vigorous prosecution of the war.

general zachary taylor—his character and past service—his expedition—battle of okechobee—his loss—returns to withlacoochee—repudiates the work of catching slaves—exiles delivered over to bondage—regular troops despise such employment—indian prisoners indignant at the outrages perpetrated against the exiles—separated from exiles—are sent to charleston—exiles to tampa bay—further efforts to re-enslave exiles—general jessup moves south—skirmish of loca hatchee—erects fort jupiter—is persuaded to propose peace on basis of permitting indians and exiles to remain in florida—sends one of the exiles to the enemy with these propositions—he returns with hallec hajo—parties agree to hold council and endeavor to form treaty on that basis—indians and exiles meet for that purpose—letter to secretary of war—his answer—indians and exiles treacherously seized—their numbers—alligator and others surrender—exiles sent to fort pike—indians sent to charleston.

1837.

general zachary taylor was in command of an efficient force in the western part of florida, holding his head-quarters at tampa bay. he had been thirty years in service; had distinguished himself in battle, and was regarded as an officer of great merit. looking to the honor of our flag and the prestige of the service, he appears to have borne himself entirely above all efforts to prostitute the powers of the nation to the re?nslavement of the exiles. he was particularly opposed to the plan of general jessup, directing that all negroes captured should be the slaves of the captors.[105]

it now became evident that there was hard fighting to be done. general taylor was at all times ready for such service. it is one of the imperfections of human government, that the men who conceive and direct the perpetration of great national crimes are usually exempt from the immediate dangers which beset those who act merely as their instruments in the consummation of transcendent wrongs. had general jackson and general cass been assured they would have been the first individuals to meet death in their efforts to enslave the exiles, it is doubtful whether either of them would have been willing to adopt a policy which should thus consign them to premature graves. or had mr. van buren, or his cabinet, at the time of which we are now writing, been conscious that, in carrying on this war for slavery, they would fall victims to their own policy, it may well be doubted whether either of them would have laid down his life for the safety of that institution; yet they were evidently willing to sacrifice our military officers and soldiers, to maintain the degradation of the african race.

general jessup had written general taylor, that all hope of terminating the war through the agency of the cherokees, was at an end; that sam jones and the mickasukies had determined to fight to the last. he, therefore, directed general taylor to proceed, with the least possible delay, against any portion of the enemy he might hear of within striking distance. general taylor at once concentrated such force as he deemed necessary for the contemplated expedition. his little army was composed of regulars and volunteers, including nearly one hundred delaware and shawnee indians, who had been induced to join the army under the expectation of obtaining plunder by the capture of slaves. his whole force amounted to nearly eleven hundred men. conscious that he was expected to encounter the full force of the enemy, if he could succeed in bringing them to action, he left his artillery; divested his troops of all heavy baggage, and prepared, as far as possible, for a rapid movement. with him were some of the most valued officers in the service of government; men on whom he could rely with confidence, and who were worthy to command veteran troops. with this force, he left his encampment on the morning of the nineteenth of december, and directed his coarse southeastwardly in the direction where, it was said, sam jones and his forces were encamped. as he advanced into the interior, he discovered signs of indians; and, through the efforts of captain parks, a half-breed chief, who commanded the delawares and shawnees, he induced jumper, and a few families of the seminoles and some few exiles, to come in and emigrate under the articles of capitulation of march previous. on the twenty-second of december, being the third day of their march, they found conclusive evidence that they were in the vicinity of the enemies’ principal force, but found it difficult to bring them to action. that night every precaution was taken against surprise. the necessary patrols were kept out, sentinels doubled, and the troops slept upon their arms. they confidently expected to engage the enemy the next day.

but the allies were cautious; they passed from swamps, through hommocks, and over prairies, constantly keeping too far in advance of our army to incur any danger. in this manner the whole of that day was occupied.

at night the troops bivouacked as on the previous night. they were in the deepest recesses of the indian country, surrounded by swamps, everglades and hommocks: through these they had groped their way for a hundred miles. up to this time, the mounted volunteers had managed to keep their horses with them, knowing they might be useful in battle. but the enemy indicated an unwillingness to encounter our troops with the advantages which the mounted men would possess over them.

