... the reasonable is that which is viable
hilde let the big ring binder fall to the floor with a heavy thud. she lay on her bed staring up at the ceiling. her thoughts were in a turmoil.
now her father really had made her head swim. the rascal! how could he?
sophie had tried to talk directly to her. she had asked her to rebel against her father. and she had really managed to plant an idea in hilde's mind. a plan ...
sophie and alberto could not so much as harm a hair on his head, but hilde could. and through hilde, sophie could reach her father.
she agreed with sophie and alberto that he was going too far in his game of shadows. even if he had only made alberto and sophie up, there were limits to the show of power he ought to permit himself.
poor sophie and alberto! they were just as defenseless against the major's imagination as a movie screen is against the film projector.
hilde would certainly teach him a lesson when he got home! she could already see the outline of a really good plan.
she got up and went to look out over the bay. it was almost two o'clock. she opened the window and called over toward the boathouse.
"mom!"
her mother came out.
"i'll be down with some sandwiches in about an hour. okay?" "fine." "i just have to read a chapter on hegel."
alberto and sophie had seated themselves in the two chairs by the window facing the lake.
"georg wilhelm friedrich hege/was a legitimate child of romanticism," began alberto. "one could almost say he developed with the german spirit as it gradually evolved in germany. he was born in stuttgart in 1770, and began to study theology in tubingen at the age of eighteen. beginning in 1799, he worked with schelling in jena during the time when the romantic movement was experiencing its most explosive growth. after a period as assistant professor in jena he became a professor in heidelberg, the center of german national romanticism. in 1818 he was appointed professor in berlin, just at the time when the city was becoming the spiritual center of europe. he died of cholera in 1831, but not before 'he-gelianism' had gained an enormous following at nearly all the universities in germany."
"so he covered a lot of ground."
"yes, and so did his philosophy. hegel united and developed almost all the ideas that had surfaced in the romantic period. but he was sharply critical of many of the romantics, including schelling."
"what was it he criticized?"
"schelling as well as other romantics had said that the deepest meaning of life lay in what they called the 'world spirit.' hegel also uses the term 'world spirit,' but in a new sense. when hegel talks of 'world spirit' or 'world reason,' he means the sum of human utterances, because only man has a 'spirit.'
"in this sense, he can speak of the progress of world spirit throughout history. however, we must never forget that he is referring to human life, human thought, and human culture."
"that makes this spirit much less spooky. it is not lying in wait anymore like a 'slumbering intelligence' in rocks and trees."
"now, you remember that kant had talked about something he called 'das ding an sich.' although he denied that man could have any clear cognition of the in-nermost secrets of nature, he admitted that there exists a kind of unattainable 'truth.' hegel said that 'truth is subjective/ thus rejecting the existence of any 'truth' above or beyond human reason. all knowledge is human knowledge, he said."
"he had to get the philosophers down to earth again, right?"
"yes, perhaps you could say that. however, hegel's philosophy was so all-embracing and diversified that for present purposes we shall content ourselves with highlighting some of the main aspects. it is actually doubtful whether one can say that hegel had his own 'philosophy' at all. what is usually known as hegel's philosophy is mainly a method for understanding the progress of history. hegel's philosophy teaches us nothing about the inner nature of life, but it can teach us to think productively."
"that's not unimportant."
"all the philosophical systems before hegel had had one thing in common, namely, the attempt to set up eternal criteria for what man can know about the world. this was true of descartes, spinoza, hume, and kant. each and every one had tried to investigate the basis of human cognition. but they had all made pronouncements on the timeless factor of human knowledge of the world."
"isn't that a philosopher's job?"
"hegel did not believe it was possible. he believed that the basis of human cognition changed from one generation to the next. there were therefore no 'eternal truths/ no timeless reason. the only fixed point philosophy can hold on to is history itself."
"i'm afraid you'll have to explain that. history is in a constant state of change, so how can it be a fixed point?"
"a river is also in a constant state of change. that doesn't mean you can't talk about it. but you cannot say at which place in the valley the river is the 'truest' river."
"no, because it's just as much river all the way through."
"so to hegel, history was like a running river. every tiny movement in the water at a given spot in the river is determined by the falls and eddies in the water higher upstream. but these movements are determined, too, by the rocks and bends in the river at the point where you are observing it."
