the army in north africa—1867–96
turn now from the southern portion of the dark continent to the northern. the researches of recent explorers, such as mr. stanley and others, had opened up the previously unknown interior to a much greater extent than had been effected before their exertions.
southern africa, as far as its white immigrant population was concerned, was extending its political limits northward. the congo free state was attempting to bring european civilisation down towards the equator. the ideas of “hinterland,” a preposterous notion, had been advanced. all nations were bent on pushing from the sea towards the rediscovered mountains of the moon. all europe was burning to get authority over some portion of the african coast-line, and every state, whether it had colonising power or not, burned to claim as much ground behind the surf-clad beach as it could get. but before this earth-hunger assumed the proportions it did, there had been trouble in the north-eastern portion of africa, though this case was rather one of national honour and prestige than desire for the extension of our “sphere of influence.”
a serious war-cloud had arisen in abyssinia, the forerunner of the many disturbances which by degrees have since led to the opening up of the heart of africa to commerce. abyssinia had seemed a promising field for our trade, and consul cameron was despatched there to represent the british government and protect as far as possible the missionaries who followed and preceded him. but theodoros, the negus, or emperor, was a man of violent passions, and375 both tyrannical and a drunkard. he fancied himself insulted because the british government took no notice of a letter he had addressed to the queen. he told consul cameron that she “can give you orders to visit my enemies, but she cannot return a civil answer to my letter to her.” so he quarrelled with his visitors, and threw them into prison. to save their lives, if possible, and avenge the insult to the nation through our representative, an expedition was fitted out under the command of sir robert napier. it was about 10,000 strong, and well equipped. it was largely composed of indian troops, stiffened by the 3rd dragoons, and the 4th, 26th, 33rd and 45th regiments of the line, with artillery and engineers.
the general plan of the campaign was simple; it was to release the prisoners, defeat the emperor if he would fight, and destroy his capital of magdala. the difficulties were regarded as mainly physical. the country was “a broken libyan highland. abyssinia is what a vaster switzerland would be, if transported to the tropics, and if bordered by blazing deserts on each flank of its cool rocky peaks.” the climate was reported good, the people warlike; their weapons were firearms, with shields and swords, or lances. they had no field artillery, but some heavy guns were reported to be at magdala. the landing was effected at zoola, where two companies of the 33rd were the first to get on shore, and pushed on to garrison the first dep?t or post at senafé, on the borders of the territory of king kassa of tigre, who readily agreed not to oppose, but to some extent assist, the invading army.
hard as the advanced party of engineers and pioneers worked at improving the road, the advance was slow and laborious. “we have scaled,” says henty, “mountains and descended precipices; we have traversed along the face of deep ravines, where a false step was death; we are familiar with smooth, slippery rock and with loose boulders; and after this expedition it can hardly be said that any country is impracticable for a determined army to advance. i hear, however, that between us and magdala there are perpendicular376 precipices running like walls for miles, places which could scarcely be scaled by experienced cragsmen, much less by loaded mules.” when within twenty-five miles in a direct line from magdala, and when the place was clearly visible, they had to make a detour of sixty miles to avoid these obstacles. but the valley of the bachelo was reached, and descending 3800 feet on one side by a fair road, the stream was forded, and the ascent of the opposite side of the enormous ravine was begun. on reaching the first level, fire was opened from the hill fortress, and a serious sortie was made by a large irregular mass of infantry and cavalry. the army was almost taken at a disadvantage. the nature of the country had tended to lengthen the column, and there were but few troops up to the front; but the naval brigade rocket-battery came into action, with the 4th, some engineers, two companies of the 10th native infantry and a squadron of the 3rd native cavalry had to bear the first brunt of the first battle. it was enough, however, and the fighting did not last long under the breechloading fire of the 4th, the first time the snider had been used in actual war. this disposed of one of the two bodies into which the enemy had been divided; the other made for the baggage defended by some of the 4th and the punjaubees, supported by the steel mountain battery of colonel penn, known therefore as the “steel pens,” and the abyssinian rush was checked by shell fire at 300 yards, and the deadly fire of the breechloading rifle. the enemy fell back badly beaten, while our own loss was only 30 men wounded and none killed. of about 5000 men who had rushed boldly to the attack of the head of the british column, the bulk were destroyed or dispersed, and the ground was covered with dead and wounded. the expenditure of ammunition was serious. in one hour nearly ninety rounds per man had been discharged.
