unlimited power of the majority in the united states and its consequences.

natural strength of the majority in democracies.—most of the american constitutions have increased this strength by artificial means.—how this has been done.—pledged delegates.—moral power of the majority.—opinions as to its infallibility.—respect for its rights, how augmented in the united states.

the very essence of democratic government consists in the absolute sovereignty of the majority: for there is nothing in democratic states which is capable of resisting it. most of the american constitutions have sought to increase this natural strength of the majority by artificial means.{182}

the legislature is, of all political institutions, the one which is most easily swayed by the wishes of the majority. the americans determined that the members of the legislature should be elected by the people immediately, and for a very brief term, in order to subject them not only to the general convictions, but even to the daily passions of their constituents. the members of both houses are taken from the same class in society, and are nominated in the same manner; so that the modifications of the legislative bodies are almost as rapid and quite as irresistible as those of a single assembly. it is to a legislature thus constituted, that almost all the authority of the government has been intrusted.

but while the law increased the strength of those authorities which of themselves were strong, it enfeebled more and more those which were naturally weak. it deprived the representatives of the executive of all stability and independence; and by subjecting them completely to the caprices of the legislature, it robbed them completely of the slender influence which the nature of a democratic government might have allowed them to retain. in several states the judicial power was also submitted to the elective discretion of the majority; and in all of them its existence was made to depend on the pleasure of the legislative authority, since the representatives were empowered annually to regulate the stipend of the judges.

custom, however, has done even more than law. a proceeding which will in the end set all the guarantees of representative government at naught, is becoming more and more general in the united states: it frequently happens that the electors, who choose a delegate, point out a certain line of conduct to him, and impose upon him a certain number of positive obligations which he is pledged to fulfil. with the exception of the tumult, this comes to the same thing as if the majority of the populace held its deliberations in the market-place.

several other circumstances concur in rendering the power of the majority in america, not only preponderant, but irresistible. the moral authority of the majority is partly based upon the notion, that there is more intelligence and more wisdom in a great number of men collected together than in a single individual, and that the quantity of legislators is more important than their quality. the theory of equality is in fact applied to the intellect of man; and human pride is thus assailed in its last retreat, by a doctrine which the minority hesitate to admit, and in which they very slowly concur. like all other powers, and perhaps more than all other powers, the authority of the many requires the sanction of time; at first it enforces obedience by constraint; but its laws are not respected until they have long been maintained.

the right of governing society, which the majority supposes itself to derive from its superior intelligence, was introduced into the united states by the first settlers; and this idea, which would be sufficient of itself to create a free nation, has now been amalgamated with the manners of the people, and the minor incidents of social intercourse.

the french, under the old monarchy, held it for a maxim (which is still a fundamental principle of the english constitution), that the king could do no wrong; and if he did wrong, the blame was imputed to his advisers. this notion was highly favorable to habits of obedience; and it enabled the subject to complain of the law, without ceasing to love and honor the lawgiver. the americans entertain the same opinion with respect to the majority.

the moral power of the majority is founded upon yet another principle, which is, that the interests of the many are to be preferred to those of the few. it will readily be perceived that the respect here professed for the rights of the majority must naturally increase or diminish according to the state of parties. when a nation is divided into several irreconcilable factions, the privilege of the majority is often overlooked, because it is intolerable to comply with its demands.

if there existed in america a class of citizens whom the legislating majority sought to deprive of exclusive privileges, which they had possessed for ages, and to bring down from an elevated station to the level of the ranks of the multitude, it is probable that the minority would be less ready to comply with its laws. but as the united states were colonized by men holding an equal rank among themselves, there is as yet no natural or permanent source of dissension between the interests of its different inhabitants.

there are certain communities in which the persons who constitute the minority can never hope to draw over the majority to their side, because they must then give up the very point which is at issue between them. thus, an aristocracy can never become a majority while it retains its exclusive privileges, and it cannot cede its privileges without ceasing to be an aristocracy.

