a portion of mankind may be said to constitute a nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than with other people, desire to be under the same government, and desire that it should be government by themselves, or a portion of themselves, exclusively. this feeling of nationality may have been generated by various causes. sometimes it is the effect of identity of race and descent. community of language and community of religion greatly contribute to it. geographical limits are one of its causes. but the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents; the possession of a national history, and consequent community of recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret, connected with the same incidents in the past. none of these circumstances, however, are either indispensable or necessarily sufficient by themselves. switzerland has a strong sentiment of nationality, though the cantons are of different races, different languages, and different religions. sicily has hitherto felt itself quite distinct in nationality from naples, notwithstanding identity of religion, almost identity of language, and a considerable amount of common historical antecedents. the flemish and the walloon provinces of belgium, notwithstanding diversity of race and language, have a much greater feeling of common nationality than the former have with holland, or the latter with france. yet in general the national feeling is proportionally weakened by the failure of any of the causes which contribute to it. identity of language, literature, and, to some extent, of race and recollections, have maintained the feeling of nationality in considerable strength among the different portions of the german name, though they have at no time been really united under the same government; but the feeling has never reached to making the separate states desire to get rid of their autonomy. among italians, an identity far from complete of language and literature, combined with a geographical position which separates them by a distinct line from other countries, and, perhaps more than every thing else, the possession of a common name, which makes them all glory in the past achievements in arts, arms, politics, religious primacy, science, and literature, of any who share the same designation, give rise to an amount of national feeling in the population which, though still imperfect, has been sufficient to produce the great events now passing before us, notwithstanding a great mixture of races, and although they have never, in either ancient or modern history, been under the same government, except while that government extended or was extending itself over the greater part of the known world.
where the sentiment of nationality exists in any force, there is a prima facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under the same government, and a government to themselves apart. this is merely saying that the question of government ought to be decided by the governed. one hardly knows what any division of the human race should be free to do if not to determine with which of the various collective bodies of human beings they choose to associate themselves. but, when a people are ripe for free institutions, there is a still more vital consideration. free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities. among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different languages, the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government can not exist. the influences which form opinions and decide political acts are different in the different sections of the country. an altogether different set of leaders have the confidence of one part of the country and of another. the same books, newspapers, pamphlets, speeches, do not reach them. one section does not know what opinions or what instigations are circulating in another. the same incidents, the same acts, the same system of government, affect them in different ways, and each fears more injury to itself from the other nationalities than from the common arbiter, the state. their mutual antipathies are generally much stronger than jealousy of the government. that any one of them feels aggrieved by the policy of the common ruler is sufficient to determine another to support that policy. even if all are aggrieved, none feel that they can rely on the others for fidelity in a joint resistance; the strength of none is sufficient to resist alone, and each may reasonably think that it consults its own advantage most by bidding for the favor of the government against the rest. above all, the grand and only reliable security in the last resort against the despotism of the government is in that case wanting—the sympathy of the army with the people. the military are the part of every community in whom, from the nature of the case, the distinction between their fellow-countrymen and foreigners is the deepest and strongest. to the rest of the people foreigners are merely strangers; to the soldier, they are men against whom he may be called, at a week's notice, to fight for life or death. the difference to him is that between friends and enemies—we may almost say between fellow-men and another kind of animals; for, as respects the enemy, the only law is that of force, and the only mitigation the same as in the case of other animals—that of simple humanity. soldiers to whose feelings half or three fourths of the subjects of the same government are foreigners will have no more scruple in mowing them down, and no more desire to ask the reason why, than they would have in doing the same thing against declared enemies. an army composed of various nationalities has no other patriotism than devotion to the flag. such armies have been the executioners of liberty through the whole duration of modern history. the sole bond which holds them together is their officers and the government which they serve, and their only idea, if they have any, of public duty, is obedience to orders. a government thus supported, by keeping its hungarian regiments in italy and its italian in hungary, can long continue to rule in both places with the iron rod of foreign conquerors.
