the public services of henry ludington during the war for independence were threefold in character. each of the three parts was of much importance, each was marked with arduous toil and frequent perils, and each was performed to the full extent of his ability. nor was the sacrifice of personal welfare inconsiderable. we have seen that he was the father of a large family, eight children having been born to him prior to the signing of the declaration of independence, and was the leasehold occupant of extensive lands. it was no light thing to absent himself from these. there was before him, moreover, the example of another and senior officer, who, because of family interests and engagements, had resigned his commission. that same commission had been passed on to henry ludington, who might with equal grace and reason have declined it or presently resigned it. there is, however, no indication that he ever contemplated such a step. leaving his lands and home in the charge of his wife and children, the eldest of whom in 1776 was only fifteen, while the youngest was a babe in arms, he gave himself with whole-hearted devotion to whatever tasks his country might require of him.
the distinctively military services of henry ludington began at an early date. the first clash of arms after the declaration of independence occurred on the shores of new york bay. the retirement of the american army, after unsuccessful engagements, from long island, and then from manhattan island, brought the theater of war closer and closer to dutchess county, and made the active participation of the militia more imminent. indeed, even before those operations, the militia was called out to assist in securing the passes of the hudson highlands, and thus preventing any communication between the british at new york and those in canada and the north woods. the convention or legislature of the state, in session at harlem, on august 8, 1776, adopted the following war measure:
resolved unanimously that brigadier general clinton be, and he hereby is, appointed to the command of all the levies raised, and to be raised in the counties of ulster, orange and west chester, agreeable to the resolutions of this convention of the sixteenth day of july last.
resolved that general clinton be informed of this appointment and directed immediately to send expresses to the counties of ulster, dutchess, orange and west chester, and order them to hasten their levies and to march them down to the fort now erected on the north side of kings bridge, leaving two hundred men under the command of a brave & alert officer to take possession of and throw up works at the pass of anthonys nose.
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resolved that general clinton be requested to order the troops of horse belonging to the counties of ulster, orange and west chester immediately to march to such posts as he may think proper that they should occupy, in order to watch the motions of the enemies ships of war now in hudsons river.
extracts from the minutes.
john mckesson secry.
when the ships of war had landed an army, and this was moving irresistibly northward, a committee of the convention, meeting at fishkill as a committee of safety, on october 10, further ordered:
resolved, that the commanding officer of the militia of ulster county, do immediately send down 300 men of the militia of the county of ulster, to peekskill well armed and accoutred with three days provisions.
resolved, that the commanding officer on the south side of the mountains or high-lands in the county of orange, be directed to order such a number of the militia from that part of the said county which lays on the south side of the high lands as will be sufficient to guard their shores, and to appoint a commissioner to supply them with provisions.
and that the commanding officer on the north side of the highlands, in the said county, order one hundred of the militia from the north side of the high lands of the said county to march without delay to peekskill taking with them three days provisions.
[80]
resolved that benjamin haight and mathew harper be commissioners to supply them with provisions, and that this convention will provide means for defraying the expense.
ordered, that the brigadier generals of the counties of albany, dutchess, ulster and orange, give orders to the several colonels in their brigades to hold the one half of their several regiments in readiness to march at an hour’s notice with five days provisions.
resolved, that all ranges raised in the county of ulster repair immediately to fishkill and be subject to the direction of the committee for enquiring into, detecting, and defeating all conspiracies formed in this state against the liberties of america.
extract from the minutes of this afternoon.
john mckesson, secr’y.
the turning-point in the campaign which began at brooklyn occurred on october 28, at white plains. there, at chatterton hill, washington once more engaged the british, and once more was compelled to retire before them. with the masterly strategy in which he was unrivaled by any soldier of his time, however, instead of falling back upon the defenses of the hudson highlands and thus inviting a conflict which might have cost him the possession of that crucial point, he retreated in another direction, south and west, thus drawing the british away from the highlands and leaving the latter secure. had the british, instead of pursuing him in that fruitless chase across the jerseys, only to meet with disaster at[81] trenton, hurled themselves against the forts at west point and elsewhere along the hudson, they might easily have gained control of the hudson, and thus have effected a junction with their northern forces and have altered the whole story of the war. we may suppose that that is what washington would have done had he been in clinton’s place. the british did not do so, but fell into the trap which the wily american had set for them. in the battle at white plains, however,—which is more to our purpose than the subsequent campaign,—the militia was largely used, and acquitted itself with credit. in an application for a pension made by joshua baker of dutchess county, it was set forth that “on or about the 1st day of august, 1776, he enlisted at a place called fredericksburgh in the county of dutchess and state of new york at which place he was residing. that he entered the company commanded by captain luddenton in the regiment commanded by col. swartwout. that from fredericksburgh aforesaid he marched with the said company to peekskill and after a short time from thence to kingsbridge in the county of westchester, that he remained at kingsbridge until the month of october, when they were ordered to white plains, where he was in the engagement generally known as the battle of white plains. in this engagement one of the chaplains named van wyck was killed. soon after the battle of white plains he marched with the said regiment to new windsor where he was discharged.” the[82] “captain luddenton” mentioned was presumably comfort ludington, who, as we have already seen, was an officer of the dutchess county militia, and the statement of baker is clear indication that that militia was engaged in the battle of white plains.
