majuba hill
(1881)
up beyond the inyati, where the frontier ranges rise,
dark and lonely looms the mountain evil-starred;
staring southward for the column, keeping vigil ’gainst surprise,
standing grimly like a sentinel on guard.
but at night strange sounds re-echo, and dim phantoms rise from rest,
and the voices of dead captains call again;
through the winds that wail and whimper round majuba’s haunted crest,
that is peopled by the spirits of the slain.
john sandes.
it would take too long to deal at all circumspectly with the history of south africa. it was the portuguese who originally discovered the cape of good hope, and for long years they were the controllers of the sea and of africa. many years later other peoples began to colonise in far-away lands, and sir francis drake ran across the cape, but as yet there was no interest in the place from a commercial point of view; the coast was merely used as a suitable stopping-place. later on the dutch—who were a great sea people then—founded a colony where cape town now stands. the french soon followed them, particularly the huguenots, who had fled from their own country and were glad to settle in africa. last of all, the british became very anxious to found a settlement, and in 1795 cape colony was added to the british empire and the rule of the dutch was ended. the dutch, who have always proved a courageous and obstinate people, never ready to admit the superiority of anybody else, in due course made their way elsewhere, preferring hardship to dependence.
after the wars of napoleon the other powers in europe recognised that the british were supreme in south africa, for which acknowledgment the government paid holland a large sum of money. from this time onwards troubles came at intervals from the kaffir wars to the zulu rising, from majuba to that greatest of all campaigns in south africa—the great boer war. from the beginning there were difficulties between the natives and the boers, the kaffir siding now with the english and now with the boers, but usually against the latter. in the kaffir campaigns the highlanders took part, but they are not of sufficient importance to demand our attention.
there is one expedition, however, that has a memorable place in our history. some men of the 2nd battalion of the black watch, the 91st argyllshire highlanders, and the highland light infantry were, in 1852, shipped for south africa to take part in the campaign against the kaffirs. they sailed upon the birkenhead, and one dark night the ship went to pieces at a place called danger point. so swift and sudden was the shock that only a certain number of the boats could be lowered, and had they all been used there was quite an inadequate number for both the troops and the passengers. in perfect order the soldiers formed up in companies, and the women and children were lowered over the side. the horses were loosed and given a last chance for their lives. then the boats put off and the birkenhead was left to her fate. as the dawn was breaking, with those silent figures as steady as on parade, the birkenhead disappeared, and four hundred british soldiers went to their death. that memorable scene has never been forgotten, and should be recalled as one of the most honourable and moving incidents in the history of the highland regiments.
subsequent to the melancholy end of the birkenhead, the boers had made their great trek, and the trouble with dingaan, the zulu chief, had resulted in the massacre of their comrades.
with the discovery of gold the whole aspect of south africa changed. the country was suddenly inundated with all the riff-raff of europe. the “gold rush” wrought more harm than can ever be fully estimated. strife and trouble arose on every side. the boers, who perpetually tyrannised over the natives, also attempted to tyrannise over the british. at last, on the 12th of april 1877, the south african republic was taken over by the english, and the union jack run up at pretoria. although the boers were very much aggrieved, they were quite unable to protect their rights in the matter, as the country was full of british troops.
a zulu war broke out under cetewayo, in which the transvaal boers would take no part, leaving the british to fend for themselves as best they could. events followed hard upon each other. the terrible disaster of isandlwana, where the british forces were cut off and suffered a loss of 800 men, sent a thrill through the whole of south africa. within a few hours there followed the heroic defence of rorke’s drift, when a handful of men kept 3000 zulus at arm’s length for many hours. in 1879 the 91st highlanders left for zululand, to take their share in the defeat of the zulus at the battle of ulundi and the capture of cetewayo.
in the meantime the dissatisfaction of the boers had in no way diminished. desiring to regain their freedom, they made preparations for doing so. they elected kruger, joubert, and pretorius as their leaders, and, on the 16th of december 1880, raised the flag of the republic at heidelburg, their new capital. war was declared, and in january 1881 the british suffered a reverse at laing’s nek, where they remained strongly posted. laing’s nek was very close to a kopje that has passed into our history as majuba hill.
