although the story of a campaign is made up of many details which cannot be omitted, since they are essential to the truth as well as the interest of the account, it is of paramount importance that the reader should preserve throughout a general idea. for otherwise the marches, forays, and reconnaissance will seem disconnected and purposeless affairs, and the battle simply a greater operation undertaken in the same haphazard fashion. to appreciate the tale it is less necessary to contemplate the wild scenes and stirring incidents, than thoroughly to understand the logical sequence of incidents which all tend to and ultimately culminate in a decisive trial of strength.
the hazards which were courted by the daring occupation of berber have been discussed in the last chapter. from october to december the situation was threatening. in december it suddenly became critical. had the emir mahmud advanced with the dervishes at metemma even as late as the middle of january, he might possibly have re-captured berber. if the great omdurman army had taken the field, the possibility would have become a certainty. the young kordofan general saw his opportunity, and begged to be allowed to seize it. but it was not until the khalifa had sent his own army back into the city that, being very badly informed of the numbers and disposition of the egyptian force, he allowed the metemma dervishes to move.
mahmud received permission to advance at the end of january. he eagerly obeyed the longed-for order. but the whole situation was now changed. the egyptian army was concentrated; the british brigade had arrived; the railway had reached geneinetti; the miserable hamlet of dakhila, at the confluence, had grown from a small depot to a fort, and from a fort to an entrenched camp, against which neither dervish science nor strength could by any possibility prevail. perhaps mahmud did not realise the amazing power of movement that the railway had given his foes; perhaps he still believed, with the khalifa, that berber was held only by 2,000 egyptians; or else—and this is the most probable—he was reckless of danger and strong in his own conceit. at any rate, during the second week in february he began to transport himself across the nile, with the plain design of an advance north. with all the procrastination of an arab he crawled leisurely forward towards the confluence of the rivers. at el aliab some idea of the strength of the atbara entrenchment seems to have dawned upon him. he paused undecided. a council was held. mahmud was for a continued advance and for making a direct attack on the enemy's position. osman digna urged a more prudent course. many years of hard fighting against disciplined troops had taught the wily hadendoa slaver the power of modern rifles, and much sound tactics besides. he pressed his case with jealous enthusiasm upon the commander he detested and despised. an insurmountable obstacle confronted them. yet what could not be overcome might be avoided. the hardy dervishes could endure privations which would destroy the soldiers of civilisation. barren and inhospitable as was the desert, they might move round the army at the atbara fort and so capture berber after all. once they were behind the egyptians, these accursed ones were lost. the railway—that mysterious source of strength—could be cut. the host that drew its life along it must fight at a fearful disadvantage or perish miserably. besides, he reminded mahmud—not without reason—that they could count on help in berber itself.
the agreement of the emirs, called to the council, decided the dervish leader. his confidence in himself was weakened, his hatred of osman digna increased. nevertheless, following the older man's advice, he left aliab on the 18th of march, and struck north-east into the desert towards the village and ford of hudi on the atbara river. thence by a long desert march he might reach the nile and berber. but while his information of the sirdar's force and movements was uncertain, the british general was better served. what mahmud failed to derive from spies and 'friendlies,' his adversary obtained by gunboats and cavalry. as soon, therefore, as sir h. kitchener learned that the dervishes had left the nile and were making a detour around his left flank, he marched up the atbara river to hudi. this offered mahmud the alternative of attacking him in a strong position or of making a still longer detour. having determined upon caution he chose the latter, and, deflecting his march still more to the east, reached the atbara at nakheila. but from this point the distance to berber was far too great for him to cover. he could not carry enough water in his skins. the wells were few, and held against him. further advance was impossible. so he waited and entrenched himself, sorely troubled, but uncertain what to do. supplies were running short. his magazines at shendi had been destroyed as soon as he had left the nile. the dervishes might exist, but they did not thrive, on the nuts of the dom palms. soldiers began to desert. osman digna, although his advice had been followed, was at open enmity. his army dwindled.
and all this time his terrible antagonist watched him as a tiger gloats on a helpless and certain prey—silent, merciless, inexorable. then the end came suddenly. as soon as the process of attrition was sufficiently far advanced to demoralise the dervish host, without completely dissolving them, the sirdar and his army moved. the victim, as if petrified, was powerless to fly. the tiger crept forward two measured strides—from ras-el-hudi to abadar, from abadar to umdabia—crouched for a moment, and then bounded with irresistible fury upon its prey and tore it to pieces.