in the united states, political questions cannot be taken up in so general and absolute a manner; and all parties are willing to recognize the rights of the majority, because they all hope to turn those rights to their own advantage at some future time. the majority therefore in that country exercises a prodigious actual authority, and a moral influence which is scarcely less preponderant; no obstacles exist which can impede, or so much as retard its progress, or which can induce it to heed the complaints of those whom it crushes upon its path. this state of things is fatal in itself and dangerous for the future.

how the unlimited power of the majority increases, in america, the instability of legislation and the administration inherent in democracy.

the americans increase the mutability of the laws which is inherent in democracy by changing the legislature every year, and by vesting it with unbounded authority.—the same effect is produced upon the administration.—in america social melioration is conducted more energetically, but less perseveringly than in europe.

i have already spoken of the natural defects of democratic institutions, and they all of them increase in the exact ratio of the power of the majority. to begin with the most evident of them all; the mutability of the laws is an evil inherent in democratic government, because it is natural to democracies to raise men to power in very rapid succession. but this evil is more or less sensible in proportion to the authority and the means of action which the legislature possesses.

in america the authority exercised by the legislative bodies is supreme; nothing prevents them from accomplishing their wishes with celerity, and with irresistible power, while they are supplied by new representatives every year. that is to say, the circumstances which contribute most powerfully to democratic instability, and which admit of the free application of caprice to every object in the state, are here in full operation. in conformity with this principle, america is, at the present day, the country in the world where laws last the shortest time. almost all the american constitutions have been amended within the course of thirty years: there is, therefore, not a single american state which has not modified the principles of its legislation in that lapse of time. as for the laws themselves, a single glance upon the archives of the different states of the union suffices to convince one, that in america the activity of the legislator never slackens. not that the american democracy is naturally less stable than any other, but that it is allowed to follow its capricious propensities in the formation of the laws.{183}

the omnipotence of the majority and the rapid as well as absolute manner in which its decisions are executed in the united states, have not only the effect of rendering the law unstable, but they exercise the same influence upon the execution of the law and the conduct of the public administration. as the majority is the only power which it is important to court, all its projects are taken up with the greatest ardor; but no sooner is its attention distracted, than all this ardor ceases; while in the free states of europe, the administration is at once independent and secure, so that the projects of the legislature are put into execution, although its immediate attention may be directed to other objects.

in america certain meliorations are undertaken with much more zeal and activity than elsewhere; in europe the same ends are promoted by much less social effort, more continuously applied.

some years ago several pious individuals undertook to meliorate the condition of the prisons. the public was excited by the statements which they put forward, and the regeneration of criminals became a very popular undertaking. new prisons were built; and, for the first time, the idea of reforming as well as of punishing the delinquent, formed a part of prison discipline. but this happy alteration, in which the public had taken so hearty an interest, and which the exertions of the citizens had irresistibly accelerated, could not be completed in a moment. while the new penitentiaries were being erected (and it was the pleasure of the majority they should be terminated with all possible celerity), the old prisons existed, which still contained a great number of offenders. these jails became more unwholesome and more corrupt in proportion as the new establishments were beautified and improved, forming a contrast which may readily be understood. the majority was so eagerly employed in founding the new prisons, that those which already existed were forgotten; and as the general attention was diverted to a novel object, the care which had hitherto been bestowed upon the others ceased. the salutary regulations of discipline were first relaxed, and afterward broken; so that in the immediate neighborhood of a prison which bore witness to the mild and enlightened spirit of our time, dungeons might be met with, which reminded the visitor of the barbarity of the middle ages.

tyranny of the majority.

how the principle of the sovereignty of the people is to be understood.—impossibility of conceiving a mixed government.—the sovereign power must centre somewhere.—precautions to be taken to control its action.—these precautions have not been taken in the united states.—consequences.

