early ship-building in philadelphia and colonies—paul jones—joshua humphreys—“alliance”—truxtun—embargo—decade following war of 1815—“rebecca sims”—inauguration of packet lines—thomas p. cope—decay of eastern trade in philadelphia—auction sales of cargoes.
the historical value of the character and career of individuals must be rated by their share in and impress upon the events of their time. this is equally true of success and failure. for example, the most famous man of modern time terminated his career in the most colossal failure known to history,—napoleon bonaparte. yet, if we judge by the interest the civilized world takes in every shred of his history and by the perennial halo that envelops his name, people do not think about either his triumphs or his disasters, but fix their attention 12singly upon the impress he made upon civilization.
on the other hand, george washington ended his career in success and glory. but few, except students and pedants, know much about washington beyond that he was the founder of a new nation and the father of a new country which a century after his death has become the most formidable on earth.
thus, in either case, whether of success or of failure, both gigantic, mankind rates the importance of each by the impress he made upon the events of his time and by its enduring character.
viewed broadly, the europe of to-day as compared with the europe of 1775 is as completely the creation of the popular forces incarnated in napoleon bonaparte, as the american republic of to-day as compared with the revolted colonies of 1775 is the creation of the popular forces whose exponent george washington was. from this point of view, the fact that one failed while the other succeeded in the personal sense cuts no figure whatever.
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these observations, while they have none other than a general relation to our immediate subject, are pertinent to the main thread of our theme. the real test of greatness in an individual, and therefore of the historical value of 13his character and career, being the impress he makes upon the events of his time, it follows that, unless the mention of a man’s name instantly suggests some great thing or things that he has done, or in a masterful way has helped to do, that man was not great; he made no impress upon his times, and his biography can possess no historic value. but whenever the name of a man stands as the exponent of some great thing done or as the symbol of notable achievement, then the character and career of that man belong to history, and the obligation devolves upon literature to suitably perpetuate his memory.
this, the prime test and condition of enduring fame, has been fulfilled by the subject of this memoir, charles henry cramp. not alone in his own country, but in europe and asia,—from st. petersburg to tokio,—the mention of his name instantly suggests triumphs in the science of naval architecture and marine engineering and successes in the art of building ships. however, before proceeding to a history of the career and life-work of mr. cramp himself, it seems proper to survey the historical antecedents of his science and his art in his own field of action.
the art of naval architecture and the industry of ship-building were almost coeval with 14the primitive establishment of the english-speaking race on the american continent, and this was more particularly true of philadelphia than of any other place. in the earliest grants of land to settlers, william penn invariably included a clause requiring them, when clearing the land granted, to “spare all smooth and large oak-trees suitable for ship-timber.”
in 1685, three years after penn arrived in the colony, it was reported to the lords of trade in london that “six ships capable of sea-voyage and many boats have been built at philadelphia.” from this early beginning the industry grew rapidly, until in 1700 four yards were engaged in building sea-going ships alone, besides several smaller concerns which built fishing-boats and river-craft. two rope-walks, two or three block-makers’ shops, and several other special manufactories of ship-building material, had been put in operation. at first the spar-iron work needed was brought from england, but by the beginning of the eighteenth century all the ship-smithing required for philadelphia-built ships was done on the spot.
the first four yards were located at different points along the beach, between the foot of market street and the foot of vine street, and 15there they remained until about the middle of the eighteenth century. by that time the value of that part of the river front for commercial wharf purposes had increased to such an extent that the ship-building industry could not afford to hold it. in the meantime new yards had been established down as far as south street, others as far north as the present foot of fairmount avenue. obedient to this law of trade the four older yards moved their plants either northward or southward, as convenience or economy might dictate. but after 1744 no ships were built between market and vine streets. the last of these original shipyards of penn’s time to succumb was the largest and most important one in philadelphia. it was owned and managed by mr. west, who was at that time the leading ship-builder in the colonies; and the ground his shipyard occupied had been deeded to him by william penn in part payment for a ship he had built for penn several years before. he removed to the present foot of green street.
in 1750-51 two ships were built in west’s new yard, which exceeded in size any merchant vessels previously constructed in america. one of them was of three hundred and twenty and the other of four hundred tons burthen. they were sent to england with cargoes of 16colonial produce, and on arrival at london were both bought by the east india company and placed in the regular east india and china fleet. they were as large as any merchant vessels built in england up to that time, and of superior model and construction. one of them—the larger of the two—remained on the list of the east india company more than thirty years; and in 1751 had for one of her passengers to india, warren hastings, who was going out to madras as a young clerk in the civil service, to become the first governor-general of british india, and founder of the british empire in asia.
