“i am more afraid of a west indian hurricane than of the entire spanish navy.” —mckinley
strangely enough, government weather bureaus were not set up for the purpose of giving warnings of tropical storms. maybe there was a feeling in the years before radio that nothing could be done for the sailor on the open sea except to teach him the law of storms. and for the landsman the case looked hopeless until the telegraph came in sight. at any rate, most of the men who began to fly into hurricanes during world war ii were astonished to find that, up to that time, the prediction of tropical storms had been a kind of side issue.
although hurricanes are nearly always destructive and other kinds of storms—the “lows” on the weather map—are generally mild, once in a long time one of these others results in a catastrophe. starting as a low which is spread weakly over a wide area, with cloudy weather, rain or snow, and gentle winds, now and then the exceptional storm suddenly fills newspaper headlines. gales and winds of hurricane force bring a blizzard, tornado, bad hailstorm, or torrential rain 46 and a damaging flood. if it really is a bad one, it finds its way into the pages of history. in times past, these storms often struck populous districts, while hurricanes, in early centuries, hit on thinly settled islands or coasts.
so far as we know, the worst storm to devastate the british isles was one of this kind. it was not a tropical cyclone. it was entirely unexpected, as were most of the big gales in england in the old days. surprise was one of the elements of danger. the weather is seldom fine in the british isles, over the english channel or in the north sea. gloom, with fog or low-flying clouds, is the rule. even on the best days, a damp haze hangs everywhere. it is like looking through a dirty window pane. into this background of gloom many a big storm stole its way eastward from the atlantic. the record-breaker tore up the docks, wrecked shipping and crumbled buildings in the year 1703.
houses were ruined and big trees were blown down. whole fleets were lost and more than nine thousand seamen were drowned. the most violent winds came at night. startled by the roar of the storm, queen anne got out of bed and found a part of the palace roof had been torn away. one prelate, bishop kidder, was buried beneath the ruins of his mansion. awakened by the giant gusts, he put on his dressing gown and made for the door, but a chimney stack crashed through the ceiling and dashed out his brains. his wife was crushed in her bed. after the gales subsided, london and other cities looked like they had been sacked by an enemy. all over the south of england, the lead roofs of churches were rolled up by the wind or blown away in large sheets.
though other gales almost as bad as this one came in later years, it was more than a century before the storm hunters made much progress. not long after 1800, several men with an inquiring mind began to get results. redfield was one, 47 but he studied hurricanes and not the storms of higher latitudes, such as the one which devastated the british isles.
shortly after 1800, there were signs of the coming of faster means of travel and communications and they were destined to be a vital factor in weather forecasting. in 1816 a “hobby-horse” with wheels was displayed in paris by an inventor named niepice. it was propelled by a man or two sitting on it and pushing on the ground. even with two men pushing, it went no faster than a man could walk. but strong claims were made about its possibilities. at about the same time, several men were working on devices like the telegraph.
whether it was this trend or not, something aroused the intense curiosity of a young professor, william heinrich brandes, of the university of breslau, in germany. he began a study in 1816, to see if the weather moved from place to place and if it would be possible to send predictions ahead by means then available. everybody at that time knew that storms moved but it was the general belief that ordinary changes in the weather didn’t go anywhere. brandes collected newspapers from many places and searched them for remarks about the weather, which he put on maps. here he was amazed to see that all kinds of weather seemed to be constantly in motion, quite generally from west to east. but the newspaper reports were rather poor for his purposes and he couldn’t be too sure about the rate of travel.
brandes knew that the french had set up weather stations and collected observations for maps as early as 1780, but the terrible french revolution had brought an end to this work and the data were lying in disuse. after some delay, he obtained copies of the observations for 1783 and put them on maps. sure enough, after he had drawn many daily maps, he saw clearly how the weather moved just as he had suspected it did from the newspaper reports. but at the same time he saw that it was hopeless. the weather moved so 48 rapidly that there was no way of sending the reports ahead fast enough for making predictions of what was coming. the quickest way of sending the reports ahead was by horse or a good man on foot, and the weather would easily outrun them. in 1820, brandes wrote an article about weather maps for publication and then put his maps and newspapers in the trash. but in time his idea got around the world and as the years passed more and more scientists began drawing maps and trying to predict the weather. and so it came about that the government weather services in different parts of the world were set up to predict storms of higher latitudes rather than hurricanes.
redfield was mapping storms after 1830, but he was not trying to make weather forecasts. he wanted only to learn about hurricanes in order to give the mariner a law of storms by which he could judge the weather for himself. nobody worried about the landlubber. it was the idea in those days that a man on land could get his weather out of an almanac or by watching the signs of the winds, clouds, birds, stars, or the rise and fall of the barometer. scientists who believed that it would be possible to predict the ordinary changes in the weather were decidedly in the minority. one of these was james pollard espy, who became known as the “old storm king” of america.