such is a brief strategic account of the atbara campaign; but the tale must be told in full.
on the 23rd of january the khalifa, having learned of the arrival of british troops near abu hamed, and baffled by the disputes about the command of his army, ordered kerreri camp to be broken up, and permitted his forces to return within the city, which he continued to fortify. a few days later he authorised mahmud to advance against berber. what he had not dared with 60,000 men he now attempted with 20,000. the course of action which had for three months offered a good hope of success he resolved to pursue only when it led to ruin. he forbade the advance while it was advisable. when it was already become mad and fatal he commanded it. and this was a man whose reputation for intelligence and military skill had been bloodily demonstrated!
the gunboats ceaselessly patrolled the river, and exchanged shots with the dervish forts. throughout january nothing of note had happened. the reports of spies showed the khalifa to be at kerreri or in omdurman. ahmed fedil held the shabluka gorge, osman digna was at shendi, and his presence was proved by the construction of two new forts on that side of the river. but beyond this the dervishes had remained passive. on the 12th of february, however, it was noticed that their small outpost at khulli had been withdrawn. this event seemed to point to a renewal of activity. it was felt that some important movement impended. but it was not until the 15th that its nature was apparent, and the gunboats were able to report definitely that mahmud was crossing to the east bank of the nile. the flotilla exerted itself to harass the dervishes and impede the transportation; but although several sailing-boats and other river craft were captured, mahmud succeeded in moving his whole army to shendi by the 28th of february. his own headquarters were established at hosh-ben-naga, a little village about five miles further south. a delay of more than a fortnight followed, during which the gunboats exercised the utmost vigilance. the suakin-berber road was again closed for caravans, and the sirdar himself proceeded to berber. on the 11th of march the remnants of the jaalin tribe, having collected at gakdul, re-occupied the now abandoned metemma, to find its streets and houses choked with the decaying bodies of their relations. on the 13th the egyptian look-out station, which had been established on shebaliya island, was attacked by the dervishes, and in the skirmish that ensued major sitwell was wounded. on the same day the enemy were reported moving northwards to aliab, and it became evident that mahmud had begun his advance.
he started from shendi with a force which has been estimated at 19,000 souls, but which included many women and children, and may have actually numbered 12,000 fighting men, each and all supplied with a month's rations and about ninety rounds of ammunition. the sirdar immediately ordered the anglo-egyptian army, with the exception of the cavalry and lewis's egyptian brigade—which, with three squadrons, held the fort at the confluence—to concentrate at kunur. broadwood, with the remaining five squadrons, marched thither on the 16th; and the whole cavalry force, with the camel corps in support, on the three subsequent days reconnoitred twenty miles up the nile and the atbara.
meanwhile the concentration was proceeding apace. the two soudanese brigades, formed into a division under command of major-general hunter, with the artillery, reached kunur on the night of the 15th. the british brigade—the lincolns, the warwicks, and the camerons—marched thither from dabeika. the seaforth highlanders, who on the 13th were still at wady halfa, were swiftly railed across the desert to geneinetti. thence the first half-battalion were brought to kunur in steamers. the second wing—since the need was urgent and the steamers few—were jolted across the desert from railhead on camels, an experience for which neither their training nor their clothes had prepared them. by the 16th the whole force was concentrated at kunur, and on the following day they were reviewed by the sirdar. the first three days at kunur were days of eager expectation. rumour was king. the dervish army had crossed the atbara at hudi, and was within ten miles of the camp. mahmud was already making a flank march through the desert to berber. a battle was imminent. a collision must take place in a few hours. officers with field-glasses scanned the sandy horizon for the first signs of the enemy. but the skyline remained unbroken, except by the wheeling dust devils, and gradually the excitement abated, and the british brigade began to regret all the useful articles they had scrupulously left behind them at dabeika, when they marched in a hurry and the lightest possible order to kunur.
