the president inaugurated on the fourth day of march, 1893, and those associated with him as cabinet officials, encountered, during their term of executive duty, unusual and especially perplexing difficulties. the members of that administration who still survive, in recalling the events of this laborious service, cannot fail to fix upon the years 1894 and 1895 as the most troublous and anxious of their incumbency. during those years unhappy currency complications compelled executive resort to heroic treatment for the preservation of our nation’s financial integrity, and forced upon the administration a constant, unrelenting struggle for sound money; a long and persistent executive effort to accomplish beneficent and satisfactory tariff reform so nearly miscarried as to bring depression and disappointment 80 to the verge of discouragement; and it was at the close of the year 1895 that executive insistence upon the monroe doctrine culminated in a situation that gave birth to solemn thoughts of war. without attempting to complete the list of troubles and embarrassments that beset the administration during these luckless years, i have reserved for separate and more detailed treatment one of its incidents not yet mentioned, which immensely increased executive anxiety and foreboded the most calamitous and far-reaching consequences.
in the last days of june, 1894, a very determined and ugly labor disturbance broke out in the city of chicago. almost in a night it grew to full proportions of malevolence and danger. rioting and violence were its early accompaniments; and it spread so swiftly that within a few days it had reached nearly the entire western and southwestern sections of our country. railroad transportation was especially involved in its attacks. the carriage of united states mails was interrupted, interstate commerce was obstructed, and railroad property was riotously destroyed.
this disturbance is often called “the chicago strike.” it is true that its beginning was in that city; and the headquarters of those who 81 inaugurated it and directed its operations were located there; but the name thus given to it is an entire misnomer so far as it applies to the scope and reach of the trouble. railroad operations were more or less affected in twenty-seven states and territories; and in all these the interposition of the general government was to a greater or less extent invoked.
this wide-spread trouble had its inception in a strike by the employees of the pullman palace car company, a corporation located and doing business at the town of pullman, which is within the limits of the city of chicago. this company was a manufacturing corporation—or at least it was not a railroad corporation. its main object was the operation and running of sleeping- and parlor-cars upon railroads under written contracts; but its charter contemplated the manufacture of cars as well; and soon after its incorporation it began the manufacture of its own cars and, subsequently, the manufacture of cars for the general market.
the strike on the part of the employees of this company began on the eleventh day of may, 1894, and was provoked by a reduction of wages. 82
the american railway union was organized in the summer of 1893. it was professedly an association of all the different classes of railway employees. in its scope and intent it was the most compact and effective organization of the kind ever attempted. its purpose was a thorough unification of defensive and offensive effort among railway employees under one central direction, and the creation of a combination embracing all such employees, which should make the grievances of any section of its membership a common cause. those prominent in this project estimated that various other organizations of railroad employees then existing had a membership of 102,000 in the united states and neighboring countries; and they claimed that these brotherhoods, because of divided councils and for other reasons, were ineffective, and that nearly 1,000,000 railroad employees still remained unorganized.
the wonderful growth of this new combination is made apparent by the fact that between the month of august, 1893, and the time it became involved in the pullman strike, in june, 1894, it had enrolled nearly 150,000 members.
the employees of the pullman palace car company could not on any reasonable and 83 consistent theory be regarded as eligible to membership in an organization devoted to the interests of railway employees; and yet, during the months of march, april, and may, 1894, it appears that nearly 4000 of these employees were enrolled in the american railway union.
this, to say the least of it, was an exceedingly unfortunate proceeding, since it created a situation which implicated in a comparatively insignificant quarrel between the managers of an industrial establishment and their workmen the large army of the railway union. it was the membership of these workmen in the railway union, and the union’s consequent assumption of their quarrel, that gave it the proportions of a tremendous disturbance, paralyzing the most important business interests, obstructing the functions of the government, and disturbing social peace and order....
no injury to the property of the pullman palace car company was done or attempted while the strike was confined to its employees; and during that time very little disorder of any kind occurred.
it so happened, however, that in june, 1894, after the strike at pullman had continued for about one month, a regular stated convention 84 of the american railway union was held in the city of chicago, which was attended by delegates from local branches of the organization in different states, as well as by representatives of its members among the employees of the pullman palace car company. at this convention the trouble at pullman was considered, and after earnest efforts on the part of the railway union to bring about a settlement, a resolution was, on the twenty-second day of june, passed by the convention, declaring that unless the pullman palace car company should adjust the grievances of its employees before noon of the twenty-sixth day of june, the members of the american railway union would, after that date, refuse to handle pullman cars and equipment.
the twenty-sixth day of june arrived without any change in the attitude of the parties to the pullman controversy; and thereupon the order made by the american railway union forbidding the handling of pullman cars, became operative throughout its entire membership.
