september 2, 1898
the bugles all over the camp by the river began to sound at half-past four. the cavalry trumpets and the drums and fifes of the british division joined the chorus, and everyone awoke amid a confusion of merry or defiant notes. then it grew gradually lighter, and the cavalry mounted their horses, the infantry stood to their arms, and the gunners went to their batteries; while the sun, rising over the nile, revealed the wide plain, the dark rocky hills, and the waiting army. it was as if all the preliminaries were settled, the ground cleared, and nothing remained but the final act and 'the rigour of the game.'
even before it became light several squadrons of british and egyptian cavalry were pushed swiftly forward to gain contact with the enemy and learn his intentions. the first of these, under captain baring, occupied surgham hill, and waited in the gloom until the whereabouts of the dervishes should be disclosed by the dawn. it was a perilous undertaking, for he might have found them unexpectedly near. as the sun rose, the 21st lancers trotted out of the zeriba and threw out a spray of officers' patrols. as there had been no night attack, it was expected that the dervish army would have retired to their original position or entered the town. it was hardly conceivable that they would advance across the open ground to attack the zeriba by daylight. indeed, it appeared more probable that their hearts had failed them in the night, and that they had melted away into the desert. but these anticipations were immediately dispelled by the scene which was visible from the crest of the ridge.
it was a quarter to six. the light was dim, but growing stronger every minute. there in the plain lay the enemy, their numbers unaltered, their confidence and intentions apparently unshaken. their front was now nearly five miles long, and composed of great masses of men joined together by thinner lines. behind and near to the flanks were large reserves. from the ridge they looked dark blurs and streaks, relieved and diversified with an odd-looking shimmer of light from the spear-points. at about ten minutes to six it was evident that the masses were in motion and advancing swiftly. their emirs galloped about and before their ranks. scouts and patrols scattered themselves all over the front. then they began to cheer. they were still a mile away from the hill, and were concealed from the sirdar's army by the folds of the ground. the noise of the shouting was heard, albeit faintly, by the troops down by the river. but to those watching on the hill a tremendous roar came up in waves of intense sound, like the tumult of the rising wind and sea before a storm.
the british and egyptian forces were arranged in line, with their back to the river. the flanks were secured by the gunboats lying moored in the stream. before them was the rolling sandy plain, looking from the slight elevation of the ridge smooth and flat as a table. to the right rose the rocky hills of the kerreri position, near which the egyptian cavalry were drawn up—a dark solid mass of men and horses. on the left the 21st lancers, with a single squadron thrown out in advance, were halted watching their patrols, who climbed about surgham hill, stretched forward beyond it, or perched, as we did, on the ridge.
the ground sloped gently up from the river; so that it seemed as if the landward ends of the surgham and kerreri ridges curved in towards each other, enclosing what lay between. beyond the long swell of sand which formed the western wall of this spacious amphitheatre the black shapes of the distant hills rose in misty confusion. the challengers were already in the arena; their antagonists swiftly approached.
although the dervishes were steadily advancing, a belief that their musketry was inferior encouraged a nearer view, and we trotted round the south-west slopes of surgham hill until we reached the sandhills on the enemy's side, among which the regiment had waited the day before. thence the whole array was visible in minute detail. it seemed that every single man of all the thousands could be examined separately. the pace of their march was fast and steady, and it was evident that it would not be safe to wait long among the sandhills. yet the wonder of the scene exercised a dangerous fascination, and for a while we tarried.
the emblems of the more famous emirs were easily distinguishable. on the extreme left the chiefs and soldiers of the bright green flag gathered under ali-wad-helu; between this and the centre the large dark green flag of osman sheikh-ed-din rose above a dense mass of spearmen, preceded by long lines of warriors armed presumably with rifles; over the centre, commanded by yakub, the sacred black banner of the khalifa floated high and remarkable; while on the right a great square of dervishes was arrayed under an extraordinary number of white flags, amid which the red ensign of sherif was almost hidden. all the pride and might of the dervish empire were massed on this last great day of its existence. riflemen who had helped to destroy hicks, spearmen who had charged at abu klea, emirs who saw the sack of gondar, baggara fresh from raiding the shillooks, warriors who had besieged khartoum—all marched, inspired by the memories of former triumphs and embittered by the knowledge of late defeats, to chastise the impudent and accursed invaders.
the advance continued. the dervish left began to stretch out across the plain towards kerreri—as i thought, to turn our right flank. their centre, under the black flag, moved directly towards surgham. the right pursued a line of advance south of that hill. this mass of men were the most striking of all. they could not have mustered fewer than 6,000. their array was perfect. they displayed a great number of flags—perhaps 500—which looked at the distance white, though they were really covered with texts from the koran, and which by their admirable alignment made this division of the khalifa's army look like the old representations of the crusaders in the bayeux tapestry.
the attack developed. the left, nearly 20,000 strong, toiled across the plain and approached the egyptian squadrons. the leading masses of the centre deployed facing the zeriba and marched forthwith to the direct assault. as the whole dervish army continued to advance, the division with the white flags, which had until now been echeloned in rear of their right, moved up into the general line and began to climb the southern slopes of surgham hill. meanwhile yet another body of the enemy, comparatively insignificant in numbers, who had been drawn up behind the 'white flags,' were moving slowly towards the nile, echeloned still further behind their right, and not far from the suburbs of omdurman. these men had evidently been posted to prevent the dervish army being cut off from the city and to secure their line of retreat; and with them the 21st lancers were destined to have a much closer acquaintance about two hours later.
