condition of navy after civil war—admiral case’s fleet—“virginius’s” scare—“huron,” “alert,” and “ranger”—secretary hunt—first advisory board—secretary chandler—“puritan” class—finished—steel—hon. j. b. mccreary and appropriation bill for new navy—members of second naval advisory board—standard for steel for new ships, “chicago,” “boston,” “atlanta,” and “dolphin”—secretary whitney—beginning of new navy, by charles h. cramp—“baltimore,” “charleston,” and “yorktown”—purchase of drawings by navy department—commodore walker—premium system—mr. whitney’s views—premiums paid—attack on system—secretary tracy—war college paper—classifying bids.
after the civil war the navy was neglected, being, so far as its cruising vessels were concerned, a wooden navy of not only obsolete types, but decayed or decaying vessels, which gradually became a reproach to the country and a laughing-stock for other maritime powers.
at the time of the “virginius’s” difficulty with spain, which occurred about five years after the close of the civil war, a “grand fleet” was assembled at key west under the command of rear-admiral case. this fleet 158consisted of a large number of wooden cruising steamers of various types and classes, all obsolete, many of them unseaworthy, and all incapable of meeting an up-to-date ship of that period (1874-75) with any chance of success whatever. to these wooden hulks were added the double-turreted monitors “terror,” “amphitrite,” and “monadnock,” which were built at the navy-yards of wood, and a batch of old worn-out single-turreted monitors. the bottoms of the wooden monitors were so weakened structurally that, whenever an effort was made to wedge up the spindles so that the turrets could revolve, the bottom went down instead of the turret going up, the latter necessarily remaining immovable. unquestionably any one, or at most any two, of our first-class modern battleships at this writing, 1903, could have annihilated and sunk the entire fleet in two or three hours, although it consisted, all types and classes taken together, of over forty vessels. this was an object lesson, and it to some extent aroused the sensibilities of the country; but the then existing administration of the navy department was under the absolute control of the navy-yard rings, and all naval work of every description was done in navy-yards. the “spanish scare,” as it was called, did, however, have the effect of spurring 159congress to provide for the construction of eight (8) new vessels, the first provided for since the civil war. of these, three were given out to be built by contract; two, the “huron” and “alert,” small iron sloops-of-war or gun-vessels, were given to john roach and built at his works at chester; and another of the same class, the “ranger,” was given to harlan & hollingsworth, of wilmington, and built there. the other five were built in navy-yards, and were completed at different periods between 1875 and 1879.
battleship alabama
with this exception, nothing whatever was done toward increase or betterment of our naval force from 1865 until 1883. however, in 1881, general garfield, having been elected president the preceding year and inaugurated the 4th of march, 1881, appointed judge william h. hunt, of louisiana, secretary of the navy. general garfield understood the naval needs of the country, referred to the subject vigorously in his inaugural, and quite early in his administration, or about a month before he was assassinated, prompted his secretary of the navy to take measures looking to the modernization of our national marine. the result of this was the convening of a board early in the summer of 1881, of which admiral john rodgers was president. the instructions 160of this board were to investigate the existing state of foreign navies, to inquire into the immediate needs of our own, and to formulate a ship-building programme on modern lines, to be carried out as soon as the resources of the country would permit. on the 7th of november, 1881, this board, which is commonly known to history as the “first naval advisory board,” reported in accordance with its instructions. it is not necessary here to go into detail with regard to the ship-building programme which they recommended. suffice to say, that not one of the ships or types of ships which they recommended was ever actually built; but their deliberations and report attracted general public attention, caused the subject to be widely and patriotically, although not very intelligently, discussed in the newspapers, so that, while the action of this first naval advisory board did not produce any actual or visible results, it at least served to popularize the subject of the “new navy.”
battleship maine
in 1882, mr. hunt was appointed minister to russia, and was succeeded in the secretaryship of the navy by william e. chandler, of new hampshire. mr. chandler was a vigorous, active man, and lost no time in taking advantage of the public interest which had been aroused. the result of the further investigations 161and reports which he caused to be made, and his communications to the president, and through the president to congress based thereon, resulted in an act, approved march 3, 1883, providing for the construction of four new cruising vessels, and the launching and engining of the four double-turreted monitors “puritan,” “terror,” “amphitrite,” and “monadnock,” which at that time had been on the stocks about eight years. these were built of iron, and took the places in the navy register of the worthless wooden monitors of the same names.
on the first lot of new vessels and engines, the bids were all considerably below the cost estimated by the advisory board and the bureaus, and the contracts were let as follows: for the four vessels, and the engines of the “puritan,” monitor, to mr. john roach; for the engines of the “terror,” monitor, to william cramp & sons; and for the “amphitrite,” monitor, to the harlan & hollingsworth company, of wilmington, delaware. work under all these contracts proceeded with commendable alacrity.
considerable difficulty was at first experienced in procuring material for the new steel ships. the standard established by law was very high, and the methods of test devised by 162the board, to say the least, did nothing to ameliorate the rigors of the statute. the steel-makers, however, bravely persevered, and finally overcame their difficulties in the main, though a historical résumé of the progress of the new navy would be incomplete without the statement that none of the contractors, under the act of march 2, 1883, made any money, and some of them suffered serious loss; and this statement applies equally to the manufacturers who made the steel for the pioneer ships,—at least one old and well established concern being wrecked by the difficulties encountered, while others were embarrassed.
the year 1884 was signalized by a presidential campaign of unusual bitterness, and, notwithstanding the cordiality with which all parties had joined hands in the inception of the new navy, the first session of the forty-eighth congress developed what for a time threatened to be at least a temporary hiatus. but wiser counsels at length prevailed, and, though no additions were made to the list of new ships authorized, sufficient appropriations were made to prevent stoppage of work on those already under contract.
the results of the year 1884 were chiefly interesting because they demonstrated, after much bitter debate and heated discussion, that 163the cause of the new navy had acquired impetus sufficient to vanquish the party passions of even so violent a presidential campaign as that which marked that year. that campaign over, the forty-eighth congress, at its second session, took up with zeal the promotion of the new navy, and the act approved march 3, 1885, authorized four additional vessels, toward the construction of which $1,895,000 was appropriated with practical unanimity. the act of march 3, 1885, marked an epoch in the history of the new navy. prior to that time, the legislative practice had been to require separate enactment to authorize the construction of new vessels for the navy. in this case the authorization appeared in the body of the regular naval appropriation bill, and that practice has been followed ever since. this innovation was debated in committee of the whole, and a point of order made to strike out the proposed authorization. the point of order was overruled by hon. james b. mccreary, a democratic member from kentucky, with the approval of speaker john g. carlisle; mr. mccreary being chairman of the committee of the whole on the naval bill. mr. mccreary ruled: 1st. that legislation in pursuance of any settled or established policy was germane in the annual appropriation bill which 164dealt with that subject matter. 2d. that the increase of the navy was clearly a settled and established policy, to which all branches of the government were committed. 3d. that in view of that fact the authorization of additional vessels of war could not be considered new legislation in the meaning of the rules, but must be regarded as progressive legislation in a direction previously sanctioned by congress; that therefore the authorization of new ships was germane to the regular naval appropriation bill for each year, and was in order.