at this time the pullman palace car company was furnishing drawing-room and sleeping-car accommodations to the traveling public under contracts with numerous railway companies, 85 and was covering by this service about one hundred and twenty-five thousand miles of railway, or approximately three fourths of all the railroad mileage of the country. the same railroad companies which had contracted to use these pullman cars upon their lines had contracts with the united states government for the carriage of mails, and were, of course, also largely engaged in interstate commerce. it need hardly be said that, of necessity, the trains on which the mails were carried and which served the purpose of interstate commerce were, very generally, those to which the pullman cars were also attached.
the president of the railway union was one eugene v. debs. in a sworn statement afterward made he gave the following description of the results of the interference of the union in the pullman dispute:
the employees, obedient to the order of the convention, at once, on the 26th, refused to haul pullman cars. the switchmen, in the first place, refused to attach a pullman car to a train, and that is where the trouble began; and then, when a switchman would be discharged for that, they would all simultaneously quit, as they had agreed to do. one department after another was involved until the illinois central was practically paralyzed, and the rock island and other roads in their turn. up to the first 86 day of july, or after the strike had been in progress five days, the railway managers, as we believe, were completely defeated. their immediate resources were exhausted, their properties were paralyzed, and they were unable to operate their trains. our men were intact at every point, firm, quiet, and yet determined, and no sign of violence or disorder anywhere. that was the condition on the thirtieth day of june and the first day of july.
the officers of the railway union from their headquarters in the city of chicago gave directions for the maintenance and management of the strike, which were quickly transmitted to distant railroad points and were there promptly executed. as early as the 28th of june, two days after the beginning of the strike ordered by the railway union at chicago, information was received at washington from the post-office department that on the southern pacific system, between portland and san francisco, ogden and san francisco, and los angeles and san francisco, the mails were completely obstructed, and that the strikers refused to permit trains to which pullman cars were attached to run over the lines mentioned. thereupon attorney-general olney immediately sent the following telegraphic despatch to the united states district attorneys in the state of california: 87
washington, d. c., june 28, 1894.
see that the passage of regular trains, carrying united states mails in the usual and ordinary way, as contemplated by the act of congress and directed by the postmaster-general, is not obstructed. procure warrants or any other available process from united states courts against any and all persons engaged in such obstructions, and direct the marshal to execute the same by such number of deputies or such posse as may be necessary.
on the same day, and during a number of days immediately following, complaints of a similar character, sometimes accompanied by charges of forcible seizure of trains and other violent disorders, poured in upon the attorney-general from all parts of the west and southwest. these complaints came from post-office officials, from united states marshals and district attorneys, from railroad managers, and from other officials and private citizens. in all cases of substantial representation of interference with the carriage of mails, a despatch identical with that already quoted was sent by the attorney-general to the united states district attorneys in the disturbed localities; and this was supplemented, whenever necessary, by such other prompt action as the different emergencies required.
i shall not enter upon an enumeration of all 88 the disorders and violence, the defiance of law and authority, and the obstructions of national functions and duties, which occurred in many localities as a consequence of this labor contention, thus tremendously reinforced and completely under way. it is my especial purpose to review the action taken by the government for the maintenance of its own authority and the protection of the interests intrusted to its keeping, so far as they were endangered by this disturbance; and i do not intend to specifically deal with the incidents of the strike except in so far as a reference to them may be necessary to show conditions which not only justified but actually obliged the government to resort to stern and unusual measures in the assertion of its prerogatives.
inasmuch, therefore, as the city of chicago was the birthplace of the disturbance and the home of its activities, and because it was the field of its most pronounced and malign manifestations, as well as the place of its final extinction, i shall meet the needs of my subject if i supplement what has been already said by a recital of events occurring at this central point. in doing this, i shall liberally embody documents, orders, instructions, and reports which i hope will not prove tiresome, since they 89 supply the facts i desire to present, at first hand and more impressively than they could be presented by any words of mine.
owing to the enforced relationship of chicago to the strike which started within its borders, and because of its importance as a center of railway traffic, government officials at washington were not surprised by the early and persistent complaints of mail and interstate commerce obstructions which reached them from that city. it was from the first anticipated that this would be the seat of the most serious complications, and the place where the strong arm of the law would be most needed. in these circumstances it would have been a criminal neglect of duty if those charged with the protection of governmental agencies and the enforcement of orderly obedience and submission to federal authority, had been remiss in preparations for any emergency in that quarter.