on the 19th of march the gunboats reported that the dervishes were leaving the nile, and mahmud's flanking movement became apparent. the next day the whole force at kunur marched across the desert angle between the rivers to hudi. the appearance of the army would have been formidable. the cavalry, the camel corps, and the horse artillery covered the front and right flank; the infantry, with the british on the right, moved in line of brigade masses; the transport followed. all was, however, shrouded in a fearful dust-storm. the distance, ten miles, was accomplished in five hours, and the army reached hudi in time to construct a strong zeriba before the night. here they were joined from atbara fort by lewis's brigade of egyptians—with the exception of the 15th battalion, which was left as garrison—and the troops at the sirdar's disposal were thus raised to 14,000 men of all arms. this force was organised as follows:
commander-in-chief: the sirdar
british brigade: major-general gatacre
1st battalion royal warwickshire regiment (6 companies)
" " lincolnshire regiment
" " seaforth highlanders
" " cameron highlanders
egyptian infantry division: major-general hunter
1st brigade 2nd brigade 3rd brigade
lieut.-col. maxwell lieut.-col. macdonald lieut.-col. lewis
8th egyptians 2nd egyptians 3rd egyptians
xiith soudanese ixth soudanese 4th "
xiiith " xth " 7th "
xivth " xith "
cavalry: lieut.-col. broadwood
8 squadrons
2 maxim guns
camel corps: major tudway
6 companies
artillery: lieut.-col. long
detachment, no. 16 company, e division r.a.,
with 6 five-inch b.l. howitzers
egyptian horse battery (6 guns)
nos. 1, 2, and 3 field batteries egyptian army (18 guns)
british maxim battery (4 guns)
rocket detachment (2 sections)
mahmud had early intelligence of the movement of the anglo-egyptian army. his original intention had been to march to hudi. but he now learned that at hudi he would have to fight the sirdar's main force. not feeling strong enough to attack them, he determined to march to nakheila. the mobility of the arabs was now as conspicuous as their dilatory nature had formerly been. the whole dervish army—horse, foot, and artillery, men, women, children, and animals—actually traversed in a single day the forty miles of waterless desert which lie between aliab and nakheila, at which latter place they arrived on the night of the 20th. the sirdar's next object was to keep the enemy so far up the atbara that they could not possibly strike at berber or railhead. accordingly, at dawn on the 21st, the whole force was ordered to march to ras-el-hudi, five miles nearer the dervishes' supposed halting-place. the detour which the arabs would have to make to march round the troops was nearly doubled by this movement. the utter impossibility of their flank march with a stronger enemy on the radius of the circle was now apparent.
the movement of the anglo-egyptian force was screened by seven squadrons of cavalry and the horse artillery, and colonel broadwood was further instructed to reconnoitre along the river and endeavour to locate the enemy. the country on either bank of the atbara is covered with dense scrub, impassable for civilised troops. from these belts, which average a quarter of a mile in depth, the dom palms rise in great numbers. all the bush is leafy, and looks very pretty and green by contrast with the sombre vegetation of the nile. between the trees fly gay parrots and many other bright birds. the river itself above ras-el-hudi is, during march and april, only a dry bed of white sand about 400 yards broad, but dotted with deep and beautifully clear pools, in which peculiarly brilliant fish and crocodiles, deprived of their stream, are crowded together. the atmosphere is more damp than by the nile, and produces, in the terrible heat of the summer, profuse and exhausting perspiration. the natives dislike the water of the atbara, and declare that it does not quench the thirst like that of the great river. it has, indeed, a slightly bitter taste, which is a strong contrast with the sweet waters of the nile. nevertheless the british soldiers, with characteristic contrariness, declared their preference for it. outside the bush the ground undulated gently, but the surface was either stony and uneven or else cracked and fissured by the annual overflow. both these conditions made it hard for cavalry, and still more for artillery, to move freely; and the difficulties were complicated by frequent holes and small khors full of long grass.
amid such scenes the squadrons moved cautiously forward. having made the ground good for fifteen miles from hudi, colonel broadwood halted his force at abadar, an old fort, and sent one squadron under captain le gallais seven miles further. at two o'clock this squadron returned, having met a few of the enemy's scouts, but no formed bodies. while the force watered by turns at the river captain baring's squadron was extended in a line of outposts about a mile and a quarter to the south-east. but the reconnoitring squadron had been followed homeward by several hundred dervish horsemen. creeping along through the dense bush by the bank and evading the vedettes, these suddenly fell on the picket line and drove in all the outposts. in this affair eight troopers were killed and seven wounded. thirteen horses were also lost, as, having rid themselves of their riders on the broken ground, they galloped off after the arab mares on which the dervishes were mostly mounted.
