introduction

by

field-marshal earl roberts, v.c., k.g.

i have read with the greatest interest mr. childers’s illuminating book “war and the arme blanche.” my opinion of the subject with which it deals is already so well known throughout the army that i need not labour to say how entirely i agree with the author’s main thesis; indeed, anyone who will take the trouble to read “cavalry training” (1904), will see that i anticipated the arguments which he has so ably developed. this being so, it is not surprising that i should view the regulations laid down in “cavalry training” (1907), with some concern.

let us consider briefly what the history of this question—the comparative value of steel weapons and firearms for cavalry in war—is. until within the last few years our lancer regiments depended entirely on the lance and sword, while other cavalry regiments depended almost entirely on the sword.[1] this was inevitable because of the inaccuracy and short range of the smooth-bore carbine. tentative changes were made when rifled arms viwere adopted, but it is only within the last thirty years that lancer regiments have had any firearm given to them save a pistol.[2] with such an equipment and such traditions it was perhaps but natural that the training of cavalry should have been almost exclusively devoted to shock tactics and the use of the arme blanche.

but why now, with a different equipment, should cavalry still be trained on the old tradition, and their rifles reside in buckets attached to the horse, only to be used on certain exceptional occasions to “supplement the sword or lance”? (“cavalry training,” sec. 142.)

the late colonel henderson, in his essay on the tactical employment of cavalry, “science of war,” chapter iii., page 51, pointed out that, notwithstanding the introduction of gunpowder, the cavalry was the arm that had undergone the least change. he went on to say that “shock-tactics, the charge, and the hand-to-hand encounter are still the one ideal of cavalry action; and the power of man?uvring in great masses, maintaining an absolute uniformity of pace and formation, and moving at the highest speed with accurately dressed ranks, is the criterion of excellence.” he added: “to such an extent has this teaching been carried out, that the efficiency of the individual, especially in those duties which are performed by single men or small parties, cannot fairly be said to have received due attention.”

after explaining how cromwell’s troopers “were taught the value of co-operation,” and how “cromwell built up his cavalry on a foundation of high individual efficiency,” he goes on to show that, “as time went on and armies became larger, and skill at arms, as a national characteristic, rarer, drill, discipline, man?uvre in mass, and a high degree of mobility came to outweigh all other viiconsiderations; and when the necessity of arming the nations brought about short service, the training of the individual, in any other branch of his business than that of riding boot-to-boot and of rendering instant obedience to the word or signal of his superior, fell more and more into abeyance. shock-tactics filled the entire bill, and the cavalry of europe, admirably trained to man?uvre and attack, whether by the squadron of 150 sabres, or the division of 3,000 or 4,000, was practically unfitted for any other duty. the climax of incompetency may be said to have been reached during the cycle of european warfare, which began with the crimea, and ended with the russo-turkish conflict of 1877–78. the old spirit of dash and daring under fire was still conspicuous, discipline and mobility were never higher. the regiments man?uvred with admirable precision at the highest speed, and never had great masses of horsemen been more easily controlled. and yet, in the whole history of war, it may be doubted whether the record of the cavalry was ever more meagre.”

referring specially to the german cavalry during the war of 1870–71, henderson says: “the troopers knew nothing whatever of fighting on foot—their movements were impeded by their equipment--and a few francs-tireurs, armed with the chassepot, were enough to paralyze a whole brigade.... in fact, to the student who follows out the operations of the cavalry of 1870–71 step by step, and who bears in mind its deficiencies in armament and training, it will appear very doubtful whether a strong body of mounted riflemen of the same type as the boers, or better still, of sheridan’s or stuart’s cavalry in the last years of the war of secession, would not have held the german horsemen at bay from the first moment they crossed the frontier.”

“had the successes gained by shock-tactics been very numerous, it might possibly be argued that the sacrifice viiiof efficiency in detached and dismounted duties, as well as the training of the individual, was fully justified. what are the facts?” after enumerating the successes gained by shock-tactics from the days of the crimea onwards, when anything larger than a regiment was engaged, henderson adds: “such is the record: one great tactical success gained at custozza: a retreating army saved from annihilation at k?niggr?tz,[3] and five minor successes which may or may not have influenced the ultimate issue. not one single instance of an effective and sustained pursuit; not one single instance—except custozza, and there the infantry was armed with muzzle-loaders—of a charge decisive of the battle; not one single instance of infantry being scattered and cut down in panic flight; not one single instance of a force larger than a brigade intervening at a critical moment. and how many failures? how often were the cavalry dashed vainly in reckless gallantry against the hail of a thin line of rifles! how often were great masses held back inactive, without drawing a sabre or firing a shot, while the battle was decided by the infantry and the guns! how few the enterprises against the enemy’s communications! how few men killed or disabled, even when cavalry met cavalry in the mêlée! can it be said in face of these facts that the devotion to shock-tactics, the constant practice in massed movements, the discouragement of individualism, both in leaders and men, was repaid by results? does it not rather appear that there was some factor present on the modern battle-field which prevented the cavalry, trained to a pitch hitherto unknown, from reaping the same harvest as the horsemen of previous eras? was not the attempt to apply the same principles to the battle of the breech-loader ixand the rifled cannon, as had been applied successfully to the battles of the smooth-bore, a mistake from beginning to end; and should not the cavalry, confronted by new and revolutionary conditions, have sought new means of giving full effect to the mobility which makes it formidable?”[4]

since colonel henderson, no one has dealt so exhaustively and so logically with this aspect of cavalry in war as mr. childers. he has gone thoroughly into the achievements of our cavalry in south africa. it has been said that this war was abnormal, but are not all wars abnormal? as, however, it was the first war in which magazine rifles were made use of, and as the weapon used in future wars is certain to be even more effective, on account of the lower trajectory and automatic mechanism about to be introduced, shall we not be very unwise if we do not profit by the lessons we were taught at such a heavy cost during that war?