the dervish centre had come within range. but it was not the british and egyptian army that began the battle. if there was one arm in which the arabs were beyond all comparison inferior to their adversaries, it was in guns. yet it was with this arm that they opened their attack. in the middle of the dervish line now marching in frontal assault were two puffs of smoke. about fifty yards short of the thorn fence two red clouds of sand and dust sprang up, where the projectiles had struck. it looked like a challenge. it was immediately answered. great clouds of smoke appeared all along the front of the british and soudanese brigades. one after another four batteries opened on the enemy at a range of about 3,000 yards. the sound of the cannonade rolled up to us on the ridge, and was re-echoed by the hills. above the heads of the moving masses shells began to burst, dotting the air with smoke-balls and the ground with bodies. but a nearer tragedy impended. the 'white flags' were nearly over the crest. in another minute they would become visible to the batteries. did they realise what would come to meet them? they were in a dense mass, 2,800 yards from the 32nd field battery and the gunboats. the ranges were known. it was a matter of machinery. the more distant slaughter passed unnoticed, as the mind was fascinated by the approaching horror. in a few seconds swift destruction would rush on these brave men. they topped the crest and drew out into full view of the whole army. their white banners made them conspicuous above all. as they saw the camp of their enemies, they discharged their rifles with a great roar of musketry and quickened their pace. for a moment the white flags advanced in regular order, and the whole division crossed the crest and were exposed. forthwith the gunboats, the 32nd british field battery, and other guns from the zeriba opened on them. about twenty shells struck them in the first minute. some burst high in the air, others exactly in their faces. others, again, plunged into the sand and, exploding, dashed clouds of red dust, splinters, and bullets amid their ranks. the white banners toppled over in all directions. yet they rose again immediately, as other men pressed forward to die for the mahdi's sacred cause and in the defence of the successor of the true prophet. it was a terrible sight, for as yet they had not hurt us at all, and it seemed an unfair advantage to strike thus cruelly when they could not reply. under the influence of the shells the mass of the 'white flags' dissolved into thin lines of spearmen and skirmishers, and came on in altered formation and diminished numbers, but with unabated enthusiasm. and now, the whole attack being thoroughly exposed, it became the duty of the cavalry to clear the front as quickly as possible, and leave the further conduct of the debate to the infantry and the maxim guns. all the patrols trotted or cantered back to their squadrons, and the regiment retired swiftly into the zeriba, while the shells from the gunboats screamed overhead and the whole length of the position began to burst into flame and smoke. nor was it long before the tremendous banging of the artillery was swollen by the roar of musketry.
taking advantage of the shelter of the river-bank, the cavalry dismounted; we watered our horses, waited, and wondered what was happening. and every moment the tumult grew louder and more intense, until even the flickering stutter of the maxims could scarcely be heard above the continuous din. eighty yards away, and perhaps twenty feet above us, the 32nd field battery was in action. the nimble figures of the gunners darted about as they busied themselves in their complicated process of destruction. the officers, some standing on biscuit-boxes, peered through their glasses and studied the effect. of this i had one glimpse. eight hundred yards away a ragged line of men were coming on desperately, struggling forward in the face of the pitiless fire—white banners tossing and collapsing; white figures subsiding in dozens to the ground; little white puffs from their rifles, larger white puffs spreading in a row all along their front from the bursting shrapnel.
the infantry fired steadily and stolidly, without hurry or excitement, for the enemy were far away and the officers careful. besides, the soldiers were interested in the work and took great pains. but presently the mere physical act became tedious. the tiny figures seen over the slide of the backsight seemed a little larger, but also fewer at each successive volley. the rifles grew hot—so hot that they had to be changed for those of the reserve companies. the maxim guns exhausted all the water in their jackets, and several had to be refreshed from the water-bottles of the cameron highlanders before they could go on with their deadly work. the empty cartridge-cases, tinkling to the ground, formed a small but growing heap beside each man. and all the time out on the plain on the other side bullets were shearing through flesh, smashing and splintering bone; blood spouted from terrible wounds; valiant men were struggling on through a hell of whistling metal, exploding shells, and spurting dust—suffering, despairing, dying. such was the first phase of the battle of omdurman.
the khalifa's plan of attack appears to have been complex and ingenious. it was, however, based on an extraordinary miscalculation of the power of modern weapons; with the exception of this cardinal error, it is not necessary to criticise it. he first ordered about 15,000 men, drawn chiefly from the army of osman sheikh-ed-din and placed under the command of osman azrak, to deliver a frontal attack. he himself waited with an equal force near surgham hill to watch the result. if it succeeded, he would move forward with his bodyguard, the flower of the arab army, and complete the victory. if it failed, there was yet another chance. the dervishes who were first launched against the zeriba, although very brave men, were not by any means his best or most reliable troops. their destruction might be a heavy loss, but it would not end the struggle. while the attack was proceeding, the valiant left, consisting of the rest of the army of osman sheikh-ed-din, might move unnoticed to the northern flank and curve round on to the front of the zeriba held by the egyptian brigade. ali-wad-helu was meanwhile to march to the kerreri hills, and remain out of range and, if possible, out of sight among them. should the frontal and flank attacks be unhappily repulsed, the 'enemies of god,' exulting in their easy victory over the faithful, would leave their strong place and march to the capture and sack of the city. then, while they were yet dispersed on the plain, with no zeriba to protect them, the chosen warriors of the true religion would abandon all concealment, and hasten in their thousands to the utter destruction of the accursed—the khalifa with 15,000 falling upon them from behind surgham; ali-wad-helu and all that remained of osman's army assailing them from kerreri. attacked at once from the north and south, and encompassed on every side, the infidels would abandon hope and order, and kitchener might share the fate of hicks and gordon. two circumstances, which will appear as the account proceeds, prevented the accomplishment of this plan. the second attack was not executed simultaneously by the two divisions of the dervish army; and even had it been, the power of the musketry would have triumphed, and though the expeditionary force might have sustained heavier losses the main result could not have been affected. the last hopes of barbarism had passed with the shades of night.
colonel broadwood, with nine squadrons of cavalry, the camel corps, and the horse artillery, had been ordered to check the dervish left, and prevent it enveloping the downstream flank of the zeriba, as this was held by the egyptian brigade, which it was not thought desirable to expose to the full weight of an attack. with this object, as the dervishes approached, he had occupied the kerreri ridge with the horse battery and the camel corps, holding his cavalry in reserve in rear of the centre.
the kerreri ridge, to which reference has so frequently been made, consists of two main features, which rise to the height of about 300 feet above the plain, are each above a mile long, and run nearly east and west, with a dip or trough about 1,000 yards wide between them. the eastern ends of these main ridges are perhaps 1,000 yards from the river, and in this intervening space there are several rocky under-features and knolls. the kerreri hills, the spaces between them, and the smaller features are covered with rough boulders and angular stones of volcanic origin, which render the movements of horses and camels difficult and painful.
the cavalry horses and camels were in the dip between the two ridges; and the dismounted men of the camel corps were deployed along the crest of the most southerly of the ridges, with their right at the desert end. next in order to the camel corps, the centre of the ridge was occupied by the dismounted cavalry. the horse artillery were on the left. the remainder of the cavalry waited in the hollow behind the guns.
the tempestuous advance of osman soon brought him into contact with the mounted force. his real intentions are still a matter of conjecture. whether he had been ordered to attack the egyptian brigade, or to drive back the cavalry, or to disappear behind the kerreri hills in conformity with ali-wad-helu, is impossible to pronounce. his action was, however, clear. he could not safely assail the egyptians with a powerful cavalry force threatening his left rear. he therefore continued his move across the front of the zeriba. keeping out of the range of infantry fire, bringing up his right, and marching along due north, he fell upon broadwood. this officer, who had expected to have to deal with small bodies on the dervish flank, found himself suddenly exposed to the attack of nearly 15,000 men, many of whom were riflemen. the sirdar, seeing the situation from the zeriba, sent him an order to withdraw within the lines of infantry. colonel broadwood, however, preferred to retire through the kerreri hills to the northward, drawing osman after him. he replied to that effect.