james espy was born in pennsylvania, in the vicinity of harrisburg, but his father moved the family to kentucky while james was an infant. it has been said in biographies of espy that the boy had no education and was seventeen years old before he learned to read, but this was denied by relatives who survived him. it seems that the elder espy soon went to the miami valley in ohio, to get established in business, and left james with an older sister in kentucky. at eighteen james registered at transylvania university, in lexington, where he was much interested in science. in any 49 event, at various times he was a schoolteacher in ohio, maryland, and pennsylvania, until he became fully occupied in the study of weather.
in 1820, espy joined the franklin institute, in philadelphia, to teach languages and work on the weather. in an amazingly short time, he became an authority on meteorology. he was a pleasant, easygoing man, but very persistent in two matters. first, he was determined to have a government bureau established to predict storms; and, second, he disagreed with redfield in the latter’s whirlwind theory of hurricanes. at times the two carried on a violent controversy in the press. espy argued that the winds blow directly toward the center of a storm or toward a line through the center. he was right with respect to storms of middle and higher latitudes, as everybody knows today. he anticipated the modern idea of fronts, and he and other scientists of his day sometimes referred to these lines as “like a line of battle.” in a way, redfield also was right, for the typical hurricane in the tropics has no fronts.
in his efforts to set up a government weather bureau, espy was successful in a small way. in 1842, he was appointed by congress for five years as “meteorologist to the u. s. government” and assigned to the surgeon general, where he worked for five years. this rather strange appointment was due to the fact that the surgeon general had been taking weather observations at army posts since 1819 and had much data for study.
in the meantime, espy had visited england and france, where he was received with honor by renowned scientific associations. on returning to the united states, he published a book, the philosophy of storms, in 1841. his weather maps and storm reports were now famous and by this time he was widely known as the “old storm king.” when his term as “meteorologist to the u. s. government” expired, he secured 50 an appointment as meteorologist under the secretary of the navy, to work with the smithsonian institution, where he made an annual report to the navy until 1852.
during these years, espy was continually after congress to do more about storm hunting. in washington, he earned the title of the “half baked storm hunter” and in congress he was known as the “old storm breeder.” in 1842 he was granted hearings and members of an appropriation committee said that he was a “monomaniac” and his “organ of self-esteem was swollen to the size of a goiter.” they told him that they were not impressed just because “the french had indorsed all his crack-brained schemes.” espy kept insisting for several years and was looked upon as a nuisance in congress until he died in 1860, having had very little success in getting the government to do anything about it, except to give him an appointment to study the weather himself.
as it finally worked out, congress in 1870 established a weather service, to study storms on the great lakes and the seacoasts of the united states. this proved to be such a tough job that, for the time being, the hurricane work, which had been neglected during and after the war between the states, was dropped into second place.
the disturbances that kept the government service busy after 1870 are those that begin in higher latitudes and move generally from west to east—the lows of the weather map—called extratropical to distinguish them from hurricanes and other tropical storms. if they were as regular in their shapes and movements as the tropical variety, the forecasting job would be much easier. but the extratropical kind takes odd forms, elongated or in the shape of a trough, sometimes with two or more centers. their movements are irregular. rarely does one of them become extremely violent, but there is always danger of it and so the forecasters must always be on the alert.
some of the most dangerous of the extratropical storms begin as small companions or secondary centers of huge disturbances, generally on the south side, where they grow rapidly in fury and merge with the original cyclones to produce winds of tremendous destructive power. this often happens in the so-called “windy corners” of the world. one of these, and a good example, is cape hatteras, on the eastern coast of north carolina. it is a sort of way station for both the tropical and extratropical varieties. hurricanes heading northwestward from the caribbean and curving to follow the coastline, sweep over the cape, which juts into the ocean at the point where the northward-moving storms still retain great force. in winter, big extratropical cyclones passing eastward across the region of the great lakes tend to produce small companions or secondaries in the southeastern states and some of them develop gales of hurricane force by the time they reach hatteras. here the cold air masses of the continent, guided by storm winds, are thrown against the warm, moist air from the gulf stream. in the reaction, there are towering seas and hazardous gales that are well known to seamen.
