a storm is working up over the publication by public servants of information which came into their possession in the course of their official careers. the immediate occasion is mr. winston churchill's story of the war. angry questions are being asked in parliament, and it is publicly announced that the cabinet have appointed a committee of its members to consider the whole problem.
it is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years been inundating the european and american public with a flood of reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the conduct of operations, either of the great war or the great peace, in which they were engaged. warriors on land and on sea have displayed an unprecedented eagerness[pg 362] to inform the public as to their own share in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some collaborator. like julius c?sar, they mean to live in history not merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon them. on the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming responsibility for particular parts of the treaty of versailles, and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. in each case highly confidential information is disclosed, secret documents are used, cabinet and council proceedings are published, without the slightest regard to precedent. one disclosure has led to another, one revelation has rendered another inevitable.
a general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary, military, naval, or political. what is the latter to do? his reputation is at stake. is he not to be allowed to repair[pg 363] the omission or to correct the misquotation? take the case of ministers who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, and whose actions have been subjected to malignant and persistent misrepresentation. in attacking these ministers statements are made which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even destroy their reputation. in formulating the attack a document is partially quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is misquoted. the minister knows that a full and fair quotation would clear his good name of the imputation sought to be cast upon it. is he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? a mere denial would carry no weight. a full revelation would settle the dispute in his favour. the publication cannot conceivably affect any public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any possible enemy of his country. is he not to be allowed to use the only means available to redeem his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny? his critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without protest. is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? he claims that he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time of crisis and peril. for[pg 364] that he is defamed by men who had access to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure or demur. why should his country deny him the same privilege for his protection? that is the case which the cabinet committee will have to consider. whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. those who are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving to the public documents which were acquired in the public service had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for purposes with which they were in sympathy. is it not rather late for them to protest now? there is such a thing as fair play even when politicians are attacked.
so far as the british are concerned the writing of the books of the type alluded to was started, i think, by field-marshal lord french of ypres, in his book, 1914. this work is of the nature of an apologia; and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes to discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually secret memoranda and dispatches written by himself and others. the late admiral of the fleet, lord fisher,[pg 365] gives in his book, memories, examples of his own intervention at the war council meetings. in his autobiography, from private to field-marshal, which appeared some time later, field-marshal sir william robertson, who was for over two years the confidential adviser of the cabinet and as such attended all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly secret conclaves. though he does not quote secret documents textually, he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme war council, inter-allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to the opinions of individuals. in his recent speeches he has gone even further. a still more recent work, sir douglas haig's command, is the result of collaboration by two authors of whom one, at least, held an official position during the war, being sir douglas haig's private secretary when he was commander-in-chief of the british army in france. this book is even less reticent. it, also, is essentially an apologia and justification of an individual. to establish their case, the writers not only summarise some of the secret proceedings of the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give[pg 366] extracts of their decisions. these extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion on the council and cabinet of that day. it is true that some of the quotations are stated to be taken from french books previously published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source of the knowledge displayed.
in addition there have been endless articles in magazines and newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously, all attacking either ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official capacity. as to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. but when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or proceedings, the wrath of the assailants and their sympathisers knows no bounds.
what happened in reference to the consultations held in connection with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the way these revelations occur. the question of the publication of these proceedings was definitely discussed at versailles, after the signature of the peace treaty with[pg 367] germany on the 28th june, 1919, by president wilson, representing the united states, m. clemenceau and m. simon, representing france, m. sonnino, representing italy, m. makino, representing japan, and myself. this is what occurred on that occasion. for the first time i quote from my own notes written at the time:
"president wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents ought to be treated as purely private conversation, and he objected to the communication of the accounts given in the notes of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken their minds with great freedom, as improper use might afterwards be made of these documents. on the other hand, he did not object to the notes being communicated to special individuals in the personal confidence of members of the council. though he looked upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the actual conversations were private. in the united states no one had the right to claim documents of this kind. president wilson's view was that each government should take the course traditional in its[pg 368] own country with the clear and distinct understanding that no one should under any circumstances make the procès verbal public. m. clemenceau did not think that such documents should be regarded as private property, whilst m. sonnino thought they need not be considered as official documents.
"for my own part i was anxious to know what the precedents were. i also felt bound to enter a caveat that if attacks should be made on the political heads i might be forced in particular cases to refer to these notes, and i gave warning that i might have to do so unless a protest was then made. m. clemenceau agreed so far, that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the procès verbaux to prove particular facts."
it will be observed from this record that i was the first to safeguard the interest of persons who, i felt certain, would be attacked for their share in the treaty. i am the last to take advantage of the proviso.
what followed? m. clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political opponents for surrendering french rights to the treaty. president wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for[pg 369] his assent to other provisions of the treaty. in self-defence they authorised the publication of the secret reports of the paris meeting.
m. clemenceau entrusted his defence to m. tardieu. m. tardieu, in his book the truth about the treaty, gives most of his attention to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, giving the opinions of individuals. he does the same with the deliberations of the peace conference. in fact the whole book is based on international proceedings of a secret nature. m. poincaré, in maligning his rivals, has not refrained from making full use of information which came to his knowledge as president of the republic. for example, in his article, souvenirs et documents, in the temps of the 12th september, 1921, he quotes in extenso a letter of april, 1919, from himself as president of the republic to the president of the council, m. clemenceau, and a letter from me in reply to the president of the council. my consent was not even asked to the publication of my letter. this correspondence referred to the period proposed to be placed on the[pg 370] occupation by the allies of the left bank of the rhine. according to signor nitti, m. poincaré makes somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the revue des deux mondes. all these disclosures were partial, truncated and, therefore, misleading. they did not give the public a complete account of what occurred. the impression created was, therefore, unfair to the other actors in that great drama. that is undoubtedly what impelled ex-president wilson to hand over his documents to mr. ray baker with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of the american delegation. hence his book, woodrow wilson and world settlement. it is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme war council, numerous extracts from which are given. signor nitti, the late italian premier, on the other hand, expressly states that he does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. nevertheless, he prints a memorandum written by myself for the peace conference in march, 1919, under the title of some considerations for the peace conference before they finally draft their terms, and also m. clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. but he excuses his [pg 371]action in this case because extracts from this memorandum had already been published.
i only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment of these various distinguished men for divulging secrets they ought to have kept under lock and key. that is not in the least my object. i do so in order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances of the great war and the peace that ensued. disclosures already made largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion upon individuals or bodies of individuals have given the assailed parties a special position which cannot in justice be overlooked.
london, march 17th, 1923.
the end