it is hard to overestimate the value of this ruling to the interests of the new navy. every one familiar with legislative processes knows the advantage which appertains to the “right of way” enjoyed by a regular appropriation bill as compared with the average chances of an independent measure. these advantages are so marked, that it is quite proper to say that mr. mccreary’s rule on this point was of greater importance than any other single incident in the legislative history of naval reconstruction. in the act of march 3, 1885, appeared another clause prohibiting the repair of any existing wooden vessel when the cost of such repair should exceed 20 per cent. upon the whole cost of such vessel entirely new. this clause was adopted upon the recommendation 165of secretary chandler, made in the previous year; its obvious object being to render impossible the perpetuation of the old and obsolete wooden ships. its effect soon became apparent in a rapid elimination of old wooden vessels from the navy, until by 1890 only sixteen of them remained on the active list, and nearly, if not quite, every one of these was then in her last commission. it is impossible to overestimate the salutary effects of this clause. 1st. it “cleared the decks” of a lot of obsolete lumber. 2d. it stimulated public opinion to demand prompt production of new and modern ships to take the places of the old and obsolete. 3d. it put an end to a policy of makeshifts which was always extravagant, often wasteful, and sometimes corrupt.
the building of the four pioneer ships involved several new departures. the congress that authorized their construction and made an appropriation toward it, also made provision for creating what was termed a second “naval advisory board,” which was to have charge of the details of their building. by this expedient congress hoped to avert the evils of the bureau system on the one hand, and to limit the one-man power of the secretary on the other. this board consisted of five members, three naval officers and two civilians, to 166be selected by the secretary of the navy. of the two civilians, one was a ship-builder, the other a mechanical engineer. the ship-builder was henry steers. this gentleman was a nephew of george steers, a somewhat celebrated naval architect in his time, whose principal achievement was the design of the yacht “america,” which won the cup which the english have struggled ever since to recapture. the famous steam-frigate “niagara,” built a short time before the war, though constructed in a navy-yard, was designed by henry steers. during the paralysis of american ship-building which followed the civil war, mr. steers became discouraged at the outlook and, having a considerable fortune, went into the banking business.
the other civilian member, the mechanical engineer, was miers coryell, of new york. this gentleman was connected in his professional capacity with the cromwell line of steamships plying between new york and new orleans. he had shortly before the time under consideration designed an engine for the “louisiana” of that line, which mr. roach built, involving an entirely new departure in sea-going engine construction. perhaps the most concise way to describe this engine would be to say that it represented an effort to introduce 167the walking-beam of a side-wheel river steamboat into the engine compartment of a screw steamship. the advantage claimed for it was that it permitted the use of vertical cylinders within a deck-height not sufficient to admit the regular type of vertical inverted cylinders. this it undoubtedly did; but there its merit stopped. for the rest it was cumbrous, complicated, and of weight exceedingly disproportionate to its power. this unspeakable device mr. coryell offered to the advisory board, and, to the speechless amazement of the engineering world, it was adopted as the propelling machinery of the most important ship then authorized for the navy. it is worthy of remark here that these beam-engines were subsequently taken out of the “chicago,” and a pair of vertical inverted or slightly inclined engines of the usual type substituted. and it might also be observed that this work, with some alterations in the hull, was done in the new york navy-yard at a cost of $1,300,000 as against an original contract price of $889,000 for the whole ship new; or, in other words, the cost of re-engining and overhauling the “chicago” in a navy-yard was 40 per cent. more than the first cost of the new ship under contract in a private shipyard!
168the navy bureaus were not slow to discern what the creation of the advisory board meant for them. at first they tried to defeat it. finding that impossible, two of the bureau chiefs besought the naval committees of the senate and house to provide that at least one of the four ships be built in a navy-yard. no member of the senate committee favored this proposition, and but two members of the house committee, both of whom, it is hardly necessary to say, represented navy-yard districts and danced to the music of labor agitators. thus, at the inception of the new navy the navy-yard snake was “scotched,” if not killed.
when the contracts and specifications were drawn up in form, two facts became evident: one was that the knowledge of the new conditions of naval construction possessed by the authorities of the navy itself was altogether academic; and the other was that neither naval authorities nor civilians interested had any adequate idea of what the requirement of the law in regard to material actually signified. the law said that the ships must be built of “steel, of domestic manufacture, having a tensile strength of 60,000 pounds to the square inch, and an elongation of 25 per cent. in eight inches.”
169verbally, this was the english admiralty standard for mild steel plates and shapes. but the english had an elastic system of inspection which left much to be determined by the judgment and knowledge of the inspector. the system adopted by our earlier inspectors of material was rigid as a rock and inelastic as cast-iron. the letter of the law, not the spirit of it, was their guide. these requirements and the mode of enforcing them would have been drastic had the mild-steel industry been in a flourishing condition. but as a matter of fact it had not been developed at all in this country; so they were formulating crucial requirements for the product of an industry which did not exist. the production of mild steel, or at least its use in naval construction, was still in the experimental stage then, even in england, its native home. the “iris” and “mercury,” the first all-steel ships built in england, had not been in commission more than two years, when the requirements for our new ships were formulated by the naval authorities and embodied in an act of congress.
bessemer steel was produced in large quantities here at the time for making rails and tank-plates. but bessemer could not stand the navy tests. nothing but open-hearth steel could do it, and at the time when bids were 170asked for the first four ships there was not an open-hearth mill in the country that could make the ingots required for the plates and shapes of the sizes and qualities demanded. still, american steel-makers were found willing to undertake the task, though the sequel soon proved that their conceptions of what confronted them were quite vague. when one surveys the open-hearth steel industry as it exists in the united states to-day (1901), largely exceeding that of great britain, and greater than that of all the rest of the world, exclusive of the united kingdom, put together, it seems impossible to realize that it is all the growth of a score of years. as late as 1887 there was no forging-mill in this country that could forge a three-throw crank-shaft in one piece, and the “baltimore’s” crank-shafts of that description had to be imported from whitworth’s works in england.
such were the conditions which confronted the ship-builders who made estimates and offered bids for the construction of the four pioneer steel ships of the new navy. when the bids were opened early in july, 1883, it became apparent that the views of bidders as to the character of the task they proposed to undertake were quite divergent. to avoid prolixity, we will deal only with the “chicago,” 171which was, in fact, the representative ship. for that vessel there were but two bidders worth considering,—mr. cramp and mr. roach. mr. roach bid $889,000 for the hull and machinery. mr. cramp bid a little over $1,000,000, or about 14 per cent. in excess of his competitor. as the sequel proved, mr. cramp, conservative as his bid was, or as it appeared to be, underwent no misfortune in failing to get the “chicago” at $1,025,000. whether mr. cramp could have been more successful than mr. roach was in creating the new open-hearth steel industry required to produce the material demanded by the law and the specifications need not be discussed. it may, however, be said that the excess of his bid over that of mr. roach was due wholly to his misgivings on this point; because on all other points involved, such as experience, skill, and efficiency of organization, he had some advantage.