during this period, the third quarter of the eighteenth century, a new scheme of ship-building commended itself to the enterprise and ingenuity of philadelphia shipwrights. this was the construction of what they called “raft-ships.”
the local supply of ship-timber in the forests of england, particularly of frames, knees, keels, and the larger spars, had begun to decline to the danger-point by 1750. the size of ships, both for commerce and for war, was constantly increasing. this increase incessantly involved the use of longer and heavier timbers for frames, larger knees and futtocks, and thicker planking. meantime the forests of 17england became smaller and smaller. the great old trees had been cut down and sawed or hewn up, and the younger stems had not found time to grow in their stead.
indeed, before 1750, england had begun to import ship-timber from the baltic; but it was mostly deal boards used for cabin-work, ceilings, sheathings, etc. now she began to look to her american colonies for the heavier materials. it was difficult to load and stow this kind of timber through the hatchways of the ships then available. the ingenuity of philadelphia shipwrights met this obstacle by building the timbers themselves into the form of ships, and they were then navigated across the atlantic to be broken up on arrival in british ports. these “raft-ships” were built with bluff bows and square sterns, their sides being several feet thick. to make them water-tight, they were sheathed with two thicknesses of boards which “broke joints,” and were caulked. the largest of these, called the “baron renfrew,” measured the equivalent of five thousand tons in a regular merchant ship. she got safely across the ocean, but went ashore on portland bill in a fog and broke up. most of her timber, however, was picked up by english and french vessels which cruised for weeks in search of it. among the mast-timber 18she carried was one white pine tree ninety-one feet long by four feet eight inches diameter at the butt inside the bark. this tree was used for the mainmast of the “royal george,” a three-decker then building at chatham (1774). it was doubtless still in the ill-fated ship when she heeled over and went down at portsmouth in 1782. the “baron renfrew” was the last of the “raft-ships.” the oncoming revolution stopped all kinds of commerce for eight years, and though after the peace ship-timber was again exported to england, it went as hold or deck cargo in regular vessels.
summing up the colonial period, it may be said that, while the records were imperfectly kept and some lost, enough is extant to show that between 1684 and 1744 one hundred and eighty-eight square-rigged ships and over seven hundred brigs and schooners, besides immense numbers of boats, river-sloops, fishing-yawls, etc., were built at philadelphia. her only rival in the colonies during that period was portsmouth, new hampshire, but philadelphia held the ascendency over all in the size and total tonnage of her ships.
that the colonies should have developed the ship-building industry from their earliest existence was natural and necessary. if you take a modern map of the united states and 19draw from maine to georgia a heavy black line averaging one hundred miles back from the general trend of the sea-coast, you will have in close approximation the geography of colonial settlement at its maximum. in this belt, this “narrow fringe of civilization,” were concentrated for more than a century all the energies of english-speaking pioneers, rapidly increasing in numbers and incessantly augmenting the products of enterprise and industry which, from surplus over home consumption, had to seek markets over sea.
in those early days the population kept within easy reach of the coast or of the arms of the sea and estuaries which abound from the savannah on the south to the penobscot on the north. the back country, forming the eastern or atlantic slope of the appalachian chain, was little more than a hunting and trapping ground or a field for primitive trade and barter with the indians. as for the vast “hinterland,” west of the alleghenies, it was, up to the middle of the eighteenth century, when the final struggle between england and france for supremacy on this continent began, an unbroken wilderness, inhabited only by hostile savages, and unknown to any white men except the jesuit priests and the cunning traders of french canada.
20for all these reasons, the gaze of the english-speaking colonists from the earliest settlements to the beginning of the conquest of canada was always bent toward the sea, and all their enterprise and energy were directed to the commerce of the ocean. under such conditions, the development of skill in ship-building was inevitable; and with that necessity was also bred a scientific alertness in marine architecture itself which, as soon as political independence freed its scope, became supreme throughout the civilized world.
the outbreak of the revolution of course, for the time being, put an end to merchant ship-building in all american ports. but in philadelphia the paralysis was only temporary, and the energies heretofore directed toward construction of ships for the uses of peace were soon turned to the conversion of available merchantmen into vessels of war or privateers, and the building of new frigates ordered by congress. the first american squadron, that of the ill-starred commodore esek hopkins, was composed entirely of merchant vessels taken up in the harbor and converted into men-of-war in the shipyards of philadelphia during the autumn of 1775.