further evidence to the same effect, directly connecting henry ludington with that battle, is found in the affidavit of elisha turner, who declared “that in the fall of 1776 he was drafted for three months in captain joel mead’s company, lieut. porter, and seargents fisher and brewsters in colonel ludington’s reg’t new york state troops. that he joined his company and marched to white plains and then joined his regiment and the army, that he was present at the battle of white plains and afterward retired with the army up the river. that he remained with his regiment and company until his term of three months expired, when he received a verbal discharge from his colonel and captain and returned home.” much other evidence to the same effect might be cited, were it needed, which it is not. there can be no doubt that henry ludington with his regiment was engaged at white plains, and that he, himself, as a representative officer of the dutchess county levies, was chosen to serve as an aide on the staff of washington. the commander-in-chief appears to have recognized in colonel ludington a man upon whose brain and arm he might with confidence depend. it is a credible tradition that during that battle washington complimented him upon his[83] soldier-like bearing, and indirectly paid a tribute to his vigilance. a family tradition tells that as the two stood side by side, with the rest of the staff about them, colonel ludington noticed the british taking up a new position and placing their artillery, screened behind shrubs and trees, and directed washington’s attention to the fact, which had been entirely unperceived by the others. “yes,” said washington, approvingly, “i have been watching them this long time.”
on november 6, the british began their fatuous movement toward new jersey, imagining that the american congress at philadelphia, rather than the american army and fortresses along the hudson, was the strategical objective. the american council of war unanimously agreed that washington’s army should thereupon cross into new jersey, anticipating the british advance, while three thousand troops, including colonel ludington’s dutchess county militia, should be sent to reinforce the defenses of the highlands. washington left white plains on the morning of november 10, and reached peekskill at sunset of the same day, colonel ludington’s regiment presumably accompanying him. after a careful inspection of the works as far up the river as west point, and after giving directions for the disposition of the troops, on november 12 he passed over into new jersey, and went his way to the disaster of fort washington, and the more than redeeming victory of trenton. meanwhile, colonel[84] ludington remained at peekskill, where there presently was a prospect of strenuous work. for having, as they imagined, put washington to hopeless flight in new jersey, the british turned a part of their attention to the very thing to which their chief attention should at the outset have been given. plans were made for an advance up the hudson, by land and water. west point was to be avoided by marching up the east shore, where the defenses were not so strong. such a movement must, of course, be resisted at all hazards. washington, from his camp on the delaware, in what thomas paine described as “the times that try men’s souls,” was able to spare enough attention from his own pressing extremities to write words of warning and exhortation to governor clinton, and in pursuance of his wise counsels the new york convention, at fishkill, on december 21, adopted the following resolutions:
whereas, from various intelligence received of the motions and designs of the enemy’s army, it appears highly probable that they meditate an attack upon the passes in the highlands on the east side of hudson’s river,
and whereas, the term of the enlistment of the militia under the command of brigadier general george clinton which is at present stationed to defend the pass at peeks kill expires on the last of this month, and that a great part of the division commanded by major general spencer, which is stationed at north castle on the 29th inst.
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and whereas, his excellency genl. washington by his letter of the 15th instant has warmly recommended to this state to exert themselves in procuring temporary supplies of militia ’till the new levies of the continental army can be brought into the field,
resolved, that the whole militia of the counties of westchester, dutchess and that part of the county of albany which lies to the southward of beeren island be forthwith marched to north castle in westchester county, well equipped with arms and ammunition and furnished with blankets & six days provisions & a pot or camp kettle to every six men, except such persons as the field officers of the respective regiments shall judge cannot be called into service without greatly distressing their families, or who may be actually engaged in the manufacturing of salt petre, or of shoes and cloathing for the use of the army.
resolved, that the said militia be allowed continental pay and rations, and that such men as cannot furnish themselves with arms shall be supplied from the continental store.