as these big storms roar past cape hatteras, the winds shift to northwest and the sky clears, unless you happen to be on shipboard and the tops of big waves are being torn off by the wind and thrown into the air, to pass overhead in streaks or splatter on the decks. in the days of the sailing ship, the master was not surprised when he got into trouble in the area between bermuda and hatteras. here many merchantmen from far places passed, en route to or from new york or other atlantic ports. slowed by cross seas and dirty weather hatched over the gulf stream, they were soon reduced to storm stay-sails. as the gales mounted, the crews 52 could see other ships rising on the billows in one instant before slithering into a great trough where, in the next instant, they could see nothing but jagged peaks of water and a welter of foam. on the hatteras side, especially, the master could get into a rendezvous with death, for he often had only two choices. he could run full tilt toward the west and try to get around the front of a hurricane moving northward, but this maneuver would take him toward hatteras, where he might find company in the wrecks of countless other ships that had failed in the effort and had been thrown against the coast. the other choice was no better. he could make such progress as was possible toward the east and hope that he would not be caught in the dangerous sector of the oncoming hurricane, a course which more likely than not would lead to disaster.
as has been noted, however, it was the tragic losses caused by extratropical cyclones that induced governments to take over the job of hunting storms and issuing warnings. in france, the first country to take positive action, the immediate cause was the catastrophe which struck the allied fleets in the harbor at balaclava in 1854, during the crimean war. ships of england and france were caught in this desperate position because of jealousies and hatreds which have abounded in europe for centuries. in this case, the tsar of russia seized a pretext to try to gain control of a part of turkey. this was not unexpected. russia always has looked with covetous eyes at the bosporus and the dardanelles, which lead through the black sea to the mediterranean. on this score europe is perpetually uneasy. france and england, who had been enemies, now joined forces and planned a campaign against russia.
it was july, 1853, when the tsar, nicholas i, mobilized his armies. as his first overt act, he occupied the part of turkey which lay north of the danube river. soon afterward, 53 the russian fleet destroyed a turkish squadron in the black sea. now the tsar became more cautious because of the threat of action by england and france, and especially because of indications that russia’s ally, austria, would desert her. the tsar took no further action. now it required a long time in those days to get a campaign under way, and it was a whole year later, july, 1854, when the allies were ready to start the invasion of the crimean peninsula. meanwhile, russia had withdrawn her troops from turkey and there was no real cause for conflict. but tempers had flared, the vast machinery of war had been put in motion, and the allies drew stubbornly nearer to disaster. they knew quite well that the time might be too short to finish the campaign before the bitterly cold weather of the russian winter would creep out over the peninsula. in fact, the tsar had said that his best generals were january and february, and that remark should have carried ample warning.
actually, the allied attack began in september, 1854. the british had taken possession of the harbor at balaclava and, in the beginning, the invasion seemed to promise success. but in october the heroic but ill-fated “charge of the light brigade,” made immortal by tennyson, marked the turning point. it was clear then that the campaign would have to be resumed in the spring of 1855. by november, cold weather had arrived, land action had ceased, and the allies were faced with the problem they had hoped so earnestly to avoid—that of keeping their fighting forces intact during winter in a hostile climate.
to understand the dire predicament of the allies when the big storm struck, it is important to note that the harbor at balaclava had proved to be too small for a supply base. many ships had to be anchored outside and there was delay and confusion in moving in and out of the harbor. not only was there a difficult supply problem but the sick and 54 wounded were being transported across the black sea to scutari, near constantinople, where hospital conditions were abominable. by october, the plight of the army had become a scandal in england. florence nightingale was sent to scutari with authority over all the nurses and a guarantee of co-operation from the medical staff. she arrived on november 4. the remainder of her story is well known as one of the bright pages of history.
now the stage was set for catastrophe. an obscure winter storm blew its way across europe without anything happening until its southern center crossed the black sea, on november 14. suddenly, as secondaries often do, it came to life. there was rain turning to snow as the disturbance burst forth in gales of hurricane force. the congestion grew while the signs of the storm intensified. the ghostly mountains around balaclava disappeared in the gloom, the near-by shore lines next were blotted out, and impenetrable darkness settled down on the shuddering and grinding of the battered remnants of the helpless fleet. wreckage was strewn along the coast and around the harbor. all the men-of-war survived, although damaged, but nearly all of the vessels with essential stores were lost.
misery, disease, and horror followed during the bitter winter. the death rate in the hospitals reached forty-two per cent in february. meanwhile, in france, napoleon iii received news of the terrible gales at balaclava and brooded over the catastrophe. he determined to learn where this deadly storm had originated, the path it followed, and to set up a plan for tracking and predicting others of its kind in the future. and so he called in the famous astronomer leverrier and asked him to carry out the investigation.
urbain leverrier, then forty-three years old, was known throughout the world as the discoverer of the planet neptune, in 1846. he knew of the works of redfield and reid 55 on hurricanes and by 1854 had noted the efforts of other americans and britishers to track extratropical storms. with their ideas in mind, he called on scientists in all european countries to send him observations of the weather on the days from november 12 to 16, preceding and following the day of the disaster at balaclava. information moved slowly between countries in those days and, though many scientists co-operated, it was february, 1855, before leverrier had gathered the data he needed. in developing his plan, he was encouraged by the invention and spread of the electric telegraph in the united states, and he hoped that the extension of lines in europe would provide fast-moving messages for his purpose.