it was in the selection and conversion of these four merchantmen into cruisers that paul 21jones, founder of the american navy, first gave to the united states his energies and his talents. thus philadelphia was the birthplace of a new sea-power, and her shipyards have ever since been the foremost contributors to its growth, until even now, though only a century and a quarter old, it has achieved imperial rank.
in november, 1775, congress authorized the construction of six 32-gun frigates and seven other war vessels of less dimensions. four of the frigates were allotted to philadelphia shipyards. they were the “washington,” the “randolph,” the “delaware,” and the “effingham.” the first two were frigate-built from their keels, but the “delaware” and “effingham,” to save time, were built upon frames already on the stocks for merchant ships when the war began. on this account they were not quite as large as the regular frigates and rated twenty-eight instead of thirty-two guns.
from 1775 till the peace of 1783, philadelphia yards built a great number of privateers and converted a few ships for the “state navy,” as it was called, that is to say, ships provided by the commonwealth of pennsylvania and assigned to the continental service. one of these, a converted bark of two hundred 22tons and mounting sixteen 6-pounders, has passed into fame as the “hyder ali.” under lieutenant joshua barney she took the “general monk,” a regular sloop-of-war, mounting fourteen 9-pounders and four 6-pounders. the “hyder ali” was a small french bark which arrived at philadelphia with military supplies early in february, 1782. she was at once bought by the state and placed in humphrey’s yard for conversion into a cruiser. within six weeks she was put in commission, and she took the “general monk,” april 8, about two months after her arrival in port as a merchant vessel. this was the last capture of an english man-of-war in the revolution.
the peace of 1783 found philadelphia possessing only thirteen merchant vessels, all built before the war and nearly all of which had served as privateers during the conflict. no new merchant keel had been laid in a philadelphia yard between 1775 and 1782; but the industry revived with wonderful energy. from 1782 to 1787, one hundred and fifty-five vessels were built, of which fifty-six were square-rigged ships averaging over three hundred tons. from this period on the progress was very great. the outbreak of the wars of the french revolution in 1793 at once threw a vast carrying trade into american bottoms, the united 23states being for a long time the only neutral maritime nation. by the year 1801, when the treaty, or truce, of amiens was signed, nearly three hundred sea-going ships were owned in philadelphia, all home-built, and fourteen shipyards were in operation,—eight in the northern or kensington and six in the southern or southwark district. these were all first-class shipyards, building the largest full-rigged ships of that epoch. in that period and for a long time afterward the leading philadelphia shipyard was that of joshua humphreys, in southwark, and its proprietor and manager was himself the foremost naval architect of his time. when congress, in 1794, authorized the construction of six frigates, and thereby laid the foundation of what we call the modern or “regular” navy, as distinguished from the old continental navy of the revolution, prominent ship-builders were asked to submit plans, the government then having no naval constructors. the plans of mr. humphreys were adopted for all six frigates. three of them embodied a distinct advance in size and weight of armament over vessels of similar rate in other navies, and were classed as 44-gun frigates. the other three were designed as 38-gun frigates, and were an improvement upon the 36-gun ships of european navies. these six ships 24were built by contract,—one of the forty-fours and one of the thirty-eights at philadelphia; one forty-four at boston; one at new york; one thirty-eight at baltimore, and one at portsmouth, new hampshire. in addition to these, a 32-gun frigate, the “essex,” was built at salisbury point, massachusetts, by private subscription, and given to the government.
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mr. humphreys had the contracts for the philadelphia-built frigates, and on may 10, 1797, he launched the 44-gun frigate “united states,” which was the first ship of the regular navy to be water-borne. thus to philadelphia belongs the credit of having fitted out the first squadron of the continental navy in 1775, and of launching the first ship of the regular navy in 1797. in 1799, mr. humphreys completed a third frigate, named the “philadelphia.” this ship is described in some histories as a “forty-four,” and in others as a “thirty-eight.” as a matter of fact, she was neither; but properly rated, under the rules then in vogue, as a 40-gun frigate. this difference was due to the fact that she carried thirty long 18-pounders on her gundeck as against twenty-eight 18-pounders in the “constellation” class, or as against thirty long 24-pounders in the “constitution” or 44-gun class. the “philadelphia” was beyond question 25the most perfect frigate of her day. she was the same length as the “constitution,” but of less beam, slightly less draught, and on finer lines. in her design, mr. humphreys had sacrificed to speed some of the battery power of the forty-fours, and therefore had to substitute 18-pounders for 24-pounders on the gundeck. she was the fastest sailing war-ship in the world, beating the “constitution” by nearly two knots an hour. in her first, and unfortunately her last, voyage, from this country to tripoli, she logged on one occasion three hundred and thirty-two knots in twenty-four hours, and on another three hundred and thirty-seven, the latter run being an average slightly exceeding fourteen knots. she was lost in tripoli harbor in 1803. it is not too much or too little to say of either that joshua humphreys held a professional rank similar to that of charles h. cramp, that of the foremost naval architect of his era; and with exceptions, not worth mention, they are the only american naval architects whose designs for sea-going war-ships have been adopted by the navy.
