house of commons, april 5, 1906
we have travelled a long way since this parliament assembled, in the discussion of the transvaal and orange river colony constitutions. when the change of government took place mr. lyttelton's constitution was before us. that instrument provided for representative and not responsible government. under that constitution the election would have been held in march of this year, and the assembly would have met in june, if the home government had not changed. but just at the time that the government changed in december two questions arose—the question of whether or not soldiers of the british army in garrison should be allowed to vote; and the question whether it would not be better to have sixty constituencies instead of thirty; and, as both questions involved necessary [4]alterations in the letters patent, the time was ripe, quite apart from any difference which the change of the men at the helm might make, for a reconsideration and review of the whole form of the government which was to be given to the two colonies.
the objection that must most readily occur in considering mr. lyttelton's constitution is that it was unworkable. it proposed that there should be from six to nine nominated ministers in an assembly of thirty-five, afterwards to be increased to sixty elective members. the position of a minister is one of considerable difficulty. he often has to defend rather an awkward case. when favourable facts are wanting he has to depend upon the nimbleness of his wits, and, when these fail him, he has to fall back upon the loyalty of his supporters. but no minister can move very far upon his road with satisfaction or success if he has not behind him either a nominated majority or an organised party majority. mr. lyttelton's ministers had neither. they would have been alone, hopelessly outnumbered in an assembly, the greater part of which was avowedly in favour of responsible and not of representative government. these ministers, with one exception, had no previous [5]parliamentary experience and no ascertained parliamentary ability. they would have been forced to carry their bills and their estimates through an assembly in the main opposed to them. all this time, while we should have given to these ministers this serious duty, we should ourselves have had to bear the whole responsibility in this country for everything that was done under their authority; and their authority could only be exerted through an assembly which, as things stood, they could not control.
the committee can easily imagine the telegrams and the questions which would have been addressed from downing street and the house of commons to these ministers on native matters, on the question of the administration of the chinese ordinance, on all the numerous intricate questions with which we are at the present moment involved in south africa. and what would have been the position of these ministers, faced with these embarrassments in a hostile assembly in which they had few friends—what possibility would they have had of maintaining themselves in such an assembly? is it not certain that they would have broken down under the strain to which [6]they would have been exposed, that the assembly would have been infuriated, that parties differing from each other on every conceivable question, divided from each other by race and religion and language, would have united in common hatred of the interference of the outside power and the government of bureaucrats. then we should very speedily have got to the bottom of the hill. there would have been a swift transition. the legislative assembly would have converted itself into a constituent assembly, and it would have taken by force all that the government now have it in their power to concede with grace, distinction, and authority. on these grounds his majesty's government came to the conclusion that it would be right to omit the stage of representative government altogether and to go directly to the stage of responsible government.
it is the same in politics as it is in war. when one crest line has been left, it is necessary to go to the next. to halt half-way in the valley between is to court swift and certain destruction, and the moment you have abandoned the safe position of a crown colony government, or government with an adequate [7]nominated majority, there is no stopping-place whatever on which you may rest the sole of your foot, until you come to a responsible legislative assembly with an executive obeying that assembly. these arguments convinced his majesty's government that it would be necessary to annul the letters patent issued on march 31, 1905, and make an end of the lyttelton constitution. that constitution now passes away into the never-never land, into a sort of chilly limbo that is reserved for the disowned or abortive political progeny of many distinguished men.
the government, and those who support them, may rejoice that we have been able to take this first most important step in our south african policy with such a very general measure of agreement, with, indeed, a consensus of opinion which almost amounts to unanimity. both races, every party, every class, every section in south africa have agreed in the course which his majesty's government have adopted in abandoning representative government and going at once to responsible government. that is already a very great thing, but it was not always so. those who sat in the last parliament will remember that it was not [8]always so. we remember that lord milner was entirely opposed to granting responsible government. we know that mr. lyttelton wrote pages and pages in the blue book of last year proving how futile and dangerous responsible government would be; and the right hon. member for west birmingham, who took the government decision as a matter of course on the first day of the present session, made a speech last session in which he indicated in terms of great gravity and force, that he thought it was wholly premature to grant responsible government to the transvaal. but all that is abandoned now. i heard the right hon. member for west birmingham, in the name of the party opposite, accept the policy of his majesty's government. i heard the hon. member for blackpool this afternoon say that he hoped that responsible government would be given to the transvaal at the earliest possible moment. in regard to the orange river colony, it is quite true that the official opposition, so far as i gather their view, think that it should be delayed, and should not be given at the same time as to the transvaal; but that is not the view of the right hon. member for west birmingham. speaking in the house of [9]commons on july 27, 1905, the right hon. gentleman said:
"objection has also been taken that the same government which is now being given to the transvaal has not been given to the orange river colony. i think that the experiment might have been far better tried in the orange river colony. it is quite true that in that colony there is an enormous majority of the dutch or boer population. but they have shown by long experience that they are most capable and moderate administrators—under the admirable rule of president brand they set an example to the whole of south africa; and although i think there is some danger in this experiment, it is in the orange river colony that i myself would have been inclined, in the first instance, to take the risk."