"i get it... i think."
"and the history of thought--or of reason--is like this river. the thoughts that are washed along with the current of past tradition, as well as the material conditions prevailing at the time, help to determine how you think. you can therefore never claim that any particular thought is correct for ever and ever. but the thought can be correct from where you stand."
"that's not the same as saying that everything is equally right or equally wrong, is it?"
"certainly not, but some things can be right or wrong in relation to a certain historical context. if you advocated slavery today, you would at best be thought foolish. but you wouldn't have been considered foolish 2,500 years ago, even though there were already progressive voices in favor of slavery's abolition. but we can take a more local example. not more than 100 years ago it was not considered unreasonable to burn off large areas of forest in order to cultivate the land. but it is extremely unreasonable today. we have a completely different--and better--basis for such judgments."
"now i see."
"hegel pointed out that as regards philosophical reflection, also, reason is dynamic; it's a process, in fact. and the 'truth' is this same process, since there are no criteria beyond the historical process itself that can determine what is the most true or the most reasonable."
"examples, please."
"you cannot single out particular thoughts from antiquity, the middle ages, the renaissance, or the enlightenment and say they were right or wrong. by the same token, you cannot say that plato was wrong and that aristotle was right. neither can you say that hume was wrong but kant and schelling were right. that would be an antihistorical way of thinking."
"no, it doesn't sound right."
"in fact, you cannot detach any philosopher, or any thought at all, from that philosopher's or that thought's historical context. but--and here i come to another point--because something new is always being added, reason is 'progressive.' in other words, human knowledge is constantly expanding and progressing."
"does that mean that kant's philosophy is nevertheless more right than plato's?"
"yes. the world spirit has developed--and progressed--from plato to kant. and it's a good thing! if we return to the example of the river, we could say that there is now more water in it. it has been running for over a thousand years. only kant shouldn't think that his 'truths' will remain on the banks of the river like immovable rocks. kant's ideas get processed too, and his 'reason' becomes the subject of future generations' criticism. which is exactly what has happened."
"but the river you talked about. . ."
"yes?"
"where does it go?"
"hegel claimed that the 'world spirit' is developing toward an ever-expanding knowledge of itself. it's the same with rivers--they become broader and broader as they get nearer to the sea. according to hegel, history is the story of the 'world spirit' gradually coming to consciousness of itself. although the world has always existed, human culture and human development have made the world spirit increasingly conscious of its intrinsic value."
"how could he be so sure of that?"
"he claimed it as a historical reality. it was not a prediction. anybody who studies history will see that humanity has advanced toward ever-increasing 'self-knowledge' and 'self-development.' according to hegel, the study of history shows that humanity is moving toward greater rationality and freedom. in spite of all its capers, historical development is progressive. we say that history is purposeful."
"so it develops. that's clear enough."
"yes. history is one long chain of reflections. hegel also indicated certain rules that apply for this chain of reflections. anyone studying history in depth will observe that a thought is usually proposed on the basis of other, previously proposed thoughts. but as soon as one thought is proposed, it will be contradicted by another. a tension arises between these two opposite ways of thinking. but the tension is resolved by the proposal of a third thought which accommodates the best of both points of view. hegel calls this a dialectic process."
"could you give an example?"
"you remember that the pre-socratics discussed the question of primeval substance and change?"
"more or less."
"then the eleatics claimed that change was in fact impossible. they were therefore forced to deny any change even though they could register the changes through their senses. the eleatics had put forward a claim, and hegel called a standpoint like that a thesis."
"yes?"
"but whenever such an extreme claim is proposed, a contradictory claim will arise. hegel called this a nega-tion. the negation of the eleatic philosophy was heracli-tus, who said that everything flows. there is now a tension between two diametrically opposed schools of thought. but this tension was resolved when empedocles pointed out that both claims were partly right and partly wrong."
"yes, it all comes back to me now . . ."
"the eleatics were right in that nothing actually changes, but they were not right in holding that we cannot rely on our senses. heraclitus had been right in that we can rely on our senses, but not right in holding that everything flows."
"because there was more than one substance. it was the combination that flowed, not the substance itself."
"right! empedocles' standpoint--which provided the compromise between the two schools of thought--was what hegel called the negation of the negation."
"what a terrible term!"