it is worthy of remark in this connection, that when the plans of mr. humphreys were adopted in 1794-95, the government not only had no naval constructors of its own, but in 26fact no navy department, except a bureau in the war department, so that mr. humphreys could have no competitors but other private ship-builders. mr. cramp’s designs, however, have been adopted under the scrutiny of a highly competent and most critical corps of regular naval constructors and marine engineers.
the renewal of general war in europe in 1803 gave a fresh impetus to the neutral carrying trade of the united states, and with it a corresponding stimulus to ship-building all along the coast, though most pronounced and on a larger scale at philadelphia than elsewhere. between the above date and 1812 nine more shipyards were established, making twenty-three all told in operation at one time. the largest merchant vessel up to that time built in america was one of seven hundred and five tons, constructed by samuel bowers for the east india trade, and her dimensions were not exceeded in merchant construction until after the war of 1812-15. her contract price was $24,000; at the rate of $34 per ton gross measurement. at that time vessels of similar class cost ten guineas ($50) per gross ton in british shipyards.
in a public document on the statistics of ship-building, we find a statement that “in 27june, 1787, the ship ‘alliance,’ owned by robert morris and commanded by captain thomas read, sailed from philadelphia for canton and batavia. she was of seven hundred tons burthen, and the largest ship built for commerce in america at that time.”
the statement that the “alliance” was “built for commerce” is an error. she was the famous old revolutionary frigate which paul jones and john barry had commanded at different times. after the peace of 1783 she was sold to mr. morris, or rather turned over to him in part payment for advance he had made to the continental government. she was converted into a merchant ship and made several china voyages. the government then bought her back again in 1790, but she was not refitted as a war vessel.
during the general period under consideration, that is to say, from the end of the revolution to the beginning of the war of 1812, a new and highly important deep-sea traffic came into existence, of which philadelphia soon obtained the supreme command. this was the east india and china trade. the first vessel to clear from philadelphia for china direct was the new ship “canton,” built by humphreys and commanded by captain, afterward commodore, thomas truxtun.
28this was the same thomas truxtun who, during the revolution, had seen more service in privateers than any other sailor then afloat. he served either as mate or commander in the philadelphia privateers, “andrew caldwell,” “congress,” “independence,” “mars,” and “st. james,” from 1775 to 1782. his ships made altogether sixty-five captures of british merchantmen and transports. while commanding the “st. james,” of twenty guns, in 1781, he beat off and disabled a british 28-gun frigate. after the revolution he commanded philadelphia indiamen from 1785 to 1798, when he was commissioned one of the original six captains in the regular navy. in the short war with france in 1799 he commanded the “constellation,” 38-gun frigate, and took the french frigate “l’insurgente,” of forty guns.