it is true the right hon. gentleman was speaking of representative government; but it cannot be disputed that if an advance were to be made in associating the people of the conquered colonies with the government of those colonies, the right hon. gentleman thought that it had better be in the orange river colony first. but at any rate now it is incontestable that there is [10]no party in this country or in the transvaal that opposes the grant of responsible government to the transvaal. that is a great advance, and shows that we have been able to take our first step with the approbation of all concerned.
but the opposition, having abandoned their resistance to the grant of responsible government, now contend that on no account must the basis of the lyttelton constitution be departed from. i am not convinced by that argument. the government are to pursue a new purpose, but to adhere to the old framework. we are to cut off the head of the lyttelton constitution, but are to preserve the old trunk and graft a new head on it. i do not believe that any government, approaching this question from a new point of view, uncompromised and unfettered, would be bound by the framework and details of the lyttelton constitution. it may be that that constitution contains many excellent principles, but the government have a right to consider things from the beginning, freshly and freely, to make their own plans in accordance with their own ideas, and to present those plans for the acceptance of the house.
the noble lord the member for south [11]birmingham spoke of the principle of "one vote, one value," which was embodied in the lyttelton constitution. the principle of "one vote, one value" is in itself an orthodox and unimpeachable principle of democracy. it is a logical, numerical principle. if the attempt be made to discriminate between man and man because one has more children and lives in the country, it would be arguable that we should discriminate because another man has more brains or more money, or lives in the town, or for any other of the many reasons that differentiate one human being from another. the only safe principle, i think, is that for electoral purposes all men are equal, and that voting power, as far as possible, should be evenly distributed among them.
in the transvaal the principle of "one vote, one value" can be made operative only upon a basis of voters. in nearly every other country in the world, population is the usual basis of distribution, for population is the same as electorate and electorate the same as population. on both bases the distribution of the constituencies would be the same. there is, for instance, no part of this country which is more married, or [12]more celibate, or more prolific than any other part. it is only in the transvaal, this country of afflicting dualities and of curious contradictions, where everything is twisted, disturbed, and abnormal, that there is a great disparity between the distribution of seats on the basis of voters and on the basis of population. the high price of provisions in the towns restricts the growth of urban population, and the dullness of the country districts appears to be favourable to the growth of large families. it is a scientific and unimpeachable fact that, if you desire to apply the principle of "one vote, one value" to the constitution of the transvaal, that principle can best be attained—i am not sure that it cannot only be attained—on the basis of voters, and that is the basis mr. lyttelton took in the constitution he formed.
but mr. lyttelton's plan did not stop there. side by side with this basis of voters, he had an artificial franchise of ￡100 annual value. that is a very much lower qualification in south africa, than it would be in this country, and i do not think that the franchise which mr. lyttelton proposed could be called an undemocratic franchise, albeit that it was an artificial franchise, because it yielded 89,000 [13]voters out of a population of 300,000, and that is a much more fertile franchise, even after making allowance for the abnormal conditions of a new country, than we have in this country or than is the case in some american and european states. so that i do not accuse mr. lyttelton of having formulated an undemocratic franchise, but taking these two points together—the unusual basis of distribution with the apparently artificial franchise—acting and reacting, as they must have done, one upon the other—there was sufficient ground to favour the suspicion, at any rate, that something was intended in the nature of a dodge, in the nature of a trick, artificially to depress the balance in one direction and to tilt it in the other.
in dealing with nationalities, nothing is more fatal than a dodge. wrongs will be forgiven, sufferings and losses will be forgiven or forgotten, battles will be remembered only as they recall the martial virtues of the combatants; but anything like chicane, anything like a trick, will always rankle. the government are concerned in south africa not only to do what is fair, but to do what south africa will accept as fair. they are concerned not merely to choose a balance [14]which will deal evenly between the races, but one which will secure the acceptance of both races.
we meet unjust charges in good heart. the permanence and security of british sovereignty in south africa is not a matter of indifference to his majesty's ministers. surely no honourable member believes that we could wish to cheat the british race in the transvaal of any numerical preponderance which may properly belong to them. equally with our political opponents we desire to see the maintenance of british supremacy in south africa. but we seek to secure it by a different method. there is a profound difference between the schools of thought which exist upon south african politics in this house. we think that british authority in south africa has got to stand on two legs. you have laboured for ten years to make it stand on one. we on this side know that if british dominion is to endure in south africa it must endure with the assent of the dutch, as well as of the british. we think that the position of the crown in south africa, and let me add the position of agents and ministers of the crown in south africa, should be just as much above [15]and remote from racial feuds, as the position of the crown in this country is above our party politics. we do not seek to pit one race against the other in the hope of profiting from the quarrel. we hope to build upon the reconciliation and not upon the rivalry of races. we hope that it may be our fortune so to dispose of affairs that these two valiant, strong races may dwell together side by side in peace and amity under the shelter of an equal flag.
