finding that the british army did not follow up its success at ferozeshah, the sikhs determined to maintain their position on the left bank, and proceeded to construct a bridge of boats at sobraon, not far from the spot where they had crossed the river in their flight. in front of the head of this bridge an exceedingly strong work was thrown up. the position was very well chosen, the bridge being placed in a curve of the river, and the artillery posted on the bank, which on their side was high, was therefore able to sweep the ground across which a force must advance to attack the work. ten thousand men under the sirdar runjoor singh were also thrown across the river near loodiana, in order not only to menace the place with its small garrison, but to cut off the passage of supplies for ferozepore and to interrupt the communications between the two posts.
as soon as the force at meerut, consisting of the 9th and 16th lancers, the 10th and 53d foot, and the 43d and 59th native regiments, arrived with the battering-train, steps were taken to reinforce loodiana and basseean with some heavy guns; additional troops were sent to each of these posts, and the sick, with the women and children, were removed thence and sent to umballa.
sir harry smith's division was increased to seven thousand men and twenty-four guns, and he was despatched to drive the force that threatened loodiana across the river and to cover the line of the british communications.
the whole country in that quarter was in a state of disorder. the advance of runjoor singh had caused great excitement among the peasantry, while it created something like a panic among the european residents of umballa and simla, either of which places could have been reached and plundered by the sikhs, who from the crossing point near loodiana were two days' march nearer to them than was the army of the commander-in-chief. it was all-important to sir harry smith to reach loodiana, where, being on the flank of the sikh army should they advance, it would be necessary for them to meet and defeat him before they ventured upon a raiding expedition. but to do this it was necessary to pass within a short distance of runjoor singh's position, and as the column passed along the sikhs sallied out, opened a heavy fire, and cut off a considerable portion of the baggage of the force, taking several officers prisoners. sir harry smith did not suffer himself to be diverted from his object or to be forced to fight a battle save on ground of his own choosing. without returning the fire he pressed forward until he reached loodiana, the troops being completely exhausted with the efforts they had made.
some more political officers having come up with the force from meerut, sir henry hardinge had placed percy's services at the disposal of sir harry smith. "he is a mere lad," he said to the latter, "but you will find him quite as valuable for most purposes as any older man would be. he speaks the language like a native, can go in disguise and obtain any information you may require, and has plenty of pluck. he was close behind the commander-in-chief and myself all through the fight here, and was one of the few of the staff who escaped uninjured. he is a volunteer serving without pay, no doubt in the hope of obtaining civil employment under the government in the future. this he has already richly earned, not only by his service in the battle of ferozeshah, but by obtaining most valuable news by going in disguise to the sikh camp before they crossed the river. poor broadfoot reported on his conduct very warmly indeed, in almost the last official document he sent me in, and having seen the young fellow under fire i shall certainly, at the proper time, take advantage of broadfoot's report to recommend him to the board of directors for an appointment in the civil service, and for special employment upon this frontier."
being recommended to him in such a manner, sir harry smith had at once taken percy upon his staff, and more than once sent for him and questioned him as to the country, the width of the river, and other points; and as percy had on his way down crossed the sutlej not far from aliwal, he was able to give some valuable information on the subject. as soon as they reached loodiana he went to see his friend mr. fullarton.
"back again, groves? you were fortunate in getting through that fight at ferozeshah, where poor broadfoot and several other politicals were killed or wounded. i had a note from him written the day before, saying how useful he had found you. you have come up with sir harry smith, i suppose?"
"yes, sir, they are very short of officers who speak the language, and so sent me on with him."
"it shows they think well of you; i am glad you are doing credit to my recommendation. you see it was very much better for you to go with the army than to remain here with me. now you have been through two battles, and have fairly earned your right to a permanent post in the service. but, mind, don't let them put you on the uncovenanted branch; you will get very few chances of real promotion there. should an offer be made to you, you had better decline respectfully and say that you would rather wait in the hope of entering the company's service in the regular way. three or four years' waiting would do you no harm, though i do not suppose you will have to wait anything like that time before you get appointed to our service."