"he also called these three stages of knowledge thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. you could, for example, say that descartes's rationalism was a thesis--which was contradicted by hume's empirical antithesis. but the contradiction, or the tension between two modes of thought, was resolved in kant's synthesis. kant agreed with the rationalists in some things and with the empiricists in others. but the story doesn't end with kant. kant's synthesis now becomes the point of departure for another chain of reflections, or 'triad.' because a synthesis will also be contradicted by a new antithesis."
"it's all very theoretical!"
"yes, it certainly is theoretical. but hegel didn't see it as pressing history into any kind of framework. he believed that history itself revealed this dialectical pattern. he thus claimed he had uncovered certain laws for the development of reason--or for the progress of the 'world spirit' through history."
"there it is again!"
"but hegel's dialectic is not only applicable to history. when we discuss something, we think dialectically. we try to find flaws in the argument. hegel called that 'negative thinking.' but when we find flaws in an argument, we preserve the best of it."
"give me an example."
"well, when a socialist and a conservative sit down together to resolve a social problem, a tension will quickly be revealed between their conflicting modes of thought. but this does not mean that one is absolutely right and the other totally wrong. it is possible that they are both partly right and partly wrong. and as the argument evolves, the best of both arguments will often crystallize."
"i hope."
"but while we are in the throes of a discussion like that, it is not easy to decide which position is more rational. in a way, it's up to history to decide what's right and what's wrong. the reasonable is that which is viable."
"whatever survives is right."
"or vice versa: that which is right survives."
"don't you have a tiny example for me?"
"one hundred and fifty years ago there were a lot of people fighting for women's rights. many people also bitterly opposed giving women equal rights. when we read the arguments of both sides today, it is not difficult to see which side had the more 'reasonable' opinions. but we must not forget that we have the knowledge of hindsight.
if 'proved to be the case' that those who fought for equality were right. a lot of people would no doubt cringe if they saw in print what their grandfathers had said on the matter."
"i'm sure they would. what was hegel's view?"
"about equality of the sexes?"
"isn't that what we are talking about?"
"would you like to hear a quote?"
"very much."
" 'the difference between man and woman is like that between animals and plants,' he said. 'men correspond to animals, while women correspond to plants because their development is more placid and the principle that underlies it is the rather vague unity of feeling. when women hold the helm of government, the state is at once in jeopardy, because women regulate their actions not by the demands of universality but by arbitrary inclinations and opinions. women are educated--who knows how?--as it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than by acquiring knowledge. the status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion.' "
"thank you, that will be quite enough. i'd rather not hear any more statements like that."
"but it is a striking example of how people's views of what is rational change all the time. it shows that hegel was also a child of his time. and so are we. our 'obvious' views will not stand the test of time either."
"what views, for example?"
"i have no such examples."
"why not?"
"because i would be exemplifying things that are already undergoing a change. for instance, i could say it's stupid to drive a car because cars pollute the environment. lots of people think this already. but history will prove that much of what we think is obvious will not hold up in the light of history."
"i see."
"we can also observe something else: the many men in hegel's time who could reel off gross broadsides like that one on the inferiority of women hastened the development of feminism."
"how so?"
"they proposed a thesis. why? because women had already begun to rebel. there's no need to have an opinion on something everyone agrees on. and the more grossly they expressed themselves about women's inferiority, the stronger became the negation."
"yes, of course."
"you might say that the very best that can happen is to have energetic opponents. the more extreme they become, the more powerful the reaction they will have to face. there's a saying about 'more grist to the mill.' "
"my mill began to grind more energetically a minute ago!"
"from the point of view of pure logic or philosophy, there will often be a dialectical tension between two concepts."
"for example?"
"if i reflect on the concept of 'being,' i will be obliged to introduce the opposite concept, that of 'nothing.' you can't reflect on your existence without immediately realizing that you won't always exist. the tension between 'being' and 'nothing' becomes resolved in the concept of 'becoming.' because if something is in the process of becoming, it both is and is not."
"i see that."
"hegel's 'reason' is thus dynamic logic. since reality is characterized by opposites, a description of reality must therefore also be full of opposites. here is another example for you: the danish nuclear physicist niels bohr is said to have told a story about newton's having a horseshoe over his front door."
"that's for luck."