before the end of february, leverrier handed his report to napoleon iii and recommended that a system of weather messages and of issuing warnings be established at once. the emperor approved this within twenty-four hours. soon the french government was mapping the weather and looking for storms. the british followed suit. already joseph henry, in the smithsonian institution in washington, was trying a similar plan, but it was not until february, 1870, that the congress of the united states appropriated funds and established a government weather service in the signal corps of the army.
the immediate reason for this legislation in the united states was similar to that in france. at that time there was a rapidly growing commerce on the great lakes, but storm disasters were all too frequent. in 1869, nearly two thousand vessels were beached or sunk by gales on the lakes. on the seacoasts, the situation was almost equally bad. the new service was soon in operation. the first storm warning by the united states government was sent out in november, 1870.
during the next twenty years, blizzards, hail storms, tornadoes 56 and sudden wind storms of other kinds gave the new weather service a great deal of trouble. they brought a vivid realization of the great variety of surprises that lay in wait for the storm hunters. no sooner had they found rules for the issuance of warnings than a new kind of peril came along. the service had been in the signal corps of the army, but in 1891 it was turned over to the department of agriculture because of its value to the farmers. the desperate struggle against storms continued, with many experienced weathermen feeling very discouraged about the whole business. and then on february 15, 1898, the battleship maine was sunk in havana harbor and war with spain loomed on the horizon.
on april 25, the united states declared war. the spanish fleet left the cape verde islands for cuba and american warships departed for the west indies, to prepare the way for the movement of troops for the coming campaign in cuba. it was june 29, however, before the transports arrived at santiago, carrying seventeen thousand officers and men to support the united states fleet. by that time, the commanders on both sides had begun to worry about storms, for the first hurricanes had appeared as early as june in some years, bringing destructive winds and torrential rains to some parts of cuba and the surrounding area.
willis moore was chief of the weather bureau. he had been a sergeant in the signal corps, transferred when the service was put in the department of agriculture. he knew very well the difficulties of tracking storms and especially in the west indies, where only scattered weather reports could be obtained by cable from some of the islands. a bad hurricane could easily sneak up on the american forces through the broad waters of the caribbean, a predicament likely to arise if the weather bureau depended on cable messages from native observers.
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moore carried his worries to james wilson, secretary of agriculture, who decided that they should go to the president. at the white house, they soon had an audience with mckinley, and wilson presented the case. moore had maps, charts and data on hurricanes and the disasters they had caused in the west indies. also, he had sketched a plan for a cordon of storm hunters on islands around the caribbean, to protect the american fleet. he said that armadas had been defeated, not by the enemy, but by the weather. he thought it probable that as many warships had been sent to the bottom by storms as by the fire of the enemy. the president listened respectfully at first, then with impatience at the lengthy discussion. he had made up his mind. interrupting moore, he got up, sat on the corner of his desk and declared:
“wilson, i am more afraid of a west indian hurricane than i am of the entire spanish navy. get this service started at the earliest possible moment.”
moore ventured to say, “yes, indeed, mr. president, but the weather bureau will need the authority of congress to organize a weather service on foreign soil.”
the president told wilson: “report to chairman cannon of the appropriations committee at once. they are preparing a bill to give me all necessary powers to conduct the war and this authority can be included.”
it was soon done. as a part of the plan, a fast cruiser was stationed at key west, to carry the news to the fleet immediately, in case the weather bureau predicted a hurricane. in that event, the fleet might have abandoned the blockade, to get sea room and avoid the center of the storm.
with this authority, the weather bureau moved swiftly to station men and equipment on the islands. letters had to be written to european countries for permission to send observers into their possessions. but although the bill containing the authority only passed congress on july 7, observers 58 arrived as follows: july 21—kingston, santiago, trinidad, san domingo, st. thomas; august 11—barranquilla; august 12—barbados; august 18—st. kitts; august 29—panama.
land fighting continued in the west indies until august 12, but the spanish fleet was destroyed on the morning of july 3. they made a desperate effort to escape from the harbor at santiago, were shelled by american warships, and all were disabled or beached. up to that time there had been no tropical disturbances in the region. a small one hit near tampa on august 3. another small but vicious hurricane swept the coast of georgia on august 31. the first big one of the 1898 season raked barbados, st. vincent and st. lucia on september 10 to 11, and disappeared east of the bahamas.
the stations set up by the storm hunters in 1898 formed the backbone of the hurricane warning service which exists today as a greatly improved system, including squadrons of aircraft that fly into tropical storms to obtain essential data for the forecasters. before storm hunting could be operated on a practical basis, however, it was necessary to find new means of communication. dependence on messages by cable from scattered islands was not good enough.
