early in 1866, clemenceau, after a visit to england, crossed the atlantic for a somewhat prolonged stay in the united states. he could scarcely have chosen a better time for making acquaintance with america and the americans. the united states had but just emerged from the civil war, which, notwithstanding the furious bitterness evoked on both sides during the struggle, eventually consolidated the great republic as nothing else could; though, owing to the behaviour of “society” in england, the tone of our leading statesmen and the action of the alabama, the feeling against great britain was naturally very strong. this animosity—it was no less—of course did not extend to the young french physician of republican views who had already suffered for his opinions in paris, and whose sympathies were with the north against the south throughout. he was well received in the eastern states, and wrote several letters to the temps on the industrial and social conditions of america which were then of value, and still serve to show how marked is the contrast between the self-contained nation of fifty years ago and the anglo-saxon world power that has successfully tried her strength in the international struggle against germanic infamy to-day. what is not so easy to comprehend is m. le dr. clemenceau, as we know him, acting as professor of french in a young ladies’ college at the village of stanford, in the neighbourhood of new york. his record in that capacity is amusingly described by one of his friends[a] in a bright little sketch of his early experiences.

[30]

“an admirable horseman, the young frenchman accompanied the still younger american misses in their rides. there were free and delightful little tours on horseback, charming excursions along the shady roads which traverse the gay landscape of connecticut. such years carried with them for clemenceau ineffaceable memories of a period during which his temperament accomplished the task of gaining strength and acquiring refinement. at the same time that he enriched his mind with solid conceptions of anglo-saxon philosophy, and perfected his general cultivation, he took his first lessons in the delicacies of american flirtation. it was in the course of these pleasing jaunts, where the fresh laughter of these young ladies echoed through the bright scenery, that it was his lot to become betrothed to one of them, miss mary plummer. henceforth, in consequence of the sound, independent and many-sided education which he had, so to say, imposed upon himself, clemenceau had completed the last stage of his intellectual development. he was ripe to play great parts. for the rest, events were not destined long to delay the throwing into full relief his versatile, intrepid and powerful characteristics.”

and so clemenceau, thus prepared to meet what the future might have in store for him, returned to paris. there are cities in the history of the human race which have taken unto themselves a personality, not only for their own inhabitants, but for succeeding ages, and for the world at large. babylon, athens, jerusalem, rome, bagdad, florence, each and all convey to the mind a conception of chic individuality and collective achievement which brings them within the range of our own knowledge, admiration and respect, which raises them also to the level of ideals of culture for men living in far different civilisations. they are still oases of brightness and greenery amid the wilderness of unconscious growth. the wars of old time, the cruelty of long-past days, the records of brutality and lust are forgotten: only the memory of greatness or beauty remains.

[31]

“terror by night, the flaming battle-call, fire on the roof-tree, dreadful blood and woe!— they cease for tears, yet joyful, knowing all is over, long ago.

knowing, the melancholy hands of time weave a slow veil of beauty o’er the place of blood-stained memory and bitter crime till horror fades in grace.

the mournful grace of long-forgotten woe and long-appeased sorrows of the dead, the deeper silence of those streams that flow where ancient highways led.”

among the great cities of the past which is still the present paris takes her undisputed place. in youth, in maturity, in age, the charm of intellectual and artistic paris ever affects not merely her own citizens, but the strangers within her gates. and the young vendéen clemenceau was from the first a parisian of parisians. the attraction of paris for him was permanent. from his arrival in 1860 until the present time practically his whole life has been spent in the french capital. many years afterwards he gave expression to the influence paris had upon him. paris for clemenceau is the sun of the world of science and letters, the source of light and heat from whose centre art and thought radiate through space. “intuition and suggestion spreading out in all directions awake dormant energy, sweep on from contact to contact, are passed on, dispersed, and finally exhausted in the inertia of material objects. here is the radiance of humanity, more or less powerful, more or less durable as time and place may decree.”

it is this impatience of paris with results already achieved, this desire to reach out and to embrace new forms in all departments of human achievement, which give the french city her position as an indispensable entity in the cosmos of modern[32] life. “boldness and boldness and boldness again” was danton’s prescription for the orator, and it might be taken as the motto of intellectual and artistic paris. there is no hesitation, no contentment, no waiting by the wayside. new ideas and new conceptions must ever be replacing the old. experience may teach what to avoid: experiment alone can teach what to attempt. and this not incidentally or as a passing phase of endeavour, but as a principle to be applied in every region of human effort. “the rights of man,” “liberty, equality, fraternity,” “property is robbery” are as thought-provoking (though they solve no problem) in the domain of sociology as pasteur’s achievements in physiology and medicine. whatever changes the future may have in store for us, we who are not frenchmen cannot dispense with the leadership and inspiration that come to us from paris.