the “canton” sailed from philadelphia on december 30, 1785. she returned in may, 1787, having made the round voyage to canton, batavia, and home in a little over sixteen months. her venture was highly profitable. from this beginning the far eastern trade grew steadily until, in 1805, philadelphia alone owned twenty-seven ships plying in it, ranging from four hundred and twenty to seven hundred and five tons. between 1805 and 1812, inclusive, 29the number of philadelphia indiamen and china ships increased to forty-two, notwithstanding the injurious effect of president jefferson’s ill-advised embargo. in fact, that measure was not much observed by ship-owners in the india and china trade. president jefferson did not attempt to enforce his embargo by either civil or military power, and very soon after he proclaimed it, the understanding became general among merchant ship-owners that if they chose to take the risks entailed by the british “orders in council” and napoleon’s “decrees of milan and berlin,” they could do so at their peril, with no recourse for protection or indemnity in case of misfortune. under these conditions, ship-owning merchants, in other coast cities who traded with european or west india ports, for the most part hesitated to take the chances. but the philadelphia merchant princes, who controlled the american trade with the british and dutch east indies and china, were not so easily foiled. they loaded and despatched their ships during the embargo, a period of nearly two years, almost as freely, if not as ostentatiously, then as they had done before or as they did afterward. this policy was founded upon the soundest judgment. the india and china merchants of philadelphia understood perfectly that the titanic 30struggle between england and napoleon involved conflicting policies and ambitions relating only to the commerce between america and europe, not to that between america and the orient. occasionally an american ship bound for india or china or thence for home would be brought to by an english or a french cruiser and searched. but, as those ships never carried anything contraband of war, the worst that ever happened to them was the occasional impressment of parts of their crews by the english or the levying of a small tribute by the french. the voyages, as a whole, were seldom interrupted, and almost never terminated by detention or capture. these were the halcyon days of philadelphia’s trade with the far east. from 1803 to 1815 the french could not trade to the orient at all. and though the east india company kept up the sailings of its fleet with more or less regularity, yet the war rates of insurance and the expense and inconvenience of constant convoy placed their traffic at signal disadvantage as compared with that of the neutral americans.
the philadelphia-built indiamen and china ships of that day had another and even more important element of safety: given plenty of sea-room and clear weather, with sailing wind, 31no british or french cruiser of their time could get anywhere near them.
for example, the “rebecca sims,” built by samuel bowers in 1801, and overhauled, coppered, and newly sparred and rigged in the winter of 1806-07, passed cape henlopen the 10th of may, 1807, and took a liverpool pilot aboard off the mouth of the mersey the 24th, having run from the delaware capes to the mersey in fourteen days. notwithstanding all the improvements in clipper ships after her time, the “rebecca sims” still holds the sailing record between henlopen and liverpool!
the “woodrup sims,” built for the same owner by mr. humphreys in 1801, was chartered for the china trade in 1808. she passed out of the capes the 8th of april and anchored in whampoa roads, canton, the 6th of august, one hundred and seventeen days from the delaware. but from this must be deducted two days hove-to in table bay, cape of good hope; three days in port at the isle of france (now the mauritius), and two days hove-to in angier road, java head, the actual running time having been one hundred and ten days. manifestly, ships capable of that kind of sailing had little need to fear the cruisers of england or of france.
to give an approximate idea of the value of 32philadelphia’s east india and china trade in its halcyon days, it may be related that in the autumn of 1812 the ship “montesquieu,” belonging to stephen girard, left canton for the delaware via batavia. at the latter port she took on board, in addition to her china cargo from canton, a rich freight of spices. she left batavia before the news of the war of 1812 reached there. her commander had intended to touch only at the cape of good hope on his voyage home, that being a british colony. but when about five hundred miles east of the cape he spoke a portuguese vessel bound for macao, whose captain informed him that england and the united states were at war. he then ran for tristan d’acunha, where he obtained needed supplies of water and wood, with such fresh provisions as the island afforded. thence shaping his course homeward he arrived off the capes of the delaware in april, 1813. there she was brought to and taken by the british frigate “tenedos.” but mr. girard was on the alert, and, judging about the time she ought to arrive, had been waiting for her in a cottage he owned at or near lewes, and she was taken in plain sight of the shore. he at once put off in a pilot-yawl under a flag of truce, boarded the british frigate, and after some parley succeeded in 33ransoming the “montesquieu” for ￡37,000 sterling in specie bills on london! he then took his ship up the river to philadelphia. the blockade had raised the value of china and east india products enormously in the american market, and mr. girard realized the handsome sum of $1,220,000 from the sale of her cargo over and above the $185,000 he had paid as ransom. he was also offered a large sum for the ship herself to fit out as a privateer, but part of his agreement with the british captain was that she should not be used for that purpose, and so she was laid up during the rest of the war.
upon the conclusion of peace in 1815, the india and china trade of philadelphia was renewed with great vigor, and ship-building became more brisk than ever before.
the war had nearly obliterated the whaling fleet of new england and new york. unable to replace those lost or destroyed as quickly as they desired in their own ports, the whaling owners resorted to philadelphia, and in the seven years between 1815-1822 sixty-four ships, ranging from three hundred to four hundred tons, were built on the delaware for the whale fishery to hail from new bedford, nantucket, new london, sag harbor, and other whaling ports. a peculiarity of these 34transactions was that most of the contracts for building whale-ships were taken by new england builders and then sublet to philadelphia yards.
