strikes and anarchist troubles, however, formidable as they were in the north and in the south, were by no means the only serious difficulties which clemenceau had to cope with, first as minister of the interior and then as premier. the danger from germany, as he well knew, was ever present. anxious as france was to avoid misunderstandings which might easily lead to war, eager as the radical leader might be to enlarge upon the folly and wickedness of strife between two contiguous civilised peoples, who could do so much for one another, it was always possible for the german government to put the republic in such a position that the alternative of humiliation or hostilities must be faced. less than a year before clemenceau accepted office, the german kaiser himself had taken a most provocative step in morocco, the object of which can now be clearly seen. germany had no real interests in morocco worthy of the name. several years later the german minister of foreign affairs pooh-poohed the idea that germany, distant from morocco as she was, with only 200 germans in the country, and not more than ￡200,000 worth of yearly commerce, all told, with the inhabitants, could be concerned about political matters in that mohammedan kingdom.
with france the case was very different. algeria was adjacent to the territories of the sultan of morocco, and, if the wild tribes on the frontier were stirred up against the infidel, the most important french colony was threatened with serious disturbance. it was all-important for france, therefore, that there should be a government at fez strong enough and enlight[203]ened enough to keep peace on the border. clemenceau, who had always been so stern an opponent of colonial adventures, and had overthrown several cabinets which he considered were prone to encourage harmful exploits, had himself spoken out very plainly about morocco. long before capitalist interests were involved on any large scale the french ownership of algeria necessitated a definite moroccan policy. this again brought with it the obligation of constant pressure upon the sultan to induce him to consider french interests. these interests could be harmonised with those of spain and great britain, and were so settled by special agreements in april, 1904, just a year before the german emperor’s coup de théatre startled the world. france’s special interests in morocco were thus recognised all round, and germany, far from raising any objection, expressly disclaimed any desire to interfere, so long as “the open door” was left for german goods. but the general antagonism between france and germany was a matter of common knowledge.
it was natural, therefore, that the sultan of morocco, alarmed lest french attempts to introduce “order” and “good government” into his realm might end, as it had always done elsewhere, by destroying his independence, should appeal to the kaiser, who had proclaimed his sympathy for the moslem, to help him against the less sympathetic infidel. for a long time these appeals fell upon deaf ears. even when the kaiser visited gibraltar, after an interview with the king of spain, he refused pressing invitations to cross the straits and meet envoys of the moroccan potentate at tangier. this was in march, 1904. but in march, 1905, when everything looked peaceful, the kaiser went to tangier in the hohenzollern, landed with an imposing suite, met the uncle of the sultan, who came as a special envoy to the german emperor, and addressed him in the following terms:—
“i am to-day paying my visit to the sultan in his quality of independent sovereign. i hope that under the sovereignty of the sultan a free morocco will remain open to the peaceful[204] competition of all nations, without monopoly and without annexation, on the footing of absolute equality. the object of my visit to tangier is to make known that i have decided to do all in my power to effectually safeguard the interests of germany in morocco. since i consider the sultan an absolutely free sovereign, it is with him that i desire to come to an understanding on suitable measures for safeguarding these interests. as to the reforms that the sultan intends to make, it seems to me that he must proceed with much caution, having regard to the religious feelings of the population, so that public order may not be disturbed.”
such was the declaration of the german emperor. what gave special point to his address was the fact that at that very moment a french delegation was at the capital, fez, in order to obtain necessary reforms from the sultan, and was meeting week after week the most obstinate resistance from him and his government. it was obviously open support of the sultan in his refusal to accept french representations, and a declaration of hostility to france on the part of the kaiser. nothing more arrogant or offensive can well be imagined. france, from the socialist point of view, was wrong in her attempt to instruct the sultan how to deal with a state of things which undoubtedly threatened the peace of algeria, but the kaiser’s intervention after such a fashion was wholly unwarrantable, and threatened the peace of the world.