the next day came the “easter monday review,” as the soldiers termed it, and the storm of theodore’s stronghold. scaling ladders were improvised from the bamboo dhooly-poles, and the handles of the pioneers’ axes. but they were not needed. the guns and rockets opened on the devoted377 fortress, and the storming column, formed of the 33rd, with major pritchard and the engineers in front, the 45th in support, and the remainder in reserve, pushed up the narrow path to the entrance. here, while efforts were made to break open the gate (for the powder required for the purpose had been forgotten), some of the 33rd managed to scramble up the side of the path, turned the flank of the defenders of the barrier, and when a second gate at the top of a steep flight of steps was destroyed, the place was taken. the loss had been most slight, but the vengeance taken on a bloodthirsty tyrant was complete. theodore himself committed suicide, his fortress was burned and destroyed, his queen died in our camp at senafé, and prince alamayu, his son, was taken to england. there he eventually became a cadet at the royal military college, sandhurst; and, dying of pneumonia in 1880, was buried, by royal command, just outside the royal chapel of st. george at windsor.
with further researches and interest in africa, and the greater enterprise resulting from them, came the desire for more possessions which would afford valuable outlets for our trade.
the finding of the sources of the nile, the discovery of the great lakes, the possibility of valuable gold-fields, the comparative healthiness of the african uplands in the interior, all emphasised again the future value of the great water way which drained those inland seas, and terminated in the egyptian delta. it is to some extent now, and might be one day fully made, the natural highway to the heart of the dark continent. directly or indirectly, politically or instinctively, possibly both, the value of egypt as the doorway to ethiopia became prominent. probably no statesman really saw it at first. but “there is a providence that shapes our ends, rough hew them how we will,” and the road to central africa from this side seems to be only opened by the sword.
so dismissing the eastern littoral and zanzibar, where the question of the penetration of the interior is far more a question of railways, so as to get over the fever belt, than378 one of soldiers, the land of egypt became a serious factor in the awakening of africa; as it was a serious factor in mediterranean politics when pharaoh was king. but the employment of the british army in egypt in 1884 rose from what most people would call a mere accident. it is possible that nothing is seriously “accidental.” but while british interference in egypt in the first years of the century was due entirely to our war with france, our present interference seems to have come from an instinctive feeling as to the importance of securing, and teaching egypt to improve, the one natural highway to the uplands of the centre of africa.
theoretical as this may be, the practical fact of our second interference in the land of egypt, by landing there, arose from a very simple cause. the khedive of egypt, prince tewfik, had made as his minister of war a turbulent and somewhat imperious soldier who aimed certainly at a species of military dictatorship, if not at the supreme power. beloved by the egyptian soldiery, and possessing some military knowledge, he posed as a patriot, with the cry of “egypt for the egyptians.” between mehemet ali and arabi there is but one difference. the former succeeded, the latter failed. nevertheless, such conduct, with such a people, tended in the direction of anarchy. anarchy might at any time endanger the security of the suez canal, in which great britain had an important pecuniary interest, and which was, moreover, her shortest and best route to her eastern possessions. both france and england claimed to have vital interests in the nile valley, and at first there was an apparent accord between the two nations, to the extent that a combined naval demonstration was made at alexandria. in this, however, the english ironclads very largely preponderated.
riots and massacres on shore at once broke out. the native press was bitterly hostile to england. nor was it likely to be otherwise. no self-respecting nation brooks foreign interference. neither of the powers most interested would have admitted for a second of time such interference379 at home; and egypt being too weak to offer a formidable resistance, only added bitterness to the native feeling of impotency. doubtless, only the most energetic sections of the people were seriously in earnest. the vast mass of the people, the fellahin, were certainly more anxious about their daily bread than political freedom. but so it is, and has been everywhere, in such popular revolts against foreign domination. the heaven-born leaders lead, by their very force of character; the mass follows. whether such revolutions are for the best, according to outside opinion, has nothing to do with the matter, except only as regards the extent to which political revolt affects foreign interests, which are mainly selfish.
all this the egyptian leaders may have felt; and, admitting the inherent corruption of all eastern governments, and even the ambition of those who seek to raise the storm, and not reap but guide the whirlwind, there is nothing extraordinary in the effort made by those who brought on the war against foreign interference to take the government of their own country out of the hands of stranger powers.