the news of an attack on adarama was received on this same afternoon. it appeared that the arabs had been repulsed by the abyssinian irregulars raised by colonel parsons. glowing details were forthcoming, but i do not propose to recount the homeric struggles of the 'friendlies.' little in them is worthy of remembrance; much seeks oblivion.
for more than a week the anglo-egyptian force remained halted at ras-el-hudi, waiting for privation to demoralise mahmud's army or to exasperate him into making an attack. every morning the cavalry rode out towards the enemy's camp. all day long they skirmished with or watched the baggara horse, and at night they returned wearily to camp. each morning the army awoke full of the hopes of battle, waited during the long hours, and finally retired to sleep in deep disgust and profound peace. and while the army halted, the camp began to assume a more homely appearance. the zeriba grew stronger and thicker, the glacis wider, the field kitchens more elaborate, the pools of the atbara more dirty. over all the sun beat down in merciless persistence, till all white men quivered with weary suffering when in the open air, and even under the grass huts or improvised tents the temperature always registered 115° during the hottest hours of the day. the nights were, however, cool and pleasant.
but although the main part of the force found the days long and tedious, the time which the army spent at ras-el-hudi was by no means uneventful. the work of the squadrons was hard, and ceased only with the night. the continual patrolling told severely on men and horses; and the fact that the dervishes were far stronger in the mounted arm than the sirdar's army necessitated the utmost vigilance of the cavalry commander. employment was also found for the gunboats.
when mahmud had left the nile he had established a sort of depot at shendi, in which the wives of the emirs and the surplus stores had been deposited. this treasure house was protected only by a slender garrison of 700 riflemen and twenty-five horsemen. on ordinary military grounds, and also since the event might infuriate the arabs, it was decided to capture this place and disperse its defenders. accordingly, on the afternoon of the 24th the 3rd egyptian battalion from lewis's brigade marched from ras-el-hudi to atbara fort and relieved the 15th egyptians then in garrison, and a small force under commander keppel—consisting of the 15th egyptians under major hickman, two field-guns of peake's battery, and 150 jaalin irregulars—was embarked on, or in boats towed by, the three gunboats zafir, naser, and fateh, and started the same night for shendi.
at dawn on the 27th the flotilla appeared off shendi. the dervishes had been apprised of its approach and prepared to offer resistance. but the force against them was overwhelming. under cover of the gunboats the infantry and guns were landed. the artillery then came into action, but after they had discharged two shells, the arabs fled, firing their rifles with little effect. shendi was occupied by the egyptians. the pursuit was left to the jaalin, and in it they are said to have killed 160 men—a revenge which must have been doubly sweet since it was consummated so near to the scene of the destruction of their tribe, and was also attended by scarcely any danger. loot of all kinds fell to the victors, and the gunboats were soon laden with a miscellaneous spoil. the wives of the important emirs made their escape to omdurman, but upwards of 650 women and children of inferior rank were taken prisoners and transported to the atbara, where in due course they contracted new family ties with the soudanese soldiery and, as far as can be ascertained, lived happily ever afterwards. there were no casualties among the troops, but the jaalin lost a few men in their pursuit. the force then returned to the atbara.
the 3rd of april was the last day the army spent at ras-el-hudi. the period of waiting was over. the enemy's position had been duly reconnoitred. his strength was believed to be sufficiently impaired for a successful attack to be made. the camp at hudi was becoming very insanitary. moreover, the situation, satisfactory though it was, was not one which the commander could view without anxiety. all the time that the army was operating on the atbara it drew its supplies from the fort at the confluence. between this and the camp, convoys, protected only by a handful of camel corps, passed once in every four days. only the idiotic apathy of the dervishes allowed the communications to remain uninterrupted. mahmud was strong in cavalry. it will be evident to anyone who looks at the map how easily a force might have moved along the left bank to attack the convoys. such tactics would have occurred to most savage tribes. but in their last campaigns the dervishes thought only of battles, and disregarded all smaller enterprises. had they assailed the communications, the sirdar might have been forced to build a chain of forts and to guard his convoys with strong infantry escorts. the fighting force would have been weakened, the troops have been wearied, and the result must have been delayed. the dervishes had as yet attempted nothing. but there was no reason why they should not at any moment become enterprising. it was time to make an end. on the 4th of april the whole force moved to abadar, and established themselves in a new camp five miles nearer the enemy. the tiger was tired of watching: he had taken his first stride towards his prey.