"i am quite content to wait, sir, for at my age it would be absurd to think of getting such an important appointment; but i am very glad, indeed, to have found the opportunity of seeing so much."
"we shall have another battle here in a day or two," mr. fullarton said. "i have just seen sir harry. he says he must give the troops a couple of days' rest before he advances to attack runjoor singh. indeed there is no hurry; now that he is here the sikhs dare not advance, and he is therefore master of the situation. it was a bad affair losing so much of the baggage at buddeewal, but the general was right in not bringing on a battle. the troops were worn out with their long march, and would have fought at a great disadvantage. it would not have made much difference to the white soldiers, who are always ready to fight however tired they may be; but it is not so with the natives. fatigue, hunger, or thirst always depress their spirits, and a native who, in the morning, would have fought stoutly by the side of our own men, would be worth nothing if taken into the field tired and hungry on the evening of the same day. i hear that some of the native regiments did not do at all well at ferozeshah, and i have no doubt that this was the reason of it. they will have a very short march before they fight this time."
after a day's rest the force moved out again to buddeewal. runjoor singh's force had just received a reinforcement of four thousand regular troops, with twelve guns, and his army now amounted to nineteen thousand men and sixty guns. early in the morning of the 28th of january sir harry smith marched from buddeewal towards the enemy. the sikhs were so inspirited by the success that had attended their attack on the column during its passage—a success which they attributed to fear on the part of the british—that, instead of waiting to be attacked in the intrenchments they had formed, they moved forward, and took up their post in the open, the village of aliwal being the key of the position.
the troops were already advancing in order of battle, and a column was at once directed to attack and carry the village, the artillery preparing the way by a heavy fire. the sikh guns opened all along their line, but their fire was very wild; most of the shot went far overhead, and the attacking force suffered but little. they did not fire a shot in return, but when within a short distance of the village went at it with a rush, carrying it at the point of the bayonet, and driving the sikh infantry headlong before them. the guns defending it fell into their hands, and as soon as they established themselves in the village, the rest of the force moved forward with admirable regularity, and the whole sikh line was driven backwards, leaving their guns behind them.
the 16th lancers charged the enemy, who were falling back sullenly and in order. the sikhs threw themselves down on the ground and slashed at the horses with their swords as they passed over them, or discharged their muskets at their riders, and the regiment lost upwards of a hundred men killed and wounded. as they fell back the horse-artillery opened upon the dense masses of sikhs, the infantry continued their steady advance, and the cavalry again and again charged. instead of retiring towards their intrenchments, which having been denuded of their guns were now untenable, the enemy retreated direct upon the river, which they crossed at the ford. their loss was comparatively small to that which they had suffered at perozeshah, but the whole of their guns fell into the hands of the british.
only one had been carried across the river. this was captured and spiked by the irregular horse and horse-artillery, who crossed the river in pursuit. the total loss of the british in killed and wounded in the battle of aliwal was only four hundred—an astonishingly small amount when it is considered that they attacked a brave enemy of double their strength both in men and guns. the victory was a most important one. it relieved the north-west of all fear of invasion, and enabled the commander-in-chief to direct his whole attention to concentrating his force against the main body of the sikh army at sobraon.
percy had watched the conflict from a distance. he had, as usual, taken his place among the staff when the general mounted his horse to advance against the sikh intrenchments; but when sir harry smith's eye fell upon him he said, "you will not ride with me to-day, mr. groves. i can have no occasion for your services as a political officer, and will not have you risk your life uselessly by your exposing yourself to fire. you will, therefore, please follow at considerable distance, and will, when we get within the enemy's range, take up any position you like that will enable you to see what is going on and at the same time keep you out of fire."
percy looked a little downcast, and sir harry added kindly: "it is no reflection on your courage, lad, that i send you back. the governor-general himself told me how fearlessly you had exposed yourself at ferozeshah; but as i do not require you on duty i have no justification for taking you with me under a heavy fire."
percy brightened up as he rode off. sir harry smith's staff were for the most part strangers to him, as he had not been connected with it until it marched, and he had feared at first that it might be thought the general had ordered him to the rear because he doubted his steadiness under fire.
