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CHAPTER XIX: THE TIDE TURNED

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from many of the points in the forest held by the ashantis the sea could be seen, and on the morning of the 2d of october a steamer which had not been there on the previous evening was perceived lying off the town. the ashantis were soon informed by spies in elmina and cape coast that the ship had brought an english general with about thirty officers. the news that thirty men had come out to help to drive back twenty thousand was received with derision by the ashantis.

“they will do more than you think,” frank said when ammon quatia was scoffing over the new arrival. “you will see a change in the tactics of the whites. hitherto they have done nothing. they have simply waited. now you will see they will begin to move. the officers will drill the natives, and even a fanti, drilled and commanded by white officers, will learn how to fight. you acknowledge that the black troops in red coats can fight. what are these? some of them are fantis, some of them are black men from the west indian islands, where they are even more peaceful than the fantis, for they have no enemies. perhaps alone the fantis would not fight, but they will have the soldiers and sailors from on board ship with them, and you saw at elmina how they can fight.”

the ship was the ambriz, one of the african company's steamers, bringing with it thirty-five officers, of whom ten belonged to the commissariat and medical staff. among the fighting men were sir garnet wolseley, colonel m'neil, chief of his staff, major t. d. baker, 18th regiment, captain huyshe, rifle brigade, captain buller, 60th rifles, all of the staff; captain brackenbury, military secretary, and lieutenant maurice, r. a., private secretary, major home, r. e., lieutenant saunders, r. a., and lieutenant wilmot, r. a.. lieutenant colonel evelyn wood, 90th regiment, and major b. c. russell, 13th hussars, were each to form and command a native regiment, having the remainder of the officers as their assistants.

the ambriz had left england on the 12th of september, and had touched at madeira and at the various towns on the coast on her way down, and at the former place had received the news of the disaster to the naval expedition up the prah.

the english government had been loath to embark upon such an expedition, but a petition which had been sent home by the english and native traders at sierra leone and elmina had shown how great was the peril which threatened the colony, and it had been felt that unless an effort was made the british would be driven altogether from their hold of the coast. when the expedition was at last determined upon, the military authorities were flooded with recommendations and warnings of all kinds from persons who knew the coast. unfortunately these gentlemen differed so widely from each other, that but little good was gained from their counsels. some pronounced the climate to be deadly. others said that it was really not bad. some warmly advocated a moderate use of spirits. others declared that stimulants were poison. one advised that all exercise should be taken between five and seven in the morning. another insisted that on no account should anyone stir out until the sun had been up for an hour, which meant that no one should go out till half past seven. one said take exercise and excite perspiration. another urged that any bodily exercise should be avoided. one consistent gentleman, after having written some letters to the papers strongly advocating the use of white troops upon the coast instead of west indian regiments, when written to by sir garnet wolseley for his advice as to articles of outfit, replied that the only article which he could strongly commend would be that each officer should take out his coffin.

ten days passed after the landing. it was known in the ashanti camp that the fanti kings had been ordered to raise contingents, and that a white officer had been alloted to each to assist him in this work. the ashantis, however, had no fear whatever on this score. the twenty thousand natives who occupied the country south of the prah had all been driven from their homes by the invaders, and had scattered among the towns and villages on the seacoast, where vast numbers had died from the ravages of smallpox. the kings had little or no authority over them, and it was certain that no native force, capable in any way of competing with the army of the assailants, could be raised.

the small number of men of the 2d west indian regiment at elmina had been reinforced by a hundred and twenty houssas brought down the coast. the ashanti advanced parties remained close up to elmina.

on the 13th of october frank accompanied the ashanti general to the neighborhood of this town. the ashanti force here was not a large one, the main body being nearly twenty miles away in the neighborhood of dunquah, which was held by a small body of houssas and natives under captain gordon. at six in the morning a messenger ran in with the news that two of the english war steamers from cape coast were lying off elmina, and that a number of troops had been landed in boats. the ashanti general was furious, and poured out threats against his spies in cape coast for not having warned him of the movement, but in fact these were not to blame. so quietly had the arrangements been made that, until late in the previous afternoon, no one, with the exception of three or four of the principal officers, knew that an expedition was intended. even then it was given out that the expedition was going down the coast, and it was not until the ships anchored off elmina at three in the morning that the officers and troops were aware of their destination. all the west indian troops at cape coast had been taken, captain peel of the simoon landing fifty sailors to hold the fort in case the ashantis should attack it in their absence. the expedition consisted of the houssas, two hundred men of the 2d west india regiment, fifty sailors, and two companies of marines and marine artillery, each fifty strong, and a large number of natives carrying a small armstrong gun, two rocket tubes, rockets, spare ammunition, and hammocks for wounded.