these, then, are mr. childers’s conclusions in reviewing the period from the beginning of the campaign up to march, 1900:

"widening our horizon to include the whole area of the war at this period, we perceive that cavalry theory, so far as it was based on the arme blanche, had collapsed. the only and not especially remarkable achievement of that weapon is the pursuit at elandslaagte on the second day of hostilities. everywhere else we have seen it directly or indirectly crippling the cavalry, and the greater the numbers employed and the larger the measure of independence permitted, the more unmistakable is the weakness. when the cavalry succeed strategically, xas in the ride to kimberley and back to paardeberg, they succeed in spite of disabilities traceable to arme blanche doctrine. when they succeed tactically, as in the colesberg operations, and in containing cronje’s force on the eve of paardeberg, they succeed through the carbine, in spite of its inferiority as a weapon of precision. in tactical offence, the paramount raison d’être of the arme blanche, they fail, and in reconnaissance they fail."

with every word of this i agree, and it must be remembered that my judgment is based upon personal and first-hand knowledge. why did our cavalry fail? because they did not know, because they had never been required to know, how to use the principal and most useful weapon with which they were armed. because they did not understand, because they had never been asked to understand, that their r?le should consist in attacking the enemy “exactly like the infantry,[5] and to shoot their way up to him.”[6]

in this matter of shooting their way up to their enemy, cavalry possess great advantages owing to their mobility. general french’s admirable movement at klip drift was essentially a rapid advance of fighting men carried out at extended intervals. it was a rapid advance of warriors who possessed the ability, by means of horses and rifles (not swords or lances), to place their enemy hors de combat. it was an ideal cavalry operation, but it was not a “cavalry charge,” as this term is generally understood, and the arme blanche had nothing to say to it.

xiin the preface to “cavalry training” (1904), i laid down that such an operation was sound in principle. i went farther—i encouraged it—and there is no doubt that on many occasions such an advance will have a far greater effect than a methodical advance on foot. but, such an advance must be essentially a rapid advance of fighting men armed with rifles, and the threat lies in the power of the rifle.

in the same preface i pointed out that the rifle, which “will chiefly be required when dismounted, must be carried on the person of the soldier himself.” the necessity for this was brought very prominently to my notice during the fight in the chardeh valley, near kabul, on december 11, 1879. on that occasion more than forty carbines were lost by the 9th lancers, two weak squadrons of which regiment, numbering only 213 men, took part in the engagement. partly owing to the rough nature of the ground, and partly to the enemy’s fire, several horses fell, and before the men could disengage the carbines from the buckets the afghans were upon them. without their firearms the dismounted cavalry were quite helpless, and it was a sorry spectacle to behold these men, with their swords dangling between their legs and impeding their movements, while they vainly endeavoured to defend themselves with their lances. this incident confirmed the experience i had gained in the mutiny as to the necessity for the firearm being attached to the man instead of to the horse, and i at once issued orders for this change to be made, and for the sword—which is only required to be used when the soldier is mounted—to be carried on the saddle.

the strongest opposition to these alterations was made by cavalry officers in this country, and it was not until 1891—twelve years after it had been adopted in afghanistan—that sanction was accorded to the men’s swords being carried on the saddles. eleven years more had to pass xiibefore officers were authorized (army order, june 1, 1902) to have their swords similarly carried. but the rifle is still being carried on the horse, and, if this arrangement is not changed, the result will certainly be that, if a man gets upset and separated from his horse in a fight, he will have neither sword nor rifle with which to defend himself. this is not the case in india, where the rifle, supported by a small bucket, is attached to the man, so that when he dismounts the rifle goes with him.[7]

i trust that thirty years will not again be allowed to elapse before we take to heart and act upon the main lesson to be learned from the boer and russo-japanese wars, and in a lesser degree from every war that has taken place since the introduction of breech-loading arms. that lesson is, that knee to knee, close order charging is practically a thing of the past. there may be, there probably will be, mounted attacks, preferably in open order, against cavalry caught unawares, or against broken infantry. but, after reading mr. childers’s book, backed by my own practical experience, i am driven to the conclusion that the only possible logical deduction from the history of late wars is, that all attacks can now be carried out far more effectually with the rifle than with the sword.