if it be said that so broadly-marked a distinction between what is due to a fellow-countryman and what is due merely to a human creature is more worthy of savages than of civilized beings, and ought, with the utmost energy, to be contended against, no one holds that opinion more strongly than myself. but this object, one of the worthiest to which human endeavour can be directed, can never, in the present state of civilization, be promoted by keeping different nationalities of any thing like equivalent strength under the same government. in a barbarous state of society the case is sometimes different. the government may then be interested in softening the antipathies of the races, that peace may be preserved and the country more easily governed. but when there are either free institutions, or a desire for them, in any of the peoples artificially tied together, the interest of the government lies in an exactly opposite direction. it is then interested in keeping up and envenoming their antipathies, that they may be prevented from coalescing, and it may be enabled to use some of them as tools for the enslavement of others. the austrian court has now for a whole generation made these tactics its principal means of government, with what fatal success, at the time of the vienna insurrection and the hungarian contest the world knows too well. happily there are now signs that improvement is too far advanced to permit this policy to be any longer successful.
for the preceding reasons, it is in general a necessary condition of free institutions that the boundaries of governments should coincide in the main with those of nationalities. but several considerations are liable to conflict in practice with this general principle. in the first place, its application is often precluded by geographical hindrances. there are parts even of europe in which different nationalities are so locally intermingled that it is not practicable for them to be under separate governments. the population of hungary is composed of magyars, slovaks, croats, serbs, roumans, and in some districts germans, so mixed up as to be incapable of local separation; and there is no course open to them but to make a virtue of necessity, and reconcile themselves to living together under equal rights and laws. their community of servitude, which dates only from the destruction of hungarian independence in 1849, seems to be ripening and disposing them for such an equal union. the german colony of east prussia is cut off from germany by part of the ancient poland, and being too weak to maintain separate independence, must, if geographical continuity is to be maintained, be either under a non-german government, or the intervening polish territory must be under a german one. another considerable region in which the dominant element of the population is german, the provinces of courland, esthonia, and livonia, is condemned by its local situation to form part of a slavonian state. in eastern germany itself there is a large slavonic population; bohemia is principally slavonic, silesia and other districts partially so. the most united country in europe, france, is far from being homogeneous: independently of the fragments of foreign nationalities at its remote extremities, it consists, as language and history prove, of two portions, one occupied almost exclusively by a gallo-roman population, while in the other the frankish, burgundian, and other teutonic races form a considerable ingredient.
when proper allowance has been made for geographical exigencies, another more purely moral and social consideration offers itself. experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another; and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race, the absorption is greatly to its advantage. nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a breton, or a basque of french navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people—to be a member of the french nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of french citizenship, sharing the advantages of french protection, and the dignity and prestige of french power—than to sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement of the world. the same remark applies to the welshman or the scottish highlander as members of the british nation.
whatever really tends to the admixture of nationalities, and the blending of their attributes and peculiarities in a common union, is a benefit to the human race. not by extinguishing types, of which, in these cases, sufficient examples are sure to remain, but by softening their extreme forms, and filling up the intervals between them. the united people, like a crossed breed of animals (but in a still greater degree, because the influences in operation are moral as well as physical), inherits the special aptitudes and excellences of all its progenitors, protected by the admixture from being exaggerated into the neighboring vices. but, to render this admixture possible, there must be peculiar conditions. the combinations of circumstances which occur, and which effect the result, are various.
the nationalities brought together under the same government may be about equal in numbers and strength, or they may be very unequal. if unequal, the least numerous of the two may either be the superior in civilization, or the inferior. supposing it to be superior, it may either, through that superiority, be able to acquire ascendancy over the other, or it may be overcome by brute strength and reduced to subjection. this last is a sheer mischief to the human race, and one which civilized humanity with one accord should rise in arms to prevent. the absorption of greece by macedonia was one of the greatest misfortunes which ever happened to the world; that of any of the principal countries of europe by russia would be a similar one.