"i am only to look on to-day," he said to his two followers as they joined him when he reined up his horse on a little knoll affording a view of the enemy's position half a mile away.
"and a very good thing too, sahib," bhop lal said bluntly. "i had quite enough of being shot at the other day, and have no stomach for sitting on horseback again doing nothing while they are pelting us with shot and bullets. if the sahib said 'charge!' i would follow into the middle of the sikh incampment, but as for sitting doing nothing i want no more of it.'
"besides," akram chunder put in, "we know all about it now; for if what people say is true as to runjoor singh's strength, the odds are not so great as they were at ferozeshah, even though they have seventy guns to our thirty. but what is that? the british are not to be stopped by guns; they will do as they did the other day, go right at the sikhs and beat them. the sikhs have thrown away their only chance by coming out from their intrenchments. besides, they will not fight so well as they did last time. then they thought they were invincible, now they know that the british are better fighters than they are, and that makes all the difference."
"we may as well dismount," percy said, "and picket the horses down behind. we can see well enough over the jungle on foot, and if the sikh gunners should notice three mounted men they might take us for officers of importance and send a few shot in this direction."
the sikh gunners, however, were too occupied with the foes marching against them to notice the detached figures, and no shot came in their direction during the battle. percy and his two followers watched the capture of aliwal, and then saw the whole british force advance, and with scarce a pause push back the sikhs all along the line.
"truly it is wonderful," bhop lal said, stroking his beard. "these men in red coats make no more of the fire of sixty guns than if they were children's playthings. as for the sikh infantry, though more than twice their numbers, they seem to sweep them before them like chaff. i thought i knew something of fighting, but i feel to-day that i know nothing, for i have seen nothing like this from the day when i first handled a sword."
"the loss cannot have been very heavy," percy said, "it has been done too quickly."
"that is the way, sahib," akram chunder remarked. "if men have but the courage to go on in the face of a heavy fire they suffer much less than if they hesitate and delay; but it is only lions who rush forward with sixty cannon firing at them, to say nothing of thousands of men with muskets. that is what takes the life out of the sikh fighting. they are brave, but they are accustomed to victory, and when they see men rushing on against them in spite of the fire which they thought would have swept them all away, they lose their confidence in themselves, and say, what use is it to fight against men like these?"
"bring up the horses, bhop lal; we may as well ride forward now that the battle is nearly over, for i believe the roll of musketry and the discharge of guns still going on are caused by our troops firing at the sikhs as they recross the river."
great was the satisfaction that prevailed among the troops at the splendid victory they had gained over an enemy of nearly thrice their force in men and guns, and that with a loss which, considering the numbers engaged and the strength of the intrenchments, was trifling. as after so crushing a defeat as this there was little chance of loodiana being again threatened, or of any large force endeavouring to intercept our communications, sir harry smith marched back with his army and rejoined the commander-in-chief on the 8th of february.
on the following day the heavy guns from delhi arrived, and orders were given for the whole force to prepare for the attack on sobraon. during the fortnight that sir harry smith had been absent the sikhs had continued to labour unceasingly at their intrenchments, which were erected under the superintendence of two or three of the foreign officers who had been in runjeet singh's service. these were not regarded by the sikhs with the same hostility with which they viewed colonel groves and two or three other english-speaking officers. they had, indeed, been deprived of their commands at the demand of the army, who objected to the european discipline and to the severe methods by which it was enforced; but several of them had been allowed to remain in the country, and the sikhs, when the war began, gladly availed themselves of their scientific knowledge in the erection of intrenchments.
the enemy had surrounded their position with works of great strength, which could only be surmounted by the aid of scaling-ladders. the works were so arranged that they afforded complete protection to three lines of infantry, one above another, who could thus pour a tremendous fire upon an advancing foe. these works were held by 34,000 men with seventy guns. they were connected by a well-built bridge, and also by a ford, with another camp of 20,000 men across the river, and the guns of this force, placed on the high bank, were in a position to play upon the flanks of an army advancing against sobraon.