on the thirtieth day of june the district attorney at chicago reported by telegraph that mail trains in the suburbs of chicago were, on the previous night, stopped by strikers, that an engine had been cut off and disabled, and that conditions were growing more and more likely to culminate in the stoppage of all trains; and he recommended that the marshal be authorized 90 to employ a force of special deputies who should be placed on trains to protect mails and detect the parties guilty of such interference. in reply to this despatch attorney-general olney on the same day authorized the marshal to employ additional deputies as suggested, and designated edwin walker, an able and prominent attorney in chicago, as special counsel for the government, to assist the district attorney in any legal proceedings that might be instituted. he also notified the district attorney of the steps thus taken, and enjoined upon him that “action ought to be prompt and vigorous,” and also directed him to confer with the special counsel who had been employed. in a letter of the same date addressed to this special counsel, the attorney-general, in making suggestions concerning legal proceedings, wrote: “it has seemed to me that if the rights of the united states were vigorously asserted in chicago, the origin and center of the demonstration, the result would be to make it a failure everywhere else, and to prevent its spread over the entire country”; and in that connection he indicated that it might be advisable, instead of relying entirely upon warrants issued under criminal statutes against persons actually guilty of the offense of obstructing 91 united states mails, to apply to the courts for injunctions which would restrain and prevent any attempt to commit such offense. this suggestion contemplated the inauguration of legal proceedings in a regular and usual way to restrain those prominently concerned in the interference with the mails and the obstruction of interstate commerce, basing such proceedings on the proposition that, under the constitution and laws, these subjects were in the exclusive care of the government of the united states, and that for their protection the federal courts were competent under general principles of law to intervene by injunction; and on the further ground that under an act of congress, passed july 2, 1890, conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states were declared to be illegal, and the circuit courts of the united states were therein expressly given jurisdiction to prevent and restrain such conspiracies.
on the first day of july the district attorney reported to the attorney-general that he was preparing a bill of complaint to be presented to the court the next day, on an application for an injunction. he further reported that very little mail and no freight was moving, that the marshal 92 was using all his force to prevent riots and the obstruction of tracks, and that this force was clearly inadequate. on the same day the marshal reported that the situation was desperate, that he had sworn in over four hundred deputies, that many more would be required to protect mail trains, and that he expected great trouble the next day. he further expressed the opinion that one hundred riot guns were needed.
upon the receipt of these reports, and anticipating an attempt to serve injunctions on the following day, the attorney-general immediately sent a despatch to the district attorney directing him to report at once if the process of the court should be resisted by such force as the marshal could not overcome, and suggesting that the united states judge should join in such report. he at the same time sent a despatch to the special counsel requesting him to report his view of the situation as early as the forenoon of the next day.
in explanation of these two despatches it should here be said that the desperate character of this disturbance was not in the least underestimated by executive officials at washington; and it must be borne in mind that while menacing conditions were moving swiftly and accumulating 93 at chicago, like conditions, inspired and supported from that central point, existed in many other places within the area of the strike’s contagion.
of course it was hoped by those charged with the responsibility of dealing with the situation, that a direct assertion of authority by the marshal and a resort to the restraining power of the courts would prove sufficient for the emergency. notwithstanding, however, an anxious desire to avoid measures more radical, the fact had not been overlooked that a contingency might occur which would compel a resort to military force. the key to these despatches of the attorney-general is found in the determination of the federal authorities to overcome by any lawful and constitutional means all resistance to governmental functions as related to the transportation of mails, the operation of interstate commerce, and the preservation of the property of the united states.
the constitution requires that the united states shall protect each of the states against invasion, “and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.” there was plenty of domestic violence in the city of chicago and in the state of illinois during 94 the early days of july, 1894; but no application was made to the federal government for assistance. it was probably a very fortunate circumstance that the presence of united states soldiers in chicago at that time did not depend upon the request or desire of governor altgeld.
section 5298 of the revised statutes of the united states provides: “whenever, by reason of unlawful obstructions, combinations or assemblages of persons, or rebellion against the authority of the united states, it shall become impracticable in the judgment of the president to enforce, by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, the laws of the united states within any state or territory, it shall be lawful for the president to call forth the militia of any or all of the states, and to employ such parts of the land or naval forces of the united states as he may deem necessary to enforce the faithful execution of the laws of the united states, or to suppress such rebellion, in whatever state or territory thereof the laws of the united states may be forcibly opposed, or the execution thereof be forcibly obstructed”; and section 5299 provides: “whenever any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combinations or conspiracies in any state ... opposes or obstructs the laws of the united 95 states, or the due execution thereof, or impedes or obstructs the due course of justice under the same, it shall be lawful for the president, and it shall be his duty, to take such measures, by the employment of the militia, or the land and naval forces of the united states, or of either, or by other means as he may deem necessary, for the suppression of such insurrection, domestic violence or combinations.”