what was the meaning of this extraordinary display of imperial diplomacy and prussian direct action? there were statesmen—sir charles dilke was one—who believed that the german emperor was really devoted to peace, and that no war could take place in europe so long as he lived. there was a general feeling in england to the same effect, largely engineered by lord haldane and others of like nature, whose spiritual or political home was in germany. but all can see now that this was an illusion. the only difference between the kaiser and the most aggressive and bloodthirsty junker or pan-german was as to the time and season when the tremendous[205] central european and partially mohammedan combination that he had formed should commence the attack. william ii wished to wait until the road had been so completely prepared for the aggressive advance that victory on every side would be practically certain. the junker party, with which the crown prince identified himself, were in a hurry, and the emperor could only keep them in good humour by these periodical outbursts which enabled him to pose as the dictator of europe.
all through, the kaiser’s real ambition was that which he occasionally disclosed in a well-known drawing-room in berlin. he would not die happy unless he had ridden at the head of the teutonic armies as the charlemagne of modern europe. but this megalomania was only indulged in with his intimates. elsewhere he stood forth as the rival of his uncle as the prince of peace. according to him, therefore, it was m. delcassé who forced him to act in this peremptory way at tangier; and efforts were made to convince all the governments in europe that the french minister of foreign affairs had tried to boycott germany out of morocco. france, rather than take up the challenge, got rid of m. delcassé. thus the emperor displayed his power for the appeasement of his junkers, established a permanent source of difficulty on the flank of france, and gave the mohammedan world to understand once more that germany, not england, was the champion of islam.
meanwhile, german political, financial and commercial influence of every kind was making astounding advances, not only in france itself, but also in every country that might at the critical moment be able to help either france or russia; while german armaments, military and naval, and german alliances for war were being worked up to the point which, if carried on for ten, or perhaps even for five years more, would have rendered the german power almost, if not quite, irresistible by any combination that could have been made in time against it. the kaiser, in short, was playing a successful game of world-peace in order to make sure of playing at the right moment a successful game of world-war. desperate as the[206] conflict has been, it may have been fortunate for mankind that the junkers, his son and the general staff forced the emperor’s hand.
when, consequently, clemenceau took the lead in french affairs, he soon found that the sacrifice of m. delcassé, the friend of edward vii, to the pretended german injury had been made in vain. there was no intention whatever, either then or later, of coming to a really permanent settlement of outstanding grievances against france, although the position in morocco was eventually used to gain great advantages in other parts of africa. germany was, in fact, a permanent menace to the peace of europe and the world; but those who said so, and adduced plain facts to justify their contentions, were unfortunately denounced both by capitalists and socialists in every country as fomenters of war. this insidious propaganda, which tended to the advantage of germany in every respect, was already going on in 1906, when m. clemenceau joined m. sarrien’s cabinet, and when he formed a cabinet of his own. this was publicly recognised.
this is what m. clemenceau said at hyères, after some furious attacks had been made upon france in the german official newspapers; no german newspapers being allowed to print comments on foreign affairs without the consent of the foreign office: “no peace is possible without force. when i took office i myself was persuaded that all european nations were of one mind in wishing for peace. but almost immediately, without any provocation whatever from us, a storm of calumny and misrepresentation broke out upon us, and we were compelled to ask ourselves, ‘are we prepared?’”
on october 23rd of the same year, m. sarrien resigned, and m. clemenceau formed his cabinet. it comprised, among others, messrs. pichon (foreign affairs), caillaux (finance), colonel picquart (war), briand (justice and education), viviani (labour), and donmergue (commerce). a more peaceful cabinet could hardly be. m. pichon, who took the place from which m. delcassé had been forced to resign because[207] he too strongly opposed german influence in morocco and refused a european conference on the subject as wholly unnecessary, was an old friend and co-worker with clemenceau on la justice, and had gone into diplomacy at clemenceau’s suggestion. he had since held positions in the east and in tunis, and he and clemenceau were believed to be entirely at one in abjuring all adventurous colonial policy. m. caillaux, at the head of the department of finance—people are apt to forget that m. caillaux, now in gaol under serious accusation, was thus trusted by clemenceau—was certainly not opposed to germany, but even at that time was favourable to a close understanding with that power. colonel picquart, who now received his reward for having, though personally an anti-semite, destroyed all his own professional prospects in his zeal to obtain justice for the jew dreyfus, was certainly as pacific a war minister as could have been appointed. but what was more significant still, m. briand, himself a socialist, and the hero of the great inquiry into the separation of church and state which had now become inevitable, was placed in a position to carry that important measure to its final vote and settlement; and m. viviani, likewise a socialist, became head of the new department, the ministry of labour. when i saw these two men, briand, whom i remembered well as a vehement anarchist, and viviani, who was a vigorous socialist speaker and writer, in the cabinet of which clemenceau was the chief, i could not but recall the conversation i had with the french premier sixteen years before.