at the same time, that is, in the decade following the peace of 1815, a new element of ocean commerce came into being. this was the inauguration of regular packet-lines. the pioneer of this enterprise on any considerable scale was the famous “cope line,” founded by thomas p. cope in 1820, and employing at first five ships which were among the largest and best vessels then afloat. this line continued to run until the civil war. its ships were from five hundred and sixty to one thousand two hundred and eighty tons. they sailed from philadelphia the 20th of each month and from liverpool the 8th, their trip-time averaging thirty days and being almost as regular as the modern steamship lines. in addition to this regular monthly service, extra ships were frequently despatched as the exigencies of trade and travel might require.
mr. cramp, in one of his reminiscences, relates an interesting anecdote of the cope line. soon after jackson was inaugurated president, he appointed john randolph, of roanoke, minister to russia. the cope line being then far ahead of all other channels of ocean 35travel from philadelphia to europe, mr. randolph presented himself at its shipping-office. in his usual grandiloquent manner he said to the first man he encountered: “sir, i want to see thomas p. cope.” he was shown to mr. cope’s office, and said to him, “i am john randolph of roanoke. i wish to take passage to liverpool in one of your ships.” mr. cope replied, “i am thomas cope; if thee goes aboard the ship and selects thy state-room and will pay $150, thee may go.” mr. cope apparently could see no reason why a philadelphia ship-owner and head of a great packet line should stand in awe of even a virginia statesman.
about 1828-30 the india and china trade of philadelphia suddenly declined, and in a few years passed almost entirely into the hands of new york and boston. in a historical paper, mr. cramp describes the conditions of this traffic at its zenith, and suggests the cause or causes of its remarkable decline.
the custom, he says, was upon the arrival of the vessels to announce in the papers not only of philadelphia but also of new york, boston, baltimore, and even less important cities, that the goods would be sold at auction, to begin on a certain day. these auction sales brought great numbers of merchants from other cities 36to philadelphia, and during the first quarter of the nineteenth century it was beyond doubt the most profitable single line of traffic on the continent. the merchants engaged in it were not mere buyers and sellers as the term is understood now. they were important public characters, diplomatists and financiers, and their influence extended to the remotest parts of the earth. they amassed enormous fortunes and lived like princes. some of them, either singly or in associations, owned fleets that would compare favorably with our then existing navy in numbers and tonnage. at its highest development, say, between 1825 and 1836, the volume of philadelphia’s oriental trade frequently reached sixty millions a year.
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finally, however, causes began to operate which gradually changed the tide of affairs. these causes, as stated in the historical paper by mr. cramp, were numerous. among them was the fact that, as the original merchants who had built up the trade grew old or died, their immediate heirs or descendants did not care to carry on the enterprises of their fathers or their grandfathers, and many of them lived permanently abroad. eventually, at the moment when the jealousy, envy, and ambition of rivals, particularly in new york and new england, had reached the critical stage, 37the legislature of pennsylvania enacted a law imposing a certain tax on all auction sales within the state. this was a tax ostensibly universal and covering the whole business of sales by auction, but its real purpose was to get at and derive revenue from the great auction business of the china and india trade of philadelphia. in those days it might easily happen that the auction sales of two or three ships’ cargoes would exceed in value, and therefore in revenue, all the rest of the auction sales in the state at large during the same time.
of course, this was a development of a tendency on the part of the rural or country legislator of that time, which unfortunately has not entirely died out, to tax the great cities by special enactments for the benefit of the general revenue of the state.
as already stated, other causes had for some time been operating to weaken or shake philadelphia’s supremacy in the oriental trade, but the imposition of this tax, falling upon the heels of those causes, proved to be the last straw that broke the camel’s back. the result was that between 1825 and 1836 the great india and china traffic of philadelphia almost disappeared. however, and notwithstanding the diversion of this trade to other ports, principally 38in new england, the marine architects and ship-builders of philadelphia managed to retain the better part of the construction of vessels, which for many years afterward were employed by their successful rivals.
this somewhat extensive and discursive survey of the early colonial and post-revolutionary conditions of philadelphia ship-building seems requisite to a proper understanding of the state of the art and its accompaniments at the time when the subject of this memoir first appeared upon the scene, and it also serves to indicate or explain what he had to do and the prior achievements which he had to equal or excel in his pursuit of professional success and eminence.