be all this as it may, it was decided by europe, nominally, to coerce the egyptians; euphuistically, to help the khedive against an armed and threatening insurrection. the bombardment of alexandria was decided on; but the french warships steamed out to sea, and refused to co-operate. the heavy fire of the ships soon silenced the shore batteries, and then the seamen and marines were landed to save what was left of the town from pillage. these were soon reinforced by battalions of infantry from malta.
preparations were at once made for the despatch of considerable reinforcements from home, and an indian contingent, among which were the seaforth highlanders and the 1st manchester regiment, was prepared for despatch from india to the seat of war. arabi made no effort to oppose the military occupation of alexandria, but contented himself with strongly fortifying the position at kafr ed dowr, the neck of land between lakes mareotis and aboukir bay.380 some desultory skirmishes then took place on the neutral ground between the city and the enemy’s lines.
the main expedition, under the command of lieutenant-general sir garnet wolseley, embarked in august 1884 for the front. it consisted of the first division under general willis, composed of the 2nd battalion grenadier, the 2nd coldstream, and the 1st scots guards, and the (18th) 2nd royal irish, the (84th) york and lancaster, and (87th) royal irish fusilier regiments, and the (50th) 1st west kent, with two squadrons of the 19th hussars, the (46th) duke of cornwall’s light infantry, and two batteries of artillery, with details. the second division, commanded by sir edward hamley, was formed of the 42nd, 75th, 79th, and 74th (or the royal, gordon, and cameron highlanders, with the highland light infantry), and the (35th) sussex, (88th) stafford, (49th) berkshire, and (53rd) shropshire light infantry, with two squadrons of the 10th hussars, the 3-60th, and two batteries of artillery, etc., as divisional troops. the cavalry brigade contained three squadrons of the household cavalry, and the 4th and 7th dragoon guards, with horse artillery, etc., under sir drury lowe. the corps-artillery under general goodenough had one battery of horse and three of field artillery. engineers and train were added in requisite proportion. an ironclad train was also used during the operations outside alexandria.
it was soon evident, however, that the frontal attack on the enemy’s fortified position would be costly and, even if successful, ineffective, as driving the egyptian army back on the capital, which it was necessary to seize. it was therefore decided to effect a change of base; and, while deceiving the enemy by openly proclaiming that the army was to be transferred to aboukir bay, to tranship the bulk of the force to ismailia, and move thence across the desert by the sweet-water canal on cairo. the several points on the suez canal were therefore suddenly and rapidly seized by the fleet; the seaforth highlanders, from india, advancing from suez, seized chalouffe, on the fresh water canal; and the bulk of the troops sailed for ismailia. in so381 doing, sir garnet, with a caution that in the conduct of so delicate an operation was entirely justifiable, left sir edward hamley, who took command of alexandria, in ignorance of what his real plan was, until after the fleet had sailed. the controversy as to whether this was right or not has, however, been warm and embittered.
the landing was rapidly accomplished, and after a brief delay the mounted troops, with the york and lancaster regiment and the royal marine light infantry, were pushed forward to magfar and tel el maskhuta, where a sharp skirmish took place with a force of all arms about 7000 strong, and two batteries. another took place the next day near mahsameh, and tel el maskhuta was occupied, with an advanced post at kassassin lock; behind these the army strung out along the line of the sweet-water canal, as a forward movement in force was not possible until sufficient stores had been collected in dep?ts well ahead, and this, under the conditions of the ground, was necessarily a slow operation.
while in this position the first “affair” of kassassin was fought, in which were engaged the royal marine artillery, the duke of cornwall’s light infantry, and the york and lancaster regiment, with a few cavalry and artillery; and one peculiarity was a krupp gun taken from the canal and mounted on a truck, and worked by a detachment of royal marine artillery under captain tucker. the royal marine light infantry arrived during the fight, and late in the evening the household cavalry and 7th dragoon guards came up from mahsameh and charged the egyptian left.
as stores were pushed to the front, so the first division became concentrated between maskhuta and kassassin; and on the 29th august, the highland brigade, under alison, was, with sir edward hamley, ordered to ismailia, leaving sir evelyn wood with his brigade at alexandria, to watch the kafr ed dowr lines until the conclusion of hostilities.
early in september reinforcements were despatched382 to strengthen alexandria and protect the direct line of communications from ismailia. here matters were still at a standstill, owing to the unavoidable difficulties of transport; and frequent reconnaissances, involving an occasional skirmish, were made towards tel el kebir, where the enemy were now known to be in strength and heavily entrenched. that this point was that in which a decisive battle for the possession of the delta might have to be fought, had been recognised before the expedition left england. on the 9th, arabi made his last offensive effort on both sides of the canal, bringing on the second battle of kassassin; and on this occasion the troops he brought from tel el kebir were reinforced by a force of five battalions from salahieh to the north; but the fighting was not severe and the loss on both sides insignificant, while in retiring, the egyptians abandoned three guns, two of which were taken by the royal marine light infantry.