to attack this formidable position sir hugh gough had but 16,224 men, of whom 6533 were europeans and 9691 natives. his force, therefore, was numerically inferior by 1500 men to that with which he attacked the sikhs at ferozeshah. his artillery force had, however, been augmented to ninety-nine guns by the addition of thirty-four heavy guns and mortars, and the commander-in-chief relied upon his artillery to clear the way for the assault of his infantry. the army was to be in motion at half-past three in the morning, in order that darkness should not, as at moodkee and ferozeshah, intervene to prevent the full results of victory being obtained.
the troops were under arms punctually, and at precisely the hour named marched in silence against the sikh position. the battering guns and most of the field batteries took up their post in an extended semicircle, so as to open fire against every point of the sikh intrenchments. it was intended that they should commence the attack as soon as it was light enough for the men to point their guns. a heavy mist, however, hung over the country, and it was not until half-past six that this lifted sufficiently to allow a view to be obtained of the enemy's works. then the cannon opened along the whole line, and a storm of shot and shell was poured in by the gun and mortar batteries, while rockets were discharged in numbers against the intrenchments.
the sikhs replied with equal vigour, and for a time the roar of artillery was unbroken. it had been intended that the cannonade should be continued for four hours before the infantry were called upon to make their advance, but so rapidly did the gunners work their pieces that the ammunition carried with them was becoming exhausted long before that time had elapsed, and the elephants who should have brought up reserves had become unmanageable from their terror at the tremendous din. but even had the fire continued during the whole day, it could not have made any serious impression upon such strong and extended earthworks, and its object was rather to shake the courage of the defenders than to produce any material damage. the loss of the sikhs was afterwards found to have been heavy, but they and their general were confident that they could repulse any attack upon the tremendous works they had erected, tej singh having been assured by ins chief engineer, a french officer named mouton, that the position was absolutely impregnable.
while the artillery duel was in progress the british infantry had remained inactive in the rear of the guns, longing for the time when they should be called upon to take their share in the action; and there was a general feeling of satisfaction when the fire began to slacken, and orders were given for the advance to begin. on the left were two brigades of general sir robert dick's division; these were to commence the engagement. the seventh brigade, commanded by general stacey, was to lead the attack, headed by the 10th foot reinforced by the 53d, and supported by the other brigade.
general gilbert's division was in the centre, sir harry smith's on the right, while brigadier-general campbell's command was thrown back between gilbert's right and sir harry smith's left. a part of the cavalry threatened to cross a ford and attack the enemy's horse on the opposite bank, the rest of the cavalry were in reserve. at nine o'clock stacey's brigade, supported by three batteries, moved to the attack. the former marched steadily on in line, the latter took up successive positions at a gallop, until within three hundred yards of the heavy batteries of the enemy. the fire of cannon, camel guns, and musketry was so tremendous, that it seemed to the lookers-on impossible that any troops could advance successfully under it.
the two british regiments, and the 43d and 59th native infantry brigaded with them, advanced, however, with splendid bravery. this brigade had not been present at the previous battles, and had been specially selected for the desperate service of effecting the first breach in the enemy's lines because their ranks were still intact, and they had not gone through the terrible ordeal at ferozeshah which had, in spite of their eventual success, greatly impressed those engaged in it with the courage and obstinacy of the sikhs in defending a strong position. well did the seventh brigade deserve the confidence the commander-in-chief placed in it. with scarcely a pause the troops pressed steadily forward, surmounted every obstacle until they reached the crest of the intrenchments, and drove the sikhs from their guns.
the moment the success of the attack was apparent general gilbert and sir harry smith were ordered to advance with their divisions, and brigadier ashburnham began to move forward his brigade to support stacey. gilbert's advance took him in front of the centre and strongest portion of the enemy's line, and although unsupported by artillery, the 29th and the 1st light infantry dashed forward under a withering fire and crossed a dry nullah in front of the intrenchments, but they then found themselves in front of a high wall too steep for them to climb and exposed to a terrible fire from above. to remain there would have been to be annihilated, and the regiments were withdrawn, but only to charge again at a fresh point.