on his return to france from america clemenceau renewed his acquaintance and friendship with those who shared his political and social opinions, especially etienne arago, now an old man, and practised as a doctor in the working-class district of montmartre. here, by his gratuitous medical advice to the people and his steady adherence to his democratic principles, he gained an amount of popularity and personal devotion from the men and women of montmartre which, in conjunction with arago’s advice and support, prepared the way for the positions which he afterwards attained. meanwhile the second empire was going slowly downhill. the change which had already taken place was not generally recognised. nevertheless, the failure of the ill-fated mexican expedition with its catholic support, its sordid financial muddling and the degrading system of plunder carried on in mexico itself by marshal bazaine, the effect on paris of the murder of victor noir by a member of the buonaparte family, and the government’s growing incapacity to handle domestic and foreign affairs all told against the prestige of napoleon. only a successful diplomatic stroke or a victorious war could rehabilitate the credit of the empire. the time had gone by for[33] either. bismarck’s disgraceful forgery at ems was as unnecessary as it was flagitious. sooner or later the second empire would have collapsed from its own incompetence. but that waiting game did not suit the grim statesman of berlin. he knew that the french army by itself could not hold its own against the prussian and other german forces; he felt convinced also that austria would not move without much clearer assurances of success than napoleon could supply; while italy was still tied to her ally of 1866, and england was devoted to a policy of profitable non-intervention. so napoleon was half driven, half tricked into a hopeless campaign, and every calculation on which bismarck relied was verified by the results. nay, the plébiscite which louis napoleon risked eighteen years after the coup d’état went entirely in his favour, and it was in reality quite unnecessary, from the point of view of internal politics, that any risk of war should be run. the empress, however, has always had the discredit of not having been of that opinion. hence steps were taken which played into bismarck’s hands.

at first, as i have heard clemenceau say himself, it was almost impossible for a patriotic republican to desire victory for the french armies. that would only have meant a new life for the decadent empire. sad, therefore, as was the long succession of disasters, and terrible the devastation wrought by german ruthlessness, not until the culminating defeat of sedan, the surrender of napoleon and the decree of imperial overthrow pronounced by the people of paris, could men feel that french soldiers were really fighting for their country. thenceforward the struggle was between democratic and progressive france and autocratic and reactionary prussia. the empire for whose humiliation the king of prussia had gone to war existed no longer. a republic was at once declared in its place. any fair-minded enemy would directly have offered the easiest possible terms for peace to the new france. but that was not the view of prussia. france, not merely the second empire, was to be defeated and crushed[34] down, because she stood in the way of that permanent policy of aggression and aggrandisement to which the house of hohenzollern, with its junker supporters, has always been devoted. this was the moment when england should have interfered decisively on the side of her old rival. it was not only our interest but our duty to do so, and the whole nation would have enthusiastically supported the statesmen who had given it a vigorous lead in the right direction. unfortunately queen victoria, then as ever bitterly pro-german, was utterly unscrupulous in enforcing her views upon her government: the men then in office were essentially courtiers, who combined servility at home with pusillanimity abroad: the laissez-faire school of parasitical commercialism which regards the accumulation of wealth for the few as the highest aspiration of humanity held the trading classes in its grip. consequently, the monarch and the ruling class of the day thought it was cheaper, and therefore better, to leave france to her fate, and make a good cash profit out of the business, rather than courageously to withstand the beginnings of evil and uphold the french republic against the brutality and greed of berlin. it is sad, nearly fifty years later, to reflect upon the results of this mistaken and cowardly policy. the war was continued, owing chiefly to english indifference, until france lay at the feet of the conquerors.

no sooner did the news of the defeat and surrender of sedan reach paris than a general shout for the overthrow of the empire went up from the people throughout the french capital. the collapse of the second empire was in fact even more sudden and dramatic than its rise. the whole imperial machinery fell with a crash. there was not a man in paris among the friends of the emperor in good fortune who had the courage and capacity to come to the front in the time of his distress. the bigoted catholic empress, against whom parisians cherished an animosity scarcely less bitter than that which their forbears felt for marie antoinette, was with difficulty got safely out of the city, and paris at once took[35] control of her own destinies. a republic having been proclaimed, republicans, radicals and socialists, harried and proscribed the day before, rushed to the front the day after, and forthwith became masters of the city. clemenceau as one of them was immediately chosen mayor of montmartre, at the instance of his old friend etienne arago.