seated comfortably in his delightful library, surrounded by splendid japanese works of art, of which at that time he was an ardent collector, m. clemenceau had spoken very freely indeed. of course, he knew quite well that i was no mere interviewer for press purposes, and, indeed, i have always made it a rule to keep such conversations, except perhaps for permitted indiscretions here and there, entirely to myself. there is no need for me to enlarge upon his quick and almost abrupt delivery, his apt remarks and illustrations, his bright, clever,[208] vigorous face and gestures. i put it to him that socialism was the basis of the coming political party in france and that, vehement individualist as he might be himself, it was impossible for him to resist permanently the current of the time, or to remain merely a supremely powerful critic and organiser of overthrow. sooner or later he must succumb to the inevitable and take his seat as president of council, and to do this with any hope of success or usefulness he would have to rely in an increasing degree upon socialist and semi-socialist support.
to this clemenceau answered that he was quite contented with his existing position; that he had no wish to enter upon office with its responsibilities and corrupting influence; while, as to socialism, that could never make way in france in his day.
“looking only at the towns,” he said, “you may think otherwise, though even there i consider the progress of socialism is overrated. but the towns do not govern france. the overwhelming majority of french voters are country voters. france means rural france, and the peasantry of france will never be socialists. nobody can know them better than my family and i know them. landed proprietors ourselves—my father’s passion for buying land to pay him three per cent. with borrowed money for which he had to pay four per cent. would have finally ruined him, but that our wholesome french law permits gentle interference in such a case—we have ever lived with and among the peasantry. we have been doctors from generation to generation, and have doctored them gratuitously, as i did myself, both in country and in town. i have seen them very close, in birth and in death, in sickness and in health, in betrothal and in marriage, in poverty and in well-being, and all the time their one idea is property; to possess, to own, to provide a good portion for the daughter, to secure a good and well dot-ed wife for the son. always property, ownership, possession, work, thrift, acquisition, individual gain. socialism can never take root in such a soil as this. north or south, it is just the same. preach nationalisation of the land in a french village, and you would barely[209] escape with your life, if the peasants understood what you meant. come with me for a few weeks’ trip through rural france, and you will soon understand the hopelessness of socialism here. it will encounter a personal fanaticism stronger than its own. your socialists are men of the town; they do not understand the men and women of the country.”
now the same m. clemenceau, after a long struggle side by side with the socialist party, first in the dreyfus case and then in the anti-clericalist and separation of church and state movement, finds that events have moved so fast, in a comparatively short space of time, that he is practically compelled to take two active socialists into his own cabinet. this, too, in spite of the fact that his action in calling in the troops at courrières and insisting upon liberty for non-strikers or black-legs had turned the socialist party, as a party, definitely against him. no more significant proof of the advance of socialist influence could well have been given. that it was entirely on the side of peace and a good understanding with germany cannot be disputed.