the few ashantis in the village next to elmina retired at once when the column was seen marching from the castle. ammon quatia had taken up his quarters at the village of essarman, and now advanced with his troops and took post in the bush behind a small village about three miles from the town. the houssas were skirmishing in front of the column. these entered the village which had been deserted by the ashantis, and set it on fire, blowing up several kegs of powder which had been left there in the hurry of the flight. then as they advanced farther the ashantis opened fire. to their surprise the british, instead of falling back, opened fire in return, the houssas, west indians, and natives discharging their rifles at random in all directions. captain freemantle with the sailors, the gun, and rockets made for the upper corner of the wood facing them to their left. captain crease with a company of marine artillery took the wood on the right. the houssas and a company of west indians moved along the path in the center. the remainder of the force remained with the baggage in reserve. the ashantis kept up a tremendous fire, but the marines and sailors pushed their way steadily through the wood on either side. captain freemantle at length gained a point where his gun and rockets could play on essarman, which lay in the heart of the wood, and opened fire, but not until he had been struck by a slug which passed through his arm. colonel m'neil, who was with the houssas, also received a severe wound in the arm, and thirty-two marines and houssas were wounded. the ashantis were gradually driven out of the village and wood, a great many being killed by the english fire.

having accomplished this, the british force rested for an hour and then moved on, first setting fire to essarman, which was a very large village. a great quantity of the ashanti powder was stored there, and each explosion excited yells of rage among the ashantis. their general was especially angry that two large war drums had been lost. so great was the effect produced upon the ashantis by the tremendous fire which the british had poured into every bush and thicket as they advanced, that their general thought it expedient to draw them off in the direction of his main body instead of further disputing the way.

the english now turned off towards the coast, marching part of the way through open country, part through a bush so dense that it was impossible to make a flank attack upon them here. in such cases as this, when the ashantis know that an enemy is going to approach through a dense and impassable forest, they cut paths through it parallel to that by which he must advance and at a few yards' distance. then, lying in ambush there, they suddenly open fire upon him as he comes along. as no idea of the coming of the english had been entertained they passed through the dense thickets in single file unmolested. these native paths are very difficult and unpleasant walking. the natives always walk in single file, and the action of their feet, aided by that of the rain, often wears the paths into a deep v-shaped rut, two feet in depth. burning two or three villages by the way the column reached the coast at a spot five miles from elmina, having marched nine miles.

as the ashantis were known to be in force at the villages of akimfoo and ampene, four miles farther, a party was taken on to this point. akimfoo was occupied without resistance, but the ashantis fought hard in ampene, but were driven out of the town into the bush, from which the british force was too small to drive them, and therefore returned to elmina, having marched twenty-two miles, a prodigious journey in such a climate for heavily armed europeans. the effect produced among the ashantis by the day's fighting was immense. all their theories that the white men could not fight in the bush were roughly upset, and they found that his superiority was as great there as it had been in the open. his heavy bullets, even at the distance of some hundred yards, crashed through the brush wood with deadly effect, while the slugs of the ashantis would not penetrate at a distance much exceeding fifty yards.

ammon quatia was profoundly depressed in spirits that evening.

“the white men who come to fight us,” he said, “are not like those who come to trade. who ever heard of their making long marches? why, if they go the shortest distances they are carried in hammocks. these men march as well as my warriors. they have guns which shoot ten times as far as ours, and never stop firing. they carry cannon with them, and have things which fly through the air and scream, and set villages on fire and kill men. i have never heard of such things before. what do you call them?”

“they are called rockets,” frank said.

“what are they made of?”

