by sir arthur conan doyle.
b from “the british campaign in france and flanders.” by sir arthur conan doyle. (hodder & stoughton.)
on september 11 the british were still advancing upon a somewhat narrowed front. there was no opposition, and again the day bore a considerable crop of prisoners and other trophies. the weather had become so foggy that the aircraft were useless, and it is only when these wonderful scouters are precluded from rising that a general realises how indispensable they have become to him. as a wit expressed it, they have turned war from a game of cards into a game of chess. it was still very wet, and the army was exposed to considerable privation, most of the officers and men having neither change of clothing, overcoats, nor waterproof sheets, while the blowing up of bridges on the lines of communication had made it impossible to supply the wants. the undefeatable commissariat, however, was still working well, which means that the army was doing the same. on the 12th the pursuit was continued as far as the river aisne. allenby’s cavalry12 occupied braine in the early morning, the queen’s bays being particularly active, but there was so much resistance that the third division was needed to make the ground good. gough’s cavalry division also ran into the enemy near chassemy, killing or capturing several hundred of the german infantry. in these operations captain stewart, whose experience as an alleged spy has been mentioned, met with a soldier’s death. on this day the sixth french army was fighting a considerable action upon the british left in the vicinity of soissons, the germans making a stand in order to give time for their impedimenta to get over the river. in this they succeeded, so that when the allied forces reached the aisne, which is an unfordable stream some sixty yards from bank to bank, the retiring army had got across it, had destroyed most of the bridges, and showed every sign of being prepared to dispute the crossing.
missy bridge, facing the fifth division, appeared at first to be intact, but a daring reconnaissance by lieutenant pennecuick, of the engineers, showed that it was really badly damaged. condé bridge was intact, but was so covered by a high horse-shoe formation of hills upon the farther side that it could not be used, and remained throughout under control of the enemy. bourg bridge, however, in front of the13 first army corps, had for some unexplained reason been left undamaged, and this was seized in the early morning of september 13 by de lisle’s cavalry, followed rapidly by bulfin’s 2nd brigade. it was on the face of it a somewhat desperate enterprise which lay immediately in front of the british general. if the enemy were still retreating he could not afford to slacken his pursuit, while, on the other hand, if the enemy were merely making a feint of resistance, then, at all hazards, the stream must be forced and the rearguard driven in. the german infantry could be seen streaming up the roads on the farther bank of the river, but there were no signs of what their next disposition might be. air reconnaissance was still precluded, and it was impossible to say for certain which alternative might prove to be correct, but sir john french’s cavalry training must incline him always to the braver course. the officer who rode through the boers to kimberley and threw himself with his weary men across the path of the formidable kronje was not likely to stand hesitating upon the banks of the aisne. his personal opinion was that the enemy meant to stand and fight, but none the less the order was given to cross.
september 13 was spent in arranging this dashing and dangerous movement. the british got across eventually in several places and by various devices. bulfin’s men, followed by the14 rest of the first division of haig’s army corps, passed the canal bridge of bourg with no loss or difficulty. the 11th brigade of pulteney’s third corps got across by a partially demolished bridge and ferry at venizel. they were followed by the 12th brigade, who established themselves near bucy. the 13th brigade was held up at missy, but the 14th got across and lined up with the men of the third corps in the neighbourhood of ste. marguerite, meeting with a considerable resistance from the germans. later, count gleichen’s 15th brigade also got across. on the right hamilton got over with two brigades of the third division, the 8th brigade crossing on a single plank at vailly and the 9th using the railway bridge, while the whole of haig’s first corps had before evening got a footing upon the farther bank. so eager was the advance and so inadequate the means that haking’s 5th brigade, led by the connaught rangers, was obliged to get over the broad and dangerous river, walking in single file along the sloping girder of a ruined bridge, under a heavy, though distant, shell-fire. the night of september 13 saw the main body of the army across the river, already conscious of a strong rear-guard action, but not yet aware that the whole german army had halted and was turning at bay. on the right de lisle’s cavalrymen had pushed up the slope from bourg bridge and reached as far as vendresse, where they were pulled up by the german lines.
15 it has been mentioned above that the 11th and 12th brigades of the fourth division had passed the river at venizel. these troops were across in the early afternoon, and they at once advanced, and proved that in that portion of the field the enemy were undoubtedly standing fast. the 11th brigade, which was more to the north, had only a constant shell-fire to endure, but the 12th, pushing forward through bucy-le-long, found itself in front of a line of woods from which there swept a heavy machine-gun and rifle-fire. the advance was headed by the 2nd lancashire fusiliers, supported by the 2nd inniskilling fusiliers. it was across open ground and under heavy fire, but it was admirably carried out. in places where the machine-guns had got the exact range the stricken fusiliers lay dead or wounded with accurate intervals, like a firing-line on a field-day. the losses were heavy, especially in the lancashire fusiliers. colonel griffin was wounded, and five of his officers with 250 men were among the casualties. it should be recorded that fresh supplies of ammunition were brought up at personal risk by colonel seely, late minister of war, in his motor-car. the contest continued until dusk, when the troops waited for the battle of next day under such cover as they could find.
the crossing of the stream may be said, upon the one side, to mark the end of the battle and pursuit of the marne, while, on the other,16 it commenced that interminable battle of the aisne which was destined to fulfil bloch’s prophecies and to set the type of all great modern engagements. the prolonged struggles of the manchurian war had prepared men’s minds for such a development, but only here did it first assume its full proportions and warn us that the battle of the future was to be the siege of the past. men remembered with a smile bernhardi’s confident assertion that a german battle would be decided in one day, and that his countrymen would never be constrained to fight in defensive trenches.
the moral effect of the battle of the marne was greater than its material gains. the latter, so far as the british were concerned, did not exceed 5,000 prisoners, 20 guns, and a quantity of transport. the total losses, however, were very heavy.
apart from the losses, the mere fact that a great german army had been hustled across 30 miles of country, had been driven from river to river, and had finally to take refuge in trenches in order to hold their ground, was a great encouragement to the allies. from that time they felt assured that with anything like equal numbers they had an ascendancy over their opponents.