but this did not make the morocco affair itself any less complicated or threatening. notwithstanding the conference which germany succeeded in having convoked at algeciras, and the settlement arrived at in april, 1906, after a sitting of more than three months, the condition of morocco itself had not improved. the fact that the conference gave france the preference in the scheme of reforms proposed and in the political management of morocco, against the efforts of germany and austria, suited neither the sultan nor the kaiser. troubles arose of a serious character. the french considered themselves forced to intervene. the old antagonism broke out afresh. so much so that the french premier spoke with more than his usual frankness in an interview with a german newspaper in november:—
“the germans have one great fault. they show us extreme courtesy to-day and marked rudeness the day after. before this morocco affair, feeling in france had much improved.[210] many of us thought an understanding with germany very desirable, and i freely admit your emperor did a good deal to engender this feeling. then, although we had dismissed delcassé, the german press attacked us. it went so far as to declare that you were to extort from us the milliards of francs necessary to finance an anglo-german war. . . . i do not want to have any war, and if we desire no war we necessarily wish to be on good terms with our neighbours. if, also, our relations are unsatisfactory, we are anxious to improve them. such is my frame of mind. moreover, if i have a chance of doing so, i shall be glad to act on these lines. of course it is imperatively necessary for us to be always strong and ready for all eventualities. that, however, does not mean that we want war: quite the contrary. to wish for war would mean that we were mad. we could not possibly carry on a war policy. if we did, parliament would soon turn us out, as it did delcassé.”
nothing could be clearer than that. and what made the pronouncement more important even than the strong but sober language used was the fact that, after as before the conference of algeciras, there was really a great disposition among certain sections in france to come to terms with germany, rather than to strengthen the understanding with england. the expression of this opinion could be frequently heard among the people. it was fostered, even in the face of the german press campaign against the clemenceau administration, by powerful financial interests and by clerical reactionary elements which were at this time less hostile to germany than to england.
throughout, however, clemenceau stood for the entente with the latter power as the only sound policy for his country. in this respect he was at one with the old statement of gambetta that a breach of the alliance with england would be fatal to france. for clemenceau, therefore, who had more than once in his career suffered so severely for his friendship for england, to state that an understanding with germany had been seriously contemplated was a striking testimony to the immediate tendency of the time at that juncture. whether the whole of[211] this fitful friendliness on the side of germany was simulated in order to foster that remarkable policy of steady infiltration of german interests, german management, and german goods into france, with far other than peaceful aims, is a question which can be much more confidently answered now than at the period when this peaceful offensive was going on. enough to say that the clemenceau ministry was not, at first, at all averse from a permanent arrangement for peace with germany, so long as english animosity was not aroused.
it must be admitted, nevertheless, that french policy in morocco was, in the long run, quite contrary to the views on colonial affairs which clemenceau had so strongly expressed and acted upon hitherto. whatever excuse may be made on account of the proximity of morocco to algeria, and the necessity for france to protect her own countrymen and secure peace on the border, the truth remains that the french republic was allowed by her statesmen to drift into what was virtually a national and capitalist domination of that independent country, backed up by a powerful french army. clemenceau in his defence of these aggressions recites those familiar apologies for that sort of patriotism which consists in love of another people’s country and the determination to seize it, which we englishmen have become so accustomed to in our own case. if we didn’t take it, somebody else would. if we leave matters as they are, endless disturbances will occur and will spread to our own territory. a protectorate must be established.
but a protectorate must have a powerful armed force behind it, or there can be no real protection. national capital is being invested under our peaceful penetration for the benefit of the protected people. the rights of investors must be safe-guarded. our countrymen—in this instance frenchmen—have been molested and even murdered by the barbarous folk whom we have been called upon to civilise. such outrages cannot be permitted to go unpunished. towns bombarded. villages burnt. peace re-established. more troops. “security of life and property” ensured by a much larger army and the[212] foundation of civilised courts. protection develops insensibly into possession. the familiar progression of grab is, in short, complete.