early on the morning of the twenty-fourth, the troops were again put in motion: the enemy keeping sufficiently in advance to be beyond the reach of musket or rifle balls. general taylor and his followers were in close pursuit; and as the allies left a swamp, or hommock, or prairie, taylor and his men entered it, hoping to bring on a general action.

at about ten o’clock, the enemy were traced to a swamp of some three-fourths of a mile in width, thickly covered with saw-grass, not less than four feet in height. through it flowed a turbid stream, whose current was scarcely perceptible, while it seemed to stretch away to the left in an endless savanna, and to the right it appeared to deepen into an impassable morass. after the proper reconnoissance, it was found that it could not be passed by horses; and on the farther side a thick hommock reached down to the very edge of the swamp.

it was now plain that the enemy intended to make a stand at this point, and give battle. perhaps the whole territory did not furnish a more advantageous position than that now occupied by the allied forces. general taylor saw at a glance the difficulties which lay before him. he well understood the superiority of the enemy’s position, but determined to maintain the honor of the service. he did not hesitate in entering upon the conflict. his arrangements were soon made. the volunteers were directed to dismount, and act on foot. knowing well that the battle was to be fought here if anywhere, he directed his troops to divest themselves of all baggage, which together with the horses, was left under the charge of a small guard. his troops entered the swamp in two lines. the first was composed of the volunteers, spies, and friendly indians, under the command of colonel gentry. they were ordered to engage the enemy, and maintain their ground until reinforced; or, if compelled to fall back, they were directed to form immediately in rear of the second line, and await orders.

they entered the swamp in this manner at about twelve o’clock. the sun was shining pleasantly, and a quiet stillness appeared to pervade the scene around them. they passed the stream in safety, and the front line was approaching the thick hommock in front. there, too, all was silent; not an enemy to be seen; no voice was heard, nor could they discover any evidence of animal life within the dense forest before them.

there, however, lay wild cat and his band, and the prophet and other mighty chiefs of the nation with their followers. wild cat had been stimulated to desperation by what he regarded the perfidy of general jessup, and his imprisonment at san augustine, from which he had just escaped. most of the exiles, who remained among the seminoles, and were capable of bearing arms, were collected here under their respective leaders. they had retreated to this point for the purpose of separating our troops from their horses, and then engaging them at such superior advantage as would be most likely to insure victory. their spies had climbed into the very tops of the trees, whence they had witnessed every movement of our troops in the swamp, and given constant information to their comrades who were on the ground, and who, acting under the information thus received, were enabled to place themselves directly in front of those who were pursuing them. every warrior was protected by a tree, and the thick foliage of the hommock shielded every movement from the scrutiny of our spies and officers.

soon as the first line, commanded by colonel gentry, came within point-blank shot of the hommock, the allies opened a heavy fire upon them. the saw-grass was so high as partially to protect the bodies of our men from view; but the fire was very fatal. colonel gentry, the gallant commander of the volunteers, fell at the first fire; his son, an interesting youth, acting as sergeant-major, was wounded almost at the same moment. captain childs, and lieutenants rogers and flanagan, of the same regiment, and acting major sconce, and lieutenants hare and gordon of the spies, and twenty-four men, fell wounded at the very commencement of the action.

it was hardly to be expected that militia would stand such a fire. they broke, fell back, and instead of halting in the rear of the regulars as directed, they continued their flight across the swamp, to the place where they left their horses; nor were the officers of general taylor’s staff able to induce them again to join their comrades, who soon became engaged in a most deadly conflict.

but the regulars moved steadily to the charge, under colonel thompson, a most gallant and estimable officer. general taylor says: “the weight of the enemy’s fire seemed to be concentrated upon five companies of the 6th infantry, which not only stood firm, but continued to advance until their gallant commander, lieut. colonel thompson, and his adjutant, lieutenant center, were killed; and every officer, with one exception, as well as most of the non-commissioned officers, including the sergeant-major, and four of the five orderly sergeants, were killed or wounded. when that portion of the regiment retired a short distance and re-formed, it was found that one of these companies had but four men untouched.”