thrice they reached the walls, thrice they had to fall back, each time followed by the sikhs, who cut the wounded to pieces. the second division, however, managed at several points to effect a lodgment within the intrenchments, while stacey's and ashburnham's brigade maintained themselves in the position the former had captured, in spite of the desperate efforts of the sikhs, who in vast numbers swarmed down upon them and tried to recapture it. thus for a while the battle raged, nor were the british able to advance beyond the points where they had gained a footing, until the sappers cut a narrow opening through the works, by which the cavalry were able to pass in single file. as soon as the 3d dragoons had entered the work they formed up, and charging along in the rear of the intrenchment, cut down the sikh gunners in their batteries and captured their field-guns.
as their fire ceased the rest of the infantry poured into the works, and advancing along the whole line, while the field batteries which had entered joined their fire to that of the musketry, they pressed the sikhs before them in masses across the river. the bridge was an excellent one, but one of the sikh commanders had caused two of the boats forming it to be removed, in order that his men, seeing there was no mode of retreat, should defend their works the more desperately. the river had risen during the night, and the ford, which had the day before been but breast-deep, was now scarcely passable.
the scene was a terrible one; the crowded masses of the enemy threw themselves into the river, and strove to cross by wading and swimming, while the guns of the british horse-artillery, which had come up, played upon them unceasingly, and the infantry poured volleys of musketry into them, all feeling of pity being for the time dissipated by the fury with which the murder of our wounded by the sikhs during the early portion of the fight had inspired the troops.
hundreds of the enemy fell under the cannonade; very many hundreds were drowned. the battle terminated at noon, the infantry having been engaged without intermission for three hours. sixty-seven cannon were captured, and upwards of two hundred camel guns. this great and decisive victory cost those engaged in it dearly. the 29th foot had 13 officers, 8 sergeants, and 167 men killed and wounded; the 1st european light infantry, 12 officers, 12 sergeants, and 173 men; the 31st, 7 officers and 147 men; the 50th, 12 officers and 227 men; the 53d, 9 officers and 111 men.
these were the heaviest losses, but all the regiments engaged suffered severely, as the total loss was 2383 in killed and wounded. the losses among the staff of officers wore small compared to those which they had suffered at ferozeshah, as it was not necessary at sobraon for the governor-general and commander-in-chief to expose themselves close to the enemy's intrenchments as they had done on that occasion. general sir robert dick, who had gone through the peninsular war, and led the 42d highlanders at waterloo, was killed as he led his men forward against the sikh intrenchments; and brigadier-generals m'laren and taylor also fell. the loss of the sikhs was never known; but the carnage was, in proportion to the numbers engaged, enormous, and many of their leading sirdars were among the slain.
at ferozeshah, the greater proportion of the loss among the assailants was caused by the grape-shot from the enemy's guns. at sobraon, on the other hand, in spite of the number and weight of the enemy's guns, and of their very numerous camel pieces, it was the musket that inflicted the great proportion of loss. this was due, in the first place, to the fact that a large number of the skilled sikh gunners had fallen in the previous battles, and that the artillery fire was in consequence very wild and ill-directed. in the next place, the artillerymen were unable to depress their pieces sufficiently to play upon the british when they reached the foot of the intrenchments, while the infantry, well sheltered behind their earthworks, were able to keep up a murderous fire upon their helpless foes. these facts account for the unusually large number of men wounded in proportion to the killed.
as the division of sir harry smith had only reached the camp two days before the battle, percy remained attached to his staff and rode behind him in the engagement. he had wished his two men to remain in camp, but they resolutely declined to do so.