the army was now concentrated within striking distance of the first objective, the defeat of the egyptian army under arabi. repeated reconnaissances had shown that in front of the village of tel el kebir was a long line of entrenchments, the right resting on the canal, the left, some four miles out en l’air in the desert. the desert, absolutely treeless, and without marked undulations, afforded absolutely no cover, and to cross the fire-swept approach against entrenched troops would have caused serious loss. sir garnet, therefore, decided on making a night march to get within charging distance, and thus inaugurated on a large scale the system of night attacks, which, as a distinguished soldier long since remarked, will, if properly prepared for and organised by a nation, cause it to win the next great war.
the ground favoured the operation, but the distance was not inconsiderable, and the danger of that unreasoning panic which sometimes seizes the best troops was always present. at anyrate, any man?uvring in the dark or the early dawn was out of the question. the army must383 march in the order in which it was going to fight, and therefore each battalion had one half in first and the other half in second line, either marching in line formation or in line of companies in column of fours at deploying interval, from which lines could speedily and readily be formed. extended order was not required for the rush into the entrenchments which the general planned. it was not to be a fire-action, but a shock-battle such as the peninsula saw.
formation of the line of battle at tel-el-kebir, 13th septr 1882.
willis’s first division was on the right, to it having been added the battalion of royal marine light infantry, the guards being in second line, and the cavalry and horse artillery on the right to sweep round the enemy’s flank and threaten his retreat. in the centre was goodenough’s artillery, acting both as a link to the two divisions, and yet separating them. if panic in one wing did occur, this might prevent its spreading to the other. on the left, the highland brigade was in first line, and sir edward hamley’s division, the other brigade of which was with wood at alexandria, was completed by a weak brigade under ashburnham, made of the duke of cornwall’s light infantry and the king’s royal rifles. in reserve were the royal marine artillery and 19th hussars; with the reserve ammunition was one company of the west kent; on the railway, the armoured train with a 40-pounder worked by bluejackets; the west kent guarded the stores at kassassin; and along the line of communication to ismailia were other troops. the army started at 1.30 a.m. on the early morning of the 13th september; the indian contingent, the seaforths leading, moving off on the other bank of the canal an hour later, so as not to alarm the inhabitants of the small hamlet on that side, and so give arabi earlier warning than need be of the impending attack. the total strength was about 11,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry, and 60 guns. halting for a few minutes at about 1000 yards from the enemy, the lines advanced, with the right, however, rather thrown back, and then suddenly a storm of fire ran along the long line of parapet,384 and when about 300 yards from it, with a wild cheer, the highland brigade began the storm. there was much stubborn fighting while it lasted, but in half an hour the enemy were beaten, and flying in hot haste and great disorder towards zagazig, pursued by the cavalry and the indian brigade. the battle had cost 9 officers and 48 men killed, with 27 officers and 385 men wounded or missing.
pushing on rapidly with the 4th dragoon guards and the indian cavalry, sir drury lowe seized cairo, and arabi surrendered. this practically ended the war, and on the very date fixed by sir garnet, before he left england, for its probable conclusion.
the isolated garrisons at tanta and elsewhere were disarmed, and when on the 17th it was found that the works at kafr ed dowr were deserted, they were occupied by the berkshire and shropshire regiments of sir evelyn wood’s brigade, which had been further strengthened by the manchester and derbyshire regiments. so the army returned home, leaving, besides artillery and the 7th dragoon guards and the 19th hussars, the (35th) sussex, (38th) stafford, (42nd) black watch, (49th) berkshire, (53rd) shropshire, the 3rd king’s royal rifles, the (74th) highland light infantry, (75th) gordons, and (79th) camerons as a garrison for cairo, and the 2nd (18th) royal irish, the (46th) duke of cornwall’s, and a wing of the (50th) west kent, to hold alexandria.
for the war a medal with clasp for tel el kebir was granted by the british government and a bronze star by the khedive; while numerous turkish and egyptian orders were distributed. sir garnet wolseley was made a peer, and the names, “egypt, 1882–84,” and “tel el kebir” were placed on the colours or appointments of the regiments which had served in this campaign.