amid these difficulties, lieut. colonel foster of the 4th infantry, with six companies, numbering about one hundred and fifty men, gained the hommock in good order, and, after maintaining his ground a short time, charged upon the allies and drove them from the field, with the loss of nine indians and one of the exiles killed, and eleven wounded.

the battle commenced at half-past twelve m., and continued nearly three hours, and proved the most desperate, and to our troops the most fatal conflict which occurred during the war. it was past three o’clock in the afternoon when the allies gave up the field, for which they had contended against a force more than double their own numbers.

general taylor and his surviving officers were now left to ascertain their loss, and contemplate the expense of subduing even a savage people, fighting for their homes, their firesides, their liberties. and we are led to think if those northern statesmen who, for many years subsequent to that date, were accustomed to inquire, what has the nation to do with slavery? had been present and propounded that question to general taylor or his officers, they would have been silently pointed to twenty-six dead bodies of their deceased comrades, then lifeless upon the ground, and to one hundred and twelve wounded officers and soldiers, who were prostrated in that swamp and hommock, suffering all the pangs which mortals are capable of enduring; but the language of their gallant commander better expresses his feelings than any which we can command.

in his official report, general taylor says: “we suffered much, having twenty-six killed and one hundred and twelve wounded, among whom are some of our most valuable officers. * * soon as the enemy were completely broken, i turned my attention to taking care of the wounded, to facilitate their removal to my baggage, where i had ordered an encampment to be formed. * * and here i trust i may be permitted to say, that i experienced one of the most trying scenes of my life; and he who could have looked on it with indifference, his nerves must have been very differently organized from my own. besides the killed, among whom were some of my personal friends, there lay one hundred and twelve officers and soldiers, who had accompanied me one hundred and forty-five miles, through an unexplored wilderness, without guides; who had so gallantly beaten the enemy, under my orders, in his strongest positions; and who had to be conveyed back, through swamps and hommocks, from whence we set out, without any apparent means of doing so.”

the next day was occupied in burying the dead, making litters for the transportation of the wounded, and preparing for their return to withlacoochee. one hundred and thirty-eight men had fallen in this single conflict, victims to the policy of our government, in attempting to restore to a state of slavery men who abhorred and had fled from it. the allies had also suffered severely. general taylor reported that ten of their dead and wounded were left on the field.[106] but no prisoners were taken, no slaves were captured; and those indians who had come from arkansas to florida, for the purpose of sharing in slave-catching forays, found it a far more dangerous employment, and one of more difficulty, than they had expected.

on the morning of the twenty-sixth, general taylor, with his sick and wounded, left his encampment, and, after encountering great difficulties, reached withlacoochee on the thirty-first of december; having been absent twelve days. he made a brief official report of this expedition, and of the severe battle he had fought. this report was quietly filed away in the war department, and but few, even of our public men, appeared to be fully conscious that he had performed meritorious service in the florida war.[107]

but while general taylor was thus quietly engaged in the most hazardous service, general jessup was active in securing negroes, and employing the military power of the nation, so far as able, to seize and return fugitives to their owners. it would exceed the limits of our present work, were we to notice the efforts of various individuals claiming to have lost slaves. the indian bureau at washington was engaged in this service, and applications were constantly made for slaves to the commanding officer. these applications were usually referred to some quarter-master, or pay-master, for decision; and if such inferior officer belonged to the militia, the person claimed was usually delivered over to bondage, whether the claimant had ever seen him previously or not. it is a matter of astonishment that our national administration, guided by a northern president (mr. van buren), should have permitted a pay-master or quarter-master of militia, to sit in grave examination of the right of their fellow-men to liberty; to act as judge, jury and counselor, in cases involving the rights with which the god of nature had endowed them.