that is pretty much what went on with morocco, whose entire independence as a sovereign state had only just been internationally acknowledged. what is more, it went on under m. clemenceau’s own government, consisting of the same peaceful politicians enumerated above. no doubt the action of germany against france and french interests, on the one side, and the support by england of france and french interests, on the other, hastened the acceptance of the “white man’s burden” which her capitalists and financiers were so eager to undertake; if only to upset the schemes of the brothers mannesmann in the troublous mohammedan sultanate. but it is strange to find clemenceau in this galley. for, unjustifiable as were the proceedings of germany at the beginning and all through, it is now obvious that france, by her own policy, put arguments into the mouth of the peace-at-any-price and pro-german advocates; that also she played the game of the kaiser and his unscrupulous agent dr. rosen. this worthy had been in the employment of prince radolin, who thus described him: “he is a levantine jew whose sole capacity is intriguing to increase his own importance.” it was disgraceful of germany to make use of such a man to stir up morocco against france. but it was certainly most unwise, as well as contrary to international comity, for france to put herself in the wrong by an aggressive policy in that state. especially was this the case when such a terrible menace still overhung her eastern frontier, and, as events proved, not a man could be spared for adventures in morocco or elsewhere.
the war between rival sultans and the attack upon the french settlers at casablanca could not justify such a complete change of front. jaurès, in fact, was in the right when he denounced the advance of general amadé with a strong french army as a filibustering expedition, dangerous in itself and provocative towards germany. but clemenceau supported his[213] foreign minister, pichon, in the occupation of casablanca, which had been heavily bombarded beforehand, and, on february 25th, declared that france did not intend to evacuate morocco, neither did she mean to conquer that country. he had, he averred, no secrets, and, as in the matter of the anarchist rising in the south, said he was ready to resign. this was evidence of impatience, which was harmful at such a critical period in french home and foreign affairs. it looked as if clemenceau had been so accustomed to turn out french governments that he could not discriminate even in favour of his own! but the chamber gave him a strong vote of confidence, and he remained at his post.
there were two important developments in foreign affairs going on during this year, 1908, of which the difficulties in morocco, serious as they were, constituted only a side issue. the one was open and above-board: the other was known only to those who kept very closely in touch with german politics.
the first was the rapid improvement in the relations between france and great britain, for which clemenceau himself and king edward vii were chiefly responsible. we are now so accustomed to regard the entente as part and parcel of english foreign policy that it is not easy to understand how bitter the feeling was against great britain which led important frenchmen to take the view of an agreement with germany spoken of above. english domination in egypt, to the practical exclusion of french influence and control even over the suez canal; english conventions with japan, checking, as was thought, that legitimate french expansion in asia by which m. jules ferry had hoped to counterbalance the defeats of 1870-71; english settlement of the irritating newfoundland fisheries question; english truculence and unfairness in the infamous boer war; english antagonism to russia, france’s trusted ally and heavy debtor—all these things stood in the way of any cordial understanding. it may well be that only clemenceau’s strong personal influence, supported by his nominee president fallières, prevented steps being taken which[214] would have been fatal to the revival of genuine good feeling between the western powers. the following passage in the encyclop?dia britannica does no more than justice to clemenceau’s services in this direction:
“m. clemenceau, who only late in life came into office and attained it when a better understanding with england was progressing, had been throughout his long career, of all public men in all political groups, the most consistent friend of england. his presence at the head of affairs was a guarantee of amicable anglo-french relations, so far as they could be protected by statesmanship.” this tribute in a permanent work of reference is thoroughly well deserved.
happily, too, his efforts had been earnestly supported long before, and even quietly during, the boer war, by edward vii, as prince of wales and as king. but this very connection between the french radical statesman and the english monarch was the subject of most virulent attacks. it was, in fact, made the groundwork of an elaborate accusation of treachery against clemenceau, who was represented as the mere tool of edward vii in promoting the permanent effacement of france. the king was an english machiavelli, constantly plotting to recover for the british empire, at the expense of france, that world-wide prestige which the miserable boer war and the rise of german power on land and sea, in trade and in finance, had seriously jeopardised. a book by the well-known m. flourens, written at this time to uphold that thesis, went through no fewer than five editions. here is the pleasing picture of the late king presented for the contemplation of the parisian populace by this virulent penman:
“edouard vii montait sur le tr?ne à l’age où, si l’on consulte les statistiques, 75% des rois sont déjà descendus dans la tombe. il sortait d’une longue oisiveté pour entrer dans la vie active a l’époque où, dans toutes les carrières et fonctions publiques, les hommes font valoir leurs droits à la retraite.