"but it is only a superstition, and newton was anything but superstitious. when someone asked him if he really believed in that kind of thing, he said, 'no, i don't, but i'm told it works anyway.' "
"amazing."
"but his answer was quite dialectical, a contradiction in terms, almost. niels bohr, who, like our own norwegian poet vinje, was known for his ambivalence, once said: there are two kinds of truths. there are the superficial truths, the opposite of which are obviously wrong. but there are also the profound truths, whose op-posites are equally right."
"what kind of truths can they be?"
"if i say life is short, for example . . ."
"i would agree."
"but on another occasion i could throw open my arms and say life is long."
"you're right. that's also true, in a sense."
"finally i'll give you an example of how a dialectic tension can result in a spontaneous act which leads to a sudden change."
"yes, do."
"imagine a young girl who always answers her mother with yes, mom ... okay, mom ... as you wish, mom ... at once, mom."
"gives me the shudders!"
"finally the girl's mother gets absolutely maddened by her daughter's overobedience, and shouts: stop being such a goody-goody! and the girl answers: okay, mom."
"i would have slapped her."
"perhaps. but what would you have done if the girl had answered instead: but i wonf to be a goody-goody?"
"that would have been an odd answer. maybe i would have slapped her anyway."
"in other words, the situation was deadlocked. the dialectic tension had come to a point where something had to happen."
"like a slap in the face?"
"a final aspect of hegel's philosophy needs to be mentioned here."
"i'm listening."
"do you remember how we said that the romantics were individualists?"
"the path of mystery leads inwards ..."
"this individualism also met its negation, or opposite, in hegel's philosophy. hegel emphasized what he called the 'objective' powers. among such powers, hegel emphasized the importance of the family, civil society, and the state. you might say that hegel was somewhat skeptical of the individual. he believed that the individual was an organic part of the community. reason, or 'world spirit/ came to light first and foremost in the interplay of people."
"explain that more clearly, please!"
"reason manifests itself above all in language. and a language is something we are born into. the norwegian language manages quite well without mr. hansen, but mr. hansen cannot manage without norwegian. it is thus not the individual who forms the language, it is the language which forms the individual."
"i guess you could say so."
"in the same way that a baby is born into a language, it is also born into its historical background. and nobody has a 'free' relationship to that kind of background. he who does not find his place within the state is therefore an unhistorical person. this idea, you may recall, was also central for the great athenian philosophers. just as the state is unthinkable without citizens, citizens are unthinkable without the state."
"obviously."
"according to hegel, the state is 'more' than the individual citizen. it is moreover more than the sum of its citizens. so hegel says one cannot 'resign from society.' anyone who simply shrugs their shoulders at the society they live in and wants to 'find their soul/ will therefore be ridiculed."
"i don't know whether i wholly agree, but okay."
"according to hegel, it is not the individual that finds itself, it is the world spirit."
"the world spirit finds itself?"
"hegel said that the world spirit returns to itself in three stages. by that he means that it becomes conscious of itself in three stages."
"which are?"
"the world spirit first becomes conscious of itself in the individual. hegel calls this subjective spirit. it reaches a higher consciousness in the family, civil society, and the state. hegel calls this objective spirit because it appears in interaction between people. but there is a third stage ..."
"and that is ... ?"
"the world spirit reaches the highest form of self-realization in absolute spirit. and this absolute spirit is art, religion, and philosophy. and of these, philosophy is the highest form of knowledge because in philosophy, the world spirit reflects on its own impact on history. so the world spirit first meets itself in philosophy. you could say, perhaps, that philosophy is the mirror of the world spirit."
"this is so mysterious that i need to have time to think it over. but i liked the last bit you said."
"what, that philosophy is the mirror of the world spirit?"
"yes, that was beautiful. do you think it has anything to do with the brass mirror?"
"since you ask, yes."
"what do you mean?"
"i assume the brass mirror has some special significance since it is constantly cropping up."
"you must have an idea what that significance is?"
"i haven't. i merely said that it wouldn't keep coming up unless it had a special significance for hilde and her father. what that significance is only hilde knows."
"was that romantic irony?"
"a hopeless question, sophie."
"why?"
"because it's not us working with these things. we are only hapless victims of that irony. if an overgrown child draws something on a piece of paper, you can't ask the paper what the drawing is supposed to represent."
"you give me the shudders."