i hold it to be an impious and an execrable maxim that, politically speaking, a people has a right to do whatsoever it pleases; and yet i have asserted that all authority originates in the will of the majority. am i, then, in contradiction with myself?

a general law—which bears the name of justice—has been made and sanctioned, not only by a majority of this or that people, but by a majority of mankind. the rights of every people are consequently confined within the limits of what is just. a nation may be considered in the light of a jury which is empowered to represent society at large, and to apply the great and general law of justice. ought such a jury, which represents society, to have more power than the society in which the laws it applies originate?

when i refuse to obey an unjust law, i do not contest the right which the majority has of commanding, but i simply appeal from the sovereignty of the people to the sovereignty of mankind. it has been asserted that a people can never entirely outstep the boundaries of justice and of reason in those affairs which are more peculiarly its own; and that consequently full power may fearlessly be given to the majority by which it is represented. but this language is that of a slave.

a majority taken collectively may be regarded as a being whose opinions, and most frequently whose interests, are opposed to those of another being, which is styled a minority. if it be admitted that a man, possessing absolute power, may misuse that power by wronging his adversaries, why should a majority not be liable to the same reproach? men are not apt to change their characters by agglomeration; nor does their patience in the presence of obstacles increase with the consciousness of their strength.{184} and for these reasons i can never willingly invest any number of my fellow-creatures with that unlimited authority which i should refuse to any one of them.

i do not think it is possible to combine several principles in the same government, so as at the same time to maintain freedom, and really to oppose them to one another. the form of government which is usually termed mixed has always appeared to me to be a mere chimera. accurately speaking, there is no such thing as a mixed government (with the meaning usually given to that word), because in all communities some one principle of action may be discovered, which preponderates over the others. england in the last century, which has been more especially cited as an example of this form of government, was in point of fact an essentially aristocratic state, although it comprised very powerful elements of democracy: for the laws and customs of the country were such, that the aristocracy could not but preponderate in the end, and subject the direction of public affairs to its own will. the error arose from too much attention being paid to the actual struggle which was going on between the nobles and the people, without considering the probable issue of the contest, which was in reality the important point. when a community really has a mixed government, that is to say, when it is equally divided between two adverse principles, it must either pass through a revolution, or fall into complete dissolution.

i am therefore of opinion that some one social power must always be made to predominate over the others; but i think that liberty is endangered when this power is checked by no obstacles which may retard its course, and force it to moderate its own vehemence.

unlimited power is in itself a bad and dangerous thing; human beings are not competent to exercise it with discretion; and god alone can be omnipotent, because his wisdom and his justice are always equal to his power. but no power upon earth is so worthy of honor for itself, or of reverential obedience to the rights which it represents, that i would consent to admit its uncontrolled and all-predominate authority. when i see that the right and the means of absolute command are conferred on a people or upon a king, upon an aristocracy or a democracy, a monarchy or a republic, i recognize the germ of tyranny, and i journey onward to a land of more hopeful institutions.

in my opinion the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the united states does not arise, as is often asserted in europe, from their weakness, but from their overpowering strength; and i am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country, as at the very inadequate securities which exist against tyranny.

when an individual or a party is wronged in the united states, to whom can he apply for redress? if to public opinion, public opinion constitutes the majority; if to the legislature, it represents the majority, and implicitly obeys its instructions: if to the executive power, it is appointed by the majority and is a passive tool in its hands; the public troops consist of the majority under arms; the jury is the majority invested with the right of hearing judicial cases; and in certain states even the judges are elected by the majority. however iniquitous or absurd the evil of which you complain may be, you must submit to it as well as you can.{185}

if, on the other hand, a legislative power could be so constituted as to represent the majority without necessarily being the slave of its passions; an executive, so as to retain a certain degree of uncontrolled authority; and a judiciary, so as to remain independent of the two other powers; a government would be formed which would still be democratic, without incurring any risk of tyrannical abuse.