we know a great deal more about the boers now than we did then. we did not realise at that time that they were a clever and courageous foe, linking their intimate knowledge of the country with a sure and deadly marksmanship. the british troops in south africa were quite inadequate in numbers to deal with such a situation. the 92nd gordon highlanders, with their famous march to kandahar still vivid in the public mind, were hurried to reinforce the troops under general sir george colley at prospect hill.
general colley had been instructed by sir evelyn wood that he must not attempt an advance for the present. despite this order he resolved to occupy majuba hill by night, and hold what appeared to be a superior position. accordingly, at half-past eight on the evening of february 25, the little party, composed of 550 men of the gordons and a party of the naval brigade, carrying 70 rounds of ammunition and three days’ rations but no water, began their ascent of majuba hill. at the base they left a detachment to guard their lines of communications, thus reducing the force to some 350 men. so far as colley’s plan was concerned it was entirely successful. just before the dawn broke the british were in possession of the summit, while far beneath them they could see the boer camp beginning to stir for the day.
general white, v.c., who was then senior major of the gordons, has described the situation in the regimental records. “the approaches,” he says, “to the brow below were nearly all concealed from the view of the defenders on the top. the slope of the hill leading up to the brow is broken by natural terraces, which run nearly round the hill, and which afford an enemy, under cover of his firing parties placed for the purpose, an opportunity of collecting in force on any point, and to circuit round the hill without coming under the fire, or even the observation of the defenders.”
to put it quite simply, the summit of the hill was like a saucer, while instead of a smooth slope down which the defenders could pick off the ascending foe, the cover was so ample that it was possible for the boers to shoot the british against the sky-line without exposing themselves.
general colley had expressed no deeper design than his wish that the men should hold the hill for three days. he made no preparations for the defence, he forbade the troops to entrench themselves, and so the day dawned, and the boers awakened to the fact that majuba hill was occupied by the british. what followed is soon told. a storming party crept up the face of the hill, though quite out of sight of the british, and when lieutenant ian hamilton of the gordons approached general colley, begging him to let them entrench themselves or charge, he merely repeated the fateful words, “hold the place for three days.” the boers, firing against the sky-line, opened the engagement. it was simply a question of time until the little garrison were picked off man by man. too late was it when colley, at last thoroughly alive to the danger, running hither and thither, attempted to entrench his men. still he refused to let the gordons charge, and the boers contented themselves for some time in reducing the number of the defenders. at last, growing contemptuous of such warfare, they attempted to finish the business and carry the position by assault. undaunted, but sick at heart, the gordons drove them back at the point of the bayonet. the end was near at hand. one hundred and fifty of the highlanders stood shoulder to shoulder, determined to hold out to the last. sir george colley, shot through the head, fell in the hour of his deep humiliation. when at last the belated order was given to retreat, 200 men of that little force of 350 lay dead or wounded, and only 60 or 70 came out of the action. lieutenant ian hamilton, who was later on to uphold the glory of the british arms against the boers, was so badly wounded that when the enemy came to look at him they said, “you will probably die, you may go.”
it had been little less than a massacre. “the top of majuba,” says colonel m’bean, “was a horrid sight. the first thing i saw was a long row of dead men—some 40 or 50 of them. there were also numbers of wounded men lying about, most of them frightfully wounded. i went towards the edge of the hill where so many of the 92nd had been killed.... the dead were all shot above the breast, in some men’s heads i counted five and six bullet wounds.”
it is now admitted that under the circumstances, and under the conditions of the defence, the disaster could not have been prevented. there was only one gleam in the encompassing gloom—to the last the british had fought without quailing.
he knows no tears who in the van
and foremost fight
met death as should an englishman
upon majuba’s height.
whether foolishly or not cannot be discussed here, the british government instructed sir evelyn wood to come to terms at all costs, and the truce that resulted gave the transvaal into boer hands, with mr. kruger as president. we see now how unwise it was to permit this disgrace and humiliation to the british arms and the british name. long years of quarrelling between the boer colonists and those who acknowledged the sovereignty of england, were to make south africa a place of miserable dissension. the easy success over a few hundred trapped british soldiers was magnified, in the eyes of the more ignorant boers, into a victory over the whole english race, and until the great war of 1899-1902 no occasion was ever let slip on which the name of ‘majuba’ could be recalled and emphasised.