"if you were killed, sahib, how could we face the colonel, and tell him that while you were killed we were cooking our dinners four miles away? no, sahib, whatever comes, we must ride behind the general's escort. had we not seen ferozeshah, we should say that success to-morrow is impossible, for the intrenchments there were but dirt-heaps in comparison to the great works opposite. we can see with our own eyes how big and high they are. they say there are three lines of parapets for the infantry to fire over, besides all their guns. but now we know that nothing is impossible to the white troops, and believe that somehow, though we cannot say how, they will capture it, and drive the sikhs across the river. if we live through it, it will be a thing to talk of for the rest of our lives; and if we die, you will tell the colonel, sahib, that we did our duty. he told us to watch over you, and though no watching can turn the course of shot or bullet, we can at least be near to carry you off should you fall wounded."
however, percy escaped without being hit, as did most of the staff, though he did his share in carrying orders to the officers commanding the different regiments in the division. as they rode back from the field after the engagement was over the general called him up to his side.
"i ought to have kept you out of the battle, lad," he said kindly; "but i did not like to baulk you again. you have done very well, and i shall mention your name in my report as among the members of my staff who did good service."
the battle of sobraon completely broke the power of the sikhs. in these and the preceding fights all the picked regiments of the regular infantry had been destroyed or dispersed, and two hundred and twenty of their guns captured. no time was lost by the commander-in-chief in following up his success. a bridge of boats had been already thrown across the river half-way between ferozepore and sobraon, and messages were sent to sir john grey, who commanded a force there, and to sir john littler at ferozepore, to cross at once. at daybreak next morning six regiments crossed the sutlej from ferozepore, while sir john grey, with two regiments of cavalry, three of infantry, and a battery, crossed by the new bridge, both forces thus placing themselves on the road by which the defeated sikhs would retire upon lahore. this speedy movement completed their discomfiture. cut off from the capital, and deprived of the leadership of all the principal sirdars, they dispersed to their homes, and the bridge at sobraon having been repaired on the day following the battle, the british crossed without opposition.
ghoolab singh, who had all this time been negotiating secretly with the british, while promising the sikhs that he was on the eve of advancing to join them with his whole force, now endeavoured to figure as mediator, and came secretly into the british camp with the object of persuading the governor-general to abstain from making an advance against lahore. sir henry hardinge refused to receive him, and sent a message to him by his political officers that terms of peace would be dictated at the capital. the crafty sirdar was not to be defeated; riding back to lahore, he took the young maharajah and rode with him to the british camp. sir henry received the young prince kindly, but was not to be diverted from his purpose of moving forward to lahore, where the army arrived without a shot being fired.
here terms of peace were dictated to the humbled sikhs. the expenses of the war, estimated at a million and a half, were to be paid, all the guns taken were to be retained, and all others that had been used against us during the war were to be handed over; the troops were to be disbanded, and the fertile province known as the jalindar doab, situated between the beas and sutlej rivers, was to be handed over to the british. many of the officers considered that it would have been better to have annexed the whole of the punjaub, but even with the army that was marching from scinde under sir charles napier the force was insufficient for the work. the sikhs had strongly fortified cities, that could scarcely have been taken without a regular battering train, and the hot season was coming on. besides, although the army trained with so much care by runjeet singh had been broken up and scattered, the sikh nation had as yet taken but little part in the struggle. it was, however, certain that they would, under their great chiefs, fight desperately to preserve their independence, and the whole of the dispersed soldiery would speedily be reunited under the banners of the leaders.
the crafty ghoolab singh gained the advantages he had hoped, for the treasury of lahore was empty, and with the greatest difficulty half a million was raised to pay the first instalment of the indemnity. ghoolab singh, therefore, out of his vast resources paid another half million, on condition that cashmere should be handed over to him, and that from being merely the governor of that province, he should become its independent ruler. the price paid by him for this rich province was absurdly inadequate, but so far as the british were concerned the bargain was a politic one. there was little doubt that a second war would, sooner or later, have to be undertaken; ghoolab singh could put a very large army into the field, and by making him ruler of cashmere his interests were at once separated from those of the sikhs, and his neutrality, if not his active alliance, were secured in any future struggle. it was arranged that a british force should remain in lahore for a year, nominally to insure the payment of the rest of the indemnity, but really to maintain the authority of the maharanee and the boy maharajah, who were in no way responsible for the war against us, and who doubtless would have been overthrown by some ambitious sirdar, aided by the disbanded troops, had they been left unsupported by british bayonets.