the first position had soon to be abandoned. the dervishes, advancing in a north-easterly direction, attacked the kerreri hills obliquely. they immediately enveloped the right flank of the mounted troops holding them. it will be seen from the map that as soon as the dervish riflemen gained a point west and in prolongation of the trough between the two ridges, they not only turned the right flank, but also threatened the retreat of the defenders of the southerly ridge; for they were able to sweep the trough from end to end with their fire. as soon as it became certain that the southerly ridge could not be held any longer, colonel broadwood retired the battery to the east end of the second or northern ridge. this was scarcely accomplished when the dip was enfiladed, and the cavalry and camel corps who followed lost about fifty men and many horses and camels killed and wounded. the camel corps were the most unfortunate. they were soon encumbered with wounded, and it was now painfully evident that in rocky ground the dervishes could go faster on their feet than the soldiers on their camels. pressing on impetuously at a pace of nearly seven miles an hour, and unchecked by a heavy artillery fire from the zeriba and a less effective fire from the horse battery, which was only armed with 7-pounder krupps of an obsolete pattern, the arabs rapidly diminished the distance between themselves and their enemies. in these circumstances colonel broadwood decided to send the camel corps back to the zeriba under cover of a gunboat, which, watchfully observing the progress of the fight, was coming down stream to assist. the distance which divided the combatants was scarcely 400 yards and decreasing every minute. the cavalry were drawn up across the eastern or river end of the trough. the guns of the horse battery fired steadily from their new position on the northern ridge. but the camel corps were still struggling in the broken ground, and it was clear that their position was one of great peril. the dervishes already carpeted the rocks of the southern ridge with dull yellow swarms, and, heedless of the shells which still assailed them in reverse from the zeriba, continued to push their attack home. on the very instant that they saw the camel corps make for the river they realised that those they had deemed their prey were trying, like a hunted animal, to run to ground within the lines of infantry. with that instinctive knowledge of war which is the heritage of savage peoples, the whole attack swung to the right, changed direction from north to east, and rushed down the trough and along the southern ridge towards the nile, with the plain intention of cutting off the camel corps and driving them into the river.
the moment was critical. it appeared to the cavalry commander that the dervishes would actually succeed, and their success must involve the total destruction of the camel corps. that could not, of course, be tolerated. the whole nine squadrons of cavalry assumed a preparatory formation. the british officers believed that a terrible charge impended. they would meet in direct collision the swarms of men who were hurrying down the trough. the diversion might enable the camel corps to escape. but the ground was bad; the enemy's force was overwhelming; the egyptian troopers were prepared to obey—but that was all. there was no exalted enthusiasm such as at these moments carries sterner breeds to victory. few would return. nevertheless, the operation appeared inevitable. the camel corps were already close to the river. but thousands of dervishes were running swiftly towards them at right angles to their line of retreat, and it was certain that if the camelry attempted to cross this new front of the enemy they would be annihilated. their only hope lay in maintaining themselves by their fire near the river-bank until help could reach them, and, in order to delay and weaken the dervish attack the cavalry would have to make a desperate charge.
but at the critical moment the gunboat arrived on the scene and began suddenly to blaze and flame from maxim guns, quick-firing guns, and rifles. the range was short; the effect tremendous. the terrible machine, floating gracefully on the waters—a beautiful white devil—wreathed itself in smoke. the river slopes of the kerreri hills, crowded with the advancing thousands, sprang up into clouds of dust and splinters of rock. the charging dervishes sank down in tangled heaps. the masses in rear paused, irresolute. it was too hot even for them. the approach of another gunboat completed their discomfiture. the camel corps, hurrying along the shore, slipped past the fatal point of interception, and saw safety and the zeriba before them.
exasperated by their disappointment, the soldiers of osman sheikh-ed-din turned again upon the cavalry, and, forgetting in their anger the mobile nature of their foe, pursued the elusive squadrons three long miles to the north. the cavalry, intensely relieved by the escape of the camel corps, played with their powerful antagonist, as the banderillo teases the bull. colonel broadwood thus succeeded in luring this division of the dervish army far away from the field of battle, where they were sorely needed. the rough ground, however, delayed the horse battery. they lagged, as the camel corps had done, and caused constant anxiety. at length two of their guns stuck fast in a marshy spot, and as several men and horses were shot in the attempt to extricate them broadwood wisely ordered them to be abandoned, and they were soon engulfed in the dervish masses. encouraged by this capture, the horsemen of osman's command daringly attacked the retreating cavalry. but they were effectually checked by the charge of a squadron under major mahon.
both gunboats, having watched the camel corps safely into the zeriba, now returned with the current and renewed their attack upon the arabs. opening a heavy and accurate fire upon the river flank, they drove them westward and away from the nile. through the gap thus opened broadwood and his squadrons trotted to rejoin the main body, picking up on the way the two guns which had been abandoned.
while these things were passing on the northern flank, the frontal attack was in progress. the debris of the 'white flags' joined the centre, and the whole 14,000 pressed forward against the zeriba, spreading out by degrees and abandoning their dense formations, and gradually slowing down. at about 800 yards from the british division the advance ceased, and they could make no headway. opposite the soudanese, who were armed only with the martini-henry rifle, the assailants came within 300 yards; and one brave old man, carrying a flag, fell at 150 paces from the shelter trench. but the result was conclusive all along the line. the attack was shattered. the leader, clad in his new jibba of many colours, rode on steadfastly towards the inexorable firing line, until, pierced by several bullets, he fell lifeless. such was the end of that stubborn warrior of many fights—wicked osman azrak, faithful unto death. the surviving dervishes lay down on the ground. unable to advance, they were unwilling to retire; and their riflemen, taking advantage of the folds of the plain, opened and maintained an unequal combat. by eight o'clock it was evident that the whole attack had failed. the loss of the enemy was more than 2,000 killed, and perhaps as many wounded. to the infantry, who were busy with their rifles, it had scarcely seemed a fight. yet all along the front bullets had whizzed over and into the ranks, and in every battalion there were casualties. captain caldecott, of the warwicks, was killed; the camerons had two officers, captain clarke and lieutenant nicholson, severely wounded; the grenadiers one, captain bagot. colonel f. rhodes, as he sat on his horse near the maxim battery of the 1st british brigade, was shot through the shoulder and carried from the field just as the attack reached its climax. there were, besides these officers, about 150 casualties among the soldiers.