although the information as to the enemy's strength and position was accurate and complete, the sirdar decided to order a final reconnaissance on the 5th of april.
starting at four o'clock broadwood cut off the sharp angle which the atbara forms at umdabia, and, avoiding the thick bush, soon approached the dervish camp. not a sign of the enemy was seen during the march. the bush by the atbara appeared deserted. the camp gave no sign of life; an ominous silence prevailed. the squadrons moved forward at a walk, keeping about 1,200 yards away from the enemy's zeriba and almost parallel to it. presently, as they did so, a large force of cavalry became visible in front. it was difficult to estimate their strength, but they appeared to be superior in numbers to the reconnaissance. the dervish horsemen continued to retire towards the south-east, always reaching round the egyptian left flank.
and while the egyptian force advanced, as soon as they were opposite the southern end of the zeriba, another considerable body of dervish horse issued from the northern side and threatened the line of retreat. at the same time the camp began to swarm with men, and crowds of tiny figures were observed clambering on to the entrenchments and gun emplacements, eagerly watching the development of the fight. the cavalry had by this time approached to within 1,000 yards of the zeriba, and the arab artillery began to fire occasional round shot and clumsily fused shells.
at nine o'clock, the enemy's position having been again sketched and the approaches reconnoitred, colonel broadwood ordered the retirement to begin. the maxims and artillery were in the centre, supported by colonel broadwood and three squadrons. captain baring with three squadrons watched the left flank, now in retirement become the right. captains le gallais and persse guarded the river flank.
the cavalry retired by alternate wings in measured fashion. but the enemy pressed on impetuously, and their horsemen, soon completely enveloping the desert flank of the egyptians, began to threaten a charge. to meet this colonel broadwood sent one of his squadrons from the centre to join those under captain baring, so that at about a quarter to ten the reconnoitring force was formed with four squadrons towards the desert, two with the guns, and two towards the river. the weakness of the river flank of the troops encouraged the dervish horse lurking in the scrub to make a bold attempt to capture the guns. the movement was shrewd and daring, but the cavalry commander met it with admirable skill. the springing-up of dust-clouds hardly 300 yards away was his only warning. he immediately took command of the two squadrons under persse and le gallais, and ordered them to 'right about wheel' and charge. thus headed by broadwood himself, and with their british officers several horse-lengths in front, the egyptians broke into a gallop and encountered the baggara line, which numbered not fewer than 400 men but was in loose order, with firmness. they struck them obliquely and perhaps a third of the way down their line, and, breaking through, routed them utterly.
while this dashing operation was carried out on the river flank the dervish cavalry, following up the retirement, also delivered an attack towards the guns. thereupon captain baring with two squadrons galloped from the desert flank across the front of the artillery, and, riding through the advancing enemy, repulsed them with loss. the charge was good and effective, but the shock and confusion broke both squadrons, and, although successful, they came through the dervishes and back on to the river flank in some disorder. persse and le gallais, who had just rallied, at once dismounted their men and opened carbine fire on the retreating dervishes. their action not only checked the enemy, but prevented, by getting the troopers off their horses, any chance of their being involved in the disorder of the squadrons who had just charged.
although their horsemen were thus sharply checked, the dervish infantry continued in spite of losses to advance rapidly, and for a few minutes a hot musketry fire was exchanged by the arab riflemen and the two dismounted squadrons. captain persse was severely wounded, and several other casualties occurred. but the whole force was drawing away from the enemy, and by eleven o'clock it had passed through the gap to the north-east and had shaken off all pursuit. the casualties in the operation were fortunately small. one british officer was wounded; six egyptian troopers were killed and ten wounded; and about thirty horses were lost or disabled.
the details of the enemy's defences were now known; his strength was estimated from trustworthy information. it was evident from the frequent desertions that his army was disheartened, and from his inactivity that he was scarcely hopeful of success. the moment for destroying him had arrived. at daybreak on the morning of the 6th the whole army broke camp at abadar and marched to the deserted village of umdabia, where they bivouacked close by a convenient pool of the atbara and seven miles nearer the dervish camp.