mr. roach got all the ships. the contracts were signed july 26, 1883. the keel of the “chicago” was laid december 5, 1883; she was launched december 5, 1885, only fifty-two days before the contract date for completion, which was january 26, 1886. meantime the first of the ships, the despatch-boat “dolphin,” had been completed, put on trial, and had failed 172to meet the requirements of the law. here the evils of the inflexible, inelastic, or “cast-iron” form of contract became instantly evident. the navy department could not accept the ship under those conditions without violating the law. mr. roach thereupon threw up his hands, and the government, as provided in the contract, had to take possession of the ships as they stood in his shipyard and complete them with its own resources, at the risk and expense of mr. roach and his bondsmen. this action on his part is hard to understand or explain. he was perfectly solvent. although, as the law and the contract stood, the navy department could not accept the “dolphin,” in view of her deficiency in performance, congress was soon to assemble, and secretary whitney was ready to ask for an amendment or modification of the law which would enable him to accept the ship with an equitable penalty for her deficiency, which, by the way, was not great. it was said at the time that mr. roach acted upon the advice of certain political friends holding high rank; that a certain group of republican politicians believed that their party needed a martyr just at that juncture, and they thought mr. roach would make a good one. be this as it may, the government finished all the ships in the roach yard, 173and the “chicago,” contracted for july 26, 1883, was ready for her first commission the middle of april, 1889,—five years and nearly nine months building. we have dwelt with some prolixity on this branch of the subject for two reasons: first, because it was the beginning of the most important epoch in our naval history; and, second, because the errors, miscalculations, and consequent disasters it developed became themselves of very great value as object lessons for guidance or warning in subsequent transactions.
when mr. whitney became secretary in march, 1885, he found ready to his hand authorization for four more ships, the designs of which had been partially worked out by the bureaus during the previous winter. he, however, proceeded slowly; so deliberately, that the contract for the first of the four ships built under the authorization of march 3, 1885, and august 3, 1886, was not signed until december 17, 1886, a year and nine months after he assumed the office. this delay was due to a variety of causes, the most important of which are interestingly and instructively described by mr. cramp himself in an account of his personal connection with the transactions. it may be premised that when mr. whitney became secretary of the navy, he very soon 174sought to avail himself of mr. cramp’s experience, professional ability, and practical knowledge. mr. cramp responded in the same spirit of frankness and candor as that in which the secretary invited him. there was no mincing of matters in any direction. mr. cramp hewed to the line on all the abuses and shortcomings of the old régime, and he also pointed out methods by which they could be overcome or, at least, compelled to get out of the way. mr. whitney was a thorough business man and an able lawyer. far removed both by character and by fortune from any possible temptation, mr. whitney’s sole object in taking the navy portfolio was to promote the public welfare, and thereby add lustre to his name.
but let mr. cramp tell his own story in his own way.
the beginning of the new navy.
“the practical beginning of the new navy occurred under the administration of mr. chandler, and while he was secretary of the navy the ‘chicago,’ ‘boston,’ ‘atlanta,’ and ‘dolphin’ were constructed.
“the hulls of these vessels had been designed by the advisory board, and were about equal to any vessels constructed abroad at that time so far, i might say, as the models and general designs were concerned. their outfit and guns were not fairly up to the prevailing practice 175abroad, and their engines were very inefficient and commonplace. they were not designed by the board, but were principally the designs of the contractor. the ‘chicago’ had engines of quite a fantastic design, suggested by one of the members in the board. the models and designs of the hulls, as compared with what had preceded them in the navy department after the end of the civil war, were great achievements over the ridiculous specimens of the ship-building art that we were loaded with during that time. they were the production principally of messrs. steers and fernald, assisted by mr. bowles, and were up to most of the requirements of the time.
“when the vessels were tried under the following administration, that is, during the secretaryship of mr. whitney, it was found that the power of the engines and the consequent speed developed were not up to the requirements of the law, although it might be said that they were up to the requirements of the contract.
“there was some considerable delay on the part of the secretary, mr. whitney, in receiving the ships from the contractors on that particular account, a decision having been made by the attorney-general that vessels contracted for and subsequently not coming up to the requirements and not in full accordance with the law were worthless, and would not be accepted.
“a violent uproar pervaded the entire country at that time on account of what they called the hesitating attitude of mr. whitney.
“the political administration of the government having changed, it was asserted that it was on account of the politics of the contractor that the vessels had not been accepted. among the people who argued thus, all considerations of contract requirements of law were entirely ignored, and mr. whitney received untold denunciations 176from these sources; but he was one of those men whom adverse criticisms as to what he had done never disturb in the slightest degree.
“mr. whitney finally accepted the vessels conditionally, after more or less contention which consumed some little time. but no more unfair denunciation or criticism of the actions and efforts of any man ever occurred than fell to his lot at that time.
“the second lot of vessels was given out by mr. whitney, who succeeded mr. chandler. two of these vessels were built on plans provided by mr. whitney, and two were on modified plans of mr. chandler.
“in compliance with the provisions of the act which authorized the ‘secretary to prepare drawings,’ mr. whitney purchased from armstrong the drawings that had been prepared for the spanish government, and the drawings of the ‘naniwa khan,’ which ship they had built for japan. these two vessels became the ‘baltimore’ and ‘charleston.’ cruiser no. 1 of mr. chandler’s plans was not given out; as the bids were above the limitation price, the smaller cruiser was given out under modified conditions. this vessel became the ‘yorktown.’
“before the advertisement was printed, mr. whitney invited all of the expectant bidders to examine the plans and specifications which he had purchased, and without exception all recorded their indorsement, and some in extravagant terms. after mr. whitney’s retirement, the contractor who had indorsed them in the most extravagant manner was the first and only one to find fault.
“we bid on all the vessels and in accordance with the conditions of the advertisement with the exception of that of the ‘yorktown.’ on that vessel we bid on the government designs, and designs of our own which embodied a 177proposition to install the first triple-expansion engines in the navy. our bid for the ‘newark’ being higher than the government allowance, we did not get her. as i said before, she was not awarded.
“when it was found that mr. whitney had purchased abroad the drawings that i have already referred to,—the drawings of the vessels that ultimately came to be the ‘baltimore’ and ‘charleston,’—he was fiercely assailed by certain parties in the navy department, while certain others indorsed his action; but the bureau of construction and repair and the bureau of steam engineering were conspicuous in their opposition. the most conspicuous in support of the secretary was commodore walker. we received our share of adverse criticism because we had indorsed the steps he had taken.
“the design of the ‘baltimore’ and the ‘charleston’ represented the best types of vessels that were constructed up to that time. they were far in advance of any other war-ships of that period, and in fact they really formed the basis of future constructions in the world’s navies.
