes one of the most humiliating incidents in the history of western civilisation:—
"the records of the present conference present an even more marvellous series of concessions and surrenders. what was frayed before is threadbare now. the allies have whittled away their own rights with a lavish hand in the cause of peace. they have also—and this is a graver matter, for which it seems they will have to give an account in the not distant future—gone back on their promises to small races, which are none the less promises because the small races have not the power to enforce their performance. the figure that the european delegates are cutting in lausanne, and the agents of the concessionnaires in angora—all alike representatives of the west—has been rendered undignified as much by the manner as the matter of their worsting."
[pg 325]
since those distressing words were written the powers have sunk yet deeper into the slough of humiliation.
the times correspondent wiring after the agreement writes in a strain of deep indignation at the blow inflicted on the prestige of the west by this extraordinary treaty. in order to gauge the extent of the disaster to civilisation which this treaty implies it is only necessary to give a short summary of the war aims of the allies in turkey.
they were stated by mr. asquith with his usual succinctness and clarity in a speech which he delivered when prime minister at the guildhall on november 9th, 1914:—
"it is not the turkish people—it is the ottoman government that has drawn the sword, and which, i venture to predict, will perish by the sword. it is they and not we who have rung the death-knell of ottoman dominion, not only in europe but in asia. with their disappearance will disappear as i, at least, hope and believe, the blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest regions of the earth."
[pg 326]
in pursuance of the policy thus declared by the british premier on behalf of the allies a series of agreements was entered into in the early months of 1915 between france, russia, and ourselves, by which the greater part of turkey, with its conglomerate population, was to be partitioned at the end of the war. cilicia and syria were allocated to france; mesopotamia to britain; armenia and constantinople to russia. palestine was to be placed under the joint control of britain and france. arabia was to be declared independent and a territory carved largely out of the desert—but including some famous cities of the east, damascus, homs and aleppo—was to be constituted into a new arab state, partly under the protection of france and partly of britain. smyrna and its precincts were to be allotted to greece if she joined her forces with those of the allies in the war. the straits were to be demilitarised and garrisoned. when italy came into the war later on in 1915, it was stipulated that in the event of the partition of turkey being carried out in pursuance of these agreements, territories in southern anatolia should be assigned to italy for development.
[pg 327]
what was the justification for breaking up the turkish empire? the portions to be cut out of turkey have a population the majority of which is non-turkish. cilicia and southern anatolia might constitute a possible exception. in these territories massacres and misgovernment had perhaps succeeded at last in turning the balance in favour of the turk. but in the main the distributed regions were being cultivated and developed before the war by a population which was western and not turanian in its origin and outlook. this population represented the original inhabitants of the soil.
the experiences, more especially of the past century, had demonstrated clearly that the turk could no longer be entrusted with the property, the honour, or the lives of any christian race within his dominions. whole communities of armenians had been massacred under circumstances of the most appalling cruelty in lands which their ancestors had occupied since the dawn of history. and even after the war began 700,000 of these wretched people had been done to death by these savages, to whom, it must be remembered, the great powers so ostentatiously proffered the hand of[pg 328] friendship at the first lausanne conference. even while the conference was in session, and the handshaking was going on, the turks were torturing to death scores of thousands of young greeks whom they deported into the interior. as "a precautionary measure" 150,000 greeks of military age, of whom 30,000 were military prisoners, were last year driven inland to the mountains of anatolia. on the way they were stripped of their clothes, and in this condition were herded across the icy mountains. it is not surprising that when an agreement was arrived at for the exchange of military prisoners, the turks found the greatest difficulty in producing 11,000, and of the total 150,000 it is estimated that two-thirds perished. the allied powers had every good reason for determining, as they hoped for all time, that this barbarian should cease to shock the world by repeated exhibitions of savagery against helpless and unarmed people committed to his charge by a cruel fate.