but to the honor of our army, it was said that both officers and men of the regular service, generally held the work of catching slaves in supreme contempt. more than three hundred heavy documentary pages were communicated to congress on this subject, nearly all of which are filled with extracts of letters, reports, orders, opinions and directions concerning slaves, connected with this florida war.[108]

great difficulty arose among the indians in consequence of the re?nslavement of their friends, the exiles. they felt the outrage with as much apparent keenness as though it had been perpetrated upon themselves. to prevent these difficulties, general jessup separated the exiles from their indian allies, whenever they surrendered or were taken prisoners.[109]

in pursuance of this plan, he sent osceola and the other indians seized at fort peyton; and micanopy, and others who had come into his own camp for the purpose of negotiating a treaty, to charleston, south carolina; while the exiles were sent, some to tampa bay and other places, to be subjected to the inspection of men who professed to have been their previous owners.

general jessup, in the very elaborate defense of his proceedings, dated july, 1838, justifies this policy of separating the indians and exiles by saying, that he learned the year previous, from prisoners captured, that the indians through the seminole negroes had entered into arrangements with their slaves that so soon as hostilities should commence, the latter were to join their masters, and take up arms against the whites. this information, representing the indians as entering into negotiation with their own slaves through the “seminole negroes” (exiles), bears the character of fiction; yet it is gravely set forth in an official report, and we are bound to treat it respectfully.[110]

under this arrangement—separating the indians and exiles—all the relations of domestic life were disregarded. the indian husband was separated from the wife he had selected among the daughters of the exiles; and the indian wife was separated from her more sable husband. the darker colored prisoners were hurried to tampa bay, and the red men and women were sent to charleston for safe keeping.

up to the commencement of the year 1838, general jessup appears to have been mostly employed in efforts to obtain peace by negotiation and in directing the movements of various detachments of the army, who did not require his personal attendance, and making arrangements for the delivery of negroes to their supposed former owners; but had found very little time to mingle in the dangers of the field. brigadier general taylor had performed a most hazardous service; and it appeared proper that the commanding general should also strike a blow that would distinguish his administration of the military department of the territory.

1838.

early in january, he moved south, with about five hundred mounted men, well provided. on the twenty-fourth, at about twelve o’clock, he encountered the “allies,” near the “locka-hatchee,” and a short skirmish followed, in which the general was himself wounded somewhat severely in the arm. he lost seven men killed and thirty wounded. the enemy yielded the field to our troops, but left neither dead nor wounded upon the scene of conflict, nor is it known whether they sustained any loss whatever. general jessup expresses the belief that there were not more than a hundred warriors engaged on the part of the enemy. on the twenty-fifth, he erected a stockade called “fort jupiter.” here he lay until the fifth of february, when he moved forward some twelve miles, where, it is said, some of his officers—general eaton and others—proposed that general jessup should make terms with the indians and their allies, and permit them to remain in the country, confining them to the southern portion of the territory. he, however, moved forward another day’s march, when, being called on by colonel twiggs, and learning that it was the general desire of the officers, he says he determined to send a messenger to the indians, offering them peace.

the first messenger dispatched on this service was one of the exiles, or, as general jessup called him, a “seminole negro.” this man soon returned with several indians, among whom was a sub-chief named “hallec hajo,” who was willing to hold a conference, and expressed a desire to remain in the country; but said, if compelled, they must go west.

general jessup insisted that “toshkogee,” the principal chief in that neighborhood, should attend, and hold a council the next day; and that the indians should give up their arms. hallec hajo at once refused to comply with such condition. he would meet in council, but would never surrender his arms.

on the morning of the eighth of february, toshkogee and hallec hajo met general jessup agreeably to appointment. an interchange of opinions and views took place, and the general agreed to recommend the conclusion of a peace upon the basis of allowing the allies to remain in the country, and occupy a suitable portion of the southern part of the territory. it was also agreed that a certain territory, near the place of negotiation, should be occupied by the indians and their families, where they should be safe, and might remain until the views of the executive should be ascertained.[111]

in pursuance of this arrangement of treating upon the basis of permitting the allies to remain in the country, many of the seminoles and exiles collected with the expectation that the agreement was to be carried out in good faith.