“it was more by good luck than by good management that mr. whitney secured those particular drawings which proved to be of such superior character. they were offered to our naval attaché, who happened to be abroad in england at that time, by the armstrong company. they had designed the two vessels which subsequently became the ‘baltimore’ and ‘charleston’ of our navy. the design of the ‘baltimore’ was made in competition with thompson for the spanish government. for certain reasons, which i need not mention here, the designs of thompson were accepted and the contract for the construction of the ship was awarded to them. she was known as the ‘reina regente.’ it was at this point that the armstrongs presented their rejected drawing and the drawings for the 178‘naniwa khan’ for sale to our naval attaché there. they had already built two vessels like the ‘naniwa khan’ for the japanese navy. these vessels were looked upon by the experts of the naval world as being the two best specimens of their type that had ever been built up to that time.
“at the time the sale was made, the armstrongs, knowing nothing of the capabilities of this country and having, like most british ship-builders and many americans at that time, a very mean and very poor opinion of every ship-builder in this country, they suggested that, in awarding the contract, a condition should be inserted providing for the payment of superintendents whom they should send over from their works to superintend the building, and designing of the engines, and operating them after their completion. considering what to them appeared a barbarian incapacity on our part, they were loath to risk their reputation without protection.
“we accepted the condition at the time, anxious to get the contracts, feeling sure that it would never be needed, and that we could prevail upon mr. whitney and the naval people as to the impropriety of it.
“after the contract was awarded and the work was started, mr. whitney concluded that, notwithstanding the provision was there, he would never use it, and never require it of us.
“in fact, we made a great many improvements in the boilers of the ‘baltimore,’ and some improvements in the engines. these improvements in the boilers of the ‘baltimore’ formed the basis and the standard of construction of all the scotch boilers that have been built for the navy since that time.
“at the beginning of our work on these ships we did not get much co-operation on the part of some of the 179bureaus, in view of the foreign character of most of the work, and in view, too, of the fact that some of it was of our own, both being equally obnoxious, as they originated outside of the bureaus. we met with a great deal of opposition at the beginning in getting up the specifications and plans.
“certain subsequent changes in the personnel that were made in the bureau of steam engineering—mr. melville having been placed at the head of it—modified the situation, and he joined the secretary in his efforts with his usual vigor. a part of the trouble i refer to in getting a start on the work was owing to lack of experience and knowledge of contract and specification requirements which were placed in the law department of the navy for the first time.
“the law department of the navy at that time was beginning to make a show, and to them, under some mistake, was delegated the getting up of the contracts and specifications. it was here where my trouble commenced. the law department endeavored to provide for everything that could possibly occur, or everything that they thought would occur, and for many matters that could not be considered at all; and the specifications soon began to assume enormous proportions, being filled with impossible requirements.
“i got over most of these difficulties and minor details which they intended to lug into the contract by having introduced at the termination of certain paragraphs of the specifications, where explanations were unsatisfactory, misleading, and inadequate, a clause using the words: ‘as the department may determine.’
“my previous experience with the navy department and naval officials generally led me to believe that i could always make out my case when it was right.
180“at the beginning of the work, mr. whitney notified us that he considered himself and all the naval officials as partners and associates of the contractor, each mutually interested and determined to get the best vessel they could for the navy. he considered that the government ought to co-operate with the contractors, and that the contractors should in turn co-operate with the government; that the inspector was not an enemy, and never once considered him so. he considered it was his duty to afford all encouragement possible in aiding the contractors to carry out the plans. during the close of a conversation which i had with mr. whitney at one time during that period, he said to me: ‘i want you to inform me of what you see going wrong, no matter where the fault originated; and i will hold you personally responsible in every case where you neglect to inform me whenever anything is not going right or not being done right, whether it be your own fault or that of the government.’
“coming back to the ships and referring to the purchasing of the drawings abroad: at the time that mr. whitney bought those drawings, it occurred to us that the triple-expansion engine which was being developed by kirk was a marked advance over the plain compound of elder; and i suggested to mr. whitney the propriety of buying plans of triple-expansion engines from us for the smaller ship which afterward was the ‘yorktown.’ of course this was before the ships were given out. he told us to go ahead. we went to work and made the drawings, which we thought were much in advance of anything of that kind in existence, and we fully expected that they would be bought by mr. whitney, as he had purchased the foreign drawings. when the drawings were finished, i took them down to washington and showed them to him. he was at this time so disgusted with and 181tired of the great uproar that had been made about purchasing drawings abroad, that he did not say much about it. he did not decline, however, to buy them; but, finding that he was not enthusiastic, i accepted promptly the situation, and simply exhibited them to him as something we had gotten up. i then returned home and threw them aside, and prepared for the coming opening of the bids which had been advertised for in the papers. the day before the bids were to be opened, i suddenly conceived the idea of giving the triple-expansion plans another chance by making an alternative bid on the ‘yorktown,’ embodying engines of the triple-expansion type. so i rushed back to philadelphia, got the drawings that we had previously prepared, and returned to washington in time to put them in with our other bid for the ‘yorktown.’ as we were responsible for the horse-power, weight, etc., we felt that we could get it a great deal better, and more satisfactory results all around, with triple-expansion engines than with uncertain and unknown performance of the bureau drawings. our bid being lowest on triple-expansion engines, being the only one, the contract was awarded to us.
“the success of these engines in the ‘yorktown’ was of a highly marked character, and it emboldened us to introduce them in our bids for the new lot of construction that had been advertised for.
“it was at this time the new york herald published in large type a paper of mine on the triple-expansion engine, and commodore walker had it printed in the reports of the information bureau. walker was always in the front when a good thing was to be promoted, and was conspicuous in his co-operation with mr. whitney.
“when the ships that followed the ‘baltimore’ were given out, we secured the contracts for the construction of 182the ‘philadelphia’ and ‘newark.’ we bid on the ‘newark’ a second time. a great deal of unpleasant feeling was manifested on the part of the bureau of construction when we failed to bid within the limitation price at the time she was first advertised. we introduced in her, however, the triple-expansion engine in place of the department’s. we also bid on ‘philadelphia’ with hull duplicate of the ‘baltimore,’ with triple-expansion engines of the same type as the ‘yorktown.’
“what ultimately became the ‘san francisco’ was given to mr. scott, who bid on the basis of ‘baltimore’s’ plans of hull with the ‘baltimore’s’ engines. after the contract was awarded to him, he agreed to substitute the ‘newark’s’ hull plans in place of the ‘baltimore’ type with a design of engine that the bureau of steam engineering had made at our shipyard by some of their officers who were on duty there and certain of our draughtsmen,—a type of engine that they considered to be an improvement over the ‘baltimore’s’ engines. the department granted this substitution.
“the bureaus that had denounced mr. whitney for buying foreign drawings had been spending money very lavishly for some years in securing plans abroad. the bureau of steam engineering and the bureau of construction were spending about $100,000 a year in the purchase of drawings.
“the hull of the ‘yorktown,’ which was designed by the bureau, was based on the design of the ‘archer’ class.
“the ‘newark,’ which was also designed by the bureau at that time, was based on the design of the ‘mersey’ class as to specifications and general construction, while the model was not of that class.
battleship retvizan—russian
“the bureau of engineering, which had been laboring for some years with a view to a consolidation of all of 183the constructive departments of the navy,—hulls, engines, guns,—under their bureau, bought abroad entire plans of ships, hulls, and engines combined. i saw a complete set of plans and drawings of the ‘polyphemus,’ which was designed as a sort of ram by the british government, and also the two vessels ‘warspite’ and ‘impérieuse,’ rather of a fantastic design, which the british government was building. these vessels were somewhat of a departure from previous vessels constructed in the british navy and were very crude. they were designed by some one in england who was not up to the capabilities of his fellow-constructors there. they were not duplicated. they are the poorest specimens of ships in the british navy.