it was a period for action, not for argument, or reflection, or propaganda. clemenceau understood that. in his capacity as mayor of montmartre, by no means an easy district to manage, he exhibited marvellous energy, as well as sound judgment, in every department of public affairs. everything had to be reorganised at once. there was no time to respect the inevitable details of democratic authorisation and delay. clemenceau with his natural rapidity of decision was the very man for the post. patriotic and revolutionary excitement seethed all round him. society seemed already to be in the melting-pot. the enthusiasm evoked by eloquent orations in favour of socialism was accompanied by the discharges of cannon and the rumbling of ammunition-wagons. but public business had to be carried on all the same. clemenceau was indefatigable and ubiquitous. he prevented the priests from intriguing in the municipal schools, he established purely secular education, hurried on the arming of the battalions and kept a sharp eye on the defences of the city. simultaneously he set on foot a series of establishments for giving warmth, food and general help to the number of people who had sought refuge on the heights. he acted throughout practically as municipal dictator, raising, arming and drilling recruits for the new republican army, as well as organising and administering all the local services.

it was a fine piece of work. having been so closely in touch with the bulk of the population of montmartre, he was able to act entirely in their interests and with their concurrence throughout. they therefore warmly supported him against the reactionists and religionists who, then as always, were his most virulent enemies. it was no easy task to maintain[36] order and carry out systematic organisation at this juncture. the downfall of the empire occurred on september 4th, the republic, with general trochu—the man of the undisclosed strategical “plan”—as president and jules favre as vice-president, being declared the same day. on september 19th paris was invested by the germans. seeing that there were then no fewer than 400,000 armed men, at various stages of training, in the capital, with many powerful forts at their disposal, while the germans could spare at the beginning of the siege no more than 120,000 men for the attack, the french having still several armies in the field, successful resistance by the republic seemed by no means hopeless. paris might even have had her share in turning the tide of victory. clemenceau was of that opinion.

but it was not to be. france failed to produce a great general, and the “bagman marshal,” as bazaine was called in mexico, by shutting himself up with 175,000 men in metz, rendered final defeat certain; though if marshal macmahon’s advice had been followed, and if general trochu had later sufficiently organised the forces at his disposal in paris to break through the german lines, a stouter fight might have been fought. as it was, one french army after another was defeated in the field, and paris and metz were forced to surrender by literal starvation. on january 28th, 1871, an armistice was signed between bismarck and jules favre and the revictualling of the famine-stricken parisians began, the siege having lasted a little over four months. a national assembly was summoned to decide the terms of a definite peace or in what manner it might be possible to continue the war.

so well satisfied were the voters of montmartre with the conduct of their mayor during all this trying time that they decided to send him as their representative to bordeaux and polled just upon 100,000 votes in his favour. to bordeaux, therefore, clemenceau went, on february 12th, as deputy for one of the most radical and revolutionary districts of paris. though neither then nor later an avowed socialist, no socialist[37] could have done more for practical democratic and socialist measures than clemenceau had done. that, of course, was the reason why he was elected by so advanced a constituency.

he found himself strangely out of his element when he took his seat in the national assembly. perhaps no more reactionary body had ever met in france. the majority of the members were thorough-going conservatives who at heart were eager to restore the monarchy. they were royalists but slightly disguised, dug up out of their seclusion, from all parts of the country, who thought their time had come to revenge themselves not so much upon the buonapartists who had governed france for twenty years as upon paris and the parisians who had chased charles x and louis philippe out of france. they well knew that the capital would never consent to the restoration of the candidate of either of the bourbon factions. these fitting champions of a worn-out legitimism or orleanism were old men in a hurry to resuscitate the dead and galvanise the past into fresh life. their very heads betrayed their own antiquity. so much so that a favourite pastime of young ladies of pleasure in the galleries, who had flocked to bordeaux, was what was irreverently called “bald-headed loo.” this consisted in betting upon the number of flies that would settle within a given period upon a devoted deputy’s hairless occiput. unfortunately these ancient gentlemen found in m. thiers a leader who could scarcely have been surpassed for ingenuity and unscrupulousness. he deliberately traded upon prejudices, and his main political assets were the fear and distrust which he awakened in one set of his countrymen against another. in modern as in ancient society there is an economic and almost a personal antagonism between country and town.