“s’il y avait un conseil de revision pour les rois, comme il y en a un pour les conscrits, il e?t été déclaré impropre au service.
[215]
“l’obésité déformait son corps, alourdissait sa marche, semblait, sous le développement des tissus adipeux, paralyser toute activité physique, toute force intellectuelle. sa figure, contractée par la douleur, trahissait, par moment, les souffrances qu’une volonté de fer s’efforcait de ma?triser, pour dissimuler aux yeux de ses sujets la maladie qui, à cet instant même, mena?ait sa vie.
“a voir sa corpulence maladive, on ne pouvait s’empêcher de se rappeler les paroles que shakespeare met dans la bouche d’un de ses ancêtres, à l’adresse du fameux falstaff, le compagnon dissolu des égarements de sa jeunesse: ’songe à travailler, a diminuer ton ventre et a grossir ton mérite—quitte ta vie dissolue! regarde la tombe, elle ouvre, pour toi, une bouche trois fois plus large que pour les autres hommes!’
“de tous c?tés, les lanceurs de prédictions, depuis le fameux archange gabriel jusqu’à la non moins fameuse mme. de thèbes, s’accordaient pour entourer son avènement des plus sinistres prévisions, pour annoncer sa fin prochaine et l’imminence d’une nouvelle vacance du tr?ne d’angleterre.
“sympt?me plus grave! les oracles de la science n’étaient pas moins mena?ants que les prophéties des devins. deux fois, les pompes de son couronnement durent être décommandées, deux fois les fêtes ajournées et les lampions éteints. les h?tes princiers, convoqués a grands frais de tous les points du globe, pour participer à ces réjouissances, attendirent, dans l’angoisse, l’annonce d’une cérémonie plus lugubre.
“la volonté d’edouard vii triumpha de toutes ces résistances. il déclara avec une indomptable énergie que, co?te que co?te, il était décidé a ne pas descendre dans la tombe avant d’avoir posé sur sa tête, avec tout l’éclat, avec toute la solennité traditionnels, aux yeux des représentants émerveillés de tout son vaste empire, aux yeux de l’univers jaloux, la couronne de ses pères, sa double couronne de roi et d’empereur, que les mains avides de la mort semblaient vouloir lui disputer.”
his account of edward vii reads curiously to-day, the[216] more so when we recall the fact that m. emile flourens was at one time french minister of foreign affairs, and that, at the moment when the book first appeared, the king was frequently in paris, and on good terms with republicans of all sections.
after pointing out how scrupulously he had as prince of wales suppressed his political opinions, during his mother’s lifetime, even when his power, had he exerted it, might have been advantageous to his country, the french critic gives him full credit for having made the best of his life in many ways. he had travelled all over the world, had studied humanity and society in all shapes, had “warmed both hands before the fire of life” in every quarter of the globe. but, though his features as a private personage were familiar to everybody, he remained a sphinx, mysterious and unfathomable, even to his friends, in public affairs. he was well known to parisians everywhere, and was as popular in working-class centres as in the most aristocratic salons. paris was, in fact, the only city where he was at his ease and at home, where, in fact, he was himself. by far the most sympathetic briton to parisians who ever was in paris, he exercised a real influence over all classes. they were kept carefully informed as to his tastes, his manners, his intimates, his vices and his debts, and were the more friendly to him on account of them. the warmest partisans of his accession, however, were his creditors, who were mortally afraid that his habits would not give him the opportunity for discharging his liabilities out of his mother’s accumulations.
the description of the position of the british empire at the close of the boer war was less flattering even than the personal sketch of its king and emperor. “at this moment the astounded peoples had felt the britannic colossus totter on its foundation, this colossus with feet of clay which weighs down too credulous nations by its bluff, by its arrogance, by rapine, by insatiable rapacity, which already grips the entire globe like a gigantic cuttle-fish and sucks its marrow through the numberless tentacles of its commerce, until the day when it shall subjugate the whole planet to its domination—always provided[217] that it does not encounter on its way another still more powerful octopus of destruction which will attack and destroy it.”