the attack languished. the enemy's rifle fire continued, and as soon as the heavy firing ceased it began to be annoying. the ground, although it appeared flat and level to the eye, nevertheless contained depressions and swellings which afforded good cover to the sharpshooters, and the solid line behind the zeriba was an easy target. the artillery now began to clear out these depressions by their shells, and in this work they displayed a searching power very remarkable when their flat trajectory is remembered. as the shells burst accurately above the dervish skirmishers and spearmen who were taking refuge in the folds of the plain, they rose by hundreds and by fifties to fly. instantly the hungry and attentive maxims and the watchful infantry opened on them, sweeping them all to the ground—some in death, others in terror. again the shells followed them to their new concealment. again they rose, fewer than before, and ran. again the maxims and the rifles spluttered. again they fell. and so on until the front of the zeriba was clear of unwounded men for at least half a mile. a few escaped. some, notwithstanding the vices of which they have been accused and the perils with which they were encompassed, gloriously carried off their injured comrades.
after the attack had been broken, and while the front of the zeriba was being cleared of the dervish riflemen, the 21st lancers were again called upon to act. the sirdar and his generals were all agreed on one point. they must occupy omdurman before the dervish army could get back there. they could fight as many dervishes as cared to come in the plain; among the houses it was different. as the khalifa had anticipated, the infidels, exulting in their victory, were eager, though for a different reason, to seize the city. and this they were now in a position to do. the arabs were out in the desert. a great part of their army was even as far away as kerreri. the troops could move on interior lines. they were bound to reach omdurman first. the order was therefore given to march on the city at once. but first the surgham ridge must be reconnoitred, and the ground between the zeriba and omdurman cleared of the dervishes—with infantry if necessary, but with cavalry if possible, because that would be quicker.
as the fusillade slackened, the lancers stood to their horses. then general gatacre, with captain brooke and the rest of his staff, came galloping along the rear of the line of infantry and guns, and shouted for colonel martin. there was a brief conversation—an outstretched arm pointing at the ridge—an order, and we were all scrambling into our saddles and straightening the ranks in high expectation. we started at a trot, two or three patrols galloping out in front, towards the high ground, while the regiment followed in mass—a great square block of ungainly brown figures and little horses, hung all over with water-bottles, saddle-bags, picketing-gear, tins of bully-beef, all jolting and jangling together; the polish of peace gone; soldiers without glitter; horsemen without grace; but still a regiment of light cavalry in active operation against the enemy.
the crest of the ridge was only half a mile away. it was found unoccupied. the rocky mass of surgham obstructed the view and concealed the great reserve collected around the black flag. but southward, between us and omdurman, the whole plain was exposed. it was infested with small parties of dervishes, moving about, mounted and on foot, in tens and twenties. three miles away a broad stream of fugitives, of wounded, and of deserters flowed from the khalifa's army to the city. the mirages blurred and distorted the picture, so that some of the routed arabs walked in air and some through water, and all were misty and unreal. but the sight was sufficient to excite the fiercest instincts of cavalry. only the scattered parties in the plain appeared to prevent a glorious pursuit. the signalling officer was set to heliograph back to the sirdar that the ridge was unoccupied and that several thousand dervishes could be seen flying into omdurman. pending the answer, we waited; and looking back northwards, across the front of the zeriba, where the first attack had been stopped, perceived a greyish-white smudge, perhaps a mile long. the glass disclosed details—hundreds of tiny white figures heaped or scattered; dozens hopping, crawling, staggering away; a few horses standing stolidly among the corpses; a few unwounded men dragging off their comrades. the skirmishers among the rocks of surgham soon began to fire at the regiment, and we sheltered among the mounds of sand, while a couple of troops replied with their carbines. then the heliograph in the zeriba began to talk in flashes of light that opened and shut capriciously. the actual order is important. 'advance,' said the helio, 'and clear the left flank, and use every effort to prevent the enemy re-entering omdurman.' that was all, but it was sufficient. in the distance the enemy could be seen re-entering omdurman in hundreds. there was no room for doubt. they must be stopped, and incidentally these small parties in the plain might be brushed away. we remounted; the ground looked smooth and unbroken; yet it was desirable to reconnoitre. two patrols were sent out. the small parties of dervishes who were scattered all over the plain and the slopes of the hill prevented anything less than a squadron moving, except at their peril. the first patrol struck out towards omdurman, and began to push in between the scattered dervishes, who fired their rifles and showed great excitement. the other patrol, under lieutenant grenfell, were sent to see what the ground looked like from further along the ridge and on the lower slopes of surgham. the riflemen among the rocks turned their fire from the regiment to these nearer objects. the five brown figures cantered over the rough ground, presenting difficult targets, but under continual fire, and disappeared round the spur. however, in two or three minutes they re-appeared, the riflemen on the hill making a regular rattle of musketry, amid which the lancers galloped safely back, followed last of all by their officer. he said that the plain looked as safe from the other side of the hill as from where we were. at this moment the other patrol returned. they, too, had had good fortune in their adventurous ride. their information was exact. they reported that in a shallow and apparently practicable khor about three-quarters of a mile to the south-west, and between the regiment and the fugitives, there was drawn up a formed body of dervishes about 1,000 strong. colonel martin decided on this information to advance and attack this force, which alone interposed between him and the arab line of retreat. then we started.
but all this time the enemy had been busy. at the beginning of the battle the khalifa had posted a small force of 700 men on his extreme right, to prevent his line of retreat to omdurman being harassed. this detachment was composed entirely of the hadendoa tribesmen of osman digna's flag, and was commanded by one of his subordinate emirs, who selected a suitable position in the shallow khor. as soon as the 21st lancers left the zeriba the dervish scouts on the top of surgham carried the news to the khalifa. it was said that the english cavalry were coming to cut him off from omdurman. abdullah thereupon determined to strengthen his extreme right; and he immediately ordered four regiments, each 500 strong, drawn from the force around the black flag and under the emir ibrahim khalil, to reinforce the hadendoa in the khor. while we were waiting for orders on the ridge these men were hurrying southwards along the depression, and concealed by a spur of surgham hill. the lancer patrol reconnoitred the khor, at the imminent risk of their lives, while it was only occupied by the original 700 hadendoa. galloping back, they reported that it was held by about 1,000 men. before they reached the regiment this number was increased to 2,700. this, however, we had no means of knowing. the khalifa, having despatched his reinforcement, rode on his donkey with a scanty escort nearly half a mile from the black flag towards the khor, in order to watch the event, and in consequence he was within 500 yards of the scene.