i do not say that tyrannical abuses frequently occur in america at the present day; but i maintain that no sure barrier is established against them, and that the causes which mitigate the government are to be found in the circumstances and the manners of the country more than its laws.

effects of the unlimited power of the majority upon the arbitrary authority of the american public officers.

liberty left by the american laws to public officers within a certain sphere.—their power.

a distinction must be drawn between tyranny and arbitrary power. tyranny may be exercised by means of the law, and in that case it is not arbitrary; arbitrary power may be exercised for the good of the community at large, in which case it is not tyrannical. tyranny usually employs arbitrary means, but, if necessary, it can rule without them.

in the united states the unbounded power of the majority, which is favorable to the legal despotism of the legislature, is likewise favorable to the arbitrary authority of the magistrates. the majority has an entire control over the law when it is made and when it is executed; and as it possesses an equal authority over those who are in power, and the community at large, it considers public officers as its passive agents, and readily confides the task of serving its designs to their vigilance. the details of their office and the privileges which they are to enjoy are rarely defined beforehand; but the majority treats them as a master does his servants, when they are always at work in his sight, and he has the power of directing or reprimanding them at every instant.

in general the american functionaries are far more independent than the french civil officers, within the sphere which is prescribed to them. sometimes, even, they are allowed by the popular authority to exceed those bounds; and as they are protected by the opinion, and backed by the cooperation of the majority, they venture upon such manifestations of their power as astonish a european. by this means habits are formed in the heart of a free country which may some day prove fatal to its liberties.

power exercised by the majority in america upon opinion.

in america, when the majority has once irrevocably decided a question, all discussion ceases.—reason of this.—moral power exercised by the majority upon opinion.—democratic republics have deprived despotism of its physical instruments.—their despotism sways the minds of men.

it is in the examination of the display of public opinion in the united states, that we clearly perceive how far the power of the majority surpasses all the powers with which we are acquainted in europe. intellectual principles exercise an influence which is so invisible and often so inappreciable, that they baffle the toils of oppression. at the present time the most absolute monarchs in europe are unable to prevent certain notions, which are opposed to their authority, from circulating in secret throughout their dominions, and even in their courts. such is not the case in america; so long as the majority is still undecided, discussion is carried on; but as soon as its decision is irrevocably pronounced, a submissive silence is observed; and the friends, as well as the opponents of the measure, unite in assenting to its propriety. the reason of this is perfectly clear: no monarch is so absolute as to combine all the powers of society in his own hands, and to conquer all opposition, with the energy of a majority, which is invested with the right of making and of executing the laws.

the authority of a king is purely physical, and it controls the actions of the subject without subduing his private will; but the majority possesses a power which is physical and moral at the same time; it acts upon the will as well as upon the actions of men, and it represses not only all contest, but all controversy.

i know no country in which there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of discussion as in america. in any constitutional state in europe every sort of religious and political theory may be advocated and propagated abroad; for there is no country in europe so subdued by any single authority, as not to contain citizens who are ready to protect the man who raises his voice in the cause of truth, from the consequences of his hardihood. if he is unfortunate enough to live under an absolute government, the people is upon his side; if he inhabits a free country, he may find a shelter behind the authority of the throne, if he require one. the aristocratic part of society supports him in some countries, and the democracy in others. but in a nation where democratic institutions exist, organized like those of the united states, there is but one sole authority, one single element of strength and success, with nothing beyond it.

in america, the majority raises very formidable barriers to the liberty of opinion: within these barriers an author may write whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if he ever step beyond them. not that he is exposed to the terrors of an auto-da-fe, but he is tormented by the slights and persecutions of daily obloquy. his political career is closed for ever, since he has offended the only authority which is able to promote his success. every sort of compensation, even that of celebrity, is refused to him. before he published his opinions, he imagined that he held them in common with many others; but no sooner has he declared them openly, than he is loudly censured by his overbearing opponents, while those who think, without having the courage to speak, like him, abandon him in silence. he yields at length, oppressed by the daily efforts he has been making, and he subsides into silence as if he was tormented by remorse for having spoken the truth.