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the reorganisation of the egyptian army was now commenced by british officers, and sir evelyn wood was its first sirdar; but this command was kept distinct from that of the british troops in the two great cities, which were under general stevenson.
385 meanwhile, trouble had long been brewing in the sudan, which had been originally conquered by mehemet ali. there were many insurrections of more or less importance, and the people were ripe for still more serious revolt. the advent of mohammed ahmed, the son of abdullah the carpenter and amina his wife, whose name, therefore, agreed with those of the parents of the prophet, as the expected mahdi, whose mission it was to convert the whole world, gave the opportunity, and one in which religious fanaticism was added to patriotism. there were many small skirmishes, with varying success, at first; but still the movement increased, and soon el obeid was captured, hicks pasha, with about 7000 men, was totally defeated, and his army practically destroyed. next general gordon was appointed governor-general of the sudan and took up his residence at khartum, and a further advance of the mahdieh resulted in the fall of berber and the investment of the capital of the sudan.
then it was that serious preparation for its relief by a british army was seriously undertaken. as far back as april 1884, lord wolseley had considered that general gordon could not hold out later than the 15th november. the nature of the opposition to be expected had, however, been already tested in the independent series of operations that long took place around suakin on the red sea littoral. suakin was the port to berber, but between the two places was an almost waterless desert, inhabited by hostile tribes of the greatest bravery.
the fighting there had commenced this way. a slave trader, osman digna by name, had heard of the mahdi’s success, and saw an opportunity of a revolt of his own with the warlike sept of the hadendowas. he invested sinkat, which fell, and its garrison was massacred. he threatened both tokar and suakin, and when to relieve the former baker pasha marched out from trinkitat with nearly 4000 egyptians, he was badly beaten, for the troops showed no fight at all. this aroused the attention of the home authorities. a british force was formed, under sir g. graham, and moved386 from trinkitat, defeating the sheikhs at el teb, taking six guns and a gatling, and killing 2100 men; but tokar had already fallen. the troops engaged were the 19th and 10th hussars, the black watch, gordon highlanders, the royal irish fusiliers, the york and lancaster regiments, the royal marine light infantry, with a naval brigade and some artillery. they advanced in a hollow square, the gordons leading; and, leaving detachments at trinkitat and fort baker (at the end of the causeway across the salt marsh that nearly surrounds the town), the small army moved against the arabs entrenched around the wells of el teb. the fighting was severe and desperate, but discipline and weapons soon told. the enemy’s guns were abandoned, and one taken by the royal marine artillery was manned by the men under captain tucker and turned on the enemy, who fled finally towards tokar. the loss to the british force had been 22 officers and 167 men killed and wounded.
after marching to tokar, the force returned to suakin, and as osman digna had collected a large force some miles outside the town, it was again decided to disperse them. sir g. graham formed the small army in two squares: that on the left, which led, under general davis, had its front and flank faces formed by the royal highlanders and the york and lancaster regiments, with the royal marines in the rear face, and the naval brigade with gatlings in the centre; on the right rear, echeloned, was general buller’s brigade, having the gordon highlanders and the royal irish fusiliers in the front and flank faces, and the king’s royal rifles in rear, inside being the 7-pounder guns. the squares were about 1000 yards apart, and between them was a battery of 9-pounders, while the left flank was covered by the hussars.
the enemy was met with in the deep ravine, or “khor,” of tamai, and early opened a brisk fire. replying with a needlessly hot fire, which enveloped the troops in smoke, the square of general davis made a rush with the front face and breaking up its close formation, the arabs rushed into the gaps between the front and flank faces. for a time it was387 a scene of wild confusion. the british, fighting steadily still, with bullet and steel, fell back in some disorder, abandoning the guns, but they soon rallied, and the advance of the other square enabled it to re-form. the edge of the ravine was reached, and the leading square crossed it, with a cheer, to occupy osman digna’s camp, and disperse such of the enemy as were still there. thirteen officers and 208 men had been killed and wounded on the attacking side.
little was done after this for a while. the force returned to suakin, and afterwards occupied and burned the village of tamaneb with little opposition. then the bulk of the troops were withdrawn, leaving the 3rd king’s royal rifles and a battalion of royal marines to garrison suakin.