as the 21st lancers left the ridge, the fire of the arab riflemen on the hill ceased. we advanced at a walk in mass for about 300 yards. the scattered parties of dervishes fell back and melted away, and only one straggling line of men in dark blue waited motionless a quarter of a mile to the left front. they were scarcely a hundred strong. the regiment formed into line of squadron columns, and continued at a walk until within 300 yards of this small body of dervishes. the firing behind the ridges had stopped. there was complete silence, intensified by the recent tumult. far beyond the thin blue row of dervishes the fugitives were visible streaming into omdurman. and should these few devoted men impede a regiment? yet it were wiser to examine their position from the other flank before slipping a squadron at them. the heads of the squadrons wheeled slowly to the left, and the lancers, breaking into a trot, began to cross the dervish front in column of troops. thereupon and with one accord the blue-clad men dropped on their knees, and there burst out a loud, crackling fire of musketry. it was hardly possible to miss such a target at such a range. horses and men fell at once. the only course was plain and welcome to all. the colonel, nearer than his regiment, already saw what lay behind the skirmishers. he ordered, 'right wheel into line' to be sounded. the trumpet jerked out a shrill note, heard faintly above the trampling of the horses and the noise of the rifles. on the instant all the sixteen troops swung round and locked up into a long galloping line, and the 21st lancers were committed to their first charge in war.
two hundred and fifty yards away the dark-blue men were firing madly in a thin film of light-blue smoke. their bullets struck the hard gravel into the air, and the troopers, to shield their faces from the stinging dust, bowed their helmets forward, like the cuirassiers at waterloo. the pace was fast and the distance short. yet, before it was half covered, the whole aspect of the affair changed. a deep crease in the ground—a dry watercourse, a khor—appeared where all had seemed smooth, level plain; and from it there sprang, with the suddenness of a pantomime effect and a high-pitched yell, a dense white mass of men nearly as long as our front and about twelve deep. a score of horsemen and a dozen bright flags rose as if by magic from the earth. eager warriors sprang forward to anticipate the shock. the rest stood firm to meet it. the lancers acknowledged the apparition only by an increase of pace. each man wanted sufficient momentum to drive through such a solid line. the flank troops, seeing that they overlapped, curved inwards like the horns of a moon. but the whole event was a matter of seconds. the riflemen, firing bravely to the last, were swept head over heels into the khor, and jumping down with them, at full gallop and in the closest order, the british squadrons struck the fierce brigade with one loud furious shout. the collision was prodigious. nearly thirty lancers, men and horses, and at least two hundred arabs were overthrown. the shock was stunning to both sides, and for perhaps ten wonderful seconds no man heeded his enemy. terrified horses wedged in the crowd, bruised and shaken men, sprawling in heaps, struggled, dazed and stupid, to their feet, panted, and looked about them. several fallen lancers had even time to re-mount. meanwhile the impetus of the cavalry carried them on. as a rider tears through a bullfinch, the officers forced their way through the press; and as an iron rake might be drawn through a heap of shingle, so the regiment followed. they shattered the dervish array, and, their pace reduced to a walk, scrambled out of the khor on the further side, leaving a score of troopers behind them, and dragging on with the charge more than a thousand arabs. then, and not till then, the killing began; and thereafter each man saw the world along his lance, under his guard, or through the back-sight of his pistol; and each had his own strange tale to tell.
stubborn and unshaken infantry hardly ever meet stubborn and unshaken cavalry. either the infantry run away and are cut down in flight, or they keep their heads and destroy nearly all the horsemen by their musketry. on this occasion two living walls had actually crashed together. the dervishes fought manfully. they tried to hamstring the horses, they fired their rifles, pressing the muzzles into the very bodies of their opponents. they cut reins and stirrup-leathers. they flung their throwing-spears with great dexterity. they tried every device of cool, determined men practised in war and familiar with cavalry; and, besides, they swung sharp, heavy swords which bit deep. the hand-to-hand fighting on the further side of the khor lasted for perhaps one minute. then the horses got into their stride again, the pace increased, and the lancers drew out from among their antagonists. within two minutes of the collision every living man was clear of the dervish mass. all who had fallen were cut at with swords till they stopped quivering, but no artistic mutilations were attempted.
two hundred yards away the regiment halted, rallied, faced about, and in less than five minutes were re-formed and ready for a second charge. the men were anxious to cut their way back through their enemies. we were alone together—the cavalry regiment and the dervish brigade. the ridge hung like a curtain between us and the army. the general battle was forgotten, as it was unseen. this was a private quarrel. the other might have been a massacre; but here the fight was fair, for we too fought with sword and spear. indeed the advantage of ground and numbers lay with them. all prepared to settle the debate at once and for ever. but some realisation of the cost of our wild ride began to come to those who were responsible. riderless horses galloped across the plain. men, clinging to their saddles, lurched helplessly about, covered with blood from perhaps a dozen wounds. horses, streaming from tremendous gashes, limped and staggered with their riders. in 120 seconds five officers, 65 men, and 119 horses out of fewer than 400 had been killed or wounded.
the dervish line, broken by the charge, began to re-form at once. they closed up, shook themselves together, and prepared with constancy and courage for another shock. but on military considerations it was desirable to turn them out of the khor first and thus deprive them of their vantage ground. the regiment again drawn up, three squadrons in line and the fourth in column, now wheeled to the right, and, galloping round the dervish flank, dismounted and opened a heavy fire with their magazine carbines. under the pressure of this fire the enemy changed front to meet the new attack, so that both sides were formed at right angles to their original lines. when the dervish change of front was completed, they began to advance against the dismounted men. but the fire was accurate, and there can be little doubt that the moral effect of the charge had been very great, and that these brave enemies were no longer unshaken. be this as it may, the fact remains that they retreated swiftly, though in good order, towards the ridge of surgham hill, where the khalifa's black flag still waved, and the 21st lancers remained in possession of the ground—and of their dead.
such is the true and literal account of the charge; but the reader may care to consider a few incidents. colonel martin, busy with the direction of his regiment, drew neither sword nor revolver, and rode through the press unarmed and uninjured. major crole wyndham had his horse shot under him by a dervish who pressed the muzzle of his rifle into its hide before firing. from out of the middle of that savage crowd the officer fought his way on foot and escaped in safety. lieutenant molyneux fell in the khor into the midst of the enemy. in the confusion he disentangled himself from his horse, drew his revolver, and jumped out of the hollow before the dervishes recoved from the impact of the charge. then they attacked him. he fired at the nearest, and at the moment of firing was slashed across the right wrist by another. the pistol fell from his nerveless hand, and, being wounded, dismounted, and disarmed, he turned in the hopes of regaining, by following the line of the charge, his squadron, which was just getting clear. hard upon his track came the enemy, eager to make an end. beset on all sides, and thus hotly pursued, the wounded officer perceived a single lancer riding across his path. he called on him for help. whereupon the trooper, private byrne, although already severely wounded by a bullet which had penetrated his right arm, replied without a moment's hesitation and in a cheery voice, 'all right, sir!' and turning, rode at four dervishes who were about to kill his officer. his wound, which had partly paralysed his arm, prevented him from grasping his sword, and at the first ineffectual blow it fell from his hand, and he received another wound from a spear in the chest. but his solitary charge had checked the pursuing dervishes. lieutenant molyneux regained his squadron alive, and the trooper, seeing that his object was attained, galloped away, reeling in his saddle. arrived at his troop, his desperate condition was noticed and he was told to fall out. but this he refused to do, urging that he was entitled to remain on duty and have 'another go at them.' at length he was compelled to leave the field, fainting from loss of blood.