fetters and headsmen were the coarse instruments which tyranny formerly employed; but the civilisation of our age has refined the arts of despotism, which seemed however to have been sufficiently perfected before. the excesses of monarchical power had devised a variety of political means of oppression; the democratic republics of the present day have rendered it as entirely an affair of the mind, as that will which it is intended to coerce. under the absolute sway of an individual despot, the body was attacked in order to subdue the soul; and the soul escaped the blows which were directed against it, and rose superior to the attempt; but such is not the course adopted by tyranny in democratic republics; there the body is left free, and the soul is enslaved. the sovereign can no longer say, "you shall think as i do on pain of death;" but he says, "you are free to think differently from me, and to retain your life, your property, and all that you possess; but if such be your determination, you are henceforth an alien among your people. you may retain your civil rights, but they will be useless to you, for you will never be chosen by your fellow-citizens, if you solicit their suffrages; and they will affect to scorn you, if you solicit their esteem. you will remain among men, but you will be deprived of the rights of mankind. your fellow-creatures will shun you like an impure being; and those who are most persuaded of your innocence will abandon you too, lest they should be shunned in their turn. go in peace! i have given you your life, but it is an existence incomparably worse than death."

absolute monarchies have thrown an odium upon despotism; let us beware lest democratic republics should restore oppression, and should render it less odious and less degrading in the eyes of the many, by making it still more onerous to the few.

works have been published in the proudest nations of the old world, expressly intended to censure the vices and deride the follies of the time; labruyère inhabited the palace of louis xiv. when he composed his chapter upon the great, and molière criticised the courtiers in the very pieces which were acted before the court. but the ruling power in the united states is not to be made game of; the smallest reproach irritates its sensibility, and the slightest joke which has any foundation in truth, renders it indignant; from the style of its language to the more solid virtues of its character, everything must be made the subject of encomium. no writer, whatever be his eminence, can escape from this tribute of adulation to his fellow-citizens. the majority lives in the perpetual exercise of self-applause; and there are certain truths which the americans can only learn from strangers or from experience.

if great writers have not at present existed in america, the reason is very simply given in these facts; there can be no literary genius without freedom of opinion, and freedom of opinion does not exist in america. the inquisition has never been able to prevent a vast number of anti-religious books from circulating in spain. the empire of the majority succeeds much better in the united states, since it actually removes the wish of publishing them. unbelievers are to be met with in america, but, to say the truth, there is no public organ of infidelity. attempts have been made by some governments to protect the morality of nations by prohibiting licentious books. in the united states no one is punished for this sort of works, but no one is induced to write them; not because all the citizens are immaculate in their manners, but because the majority of the community is decent and orderly.

in these cases the advantages derived from the exercise of this power are unquestionable; and i am simply discussing the nature of the power itself. this irresistible authority is a constant fact, and its beneficent exercise is an accidental occurrence.

effects of the tyranny of the majority upon the national character in the americans.

effects of the tyranny of the majority more sensibly felt hitherto in the manners than in the conduct of society.—they check the development of leading characters.—democratic republics, organized like the united states, bring the practice of courting favor within the reach of the many.—proofs of this spirit in the united states.—why there is more patriotism in the people than in those who govern in its name.

the tendencies which i have just alluded to are as yet very slightly perceptible in political society; but they already begin to exercise an unfavorable influence upon the national character of the americans. i am inclined to attribute the paucity of distinguished political characters to the ever-increasing activity of the despotism of the majority in the united states.

when the american revolution broke out, they arose in great numbers; for public opinion then served, not to tyrannize over, but to direct the exertions of individuals. those celebrated men took a full part in the general agitation of mind common at that period, and they attained a high degree of personal fame, which was reflected back upon the nation, but which was by no means borrowed from it.