needless to say that this challenger of the british supremacy was the rising power of germany. as an englishman i admit the infamy of the boer war, and recognise that our rule in india and ireland has been anything but what it ought to have been. m. clemenceau knew all that as well as we british anti-imperialists do. but even in 1907-8 much had happened since 1900. democracy was slowly making way in great britain likewise, and freedom for others would surely follow emancipation for herself. it was not to be expected that all frenchmen should see or understand this. a nation which has under its flag a fourth of the population and more than a seventh of the habitable surface of the world can scarcely expect that another colonial country, whose colonies the british have largely appropriated, in the east and in the west, will admit the “manifest destiny” of the union jack to wave of undisputed right over still more territory. there was a good deal to be said, and a good deal was said, about british greed and british unscrupulousness: nor could the truth of many of the imputations be honestly denied.
it called, therefore, for all edward vii’s extraordinary knowledge of paris, his bonhomie, shrewd common sense, and uncanny power of “creating an atmosphere” to overcome the prejudice thus created against himself as a master of intrigue, and clemenceau as his willing tool. matters went so far that at one moment the king’s reception in his favourite capital seemed likely to be hostile, and might have been so, but for the admirable conduct of the high-minded, conservative patriot, m. déroulède. but, luckily for france, great britain and the world at large, these difficulties had been overcome; and almost the only good feature in the trouble with morocco was the vigorous diplomatic help france received from england—a good feature because it helped to wipe away the bitter memories of the past from the minds of the french people. the extremely cordial reception of president fallières and m. clemenceau in[218] london, and the king’s own exceptional courtesy at all times to m. delcassé, whom the french public regarded as the victim of german dictatorial demands, tended in the same direction. all the world could see that clemenceau’s administration had so far strengthened the anglo-french entente as to have brought it almost to the point of an alliance: nor thereafter was the triple entente with russia, as opposed to the triple alliance, very far off.
at this same time, however, matters were going so fast in germany towards an open breach that the only wonder is that the truth of the situation was not disclosed, and that germany, quite ready, and determined to be more ready, for war at any moment, was allowed to continue her policy of pretended peace.
england and, to a large extent, france still believed in the pacific intentions of the fatherland. yet a meeting was held in berlin of the heads of all the departments directly or indirectly connected with war, at which the kaiser delivered a speech which could only mean one thing: that germany and her allies would enter upon war so soon as the opportunity presented itself, and the preparations, including the completion of the kiel canal (or perhaps before that great work had been accomplished), gave promise of a short and decisive campaign. rumours of this address reached those who were kept informed as to what was being contemplated by the kaiser, his militarist junker entourage and the federal council. unfortunately, when the statement was challenged, a strong denial was issued, and the pacifists and pro-germans, honest and dishonest, laughed at the whole story as a baseless scare.
how far it was baseless could be learnt from deeds that spoke much louder than words. even thus early great accumulations of munitions of war were being made at cologne, and the military sidings and railway equipments, which could only serve for warlike and not commercial purposes, were being completed. six years before the war, all the work necessary for an aggressive descent on the west and for the passage through belgium had been done.
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europe was comfortably seated over a powder magazine. m. clemenceau might well discuss in london, when he came over to sir henry campbell-bannerman’s funeral, as premier of france, how many hundred thousand men, fully equipped for war, england could land within a fortnight in north-eastern france, should a sudden and unprovoked attack be made. but he got no satisfactory answer.
it is evident, therefore, that what with strikes, anarchist outbreaks, the troubles in morocco, the menacing attitude of germany—who, as clemenceau put it, said, “choose between england and us”—and the attempts to form an enduring compact with england, clemenceau as president of council, with all his energy, determination and versatility, had enough on his hands to occupy all his thoughts. but this did not exhaust the catalogue of his labours during his term of premiership.