“they are made of coarse powder mixed with other things, and rammed into an iron case.”

“could we not make some too?” the ashanti general asked.

“no,” frank replied. “at least, not without a knowledge of the things you should mix with the powder, and of that i am ignorant. besides, the rockets require great skill in firing, otherwise they will sometimes come back and kill the men who fire them.”

“why did you not tell me that the white men could fight in the bush?”

“i told you that there would be a change when the new general came, and that they would not any longer remain in their forts, but would come out and attack you.”

a few days after this fight the ashantis broke up their camp at mampon, twelve miles from elmina, and moved eastward to join the body who were encamped in the forest near dunquah.

“i am going,” ammon quatia said to frank, “to eat up dunquah and abra crampa. we shall do better this time. we know what the english guns can do and shall not be surprised.”

with ten thousand men ammon quatia halted at the little village of asianchi, where there was a large clearing, which was speedily covered with the little leafy bowers which the ashantis run up at each halting place.

two days later sir garnet wolseley with a strong force marched out from cape coast to abra crampa, halting on the way for a night at assaiboo, ten miles from the town. on the same day the general sent orders to colonel festing of the marine artillery, who commanded at dunquah, to make a reconnaissance into the forest from that place. in accordance with this order colonel festing marched out with a gun and rocket apparatus under captain rait, the annamaboe contingent of a hundred and twenty men under their king, directed by captain godwin, four hundred other fantis under captain broomhead, and a hundred men of the 2d west india regiment. after a three mile march in perfect silence they came upon an ashanti cutting wood, and compelled him to act as guide. the path divided into three, and the annamaboes, who led the advance, when within a few yards of the camp, gave a sudden cheer and rushed in.

the ashantis, panic stricken at the sudden attack, fled instantly from the camp into the bush. sudden as was the scare frank's guards did not forget their duty, but seizing him dragged him off with them in their flight, by the side of ammon quatia. the latter ordered the war drums to begin to beat, and frank was surprised at the quickness with which the ashantis recovered from their panic. in five minutes a tremendous fire was opened from the whole circle of bush upon the camp. this stood on rising ground, and the british force returned the fire with great rapidity and effect. the annamaboe men stood their ground gallantly, and the west indians fought with great coolness, keeping up a constant and heavy fire with their sniders. the houssas, who had been trained as artillerymen, worked their gun and rocket tube with great energy, yelling and whooping as each round of grape or canister was fired into the bush, or each rocket whizzed out.

notwithstanding the heavy loss which they were suffering, the ashantis stood their ground most bravely. their wild yells and the beating of their drums never ceased, and only rose the louder as each volley of grape was poured into them. they did not, however, advance beyond the shelter of their bush, and, as the british were not strong enough to attack them there, the duel of artillery and musketry was continued without cessation for an hour and a half, and then colonel festing fell back unmolested to dunquah.

the ashantis were delighted at the result of the fighting, heavy as their loss had been. they had held their ground, and the british had not ventured to attack them in the bush.

“you see,” ammon quatia said exultingly to frank, “what i told you was true. the white men cannot fight us in the bush. at essarman the wood was thin and gave but a poor cover. here, you see, they dared not follow us.”

on the british side five officers and the king of annamaboe were wounded, and fifty-two of the men. none were killed, the distance from the bush to the ground held by the english being too far for the ashanti slugs to inflict mortal wounds.

ammon quatia now began to meditate falling back upon the prah—the sick and wounded were already sent back—but he determined before retiring to attack abra crampa, whose king had sided with us, and where an english garrison had been posted.

on the 2d of november, however, colonel festing again marched out from dunquah with a hundred men of the 2d west india regiment, nine hundred native allies, and some houssas with rockets, under lieutenant wilmot, towards the ashanti camp. this time ammon quatia was not taken by surprise. his scouts informed him of the approach of the column, and moving out to meet them, he attacked them in the bush before they reached the camp. crouching among the trees the ashantis opened a tremendous fire. all the native allies, with the exception of a hundred, bolted at once, but the remainder, with the houssas and west indians, behaved with great steadiness and gallantry, and for two hours kept up a heavy snider fire upon their invisible foes.