“mr. whitney was exceedingly fortunate in the officer whom he found at the head of the most important bureau. this was commodore john g. walker, then chief of the bureau of navigation, and unquestionably the ablest and most forceful man of his time in the navy. american naval officers, as a rule, are able men in the professional sense; but walker, while equal to the very best and superior to most of them in that regard, possessed an additional fund of tact, equipment, and energy in purely administrative directions seldom equalled and never surpassed in the history of our navy. he had enjoyed, also, considerable experience in civic responsibility, having been for a considerable period identified with the management of an important railway corporation prior to his appointment as chief of the bureau in 1881. his term of four years was about to expire when mr. whitney assumed office, but at the instance of the latter he was immediately reappointed, and served through the entire term until 1889. commodore walker was exactly the man for the place, which was that of chief adviser to the secretary. to a 184perfect acquaintance with the personnel of the service, he joined a freedom from narrow predilections and selfish aims seldom found in any veteran regular officer of any branch, and his sense of the material needs of the navy was broad, keen, and practical. moreover, in mental character and manly temperament he was congenial to mr. whitney. for these reasons, and imbued with a common purpose, commodore walker and the secretary coalesced from the first day of their association, and remained in the most perfect accord throughout the four most important years in the history of the new navy. on some occasions it happened that walker sustained the secretary and helped him carry out most important reforms and policies of progress against powerful opposition in the navy itself and in the department.
“commodore walker’s influence among senators and representatives in congress, built up during his first four years in the bureau, was superior to that of any other officer, and occasionally it proved equal to that of a considerable majority of them combined. his powers were uniformly exerted in behalf of the readiest and most practical methods of increasing the navy in number, excellence, and force of its ships and in organization and training of its personnel. against all efforts to perpetuate the obsolete, cumbrous, and abnormal navy-yard system of construction he set his face with all the strength and resolution he possessed. for detailed discussion of the questions involved in this phase of the subject, neither the limitations of space nor the patience of scientific readers offer opportunity. suffice it to say, that the antique, red-tape-ridden and muddle-brained policy of trying to build new ships of the modern type under military methods was in the main abandoned.
“commodore walker also ably supported mr. whitney’s 185policy of purchasing modern designs and plans of hulls and machinery abroad, a policy which a large and influential group of naval officers vehemently opposed. on the whole, it is not too much to say that, in the all-round importance of his usefulness to the new navy, commodore walker fairly divided honors with mr. whitney himself.
“that walker’s all-round ability and energy were understood and appreciated by others besides secretary whitney is abundantly attested by the fact that upon his retirement in 1897, at the age of sixty-two, he was appointed chairman or president of the isthmian canal commission, which he still holds at this writing (1903), in his seventieth year. taking his career altogether from graduation at the naval academy in 1856; then through the civil war, in which he played a distinguished part; then for some time in the civic pursuits already mentioned; then as chief of bureau and principal adviser to the secretary for eight years; then as admiral in command of the ‘white squadron’; and, finally, as president of the canal commission, it is safe to say that few officers in our navy have done more important public service than john g. walker.”
the most important matter adjusted in the conferences of mr. cramp with mr. whitney was the arrangement of the form of contract so that it might be, within a narrow margin, flexible or elastic. the operation of other contracts had clearly shown the need of such modification, and a solution was reached without difficulty, though not without much deliberation.
186the matter under immediate consideration was the form of contract for the “baltimore.” the guarantee to be required was that her engines should develop a mean of 9000 collective indicated horse-power for four consecutive hours, a lower or minimum limit being also prescribed. they had before them the form of contract for the roach ships.
mr. cramp remarked that the guarantee for the “baltimore” was 9000 indicated horse-power.
“suppose, mr. secretary,” he said, “that we should use that form of contract, and the engines of the ‘baltimore’ should develop only 8999 indicated horse-power, what could you do?”
“well, mr. cramp, under this form of contract, construed according to law, i could not accept her. there ought to be a way of averting such a possibility. what can you suggest?”
mr. cramp then proposed to apply to our naval contracts the principle often recognized in agreements for construction of merchant steamships and also in the naval contracts of foreign governments, namely, a sliding scale of penalties for deficiency in performance, with a minimum limit; and, in case the ship should prove unable to reach the minimum limit after 187a fair number of trials, the owner (if a merchant vessel) or the government (if a naval ship) might at will either reject her altogether or accept her under a supplemental agreement. mr. cramp also explained the usual basis upon which penalties for deficiency were computed and imposed in our own merchant practice and in foreign navies.
the secretary assented to this suggestion, and pronounced it the only business-like plan for solution of the difficulty he had heard. but he said that, in order to make the arrangement perfectly equitable, there should be a premium for excess over and above guaranteed performance, corresponding to or commensurate with the penalty for deficiency.
these discussions led to the adoption of what became known as the premium system. some time afterward, when mr. whitney was before the naval committee, the subject came up, and one member referred to it as “a bonus to contractors.”
“if you use the word ‘bonus’ in the sense of a gift,” said the secretary, “it is a misapprehension. it is part of an equitable transaction. performance is a prime element of value in a ship-of-war. we stipulate in our contracts for a specific performance. we consider the guaranteed performance as representing 188the normal value of the ship. if upon trial the performance falls below the normal, it reduces the value of the ship to that extent, and we meet it with proportionate penalties deducted from the contract price. but if upon trial the performance exceeds the normal, the value of the ship is increased, and we propose to meet such cases with premium proportionate to the excess of guaranteed performance. in either case we simply pay for as good a ship as we get, be it above or below the normal. it is a poor rule that won’t work both ways.”
mr. whitney’s terse observations embodied the whole logic of the penalty and premium system, and his argument was so conclusive that no further discussion seemed to be desired. the system remained in effect nearly ten years, and was applied to every vessel built for the new navy up to and including the “iowa” and “brooklyn.” every ship built by mr. cramp earned a premium for excess of either indicated horse-power or speed. none of his ships exhibited deficiency. the list is rather interesting, because it exhibits more graphically than any other method could do the actual extent to which the contract requirement was exceeded in each case. 189
“yorktown” (horse-power) $39,825.00
“baltimore” (horse-power) 106,441.00
“newark” (horse-power) 36,857.00
“philadelphia” (speed) 100,000.00
“new york” (speed) 200,000.00
“columbia” (speed) 300,000.00
“minneapolis” (speed) 414,600.00
“indiana” (speed) 50,000.00
“massachusetts” (speed) 100,000.00
“iowa” (speed) 217,420.00
“brooklyn” (speed) 350,000.00
–––––––––––
$1,915,143.00
when the administration of mr. whitney ended in march, 1889, he left over to his successor the most important work in the way of new departure yet attempted. of his successor, general b. f. tracy, of new york, mr. cramp, speaking of the man and the task before him, says:
“secretary tracy entered the navy department under very favorable auspices. he was himself free from entanglements, political or personal. his previous public life, aside from service as a colonel and brigadier-general in the civil war, had been confined to legal and judicial positions, his highest post having been that of justice of the new york court of appeals, the court of last resort. to the affairs of the navy department in general he applied the judicial habits formed on the bench. in technical matters, he enjoyed at the outset of his administration the continuing services of commodore—now 190become rear-admiral—walker, whose term extended till december, 1889; and who, by the way, had the honor, after eight years of service as chief of bureau, to command the first american squadron of modern war-ships known to history as ‘the white squadron.’