lieutenant nesham had an even more extraordinary escape than molyneux. he had scrambled out of the khor when, as his horse was nearly stopping, an arab seized his bridle. he struck at the man with his sword, but did not prevent him cutting his off-rein. the officer's bridle-hand, unexpectedly released, flew out, and, as it did so, a swordsman at a single stroke nearly severed it from his body. then they cut at him from all sides. one blow sheared through his helmet and grazed his head. another inflicted a deep wound in his right leg. a third, intercepted by his shoulder-chains, paralysed his right arm. two more, missing him narrowly, cut right through the cantel of the saddle and into the horse's back. the wounded subaltern—he was the youngest of all—reeled. a man on either side seized his legs to pull him to the ground; but the long spurs stuck into the horse's flanks, and the maddened animal, throwing up its head and springing forward, broke away from the crowd of foes, and carried the rider—bleeding, fainting, but still alive—to safety among the rallying squadrons. lieutenant nesham's experience was that of the men who were killed, only that he escaped to describe it.
the wounded were sent with a small escort towards the river and hospitals. an officer was despatched with the news to the sirdar, and on the instant both cannonade and fusillade broke out again behind the ridge, and grew in a crashing crescendo until the whole landscape seemed to vibrate with the sound of explosions. the second phase of the battle had begun.
even before the 21st lancers had reconnoitred surgham ridge, the sirdar had set his brigades in motion towards omdurman. he was determined, even at a very great risk, to occupy the city while it was empty and before the army in the plain could return to defend it. the advantage might be tremendous. nevertheless the movement was premature. the khalifa still remained undefeated west of surgham hill; ali-wad-helu lurked behind kerreri; osman was rapidly re-forming. there were still at least 35,000 men on the field. nor, as the event proved, was it possible to enter omdurman until they had been beaten.
as soon as the infantry had replenished their ammunition, they wheeled to the left in echelon of brigades, and began to march towards surgham ridge. the movements of a great force are slow. it was not desirable that the british division, which led the echelon, should remain in the low ground north of surgham—where they were commanded, had no field of fire, and could see nothing—and accordingly both these brigades moved forward almost together to occupy the crest of the ridge. thus two steps of the ladder were run into one, and maxwell's brigade, which followed wauchope's, was 600 yards further south than it would have been had the regular echelon been observed. in the zeriba macdonald had been next to maxwell. but a very significant change in the order was now made. general hunter evidently conceived the rear of the echelon threatened from the direction of kerreri. had the earth swallowed all the thousands who had moved across the plain towards the hills? at any rate, he would have his best brigade and his most experienced general in the post of possible danger. he therefore ordered lewis's brigade to follow maxwell, and left macdonald last of all, strengthening him with three batteries of artillery and eight maxim guns. collinson marched with the transport. macdonald moved out westward into the desert to take his place in the echelon, and also to allow lewis to pass him as ordered. lewis hurried on after maxwell, and, taking his distance from him, was thus also 600 yards further south than the regular echelon admitted. the step which had been absorbed when both british brigades moved off—advisedly—together, caused a double gap between macdonald and the rest of the army. and this distance was further increased by the fact that while he was moving west, to assume his place in correct echelon, the other five brigades were drawing off to the southward. hence macdonald's isolation.
at 9.15 the whole army was marching south in echelon, with the rear brigade at rather more than double distance. collinson had already started with the transport, but the field hospitals still remained in the deserted zeriba, busily packing up. the medical staff had about 150 wounded on their hands. the sirdar's orders had been that these were to be placed on the hospital barges, and that the field hospitals were to follow the transport. but the moving of wounded men is a painful and delicate affair, and by a stupid and grievous mistake the three regular hospital barges, duly prepared for the reception of the wounded, had been towed across to the right bank. it was necessary to use three ammunition barges, which, although in no way arranged for the reception of wounded, were luckily at hand. meanwhile time was passing, and the doctors, who worked with devoted energy, became suddenly aware that, with the exception of a few detachments from the british division and three egyptian companies, there were no troops within half a mile, and none between them and the dark kerreri hills. the two gunboats which could have guarded them from the river were down stream, helping the cavalry; macdonald with the rear brigade was out in the plain; collinson was hurrying along the bank with his transport. they were alone and unprotected. the army and the river together formed a huge "v" pointing south. the northern extremity—the gorge of the redan, as it were—gaped open towards kerreri; and from kerreri there now began to come, like the first warning drops before a storm of rain, small straggling parties of dervish cavalry. the interior of the "v" was soon actually invaded by these predatory patrols, and one troop of perhaps a score of baggara horse watered their ponies within 300 yards of the unprotected hospitals. behind, in the distance, the banners of an army began to re-appear. the situation was alarming. the wounded were bundled on to the barges, although, since there was no steamer to tow them, they were scarcely any safer when embarked. while some of the medical officers were thus busied, colonel sloggett galloped off, and, running the gauntlet of the baggara horsemen, hurried to claim protection for the hospitals and their helpless occupants. in the midst of this excitement and confusion the wounded from the cavalry charge began to trickle in.
when the british division had moved out of the zeriba, a few skirmishers among the crags of surgham hill alone suggested the presence of an enemy. each brigade, formed in four parallel columns of route, which closed in until they were scarcely forty paces apart, and both at deploying interval—the second brigade nearer the river, the first almost in line with it and on its right—hurried on, eager to see what lay beyond the ridge. all was quiet, except for a few 'sniping' shots from the top of surgham. but gradually as maxwell's brigade—the third in the echelon—approached the hill, these shots became more numerous, until the summit of the peak was spotted with smoke-puffs. the british division moved on steadily, and, leaving these bold skirmishers to the soudanese, soon reached the crest of the ridge. at once and for the first time the whole panorama of omdurman—the brown and battered dome of the mahdi's tomb, the multitude of mud houses, the glittering fork of water which marked the confluence of the rivers—burst on their vision. for a moment they stared entranced. then their attention was distracted; for trotting, galloping, or halting and gazing stupidly about them, terrified and bewildered, a dozen riderless troop-horses appeared over the further crest—for the ridge was flat-topped—coming from the plain, as yet invisible, below. it was the first news of the lancers' charge. details soon followed in the shape of the wounded, who in twos and threes began to make their way between the battalions, all covered with blood and many displaying most terrible injuries—faces cut to rags, bowels protruding, fishhook spears still stuck in their bodies—realistic pictures from the darker side of war. thus absorbed, the soldiers hardly noticed the growing musketry fire from the peak. but suddenly the bang of a field-gun set all eyes looking backward. a battery had unlimbered in the plain between the zeriba and the ridge, and was beginning to shell the summit of the hill. the report of the guns seemed to be the signal for the whole battle to reopen. from far away to the right rear there came the sound of loud and continuous infantry firing, and immediately gatacre halted his division.