in absolute governments, the great nobles who are nearest to the throne flatter the passions of the sovereign, and voluntarily truckle to his caprices. but the mass of the nation does not degrade itself by servitude; it often submits from weakness, from habit, or from ignorance, and sometimes from loyalty. some nations have been known to sacrifice their own desires to those of the sovereign with pleasure and with pride; thus exhibiting a sort of independence in the very act of submission. these peoples are miserable, but they are not degraded. there is a great difference between doing what one does not approve, and feigning to approve what one does; the one is the necessary case of a weak person, the other befits the temper of a lacquey.

in free countries, where every one is more or less called upon to give his opinions in the affairs of state; in democratic republics, where public life is incessantly commingled with domestic affairs, where the sovereign authority is accessible on every side, and where its attention can almost always be attracted by vociferation, more persons are to be met with who speculate upon its foibles, and live at the cost of its passions, than in absolute monarchies. not because men are naturally worse in these states than elsewhere, but the temptation is stronger, and of easier access at the same time. the result is a far more extensive debasement of the characters of citizens.

democratic republics extend the practice of currying favor with the many, and they introduce it into a great number of classes at once: this is one of the most serious reproaches that can be addressed to them. in democratic states organized on the principles of the american republics, this is more especially the case, where the authority of the majority is so absolute and so irresistible, that a man must give up his rights as a citizen, and almost abjure his quality as a human being, if he intends to stray from the track which it lays down.

in that immense crowd which throngs the avenues to power in the united states, i found very few men who displayed any of that manly candor, and that masculine independence of opinion, which frequently distinguished the americans in former times, and which constitute the leading feature in distinguished characters wheresoever they may be found. it seems, at first sight, as if all the minds of the americans were formed upon one model, so accurately do they correspond in their manner of judging. a stranger does, indeed, sometimes meet with americans who dissent from these rigorous formularies; with men who deplore the defects of the laws, the mutability and the ignorance of democracy; who even go so far as to observe the evil tendencies which impair the national character, and to point out such remedies as it might be possible to apply; but no one is there to hear these things besides yourself, and you, to whom these secret reflections are confided, are a stranger and a bird of passage. they are very ready to communicate truths which are useless to you, but they continue to hold a different language in public.

if ever these lines are read in america, i am well assured of two things: in the first place, that all who peruse them will raise their voices to condemn me; and in the second place, that very many of them will acquit me at the bottom of their conscience.

{the author's views upon what he terms the tyranny of the majority, the despotism of public opinion in the united states, have already excited some remarks in this country, and will probably give occasion to more. as stated in the preface to this edition, the editor does not conceive himself called upon to discuss the speculative opinions of the author and supposes he will best discharge his duty by confining his observations to what he deems errors of fact or law. but in reference to this particular subject, it seems due to the author to remark, that he visited the united states at a particular time, when a successful political chieftain had succeeded in establishing his party in power, as it seemed, firmly and permanently; when the preponderance of that party was immense, and when there seemed little prospect of any change. he may have met with men, who sank under the astonishing popularity of general jackson, who despaired of the republic, and who therefore shrank from the expression of their opinions. it must be confessed, however, that the author is obnoxious to the charge which has been made, of the want of perspicuity and distinctness in this part of his work. he does not mean that the press was silent, for he has himself not only noticed, but furnished proof of the great freedom, not to say licentiousness, with which it assailed the character of the president, and the measures of his administration.

he does not mean to represent the opponents of the dominant party as having thrown down their weapons of warfare, for his book shows throughout his knowledge of the existence of an active and able party, constantly opposing and harassing the administration.