on the next day, general jessup addressed a long communication to the secretary of war, in which he gives his views upon the policy of immediate emigration somewhat at length, and advises its abandonment in the following language:

“in regard to the seminoles, we have committed the error of attempting to remove them when their lands were not required for agricultural purposes; when they were not in the way of the white inhabitants, and when the greater portion of their country was an unexplored wilderness, of the interior of which we were as ignorant as of the interior of china. we exhibit in our present contest the first instance, perhaps, since the commencement of authentic history, of a nation employing an army to explore a country, (for we can do little more than explore it,) or attempting to remove a band of savages from one unexplored wilderness to another.”

“as a soldier, it is my duty, i am aware, not to comment upon the policy of the government, but to carry it out in accordance with my instructions. i have endeavored faithfully to do so; but the prospect of terminating the war in any reasonable time is any thing but flattering. my decided opinion is, that, unless immediate emigration be abandoned, the war will continue for years to come, and at constantly accumulating expense. is it not, then, well worthy the serious consideration of an enlightened government whether, even if the wilderness we are traversing could be inhabited by the white man, (which is not the fact,) the object we are contending for would be worth the cost? i do not certainly think it would; indeed, i do not consider the country south of chickasa-hatchee worth the medicines we shall expend in driving the indians from it.”

to this communication the secretary of war replied: “in the present stage of our relations with the indians residing within the states and territories east of the mississippi, including the seminoles, it is useless to recur to the principles and motives which induced the government to determine their removal to the west. the acts of the executive, and the laws of congress, evince a determination to carry out the measure, and it is to be regarded as the settled policy of the country. in pursuance of this policy, the treaty of payne’s landing was made with the seminoles; and the character of the officer employed on the part of the government is a guarantee of the perfectly fair manner in which that negotiation was conducted and concluded. whether the government ought not to have waited until the seminoles were pressed upon by the white population, and their lands become necessary to the agricultural wants of the community, is not a question for the executive now to consider. the treaty has been ratified, and is the law of the land; and the constitutional duty of the president requires that he should cause it to be executed. i cannot, therefore, authorize any arrangement with the seminoles by which they will be permitted to remain, or assign them any portion of the territory of florida as their future residence.”

“the department indulged the hope, that, with the extensive means placed at your disposal, the war by a vigorous effort might be brought to a close this campaign. if, however, you are of opinion that, from the nature of the country and the character of the enemy, such a result is impracticable, and that it is advisable to make a temporary arrangement with the seminoles, by which the safety of the settlements and posts will be secured throughout the summer, you are at liberty to do so.”

general jessup had previously represented the subjection of the seminoles as an object easily to be accomplished. he had so represented in his letter to mr. blair, in 1836, which occasioned the withdrawal of general scott, and his own appointment to the command of the army in florida. he had himself been in command more than a year, and the war department was doubtless somewhat astonished at his recommendation now to adopt the policy which the indians and exiles had from the first been ready to accept. he was probably somewhat mortified at seeing his proposition so coldly received, and the whole responsibility of carrying it out placed upon himself, upon condition that he was satisfied nothing better could be accomplished. he had done all in his power to effect the objects so much cherished by the administration. but the secretary of war still urged the carrying out of the treaty of payne’s landing, not according to its letter and spirit, but according to the unnatural and unexpected construction which general jackson placed upon it, after complaints were made against the seminoles by the people of florida. it is also evident that no intention of executing it according to the supplemental treaty entered into by the seminole delegates while at the west, was entertained by the administration. no measures had been taken for establishing the boundaries between the seminoles and the creeks; nor do we hear of any intention to fulfill that stipulation. on the contrary, it had been constantly asserted by the secretary of war, that the seminoles and creeks were to be united as one people.