almost before the british had topped the crest of the ridge, before the battery had opened from the plain, while colonel sloggett was still spurring across the dangerous ground between the river and the army, the sirdar knew that his enemy was again upon him. looking back from the slopes of surgham, he saw that macdonald, instead of continuing his march in echelon, had halted and deployed. the veteran brigadier had seen the dervish formations on the ridge to the west of surgham, realised that he was about to be attacked, and, resolving to anticipate the enemy, immediately brought his three batteries into action at 1,200 yards, five minutes later the whole of the khalifa's reserve, 15,000 strong, led by yakub with the black flag, the bodyguard and 'all the glories' of the dervish empire, surged into view from behind the hill and advanced on the solitary brigade with the vigour of the first attack and thrice its chances of success. thereupon sir herbert kitchener ordered maxwell to change front to the right and storm surgham hill. he sent major sandbach to tell lewis to conform and come into line on maxwell's right. he galloped himself to the british division—conveniently halted by general gatacre on the northern crest of the ridge—and ordered lyttelton with the 2nd brigade to form facing west on maxwell's left south of surgham, and wauchope with the 1st brigade to hurry back to fill the wide gap between lewis and macdonald. last of all he sent an officer to collinson and the camel corps with orders that they should swing round to their right rear and close the open part of the "v". by these movements the army, instead of facing south in echelon, with its left on the river and its right in the desert, was made to face west in line, with its left in the desert and its right reaching back to the river. it had turned nearly a complete somersault.
in obedience to these orders lyttelton's brigade brought up their left shoulders, deployed into line, and advanced west; maxwell's soudanese scrambled up the surgham rocks, and, in spite of a sharp fire, cleared the peak with the bayonet and pressed on down the further side; lewis began to come into action on maxwell's right; macdonald, against whom the khalifa's attack was at first entirely directed, remained facing south-west, and was soon shrouded in the smoke of his own musketry and artillery fire. the three brigades which were now moving west and away from the nile attacked the right flank of the dervishes assailing macdonald, and, compelling them to form front towards the river, undoubtedly took much of the weight of the attack off the isolated brigade. there remained the gap between lewis and macdonald. but wauchope's brigade—still in four parallel columns of route—had shouldered completely round to the north, and was now doubling swiftly across the plain to fill the unguarded space. with the exception of wauchope's brigade and of collinson's egyptians, the whole infantry and artillery force were at once furiously engaged.
the firing became again tremendous, and the sound was even louder than during the attack on the zeriba. as each fresh battalion was brought into line the tumult steadily increased. the three leading brigades continued to advance westward in one long line looped up over surgham hill, and with the right battalion held back in column. as the forces gradually drew nearer, the possibility of the dervishes penetrating the gap between lewis and macdonald presented itself, and the flank battalion was wheeled into line so as to protect the right flank. the aspect of the dervish attack was at this moment most formidable. enormous masses of men were hurrying towards the smoke-clouds that almost hid macdonald. other masses turned to meet the attack which was developing on their right. within the angle formed by the three brigades facing west and macdonald facing nearly south a great army of not fewer than 15,000 men was enclosed, like a flock of sheep in a fold, by the thin brown lines of the british and egyptian brigades. as the 7th egyptians, the right battalion of lewis's brigade and nearest the gap between that unit and macdonald, deployed to protect the flank, they became unsteady, began to bunch and waver, and actually made several retrograde movements. there was a moment of danger; but general hunter, who was on the spot, himself ordered the two reserve companies of the 15th egyptians under major hickman to march up behind them with fixed bayonets. their morale was thus restored and the peril averted. the advance of the three brigades continued.
yakub found himself utterly unable to withstand the attack from the river. his own attack on macdonald languished. the musketry was producing terrible losses in his crowded ranks. the valiant wad bishara and many other less famous emirs fell dead. gradually he began to give ground. it was evident that the civilised troops were the stronger. but even before the attack was repulsed, the khalifa, who watched from a close position, must have known that the day was lost; for when he launched yakub at macdonald, it was clear that the only chance of success depended on ali-wad-helu and osman sheikh-ed-din attacking at the same time from kerreri. and with bitter rage and mortification he perceived that, although the banners were now gathering under the kerreri hills, ali and osman were too late, and the attacks which should have been simultaneous would only be consecutive. the effect of broadwood's cavalry action upon the extreme right was now becoming apparent.
regrets and fury were alike futile. the three brigades advancing drove the khalifa's dervishes back into the desert. along a mile of front an intense and destructive fire flared and crackled. the 32nd british field battery on the extreme left was drawn by its hardy mules at full gallop into action. the maxim guns pulsated feverishly. two were even dragged by the enterprise of a subaltern to the very summit of surgham, and from this elevated position intervened with bloody effect. thus the long line moved forward in irresistible strength. in the centre, under the red egyptian flag, careless of the bullets which that conspicuous emblem drew, and which inflicted some loss among those around him, rode the sirdar, stern and sullen, equally unmoved by fear or enthusiasm. a mile away to the rear the gunboats, irritated that the fight was passing beyond their reach, steamed restlessly up and down, like caged polar bears seeking what they might devour. before that terrible line the khalifa's division began to break up. the whole ground was strewn with dead and wounded, among whose bodies the soldiers picked their steps with the customary soudan precautions. surviving thousands struggled away towards omdurman and swelled the broad stream of fugitives upon whose flank the 21st lancers already hung vengefully. yakub and the defenders of the black flag disdained to fly, and perished where they stood, beneath the holy ensign, so that when their conquerors reached the spot the dark folds of the banner waved only over the dead.