but, after a careful perusal of the chapters on this subject, the editor is inclined to the opinion, that m. de tocqueville intends to speak of the tyranny of the party in excluding from public employment all those who do not adopt the shibboleth of the majority. the language at pp. 266, 267, which he puts in the mouth of a majority, and his observations immediately preceding this note, seem to furnish the key to his meaning; although it must be admitted that there are other passages to which a wider construction may be given. perhaps they may be reconciled by the idea that the author considers the acts and opinions of the dominant party as the just and true expression of public opinion. and hence, when he speaks of the intolerance of public opinion, he means the exclusiveness of the party, which, for the time being, may be predominant. he had seen men of acknowledged competency removed from office, or excluded from it, wholly on the ground of their entertaining opinions hostile to those of the dominant party, or majority. and he had seen this system extended to the very lowest officers of the government, and applied by the electors in their choice of all officers of all descriptions; and this he deemed persecution—tyranny—despotism. but he surely is mistaken in representing the effect of this system of terror as stifling all complaint, silencing all opposition, and inducing "enemies and friends to yoke themselves alike to the triumphant car of the majority." he mistook a temporary state of parties for a permanent and ordinary result, and he was carried away by the immense majority that then supported the administration, to the belief of a universal acquiescence. without intending here to speak of the merits or demerits of those who represented that majority, it is proper to remark, that the great change which has taken place since the period when the author wrote, in the political condition of the very persons who he supposed then wielded the terrors of disfranchisement against their opponents, in itself furnishes a full and complete demonstration of the error of his opinions respecting the "true independence of mind and freedom of discussion" in america. for without such discussion to enlighten the minds of the people, and without a stern independence of the rewards and threats of those in power, the change alluded to could not have occurred.

there is reason to complain not only of the ambiguity, but of the style of exaggeration which pervades all the remarks of the author on this subject—so different from the well considered and nicely adjusted language employed by him on all other topics. thus, p. 262, he implies that there is no means of redress afforded even by the judiciary, for a wrong committed by the majority. his error is, first, in supposing the jury to constitute the judicial power; second, overlooking what he has himself elsewhere so well described, the independence of the judiciary, and its means of controlling the action of a majority in a state or in the federal government; and thirdly, in omitting the proper consideration of the frequent changes of popular sentiment by which the majority of yesterday becomes the minority of to-day, and its acts of injustice are reversed.

certain it is that the instances which he cites at this page, do not establish his position respecting the disposition of the majority. the riot at baltimore was, like other riots in england and in france, the result of popular phrensy excited to madness by conduct of the most provoking character. the majority in the state of maryland and throughout the united states, highly disapproved the acts of violence committed on the occasion. the acquittal by a jury of those arraigned for the murder of general lingan, proves only that there was not sufficient evidence to identify the accused, or that the jury was governed by passion. it is not perceived how the majority of the people are answerable for the verdicts rendered. the guilty have often been erroneously acquitted in all countries, and in france particularly, recent instances are not wanting of acquittals especially in prosecutions for political offences, against clear and indisputable testimony. and it was entirely fortuitous that the jury was composed of men whose sympathies were with the rioters and murderers, if the fact was so. it not unfrequently happens that a jury taken from lists furnished years perhaps, and always a long time, before the trial, are decidedly hostile to the temporary prevailing sentiments of their city, county, or state.

as in the other instance, if the inhabitant of pennsylvania intended to intimate to our author, that a colored voter would be in personal jeopardy for venturing to appear at the polls to exercise his right, it must be said in truth, that the incident was local and peculiar, and contrary to what is annually seen throughout the states where colored persons are permitted to vote, who exercise that privilege with as full immunity from injury or oppression, as any white citizen. and, after all, it is believed that the state of feeling intimated by the informant of our author, is but an indication of dislike to a caste degraded by servitude and ignorance; and it is not perceived how it proves the despotism of a majority over the freedom and independence of opinion. if it be true, it proves a detestable tyranny over acts, over the exercise of an acknowledged right. the apprehensions of a mob committing violence deterred the colored voters from approaching the polls. are instances unknown in england or even in france, of peaceable subjects being prevented by mobs or the fear of them, from the exercise of a right, from the discharge of a duty? and are they evidences of the despotism of a majority in those countries?—american editor.}