apart from these atrocities the fact that great tracts of country, once the most fertile and populous in the world, have been reduced by turkish misrule and neglect to a condition which is indistinguishable from the wilderness, alone proves that[pg 329] the turk is a blight and a curse wherever he pitches his tent, and that he ought in the interests of humanity to be treated as such. when a race, which has no title to its lands other than conquest, so mismanages the territories it holds by violence as to deprive the world of an essential contribution to its well-being, the nations have a right—nay, a duty—to intervene in order to restore these devastated areas to civilisation. this same duty constitutes the reason and justification for the white settlers of america overriding the prior claims of the indian to the prairies and forests of the great west.
on the shores of the mediterranean are two races with a surplus population of hard-working, intelligent cultivators, both of them belonging to countries which had themselves in the past been responsible for the government of the doomed lands covered by the turkish empire. greece and italy could claim that under their rule this vast territory throve and prospered mightily. they now pour their overflow of population into lands far away from the motherland. yet they are essentially mediterranean peoples. the history of the mediterranean will for ever be associated with their[pg 330] achievements on its shores and its waters. the derelict wastes of asia minor need them. valleys formerly crowded with tillers are now practically abandoned to the desert weeds. irrigation has been destroyed or neglected. the italian engineers are amongst the best in the world, and once they were introduced into asia minor would make cultivation again possible. there is plenty of scope in the deserts of anatolia for both italian and greek. i was hoping for a peace that would set them both working. had such a settlement been attained, a generation hence would have witnessed gardens thronging with happy men, women, and children, where now you have a wilderness across which men, women, and children are periodically hunted down into nameless horror.
yet another reason for the allied decision was the bitter resentment that existed at the ingratitude displayed by the turk towards britain and france. they were naturally indignant that he should have joined their foes and slammed the gate of the dardanelles in their face, and by that means complicated and prolonged their campaign and added enormously to their burdens, their losses, and their dangers. but he had not the [pg 331]thankfulness even of the beast of prey in the legend towards the man who had cured his wounded limb. france and britain had many a time extracted the thorn from the turkish paw when he was limping along in impotent misery. they had done more. they had often saved the life of that empire when the russian bear was on the point of crushing it out of existence; and yet without provocation, without even a quarrel, he had betrayed them to their enemies.
i have set out shortly what the war policy of the allies was in reference to turkey. the treaty of sèvres considerably modified that policy in many vital aspects. by that treaty, constantinople, cilicia, and southern anatolia were left to the turk; armenia was created into an independent state. there were many objections which could be raised to the original proposals of 1915, as it might be argued that they contemplated handing over in cilicia and southern anatolia populations which in the main were turkish and moslem to christian rulers. but in substance the modified plan of sèvres was sound, and if carried out would have conduced to the well-being of the millions to be liberated by its terms for ever from turkish[pg 332] rule. the world at large also would have benefited by the opportunity afforded to the industrious and intelligent armenian and greek populations of turkey to renew the fertility of this land, once so bountiful in its gifts, thus enriching man's store of good things. the barbarian invasion which withered that fertility was pushed back into the interior by the treaty of sèvres. the treaty of lausanne has extended and perpetuated its sway from the black sea to the mediterranean. i have explained the why and wherefore of sèvres. but why lausanne? it is a long and painful story—a compound of shortsightedness, disloyalty, selfishness, and pusillanimity amongst nations and their statesmen. and more than all, fate happened to be in its grimmest mood when dealing with this problem. the russian revolution eliminated that great country from the solution of the problem on the lines of protection for the oppressed races of turkey, and instead cast its might on the side of the oppressor. president wilson was inclined to recommend that the united states of america should undertake the mandate for the armenians. had he succeeded, what a different story would now have[pg 333] been told! what a different story the generations to come would also tell! but his health broke down at the vital moment and america would have none of his humanitarian schemes. then came the departure of sonnino from the quirinal. with him went for a momentous while the old dreams of italian colonisation, which in the past had done so much to spread civilisation in three continents. his successors were homelier men. i have still my doubts as to whether they served italy best by the less adventurous and more domesticated policy they pursued. the future may decide that issue. but whatever the decision, the time for action passed away, and unless and until there is another break up in turkey, the chance italy has lost since 1919 will not be recovered. will it ever come back?