while all this was taking place—for events were moving at speed—the 1st british brigade were still doubling across the rear of maxwell and lewis to fill the gap between the latter and macdonald. as they had wheeled round, the regiments gained on each other according to their proximity to the pivot flank. the brigade assumed a formation which may be described as an echelon of columns of route, with the lincolns, who were actually the pivot regiment, leading. by the time that the right of lewis's brigade was reached and the british had begun to deploy, it was evident that the khalifa's attack was broken and that his force was in full retreat. in the near foreground the arab dead lay thick. crowds of fugitives were trooping off in the distance. the black flag alone waved defiantly over the corpses of its defenders. in the front of the brigade the fight was over. but those who looked away to the right saw a different spectacle. what appeared to be an entirely new army was coming down from the kerreri hills. while the soldiers looked and wondered, fresh orders arrived. a mounted officer galloped up. there was a report that terrible events were happening in the dust and smoke to the northward. the spearmen had closed with macdonald's brigade; were crumpling his line from the flank; had already broken it. such were the rumours. the orders were more precise. the nearest regiment—the lincolnshire—was to hurry to macdonald's threatened flank to meet the attack. the rest of the brigade was to change front half right, and remain in support. the lincolnshires, breathless but elated, forthwith started off again at the double. they began to traverse the rear of macdonald's brigade, dimly conscious of rapid movements by its battalions, and to the sound of tremendous independent firing, which did not, however, prevent them from hearing the venomous hiss of bullets.
had the khalifa's attack been simultaneous with that which was now developed, the position of macdonald's brigade must have been almost hopeless. in the actual event it was one of extreme peril. the attack in his front was weakening every minute, but the far more formidable attack on his right rear grew stronger and nearer in inverse ratio. both attacks must be met. the moment was critical; the danger near. all depended on macdonald, and that officer, who by valour and conduct in war had won his way from the rank of a private soldier to the command of a brigade, and will doubtless obtain still higher employment, was equal to the emergency.
to meet the khalifa's attack he had arranged his force facing south-west, with three battalions in line and the fourth held back in column of companies in rear of the right flank—an inverted l-shaped formation. as the attack from the south-west gradually weakened and the attack from the north-west continually increased, he broke off his battalions and batteries from the longer side of the l and transferred them to the shorter. he timed these movements so accurately that each face of his brigade was able to exactly sustain the attacks of the enemy. as soon as the khalifa's force began to waver he ordered the xith soudanese and a battery on his left to move across the angle in which the brigade was formed, and deploy along the shorter face to meet the impending onslaught of ali-wad-helu. perceiving this, the ixth soudanese, who were the regiment in column on the right of the original front, wheeled to the right from column into line without waiting for orders, so that two battalions faced towards the khalifa and two towards the fresh attack. by this time it was clear that the khalifa was practically repulsed, and macdonald ordered the xth soudanese and another battery to change front and prolong the line of the ixth and xith. he then moved the 2nd egyptians diagonally to their right front, so as to close the gap at the angle between their line and that of the three other battalions. these difficult manoeuvres were carried out under a heavy fire, which in twenty minutes caused over 120 casualties in the four battalions—exclusive of the losses in the artillery batteries—and in the face of the determined attacks of an enemy who outnumbered the troops by seven to one and had only to close with them to be victorious. amid the roar of the firing and the dust, smoke, and confusion of the change of front, the general found time to summon the officers of the ixth soudanese around him, rebuked them for having wheeled into line in anticipation of his order, and requested them to drill more steadily in brigade.
the three soudanese battalions were now confronted with the whole fury of the dervish attack from kerreri. the bravery of the blacks was no less conspicuous than the wildness of their musketry. they evinced an extraordinary excitement—firing their rifles without any attempt to sight or aim, and only anxious to pull the trigger, re-load, and pull it again. in vain the british officers strove to calm their impulsive soldiers. in vain they called upon them by name, or, taking their rifles from them, adjusted the sights themselves. the independent firing was utterly beyond control. soon the ammunition began to be exhausted, and the soldiers turned round clamouring for more cartridges, which their officers doled out to them by twos and threes in the hopes of steadying them. it was useless. they fired them all off and clamoured for more. meanwhile, although suffering fearfully from the close and accurate fire of the three artillery batteries and eight maxim guns, and to a less extent from the random firing of the soudanese, the dervishes drew nearer in thousands, and it seemed certain that there would be an actual collision. the valiant blacks prepared themselves with delight to meet the shock, notwithstanding the overwhelming numbers of the enemy. scarcely three rounds per man remained throughout the brigade. the batteries opened a rapid fire of case-shot. still the dervishes advanced, and the survivors of their first wave of assault were scarcely 100 yards away. behind them both green flags pressed forward over enormous masses of armed humanity, rolling on as they now believed to victory.
at this moment the lincoln regiment began to come up. as soon as the leading company cleared the right of macdonald's brigade, they formed line, and opened an independent fire obliquely across the front of the soudanese. groups of dervishes in twos and threes were then within 100 yards. the great masses were within 300 yards. the independent firing lasted two minutes, during which the whole regiment deployed. its effect was to clear away the leading groups of arabs. the deployment having been accomplished with the loss of a dozen men, including colonel sloggett, who fell shot through the breast while attending to the wounded, section volleys were ordered. with excellent discipline the independent firing was instantly stopped, and the battalion began with machine-like regularity to carry out the principles of modern musketry, for which their training had efficiently prepared them and their rifles were admirably suited. they fired on an average sixty rounds per man, and finally repulsed the attack.
the dervishes were weak in cavalry, and had scarcely 2,000 horsemen on the field. about 400 of these, mostly the personal retainers of the various emirs, were formed into an irregular regiment and attached to the flag of ali-wad-helu. now when these horsemen perceived that there was no more hope of victory, they arranged themselves in a solid mass and charged the left of macdonald's brigade. the distance was about 500 yards, and, wild as was the firing of the soudanese, it was evident that they could not possibly succeed. nevertheless, many carrying no weapon in their hands, and all urging their horses to their utmost speed, they rode unflinchingly to certain death. all were killed and fell as they entered the zone of fire—three, twenty, fifty, two hundred, sixty, thirty, five and one out beyond them all—a brown smear across the sandy plain. a few riderless horses alone broke through the ranks of the infantry.
after the failure of the attack from kerreri the whole anglo-egyptian army advanced westward, in a line of bayonets and artillery nearly two miles long, and drove the dervishes before them into the desert, so that they could by no means rally or reform. the egyptian cavalry, who had returned along the river, formed line on the right of the infantry in readiness to pursue. at half-past eleven sir h. kitchener shut up his glasses, and, remarking that he thought the enemy had been given 'a good dusting,' gave the order for the brigades to resume their interrupted march on omdurman—a movement which was possible, now that the forces in the plain were beaten. the brigadiers thereupon stopped the firing, massed their commands in convenient formations, and turned again towards the south and the city. the lincolnshire regiment remained detached as a rearguard.
meanwhile the great dervish army, who had advanced at sunrise in hope and courage, fled in utter rout, pursued by the egyptian cavalry, harried by the 21st lancers, and leaving more than 9,000 warriors dead and even greater numbers wounded behind them.
thus ended the battle of omdurman—the most signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians. within the space of five hours the strongest and best-armed savage army yet arrayed against a modern european power had been destroyed and dispersed, with hardly any difficulty, comparatively small risk, and insignificant loss to the victors.