i have heard of patriotism in the united states, and it is a virtue which may be found among the people, but never among the leaders of the people. this may be explained by analogy; despotism debases the oppressed, much more than the oppressor; in absolute monarchies the king has often great virtues, but the courtiers are invariably servile. it is true that the american courtiers do not say, "sire," or "your majesty"—a distinction without a difference. they are for ever talking of the natural intelligence of the populace they serve; they do not debate the question as to which of the virtues of their master are pre-eminently worthy of admiration; for they assure him that he possesses all the virtues under heaven without having acquired them, or without caring to acquire them: they do not give him their daughters and their wives to be raised at his pleasure to the rank of his concubines, but, by sacrificing their opinions, they prostitute themselves. moralists and philosophers in america are not obliged to conceal their opinions under the veil of allegory; but, before they venture upon a harsh truth, they say: "we are aware that the people which we are addressing is too superior to all the weaknesses of human nature to lose the command of its temper for an instant; and we should not hold this language if we were not speaking to men, whom their virtues and their intelligence render more worthy of freedom than all the rest of the world."

it would have been impossible for the sycophants of louis xiv. to flatter more dexterously. for my part, i am persuaded that in all governments, whatever their nature may be, servility will cower to force, and adulation will cling to power. the only means of preventing men from degrading themselves, is to invest no one with that unlimited authority which is the surest method of debasing them.

the greatest dangers of the american republics proceed from the unlimited power of the majority.

democratic republics liable to perish from a misuse of their power, and not by impotence.—the governments of the american republics are more centralized and more energetic than those of the monarchies of europe.—dangers resulting from this.—opinions of hamilton and jefferson upon this point.

governments usually fall a sacrifice to impotence or to tyranny. in the former case their power escapes from them: it is wrested from their grasp in the latter. many observers who have noticed the anarchy of domestic states, have imagined that the government of those states was naturally weak and impotent. the truth is, that when once hostilities are begun between parties, the government loses its control over society. but i do not think that a democratic power is naturally without resources: say rather, that it is almost always by the abuse of its force, and the misemployment of its resources, that a democratic government fails. anarchy is almost always produced by its tyranny or its mistakes, but not by its want of strength.

it is important not to confound stability with force, or the greatness of a thing with its duration. in democratic republics, the power which directs{186} society is not stable; for it often changes hands and assumes a new direction. but whichever way it turns, its force is almost irresistible. the governments of the american republics appear to me to be as much centralized as those of the absolute monarchies of europe, and more energetic than they are. i do not, therefore, imagine that they will perish from weakness.{187}

if ever the free institutions of america are destroyed, that event may be attributed to the unlimited authority of the majority, which may at some future time urge the minorities to desperation, and oblige them to have recourse to physical force. anarchy will then be the result, but it will have been brought about by despotism.

mr. hamilton expresses the same opinion in the federalist, no. 51. "it is of great importance in a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part. justice is the end of government. it is the end of civil society. it ever has been, and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or until liberty be lost in the pursuit. in a society, under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger: and as in the latter state even the stronger individuals are prompted by the uncertainty of their condition to submit to a government which may protect the weak as well as themselves, so in the former state will the more powerful factions be gradually induced by a like motive to wish for a government which will protect all parties, the weaker as well as the more powerful. it can be little doubted, that if the state of rhode island was separated from the confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under the popular form of government within such narrow limits, would be displayed by such reiterated oppression of the factious majorities, that some power altogether independent of the people would soon be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had proved the necessity of it."

jefferson has also expressed himself in a letter to madison:{188} "the executive power in our government is not the only, perhaps not even the principal object of my solicitude. the tyranny of the legislature is really the danger most to be feared, and will continue to be so for many years to come. the tyranny of the executive power will come in its turn, but at a more distant period."

i am glad to cite the opinion of jefferson upon this subject rather than that of another, because i consider him to be the most powerful advocate democracy has ever sent forth.