if the smaller nationality, supposed to be the more advanced in improvement, is able to overcome the greater, as the macedonians, re-enforced by the greeks, did asia, and the english india, there is often a gain to civilization, but the conquerors and the conquered can not in this case live together under the same free institutions. the absorption of the conquerors in the less advanced people would be an evil: these must be governed as subjects, and the state of things is either a benefit or a misfortune, according as the subjugated people have or have not reached the state in which it is an injury not to be under a free government, and according as the conquerors do or do not use their superiority in a manner calculated to fit the conquered for a higher stage of improvement. this topic will be particularly treated of in a subsequent chapter.
when the nationality which succeeds in overpowering the other is both the most numerous and the most improved, and especially if the subdued nationality is small, and has no hope of reasserting its independence, then, if it is governed with any tolerable justice, and if the members of the more powerful nationality are not made odious by being invested with exclusive privileges, the smaller nationality is gradually reconciled to its position, and becomes amalgamated with the larger. no bas-breton, nor even any alsatian, has the smallest wish at the present day to be separated from france. if all irishmen have not yet arrived at the same disposition towards england, it is partly because they are sufficiently numerous to be capable of constituting a respectable nationality by themselves, but principally because, until of late years, they had been so atrociously governed that all their best feelings combined with their bad ones in rousing bitter resentment against the saxon rule. this disgrace to england and calamity to the whole empire has, it may be truly said, completely ceased for nearly a generation. no irishman is now less free than an anglo-saxon, nor has a less share of every benefit either to his country or to his individual fortunes than if he were sprung from any other portion of the british dominions. the only remaining real grievance of ireland, that of the state church, is one which half, or nearly half the people of the larger island have in common with them. there is now next to nothing, except the memory of the past, and the difference in the predominant religion, to keep apart two races perhaps the most fitted of any two in the world to be the completing counterpart of one another. the consciousness of being at last treated not only with equal justice, but with equal consideration, is making such rapid way in the irish nation as to be wearing off all feelings that could make them insensible to the benefits which the less numerous and less wealthy people must necessarily derive from being fellow-citizens instead of foreigners to those who are not only their nearest neighbors, but the wealthiest, and one of the freest, as well as most civilized and powerful nations of the earth.
the cases in which the greatest practical obstacles exist to the blending of nationalities are when the nationalities which have been bound together are nearly equal in numbers and in the other elements of power. in such cases, each, confiding in its strength, and feeling itself capable of maintaining an equal struggle with any of the others, is unwilling to be merged in it; each cultivates with party obstinacy its distinctive peculiarities; obsolete customs, and even declining languages, are revived, to deepen the separation; each deems itself tyrannized over if any authority is exercised within itself by functionaries of a rival race; and whatever is given to one of the conflicting nationalities is considered to be taken from all the rest. when nations thus divided are under a despotic government which is a stranger to all of them, or which, though sprung from one, yet feeling greater interest in its own power than in any sympathies of nationality, assigns no privilege to either nation, and chooses its instruments indifferently from all, in the course of a few generations identity of situation often produces harmony of feeling, and the different races come to feel towards each other as fellow-countrymen, particularly if they are dispersed over the same tract of country. but if the era of aspiration to free government arrives before this fusion has been effected, the opportunity has gone by for effecting it. from that time, if the unreconciled nationalities are geographically separate, and especially if their local position is such that there is no natural fitness or convenience in their being under the same government (as in the case of an italian province under a french or german yoke), there is not only an obvious propriety, but, if either freedom or concord is cared for, a necessity for breaking the connection altogether. there may be cases in which the provinces, after separation, might usefully remain united by a federal tie; but it generally happens that if they are willing to forego complete independence, and become members of a federation, each of them has other neighbors with whom it would prefer to connect itself, having more sympathies in common, if not also greater community of interest.