the nile expedition for the relief of gordon had now begun, and it was still, for a while, designed to take berber and advance thence on khartum. to communicate with the coast at suakin from berber was evidently advisable, but the district was almost waterless, and a railway was of primary importance. furthermore, the destruction of osman digna’s power there was essential to its construction, let alone that to attack him would effect a useful diversion, and weaken the dervish strength which might otherwise collect in the nile valley.
a second expedition was hence despatched to suakin under sir g. graham. it consisted of a guards brigade (3rd grenadiers, 1st coldstream, and 2nd scots), and a second brigade of the 2nd east surrey, 1st shropshire light infantry, 1st berkshire, and royal marines, with two squadrons 5th lancers, two of the 20th hussars, some mounted infantry, royal engineers, and three batteries of artillery. in addition, there was a strong indian contingent and a volunteer force from new south wales.
the enemy was known to be at tamai, to the south-west, and at hasheen to the west of the town, and by the latter the railway, which was to be made by english contractors, was to run. the first move, therefore, was the defeat of the force at hasheen, and for this purpose the whole force, with the exception of the shropshire light infantry, marched388 and formed in one square, of which the front face was held by the marines and berkshire regiment (the surrey was detached to cover a working party on some hills to the right front), the left flank by the indian brigade, and the right by the guards. the rear was open, and the artillery, and the camel transport occupied the centre. the operations resulted in the temporary dispersion of the hadendowas, with a loss on our side of 9 officers and men killed and 39 wounded. throughout the enemy displayed the most reckless bravery, and an utter indifference to death.
it was now necessary to attack osman digna’s main force at tamai, and for this purpose it was intended to establish an intermediate post on the road to that place, as one had been made at hasheen. the force detailed to cover the work was under sir j. m’neill, and, made up of the indian contingent, one squadron of the 5th lancers, with the berkshire regiment, the royal marines, etc., was formed into two squares. on reaching the open space of tofrik, a zareba was commenced, the two angles of which were held by the berkshires and marines in two squares, while the indian contingent formed a large rectangle in between, covering the huge mass of camels and transport.
the mimosa bush was very dense, and little could be seen even by the cavalry, who were pushed out en vedette in front. while in some confusion a sudden attack was made by the enemy. crawling under the low trees until within charging distance, they reached the squares in small groups with their usual headlong gallantry. so fierce was the assault that the 17th native infantry broke, and for a while, with stampeded animals rushing to and fro, and with the mahdieh cutting and stabbing in all directions, matters looked grave. but determined courage and discipline at length triumphed, and the enemy sullenly withdrew, leaving behind him 1500 dead. the loss on our side was 150 officers, men, and camp followers killed, 148 missing, and 174 wounded, in a fight that lasted just twenty minutes.
the remaining operations around suakin have little interest. tamai was reached, and found to be abandoned;389 and numerous petty skirmishes occurred in protecting the construction of the railway, which was getting near handub. but with the eventual abandonment of the nile expedition that of suakin followed. on the 17th may the troops commenced to withdraw. they had had a severe time of it, with the thermometer at 120° in the tents, and constant disturbances night after night from the enemy. he was by no means to be despised. he combined the courage of the fanatic who saw heaven in view if he fell in battle with the infidel, with the most determined physical bravery. few men want more killing than those arabs of the sudan. no one has added them up better than rudyard kipling when he says—
“’e rushes at the smokes when we let drive, an’, before we know, ’e’s ’ackin’ at our ’ead; ’e’s all ’ot sand and ginger when alive, an’ ’e’s generally shammin’ when ’e’s dead.
’e’s a daisy, ’e’s a ducky, ’e’s a lamb, ’e’s a injia-rubber idiot on the spree; ’e’s the on’y thing that doesn’t give a d—n for a regiment o’ british infantree!
so ’ere’s to you, fuzzy-wuzzy, at your ’ome in the soudan. you’re a pore benighted ’eathen, but a fust-class fightin’ man; an’ ’ere’s to you, fuzzy-wuzzy, with your ’ayrick ’ead of ’air, you big black boundin’ beggar—for you broke a british square!”
to commemorate the services of the army in this portion of the theatre of war, clasps for suakin 1885, el teb, tamai, and tofrik, were given with the ordinary egyptian war medal.