“with regard to the task of rebuilding the navy, which was then, and still is, the chief responsibility of a secretary, mr. tracy had but to carry on a programme already well begun. he was not, however, content with following simply the lines laid out before him. he at once proceeded to lengthen them and to widen their scope. under his administration was begun and carried out the ‘battle-ship and armored cruiser programme’ which gave to the navy the fleet that made our success in the spanish war so swift and so easy.
“the distinguishing traits of tracy’s administration were the unbroken co-operation between the executive and legislative branches of the government in everything pertaining to the new navy, and the remarkable progress made in size, power, speed, and other prime qualities of war-ships, together with the almost incredible development of all contributory industries. in this connection should also be mentioned the constant and powerful support which president harrison gave to the secretary of the navy in every possible manner, from first to last.
“in his methods of considering propositions laid before him, mr. tracy was always deliberate and cautious; but in executing a programme once resolved upon, he was equally prompt and peremptory. he never determined to begin anything until he could foresee the end of it, and when he had reached a conclusion on that basis he was wont to push practical operations with untiring energy. in some respects, when giving preliminary consideration 191to subjects, he may have been less self-reliant or more disposed to feel the influence of his military subordinates than mr. whitney was; but in energy of execution he had no superior. as a general consequence, mr. tracy’s four years in the navy department made a history that compares favorably with that of any predecessor from the foundation of the department itself in 1797 to his own time.
“one of the first and most important matters that came before secretary tracy was the design of the armored cruiser ‘new york,’ the appropriation for its construction having been one of the last acts of the congress that went out with mr. whitney. this ship was intended to be an echo to the ‘blake’ and ‘blenheim’ type of protected cruisers, and they were the largest heretofore constructed. the question was asked by the secretary of the head of one of the bureaus, during the discussion of the details of the ship, if there could not be an improvement in the salient features of the design over the ‘blake,’ as merely copying her was obnoxious to him. he had heard of the ‘dupuy de lome,’ the first of the armored cruisers, and he conceived the idea of adding vertical armor on the sides of the ship in addition to the sloping armor of the protected deck as an additional protection, and of sufficient importance to warrant its adoption in the new design. he argued that no projectile could penetrate the outer plates and strike the sloping plate at the same angle in both, etc.
“strong objections were urged by the head of the bureau who had been consulted about it, and the legend of weights of the ‘blake’ as published and the distribution of them in the ‘blake’ were shown with the assertion that nothing could be done. the secretary became more persistent as the opposition increased, and the wires between 192the department and the british admiralty became hot from the number of messages that passed as to the ‘blake’ and ‘blenheim.’
“while the secretary was perplexed with the opposition of officers who should have aided rather than opposed him, we happened to meet, and he asked if i could duplicate the ‘blake’ and her performance if side armor of moderate thickness were added, and also asked my views of the ‘dupuy de lome’ and other ships of the same kind.
“i promptly stated that i could do it, and explained the idea of ‘dupuy de lome,’ also giving him the names of three other armored cruisers the french had under way. i went into the secretary’s room at 3 p.m. and discussed the whole subject with him till 8 p.m.; then left, and promised to return promptly with additional information.
“at the next interview i furnished the secretary with a complete detail of what would be required to make an armored cruiser on the ‘blake’s’ dimensions and performance, and stated that i would like to bid in class ii on an alternative design with side armor.
“the secretary handed my details and allotment of weights to the proper officer, and the department proceeded to get up the plans and specifications. frequent interviews with the secretary occurred as the work progressed, and i felt sure that under class ii, permitting alternative designs, the contract would be awarded. before the time for awarding the contract had arrived, i found that the plans were being developed under the conditions that i had given the secretary; but when the plans were exhibited before bids were sent in, it transpired that the boilers had been placed three abreast in 193the government plans, bringing them within a few feet of the side of the ship.
“i then designed a plan for arranging the six boilers in pairs, making the coal-bunkers on the sides of the ship. this arrangement of coal-bunkers facilitated the prompt coaling of the ship and the handling of it. it also permitted a liberal amount of ‘coal protection’ for the boilers and engines, which was considered of important value at that time, and, what was of more weight than any other consideration, the introduction of two longitudinal bulkheads that extended the entire length of the engine and boiler spaces on each side of the ship. with three boilers abreast, the ship was liable to be sunk at any time by a collision with a coal-barge or passing schooner; any penetration of the side abreast of boiler, besides resulting in a speedy foundering, would certainly unship the side boiler, adding thereby an explosion to the other damage.
“with the boilers in pairs, it would be necessary for a ramming vessel to penetrate the side and two bulkheads and enter ten feet to do any damage, so the chances of being destroyed by ramming would be reduced to a minimum. i also lengthened the vessel over the department’s plan, but kept all the conditions of specifications intact, except as to dimensions.
“after the bids were opened, it was found that ours was the lowest in class ii, and lower than any other bid, taking the competition as a whole. the secretary then called a conference, at which all the bidders and the chief constructor were present, and, after thorough discussion of all the points involved, awarded the contract to the cramp company under the bid in class ii on the modified plan i had suggested and offered as to boiler arrangement and other details conformable to it.
194“the ship was named the ‘new york,’ and on trial trip she largely exceeded her contract speed and requirements of coal endurance and in all other respects; while the ‘blake’ on trial was a failure; her engines had to be practically rebuilt, and then did not come within the scope of reasonable competition.