the man of the provinces, living always in the rural districts, the tiller, the producer, the indefatigable toiler, the parsimonious accumulator of small gains, the respecter of ancestral traditions and the devotee of old-world methods and well-tried means of gaining a poor livelihood, profoundly affected likewise by his inherited religion, has, in most cases,[38] a deep-seated contempt, strangely enough not wholly divorced from fear, for the man of the town, and especially for the man of paris. this animosity, which has by no means wholly disappeared to-day, was keenly in evidence forty and fifty years ago. there is an economic cause at the bottom of the antipathy, but this does not account for its many-sided manifestation. the countryman naturally desires to sell his produce at as high a price as possible. it is for him almost a matter of life and death to do so. the townsman, on his side, the artisan or labourer or even the rentier of the great cities, is naturally anxious to obtain the necessaries of life which he gets from the rural districts at as low a rate as he may be able to buy them having regard to his wages or his income. hence any expenditure which tends to benefit the country is regarded with suspicion by the townsman and contrariwise as between town and country, except such outlay as cheapens the cost of transportation, where both have an identical interest.

but this general divergence of economic advantage, which has existed for many centuries does not wholly account for the ill-feeling which too often appears. there is a psychological side to the matter as well. thus the peasant, even when he is getting satisfactory prices for his wares, despises his own customers when they pay too much for small luxuries which they could easily do without. moreover, he considers the cleverness of his fellow-countrymen of the city, their readiness to change their opinions and adopt new ideas, their doubts as to the super-sanctity of that individual property, property which is the small landowner’s god, as evidences of a dangerous disposition to upset all that ought to be most solemnly upheld. the townsman, on the other hand, too often looks down upon the peasant and the rural provincial generally as an ignorant, short-sighted, narrow-minded, grasping creature, full of prejudices and eaten up with superstition, who, out of sheer obstinacy, stands immovably in the way of reforms that might, and in many cases certainly would, benefit them both.

it is the task and the duty of the true statesman to bridge[39] over these differences as far as possible, to try to harmonise interests and assuage feelings which under existing conditions are apt to conflict with one another. thus only can the whole country be well and truly served. m. thiers pursued precisely the contrary course. in order to foster reaction and to strengthen the position of the bourgeoisie, he and his supporters set to work deliberately to excite the hatred of the country-folk against their brethren of the towns. they were willing to accept the republic only on the distinct understanding that it should be, as zola expressed it, a bourgeoised sham. the bogey of the social revolution was stuck up daily to frighten the timid property-owners. above all, paris was pointed out as the danger spot of order-respecting france. paris ought to be muzzled and kept under even more strictly by the self-respecting republic than by the empire. that way alone lay safety. thus the dislike of the provincials for the capital was fanned to so fierce a heat that the very title of capital was denied to her. as a result of this unpatriotic and traitorous policy paris herself was unfortunately forced to the conviction that the reactionists of bordeaux were determined to deprive her of all her rights, and that the great city which founded the republic would be made to suffer dearly for her presumption. nearly all that followed was in reality due to this sinister policy of provocation, adopted and carried out by m. thiers and his bigoted followers.

clemenceau’s position was a difficult one. knowing both peasants and parisians intimately well, he saw clearly the very dangerous situation which must inevitably be created by such tactics of exasperation. as one of the deputies of radical republican paris, he did his utmost at bordeaux to maintain the independence of his constituents and to resist the fatal action of the majority. as the son of a landowner in la vendée, he understood clearly the views of the provincials and how necessary it was that they should be thoroughly informed as to the aims of the parisians. but paris had first claim on his services. he therefore associated himself with louis blanc,[40] voted with him against the preliminaries of peace and in favour of the continuance of the war. there was a strong opinion at this time that many of the buonapartists in high military command, as well as in important civil posts, were traitors to the republic and had acted, as bazaine unquestionably did, in the interest of the imperial prisoner instead of on behalf of france. these factionists too were hostile to paris, and a demand was made, in which clemenceau joined, for a full investigation of the conduct of such men during the siege. unfortunately, affairs in the capital were now becoming so critical and the probability of another revolution there seemed so great that clemenceau felt his duties as mayor of montmartre were still more urgent than his votes and speeches at bordeaux, as deputy for that district. consequently, after less than a month’s stay at bordeaux, he returned to paris on the evening of march 5th. the commune of paris was set on foot within a fortnight of that date, on march 18th, 1871.