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but a more important series of operations had been taking place at the same time as these troublesome affairs on the shores of the red sea. the relief of gordon had, after fatal delays and indecision on the part of the government, been, with apparent reluctance, decided on, and in supreme command was placed lord wolseley. notwithstanding that many authorities advocated the suakin-berber line of approach, he, throughout, had resolutely insisted that390 the nile valley was the only practicable way of reaching the sudan, because of the difficulties both of roads and water supply.
lord wolseley arrived in cairo on the 9th september, and proceeded to organise the concentration of a sufficiently powerful force about korti and ambigol (south of dongola), whence one, “the river” column, could be despatched to seize berber, assisted to some extent by the force operating at suakin against osman digna, and the other, the “desert” column, could make its way across the bayuda desert, by a known track way indifferently furnished with water, to metemmeh on the nile opposite shendy, and about midway between berber and khartum.
a camel force had also been formed, and was divided into four parts, the heavy camel regiment (from the household and seven other cavalry regiments), the light (made up of detachments of light cavalry men), the guards (from the brigade, and to which the royal marines were attached), and the mounted infantry camel regiment (men selected from different line regiments).
the general plan of the desert march was to form posts at the wells of howeryat, jakdul, and abu klea, and seize metemmeh, forming at the same time a strong dep?t at jakdul. the first move was made at 3 a.m. on the 30th december, and jakdul was occupied, garrisoned, and the camels returned for stores, etc., but it was the 8th january before the force definitely started on its mission. it was composed of a naval brigade under lord charles beresford, one squadron 19th hussars, the guards, heavy and mounted infantry camel regiments (the light was employed chiefly in guarding convoys), half battery royal artillery, royal engineers, 400 men of the royal sussex regiment (of whom 150 were to be left at jakdul), one company of the essex regiment for the howeryat post, with “details”; in all about 120 officers and 1900 men, exclusive of natives, camel-drivers, etc. the whole was under the command of sir herbert stewart. the force left jakdul at 2 p.m. on the 14th january, and on the 16th got touch of the enemy near391 abu klea wells, but too late for fighting that day. at 9 a.m. the following day, square was formed with camels in the centre, the front angles being formed by the mounted infantry, the guards camel regiment, with the artillery between, and the rear angles by the heavy camel regiment and the royal sussex regiment, with the naval brigade in the middle of the rear face. the cavalry were left free to act outside; the sick and baggage were left in a zareba guarded by some of the royal sussex; and the square, covered by skirmishers, then advanced against the enemy’s line, which was some half mile long, and marked by flags. though the skirmishers helped to check the enemy’s fire, which had already caused casualties, they were in the way of the defensive power when the arab rush was made. it was executed with “lightning rapidity, and into gaps formed by the lagging back of the camels the arab spearmen poured. the fight was sharp and desperate.” within the square the din of battle was such that no words of command could be heard, and each man was obliged to act on the impulse of the moment. the enemy’s “formation was curious, a sort of variety of the old phalanx. it was as if there were portions of three phalanxes, with rows of men behind. at the head of each rode an emir or sheikh with a banner, accompanied by personal attendants, and then came the fighting men. they advanced at a quick, even pace, as if on parade.” and this before the breechloading fire! the “fine old sheikh on horseback,” who planted his banner in the middle of the broken square, had advanced “with his banner in one hand and his book of prayers in the other.” he “never swerved to the right or left, and never ceased chanting his prayers until he had planted his banner in our square.” such bravery is worthy of all admiration, and well may sir charles wilson say, “if any man deserved a place in the moslem paradise, he did.” it was sheer hard hand-to-hand work for a brief space, and then the square re-formed, with its late antagonists falling suddenly back, leaving only their dead. short as the affair was, 9 officers and 65 men were killed, and 9 officers and 85 men wounded;392 a serious loss. on the other hand, 1100 arab dead were counted near the square, and their loss in wounded too was severe. before moving on, a small fort was built here to contain the wounded, guarded by 100 men of the royal sussex, and when this was completed, sir herbert marched at 4 p.m. on the 18th for abu kru. the guide was one ali loda, a local freebooter. but night marches, however advisable under such conditions as tel el kebir, are bad with wearied men. the soldiers in this case were exhausted, and did not get within measurable distance of the river, so that between them and water lay the arab host. laager was then formed to protect the transport; and was garrisoned by some of the heavies, the 19th hussars, the artillery and naval brigade. then the square moved toward the enemy, not without skirmishes, and while halting for breakfast the enemy’s fire increased, and sir herbert received the wound which afterwards proved fatal. at 3 p.m. the advance was resumed, and the arabs charged as before. but the men were cooler than in the previous action, and none of the enemy got within 100 yards of the square, and in five minutes the arabs broke and fled. thereupon the wearied british reached the wished-for stream and bivouacked. the loss had been 1 officer and 22 men killed, and 8 officers and 90 men wounded.