“mr. tracy can fairly claim credit for the design of the ‘new york,’ and the project for the construction of the ‘indiana,’ ‘massachusetts,’ and the ‘oregon’ class of battleships was also due to his foresight.”
it is not within the scope of this memoir to trace the progress of the new navy ship by ship, or even by naval programmes from year to year. for the purpose of this work, it suffices to say that, of the total number of battleships, armored cruisers, and first-class protected cruisers actually in service at this writing (1903), mr. cramp has built about a majority as against all other american ship-builders combined. there are ten battleships in commission, of which mr. cramp has built five; two armored cruisers, both built by him; ten protected cruisers of the first class, of which five hail from cramps’ shipyard: that is to say, a total of twenty-two vessels, all first-class in their respective types, of which mr. cramp has built twelve as against ten by all other american ship-builders put together, navy-yards included.
battleship retvizan—docking with submarine
of course, we exclude from this reckoning 195the two show-ships built by armstrong for a south american government and foolishly bought by our navy department in the paroxysmal flurry incident to the outbreak of the spanish war. the main excuse for buying them was that, if we did not, spain would. so be it. better to have let spain buy them, if they could not have strengthened her navy more than they did ours. at any rate, had spain bought them, we might have captured or destroyed them, as we did nearly all her ships. they would probably have been worth capture or destruction, but they were never worth buying.
since 1887, a period of sixteen years, mr. cramp has completed fifteen ships for the navy (including the “vesuvius” and “terror”), and is building three more at this writing. in every case these ships embody in plan and design more or less of his own knowledge, skill, and experience. in some cases the designs are altogether his own. in others the machinery is his, with important modifications of the department’s hull. in no case has he built a ship wholly upon the plans of the department. while this has redounded to the benefit of the navy, it would be idle to say that it has been in the long run advantageous to mr. cramp. on the other hand, its tendency 196has been otherwise: a certain class of naval officers have chosen to consider mr. cramp’s constantly recurring propositions to modify and improve their designs as having the force and effect of criticisms, and, to say the least, they have not been grateful to him for his pains. on the contrary, no little jealousy and some resentment have been the results, and he has been made to feel their consequences more than once. the chief misfortune of this state of affairs is that it precludes the cordial co-operation which should exist between officers of the navy department and a contractor engaged in building naval vessels, and creates in its stead a sense of antagonism which tends to augment the difficulties of naval construction, which are great and perplexing enough at the best.
but mr. cramp has not concerned himself with the building of naval ships alone. he has delved into the problems presented by the uses to which the ships are put when completed. the results of his observations in this direction were embodied in an address to the naval war college read before that institution, june 18, 1897, by invitation of the commandant, a little less than a year before the spanish war. the experience of that struggle, brief as it 197was, and decided almost wholly by sea power, made this paper little short of prophetic.
some extracts from it will serve to exhibit the trend of mr. cramp’s thought in the direction of the practical uses and needs of ships-of-war after they leave the ship-builder’s hands. among other things he said:
“the accomplishment of the objects of sea-warfare will depend partly upon the character of the armaments and partly on the wisdom with which their operations are directed; nor can any one gainsay that the wisdom of direction will depend on the conversancy of officers with the nature and necessities of the material units of which the armaments are composed.
“these propositions being taken for granted, it becomes clear that there can be no effective system of teaching the art of naval warfare which does not embrace exhaustive study of and consequent close familiarity with the instruments by which the principles of the art are to be carried into force and effect.
“from this point of view it must be admitted that questions within the province of the naval architect and problems which he is best qualified to solve form an essential part of such a curriculum in its largest and most comprehensive aspects.
“the unvarying tendency of naval progress is to exalt the importance of the naval architect and to augment the value of the constructor as a factor in the sum-total of sea power.
“the naval armament of to-day is a mechanism. if we view it as a single ship, it is a mechanical unit whose warlike value depends on its excellence as a fighting machine. 198if we view it as a fleet, it is an assembly of mechanical units, the warlike value of which will depend alike on the excellence of each unit as a fighting machine, and on the adaptation of each unit to its consorts to produce the most symmetrical efficiency of the group as a whole.
“for this reason, the word seamanship, in the old-fashioned or conventional sense, has ceased to cover adequately the requirements of knowledge, skill, and aptness which the modern conditions of naval warfare impose upon the officer in command or subordinate.
“by this i mean not to depreciate seamanship pure and simple, but to point out that modern conditions require an enlargement of the meaning of the term and a broadening of its scope of function far beyond the exactions of any former period.
“in the old days there was no essential difference in ships except in size. experience in a sloop-of-war qualified an officer to assume, at once and in full efficiency, equivalent duties in a frigate, a seventy-four, or a three-decker. familiarity with one ship, irrespective of rate, was familiarity with all ships. tactical lessons learned in man?uvring one fleet were alike applicable to the man?uvring of all fleets. even the application of steam as a propulsive auxiliary in its earlier stages did not radically alter the old conditions. at all events, it did not practically erase them, as the present development has done.
“this growth of complexity and elaboration, and this almost infinite multiplication of parts and devices in modern ships, have entailed upon the naval architect and constructor demands and difficulties never dreamed of in the earlier days. the staff required to design and construct an ‘iowa’ is multiplied in number, and the complexity 199of its organization augmented, as compared with that required for the design and construction of the ‘new ironsides,’ almost infinitely.
“similar conditions apply to command and management; so that, while the building of a modern battleship entails enormous work and responsibility on the naval architect, constructor, and staff, the effective use of her as a tool in the trade of war presents an equal variety and intricacy of problems to students of the art of naval warfare in this college.
“such questions and such problems cannot be relegated to the category of details. even if we consider the art of naval warfare in the aspects only of strategy and tactics, both will be affected for better or for worse by the behavior and performance of the units composing the force in operation. this being admitted, it follows that the behavior and performance of the units will be as the knowledge and capacity of captains and their staffs, and that no extent of skill and capacity in the admiral directing the whole can overcome or evade the consequences of incapacity and failure on the part of a captain commanding a part.
“as the speed of any fleet is that of its slowest ship, so will its man?uvring power be limited by the capacity of its poorest captain. as it might easily happen that the slowest or least handy ship and the poorest captain would be joined, the quality of the other ships and the ability of the other officers would go for nothing.
“in view of the complex character of the ships themselves, and the difficulty and danger of man?uvring them under the most favorable conditions, as pointed out, the experience of the first general action will demonstrate the necessity of having all the battleships in a fleet as nearly alike as possible in size, type, and capacity of performance. 200such provision would not equalize the personal factor of different commanding officers, but it would at least give them all an equal chance at the start.
“for this reason i have always considered it unwise to multiply types or to modify seriously those which the best judgment we are able to form approves.
“these considerations seem conclusive against multiplication of types, and in favor of adhering to one that plainly meets the requirements of our national situation and policy.
“the composition of a battleship fleet under such conditions would minimize the tactical dangers and difficulties referred to earlier, but they would still remain very great, and nothing can mitigate them except frequent and arduous drill in squadron of evolution, so that our captains may become familiar with their weapons before being called upon to use them in actual battle. there will be scant opportunity to drill a battleship squadron after the outbreak of war.
“in my judgment, it is hardly possible to overvalue the importance of homogeneity in fleet organizations, and i am sure that the very first and perhaps greatest lesson taught by an encounter between fleets of modern battleships will be the advantage of similarity of type and equality of performance in the units of action.
“to this element of the art of naval warfare, then, i would invite your most earnest and penetrating attention and study.
“assuming this problem to be satisfactorily solved and the material of the fleet in the most effective possible condition, so far as relation of units to each other and to the sum-total is concerned, we have still left for consideration the difference between men, the lack of uniformity in personnel. homogeneity of material may be 201attained by adherence to a wise programme of design and construction; but homogeneity of personnel, in the sense of uniform capacity and efficiency among individuals, is beyond human art or science to produce, because the difference between men is the decree of a higher power. the existence of this college is itself a devout recognition of that great fact, because its whole objective is to mitigate or minify as much as possible this inherent human frailty, by exhausting the resources of training and study, of precept and example.