early in the fight lieutenant wilmot, while directing the rocket tube, received a severe wound in the shoulder. he, however, continued at his work till, just as the fight was ended, he was shot through the heart with a bullet. four officers were wounded as were thirteen men of the 2d west india regiment. one of the natives was killed, fifty severely wounded, and a great many slightly. after two hours' fighting colonel festing found the ashantis were working round to cut off his retreat, and therefore fell back again on dunquah. the conduct of the native levies here and in two or three smaller reconnaisances was so bad that it was found that no further dependence could be placed upon them, and, with the exception of the two partly disciplined regiments under colonel wood and major russell, they were in future treated as merely fit to act as carriers for the provisions.

although the second reconnaissance from dunquah had, like the first, been unsuccessful, its effect upon the ashantis was very great. they had themselves suffered great loss, while they could not see that any of their enemies had been killed, for lieutenant wilmot's body had been carried off. the rockets especially appalled them, one rocket having killed six, four of whom were chiefs who were talking together. it was true that the english had not succeeded in forcing their way through the bush, but if every time they came out they were to kill large numbers without suffering any loss themselves, they must clearly in the long run be victorious.

what the ashantis did not see, and what frank carefully abstained from hinting to ammon quatia, was that if, instead of stopping and firing at a distance beyond that which at their slugs were effective, they were to charge down upon the english and fire their pieces when they reached within a few yards of them, they would overpower them at once by their enormous superiority of numbers. at ten paces distant a volley of slugs is as effective as a snider bullet, and the whole of the native troops would have bolted the instant such a charge was made. in the open such tactics might not be possible, as the sniders could be discharged twenty times before the english line was reached, but in the woods, where the two lines were not more than forty or fifty yards apart, the sniders could be fired but once or at the utmost twice, while the assailants rushed across the short intervening space.

had the ashantis adopted these tactics they could have crushed with ease the little bands with which the english attacked them. but it is characteristic of all savages that they can never be got to rush down upon a foe who is prepared and well armed. a half dozen white men have been known to keep a whole tribe of red indians at a distance on the prairie. this, however, can be accounted for by the fact that the power of the chiefs is limited, and that each indian values his own life highly and does not care to throw it away on a desperate enterprise. among the ashantis, however, where the power of the chiefs is very great and where human life is held of little account, it is singular that such tactics should not have been adopted.

the ashantis were now becoming thoroughly dispirited. their sufferings had been immense. fever and hunger had made great ravages among them, and, although now the wet season was over a large quantity of food could be obtained in the forest, the losses which the white men's bullets, rockets, and guns had inflicted upon them had broken their courage. the longing for home became greater than ever, and had it not been that they knew that troops stationed at the prah would prevent any fugitives from crossing, they would have deserted in large numbers. already one of the divisions had fallen back.

ammon quatia spent hours sitting at the door of his hut smoking and talking to the other chiefs. frank was often called into council, as ammon quatia had conceived a high opinion of his judgment, which had proved invariably correct so far.

“we are going,” he said one day, “to take abra crampa and to kill its king, and then to fall back across the prah.”

“i think you had better fall back at once,” frank answered. “when you took me with you to the edge of the clearing yesterday i saw that preparations had been made for the defense, and that there were white troops there. you will never carry the village. the english have thrown up breastworks of earth, and they will lie behind these and shoot down your men as they come out of the forest.”

“i must have one victory to report to the king if i can,” ammon quatia said. “then he can make peace if he chooses. the white men will not wish to go on fighting. the fantis are eager for peace and to return to their villages. what do you think?”

“if it be true that white troops are coming out from england, as the fanti prisoners say,” frank answered, “you will see that the english will not make peace till they have crossed the prah and marched to coomassie. your king is always making trouble. you will see that this time the english will not be content with your retiring, but will in turn invade ashanti.”

ammon quatia and the chiefs laughed incredulously.

“they will not dare to cross the prah,” ammon quatia said. “if they enter ashanti they will be eaten up.”

“they are not so easy to eat up,” frank answered. “you have seen how a hundred or two can fight against your whole army. what will it be when they are in thousands? your king has not been wise. it would be better for him to send down at once and to make peace at any price.”

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