sir c. wilson was now in chief command, and made a reconnaissance in force of metemmeh; but he judged that to storm it would be both costly and inadvisable, and therefore returned to the zareba at gubat, to meet the egyptian government steamers from khartum. then ensued a brief delay, necessary to make arrangements for the security of the camp, and also because of the general exhaustion of the men. sir charles, therefore, first proceeded down stream beyond metemmeh, to ensure that there was no force advancing from the north in addition to what might be reasonably expected to arrive from the south, and then turned back, halting for a while at gubat, and finally reached the immediate neighbourhood of khartum, to find that all was over. it393 had fallen, and gordon had been killed; so, running the gauntlet of guns and rifles, the small flotilla returned to gubat, but both steamers were sunk and a fresh one had to be sent up. the story of this adventure well merited the telegram received by sir charles at korti from the secretary of state for war: “express warm recognition of government of brilliant services of sir charles wilson and satisfaction at gallant rescue of his party.”70
on his return from khartum, he started for korti, and on his report, sir r. buller was despatched to take command of the desert column, which was to be reinforced by the royal irish and west kent regiments; but it was soon afterwards decided to abandon the effort to crush the power of the mahdi, and the small army withdrew by degrees to korti, with but little molestation on the way. during the march, however, sir herbert stewart succumbed to his wound, and was buried near jakdul. like his namesake, who had been with gordon and was murdered when going down the river at hebbeh, his loss to the army was serious. “what an ill-fated expedition this has been!” writes sir c. wilson. “the whole sudan is not worth the lives of men like gordon and the two stewarts.”
in the meantime, the river column had been pushing on, and had its tale to tell. under the command of general earle, it was made up of one squadron 19th hussars, the south staffordshire regiment, the duke of cornwall’s light infantry, the black watch, and the gordon highlanders, with some egyptian artillery and camel corps, etc. the essex regiment was, at first, to hold the line of communication of this force between merowi and abu hamed, but the idea had to be abandoned.
the force marched on the 24th, the mounted troops by land, the remainder in the boats, and there was a small skirmish at berti; but on the news of the fall of khartum, the force halted for further orders near dulka island; and while there, news was received that the enemy, some 1500394 strong, had advanced out of the shukuk pass and taken up a position at kirbekan.
as it was still determined to seize berber, in which operation it was proposed, if possible, to employ the remains of the desert column, general earle was directed to push on again; and, finding the enemy still blocking the road to abu hamed, whence there is a track across the desert to korosko, he turned the enemy’s left flank and attacked him in flank and rear. the battle was mainly a fire-action, there being only one partial charge of the arab spearmen; and with the charge of the highlanders, pipes playing, the enemy were turned out of the rocky hill land on which they were posted, and at the very end of the fight, general earle was killed, with 2 other officers and 7 men, while 4 officers and 43 men were wounded. the troops engaged had been the staffordshire regiment, black watch, egyptian camel corps, and the artillery. on the 20th february, however, the column, now commanded by general h. brackenbury, was recalled, in accordance with the decision to attempt no further operations until after the hot season. but even this plan was given up by orders from home; and on the 11th may, lord wolseley was ordered to withdraw the troops from the sudan. this was successfully effected, but, as might be expected, the arab leaders pushed on. kassala was occupied by osman digna from suakin, and dongola by the mahdieh from khartum. near this, the town of kosheh was invested, and the small action of ginnis was fought in december 1885, the last skirmish of the first sudan war. throughout, the enormous physical and administrative difficulties had been successfully met; the conduct of the men, both in battle and on the march, left nothing to be desired. that lord wolseley and the expedition failed in their primary object of relieving khartum and saving gordon’s life was no fault of theirs. they did all that men could, and the blame rests only on the head of a weak government, that could not make up its mind until it was too late. yet “the siege of khartum lasted for three hundred and seventeen days—only nine less395 than the great siege of sebastopol, in which general gordon first saw active service. for more than ten months the wild tribes of the sudan were kept in check by the genius, the indomitable resolution, and fertile resources of one man; and, long after the controversies of the present day have been forgotten, the defence of khartum by general gordon will be looked on as one of the most memorable military achievements of modern times.”71
a medal was given for the campaign, with clasps for kirbekan, abu klea, and abu kru; and the rank of viscount was bestowed on the commander-in-chief of the two expeditions, those of the nile and suakin. never was honour more justly bestowed.