“i do not by any means argue that the commander of a ship should be a naval architect or constructor. but, having familiarized himself with the principles of that art which touch directly and immediately his function of handling his ship under sea conditions of common occurrence, and having gained sufficient knowledge of her traits, he should be able to form an instant and correct judgment as to her point of best behavior in any sea-way. it goes without saying that sea experience is the only school in which these problems can be worked out.
“knowledge of that character cannot be acquired by study of the experience of others. close and earnest attention to this course of, at best partial, information cannot serve as a substitute for experience of one’s own. at most it can only provide a sound basis on which to take quick advantage of one’s own experience, when confronted with an actual situation.
“this brings me to the proposition that the modern battleship, with all its complexities, weights, and peculiarities of design and model, entails upon commanding officers a new requirement which i can find no better terms to describe than ‘battleship seamanship.’ it is a development of the seafaring art which, as events have proved, is by no means yet mastered in the greatest and most actively 202exercised navy of the world; therefore it would be too much to expect its mastery in navies of far less magnitude and, hence, less means for distribution of opportunities to gain experience.
“it therefore follows indisputably that navies of the lesser magnitude should constantly exhaust their means of enabling officers to gain sea experience by keeping all their large ships in active evolution all the time.
“having thus viewed the modern battleship as a mechanical unit herself, we may profitably pass to brief consideration of the great number and variety of mechanisms composing her. in the strict professional or technical sense, these mechanisms concern mainly the engineer and the electrician. but as the foundation of all warlike efficiency in personnel is discipline, and as the foundation of all discipline is the inevitable principle of a single head, one commander, who is to all intents and purposes an absolute monarch, it should follow that ‘the king can do no wrong.’
“i have already remarked that the captain need not be a naval architect or constructor to comprehend and be able to apply the group of principles of that art which touch his functions directly in managing his ship as a whole; likewise, i would say here that he need not be engineer or electrician in his relation to the numerous and diverse mechanisms whose proper operation and control are essential to the efficiency of his command.
“but, if he really commands, he must know enough about the instruments that do his work to know when they are doing it well and when not; to know whether his subordinates immediately in charge of the several devices are operating them properly or not; to know when defects exist and when they have been made good. if he does not know or cannot learn these things, he must 203depend wholly on subordinates immediately in charge; and their reports will be law to him, or if not law, at least decisions from which he has no appeal. manifestly such a situation is utterly incompatible with the independent and self-relying autocracy which is the essential and fundamental principle of naval command, without which discipline must sooner or later vanish into mere empty form or conventional myth. these facts, even more than any other considerations, argue for uniformity of type, previously touched upon, so that in learning the traits of one battleship the officer acquires experience and knowledge applicable at once to the discharge of his duties in another.
“the foregoing discussion is limited to matters affecting the unit of action, the single ship, and the captain. passing to consideration of the unit of operation, the fleet and the admiral, we find another array of problems equally within the scope of this paper.
“let us assume that the composition of the fleet has been made as nearly homogeneous as possible, by carrying out the principles previously stated for ships and their captains, and that the admiral finds himself in command of an ideal fleet as to material and personnel. actual differences in efficiency among the several units of action will still remain, and it will become the first duty of the admiral to ascertain and locate these diversities with unerring judgment and unsparing perception. he should know to a nicety the personal equation of every captain and the effective individuality of every ship.
“among the captains he should be able to differentiate the traits of relative quickness of perception, promptness of action, readiness of responsibility, and boldness of execution.”
204among the most important services of mr. cramp to the new navy was his instrumentality in bringing about the system of classifying bids. prior to 1885, whenever contract construction was to be done, the plans of the department, pure and simple, were the standard. if any bidder proposed to deviate from them in any way,—no matter how palpable the improvement,—his bid would be held irregular and thrown out. the issue came on the machinery of the ships authorized by the act of march 3, 1885. of these four ships, the “baltimore’s” plans had been purchased abroad, hull and machinery, and were accepted practically without change. but the department’s design involved the then nearly, if not quite, obsolete compound engine for the other three, “newark,” “yorktown,” and “petrel.” mr. cramp, desiring to bid on the “newark” and “yorktown,” was doubtful whether he could develop the indicated horse-power, which the form of contract required him to guarantee, with the department’s compound engines. he was, however, confident that he could do it with triple-expansion engines of his own design.
to overcome the difficulty, he suggested to secretary whitney that, in issuing the circular asking for proposals, a classification of bids be 205provided for. this suggestion was at once adopted, and bids were authorized to be offered in three classes: class i, the department’s plans pure and simple; class ii, the department’s plans modified by the bidder as to hull or machinery or both; and class iii, the bidder’s plans wholly. this arrangement broke up the embargo of the bureaus, and admitted the results of the study, experience, and skill of practical ship-builders. some of the bureaus fought the plan with all their energy, but the contest they made had no other result than to convince them that mr. whitney was the de facto as well as the de jure head of the department,—a quite novel experience for them! some time afterward classes ii and iii were merged, so that all departures from the department’s plans, whether modifications of them or complete substitution of bidder’s plans for them, were grouped under class ii, which has become the established practice in inviting proposals. mr. cramp’s bids have usually been in class ii; involving in most cases more or less extensive modifications of the department’s plans, and in two cases, the “philadelphia” and the “maine,” his own plans complete. the value of this new departure lay in the fact that it gave the navy department the benefit of all the progress of 206the country in the ship-building art as actually practised by men who were building ships for a living, and emancipated it from the dominion of the cloister. it has become a part of the permanent policy of the government.
cruiser variag—russian
the history of mr. cramp’s contributions to the new navy must, at this writing, be left an unfinished chapter. having built and delivered to the government five first-class battleships, two first-rate armored cruisers, five first-class protected cruisers, together with a double-turreted monitor, a gunboat and a torpedo vessel, he is yet building three armored cruisers of the largest dimensions and most approved type. his contributions to the literature of the subject, ranging over a score of years, have been in their way of hardly less importance and interest than his achievements in producing its warlike material. their full test, in all forms and through all channels,—hearings before committees, communications to the navy department and its bureaus, newspaper interviews and magazine papers,—would, if reproduced in extenso, fill two volumes larger than this one. suffice it to say here that there is no practical subject pertaining to naval art or science, from the design and construction of ships-of-war to their management in service, which he has not from time 207to time discussed as opportunity offered or occasion required. if he has at times shown a spirit approaching intolerance when dealing with invasions of his profession by inexperienced, untrained, or incapable men, it may be explained by the logic of a favorite quotation of his own, “fools rush in where angels fear to tread!” be this as it may, it is yet to be said that, if not always charitable in his criticisms and not always liberal in the standard of competency which he has set so high and maintained so vigorously, his professional motives have always been worthy and his efforts sincere and earnest. whatever may be the future growth or achievements of the modern american navy, the name of charles h. cramp will ever be found indelibly stamped upon its historical origin and primary development. the ships he has built have won battles, gained campaigns, and vanquished the enemies of the country in war. they have held the lead in renewing the one-time waning naval prestige of our flag, and in restoring the sea power of the united states to its rightful rank among the nations.