the commanding general, in the opinion of many statesmen, had compromited the honor of the service, and violated the plighted faith of the nation by treacherously seizing indians and exiles who had approached the army under the white flag, which had so long been regarded as a sacred emblem of peace by all civilized nations; yet, notwithstanding these circumstances, his propositions were in spirit rejected, although in language he had been authorized to negotiate a temporary peace upon the basis he had proposed.

it is believed that the substance of this answer had become to some extent known, or suspected by the indians, for general jessup admits he received the decision of the secretary of war on the seventeenth; and on the nineteenth, he directed the chiefs to meet him in council on the twentieth, at twelve o’clock. for some cause, the indians and their allies appear to have been indisposed to do this, and he directed colonel twiggs to seize them, and hold them prisoners; and he reported to the war department that, by this movement, “five hundred and thirteen indians, and one hundred and sixty-five negroes, were secured.”[112]

of this transaction we can only speak from the account given of it by general jessup. from his report, certain important facts are clearly understood. for instance, he announces to the indians and exiles a proposition to treat with them, upon the basis of permitting them to remain in the country. that, for the purpose of entering into such a negotiation, they collected near fort jupiter; and that, without any attempt to negotiate, and while they were in his camp, they were unexpectedly seized against their will; and that passac micco, and fourteen others, escaped capture. nor does general jessup pretend that one of those six hundred and seventy-eight persons voluntarily surrendered. it is certain, that however honorable the intentions of general jessup were, the indians and the exiles were deceived, and, as they believed, treacherously dealt with.

the official register of colored persons seized at fort jupiter, represents one hundred and fifty-one as properly belonging to the seminoles, or as “seminole negroes,” the term usually applied to the exiles by general jessup and his officers; and fourteen are represented as the slaves of citizens of florida. these people were soon hurried off to tampa bay, where they were confined within the pickets, under a strong guard. fort brooke now presented to the eye of a stranger all the external appearances of a first class “slave factory” upon the african coast. the exiles who had been betrayed at fort peyton and other places, and not delivered over to slave-hunters, were also here; and the number had so greatly increased, that many had to be sent to new orleans for safe keeping.

when the exiles seized at fort jupiter arrived at tampa bay, they found, among those already there, many old acquaintances, friends and relatives, who had been taken at other places. families, in some instances long separated, were once more united; husbands, whose wives and children had been seized and long imprisoned at tampa bay, now rejoined their families, and were in some degree compensated for the mortification of having been made prisoners by treachery.

but fathers and husbands, whose children and wives were captured by the creeks near withlacoochee and other places during the previous year, now looked around for their families in vain. on making inquiry, they were informed their friends had been taken to fort pike, which had now become a general depot for the imprisonment of exiles.

the indians who had been captured by this “coup d’etat,” were sent to charleston, south carolina, for safe keeping; and the negroes reported upon the registry as “slaves of citizens of florida,” were without ceremony delivered over to those who claimed to be their masters.

we have now reached a period of the war at which we are constrained to admit our inability to give a full or accurate history of the various captures of exiles, or of the re?nslavement of those captured.

captain sprague, who had the advantages of personal observation and experience during the war, says that general hernandez of the florida militia, serving principally in the eastern part of the territory, “captured some important chiefs, and restored to citizens more than three hundred negroes who had been captured by the indians.” but the means which he used for their capture is not stated.

general jessup informs us, also, that abraham, the negro chief, and two indians, were sent to the seminoles west of the okechobee, and prevailed upon alligator, and three hundred and sixty indians and negroes, to surrender to colonel smith and general taylor. but what proportion of this number were exiles, we are not informed; nor are we told of the means used, or the assurances given, to induce them to surrender. it is certain, that many of the chiefs alleged that the cherokee delegation assured their friends, that they would be permitted to remain in their own country, and that the president was desirous of making peace upon those terms; and general jessup says, that the negro chief abraham, and another negro interpreter named auguste, gave the same information. abraham had in fact dictated the supplemental treaty, entered into by the delegation while in the western country, and was made to believe, at all times, that the government would fulfill, and abide by, the terms of this supplemental treaty. it was on this conviction that he acted, and he appears never to have doubted the good faith of the executive until he actually arrived in the western country.