there followed the french check in cilicia, and the negotiations at angora with mustapha kemal, which were both single-handed and under-handed; for the allies were not even informed of what was going on. this was a fatal step, for it broke up the unity which alone would enable the western powers to deal effectively with the turk. this unity was never fully re-created. there can be no[pg 334] reunion without confidence. there can be no trust in the west that is broken in the east. much of the recent mischief in the entente came from the clandestine negotiations at angora.
the last fatal change was the greek revolt against venizelos. it is often said that he is the greatest statesman thrown up by that race since pericles. in all he has undertaken he has never failed his people. disaster has always come to them when they refused to follow his guidance. when king alexander was killed by a monkey, the greeks were called upon to decide between constantine and venizelos. their choice was ruinous to their country. no greater evil can befall a nation than to choose for its ruler a stubborn man with no common sense. before the advent of constantine, greece, with no aid and little countenance from the powers, was able to hold the forces of mustapha kemal easily at bay and even to drive him back into the fastnesses of anatolia. in encounter after encounter the greek army, led by men chosen for their military gifts and sufficiently well equipped, inflicted defeat after defeat on the armies of angora. but with constantine came a change. in the greek army, courtiers were substituted for[pg 335] soldiers in the high command. french, british and italian public opinion, with the memory of constantine's treachery during the war still fresh in their minds, altered their attitude towards the greeks who had elevated him to the throne in defiance of allied sentiment. indifferent powers became hostile; hostile powers became active. the final catastrophe began with the heroic but foolish march of the greek army into the defiles of asia minor, followed by the inevitable retreat. it was consummated when constantine for dynastic reasons appointed to the command of the troops in asia minor a crazy general whose mental condition had been under medical review. the greeks fight valiantly when well led, but like the french, once they know they are not well led, confidence goes, and with confidence courage. before the kemalist attack reached their lines the greek army was beaten and in full retreat. with attack came panic, with panic the complete destruction of what was once a fine army. with the disappearance of that army vanished the last hope for the salvation of anatolia. that the history of the east, and probably the west, should have been changed by the bite of a monkey is just another grimace of the[pg 336] comic spirit which bursts now and again into the pages of every great tragedy.
all that could be done afterwards was to save the remnants of a great policy. western civilisation put up its last fight against the return of savagery into europe, when in september and october of last year british soldiers and sailors, deserted by allies and associates alike, saved constantinople from hideous carnage. the pact of mudania was not sèvres, but it certainly was better than lausanne. from sèvres to mudania was a retreat. from mudania to lausanne is a rout.
what next? lausanne is not a terminus, it is only a milestone. where is the next? no one claims that this treaty is peace with honour. it is not even peace. if one were dealing with a regenerated turk, there might be hope. but the burning of smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders of tens of thousands of young greeks in the interior, prove that the turk is still unchanged. to quote again from the correspondent of the times at lausanne:—
"all such evidence as can be obtained here confirms the belief that the new turk is but the old,[pg 337] and that the coming era of enlightenment and brotherly love in turkey, for which it is the correct thing officially to hope, will be from the foreigners' point of view at best a humiliating, and at worst a bloody, chaos."
the amazing legend that the turk is a gentleman is dying hard. that legend has saved him many a time when he was on the brink of destruction. it came to his aid in october last when the policy of this country was changed by the revolt of the turcophile against the coalition. the turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of armenians, and dishonoured myriads of christian women who trusted to his protection. nevertheless the turk is a gentleman! by his indolence, his shiftiness, his stupidity, and his wantonness, he has reduced a garden to a desert. what better proof can there be that he is a real gentleman? for a german bribe he sold the friends who had repeatedly saved his wretched life. all the same, what a gentleman he is! he treated british prisoners with a barbarous neglect that killed them off in hundreds. still, he is such a gentleman! he plunders, he slays, and outrages those who are unable to defend themselves.[pg 338] he misgoverns, cheats, lies, and betrays. for all that, the turk is a gentleman! so an agitation was engineered with perverse tenacity to save this fine old oriental gentleman from the plebeian hands that sought his destruction. hence the black treaty of lausanne.
london, july 25th, 1923