at the same time i do not go so far as the author in thinking that the sword should be done away with altogether. it is desirable that cavalry soldiers, equally with their comrades in the infantry, should have a steel weapon of some kind for use in the assault by night, in a mist, or on other occasions when a fire-fight might be impossible or inadvisable. instead, however, of the present sword, the cavalry soldier would be more suitably equipped with a sword-bayonet for fixing on the rifle when xiiifighting on foot—something like that with which our rifle regiments were formerly armed—but made with a substantial handle, large enough to be firmly gripped, so that in the event of its being required it could be used on horseback as well as on foot. this sword-bayonet must, of course, be attached to the man.

the two essentials of cavalry in the present day are mobility and the power to use the rifle with effect. unless cavalry is mobile it is practically useless, as is proved over and over again in the pages of this book. it is by saving their horses in every possible way, and by skill in the use of the rifle, that cavalry soldiers can hope to carry out properly the many important functions required of them in advance of, at a distance from, and in conjunction with, the main army. further, as the rifle is the weapon which will enable cavalry to be of the most real value in co-operating with the other arms on the actual field of battle, cavalry soldiers must not only be good shots, but they must be taught how to fight as infantry.

owing to the enormous increase in recent years in the numbers which now constitute a modern army, the strategical area in which cavalry will have to operate must inevitably be of considerable extent. owing also to the increased size of armies on the actual battle-field, and to the extended formations necessitated by the long-reaching effect of modern weapons, the strain upon the cavalry horses is infinitely greater than in former days, and unless men are taught to take every possible care of their horses, cavalry will be unable to co-operate with the other arms when their services are most urgently needed—perhaps at a critical period of the fight—or to follow up and harass a retreating enemy.

it is impossible to over-estimate the value of cavalry—trained as i should wish to see them trained—under the existing conditions of war. it is cavalry that carries out xivthe preliminary operations. it is frequently due to the information gained by cavalry that a commander is enabled to make, or alter, his plan of action. it may often happen that cavalry may help to decide the issue of a battle. it is by cavalry that the fruits of a successful action are most completely reaped. and it is to the cavalry that the army will look to save a retreat being turned into a rout or a disaster.

it is for these reasons, and because cavalry is so frequently required to act alone, and often in quite small parties, at a considerable distance from the main force, that all ranks need the most careful training. the men should be intelligent and trustworthy; they require to have their wits about them even in a greater degree than other soldiers, for a single cavalry soldier may at times have great responsibility thrown upon him. the officers should possess all the qualities of good sportsmen. they should be fine riders, careful horse-masters, have a keen eye for country, and be thoroughly well educated.[8]

in some recently written books on cavalry great stress is laid on the necessity for inculcating the “true cavalry spirit,” and on the idea that “shock action alone gives decisive results.” i cannot call to mind one single instance during the last half-century—ever since, indeed, arms of precision have been brought into use—when shock action alone has produced decisive results, and i doubt whether shock action, or, in other words, the arme blanche alone, will ever again be able to bring about such results against a highly trained enemy armed with magazine rifles. i confess i cannot follow the xvtrain of thought which insists upon cavalry requiring a “spirit” for “shock action,” and a spirit different, it is presumed, to the soldierly spirit which it is essential for the other arms to possess if they are to behave with resolution and courage on the field of battle.

it is this soldierly spirit, which can only be produced by discipline and thorough training, that animates the engineers to carry out the extremely dangerous duty of blowing open the gates of a walled city. it is this soldierly spirit that enables the artillery to continue serving their guns until the last man of the party is shot down. it is the same soldierly spirit that enables the infantry soldier to stand the strain of lying out in the open, possibly for hours, under a burning sun or in drenching rain, unable to move hand or foot without being shot at, a strain to which the order to charge the enemy’s position comes as a distinct and welcome relief. and it is the same soldierly spirit which sustains the cavalry soldier when employed on the important and hazardous duties of scouting and reconnoitring, in the carrying out of which he so often finds himself alone or with quite a small party. the “charge” doubtless requires “dash,” but no special “cavalry spirit”; the excitement of galloping at full speed, in company with a number of his comrades, is of itself sufficient to carry the cavalry soldier forward.

i certainly would not venture to speak so decidedly on a matter, which has given rise to so much controversy of late years, did i not feel that i am justified in expressing an opinion from the fact that i have taken part in cavalry combats, and have frequently had occasion to scout and reconnoitre with two, three, or perhaps half a dozen cavalry soldiers, at a time when capture by the enemy meant certain death. and i have no hesitation in saying that scouting and reconnoitring try the nerves far more seriously than charging the enemy.

xviin conclusion, i would ask you, my brother officers, in whatever part of the empire you may be serving, whether in the mounted or dismounted branches, whether in the cavalry, yeomanry, mounted infantry, or colonial mounted corps, whether in the artillery, engineers, or infantry, to read this book with an unbiassed mind, and not to be put off by the opening chapters, or to throw the book on one side with some such remark as, “this is written by a civilian, and what can he know of the subject?” remember that most of our finest military histories have been written by civilians. i would ask you to study the facts for yourselves, weigh the arguments, follow the deductions, note the conclusions, and then do one of two things. either traverse the facts, refute the deductions, and upset the conclusions, or admit the facts, agree to the arguments, acknowledge the deductions, and accept the conclusions.