colonel ludington and his regiment therefore remained on duty at north castle until word came of the rout of the british at trenton and princeton, and washington’s triumphant return to the hills of morristown for the winter. all imminent danger of a british attack upon the highlands was then past, and the militia was permitted to return home for a time. the respite was brief, however. on january 3, 1777, nathaniel sackett was authorized by the committee[86] of safety “to employ such detachments of the militia of dutchess county as are not in actual service, as he may deem expedient, for inquiring into, detecting and defeating all conspiracies which may be found against the liberties of america.” also, on march 25, the convention took further action, resulting in the issuance of this order by governor clinton:
to colonel morris graham,
pursuant to a resolve of the honorable the convention of the state of new york, dated the 25th day of march last, impowering & requiring me until the first of august next to call into actual service all or any part or proportion of the militia as well horse as foot of the counties of ulster, west chester, dutchess and orange, for the defence of the posts and passes of the highlands, & frustrating the attempts of the enemy to make incursions into this state you are for these purposes forthwith, to draft by ballot or other equitable manner, one hundred & thirty three men of your regiment & them compleatly armed & equiped, cause to march, properly officered, to fort independence near peek’s kill there to join the field officers who shall be appointed to command them. the companies to consist as nearly as may be of sixty two privates & to have a captain & two lieutenants.
given under my hand at poughkeepsie this 3d day of april 1777.
geo. clinton, b. gen.
colonel ludington appears at this time not to have been among those called to duty at peekskill, but to[87] have been left for a few weeks among those “not in actual service” who were to act under nathaniel sackett, as already related, for the suppression of conspiracies. the call to duty was not very well responded to by the other officers and men. the militia had been in the field in the early part of the winter longer than they had expected to be, and now, in the spring, they were desirous of remaining at home as much as possible to attend to the season’s work on their farms. this reluctance to respond to the call provoked this action of the convention, taken at kingston on april 24:
whereas it appears that a great part of the militia of dutchess county have neglected to obey the orders of general clinton issued in consequence of a resolve of this house, for calling out a part of the militia of the counties of ulster, orange and dutchess to garrison the forts and guard the passes in the highlands.
resolved that major lawrence and mr. zephaniah platt be & they are hereby appointed a committee to repair forthwith to dutchess county to enquire into the reasons of such neglect, that they use their utmost endeavours to convince the people of the necessity of exerting themselves at this critical juncture, and that they make report to this convention with all convenient dispatch in order that the most effectual measures may be taken to induce a compliance with the aforesaid resolve.
resolved that general clinton be & he hereby is empowered to make such disposition[88] with respect to the officers of the militia under his command as he shall judge most advansive of the public service and where any extra expense shall accrue in consequence of this resolve which cannot be considered as a continental charge this convention will pay the same.
extract from the minutes.
robt. benson, secry.
there was, however, no question concerning the activity and zeal of colonel ludington at this time. on april 25, the very day after the adoption of the foregoing resolution by the convention, a force of two thousand british troops landed at compo, near fairfield, connecticut, under command of general tryon, the former british governor of new york, under whom henry ludington had once held a commission. it marched hastily inland, and on the afternoon of the next day reached danbury, connecticut, where there were large stores of provisions, tents, etc., for the american army, many of which had been sent thither from peekskill for—as was supposed—greater security. not only these, but also most of the private houses in the town, were at once set afire, while the soldiers made themselves drunk with looted spirits, and gave themselves up to an unrestrained orgy. it was one of the most brutal and disgraceful performances of british arms in all the war, and was unhesitatingly denounced as such by self-respecting british officers. it does not appear that the raid had any other object than the destruction[89] of danbury, or the stores at that place, for as soon as the soldiers could be sufficiently sobered up thereafter, a retreat toward the british shipping on the sound was begun. but on the american side the incident gave occasion for one of the most thrilling and gallant exploits of the war.
it was on friday afternoon that the landing was made at compo, and it was on saturday afternoon that danbury was burned. patriot messengers rode at top speed in three directions—toward new haven to hasten generals arnold and wooster, who were already on their way; to meet general silliman, to expedite his juncture with the others; and to fredericksburgh to tell the news to colonel ludington, that he might furnish the troops which the generals would need. railroads, telegraphs and other annihilators of time and space were unknown in those days. but the personal factor, which after all dominates all the problems of this world, was active and effective. at four o’clock danbury was fired. at eight or nine o’clock that evening a jaded horseman reached colonel ludington’s home with the news. we may imagine the fire that flashed through the veteran’s veins at the report of the dastardly act of his former chief. but what to do? his regiment was disbanded, its members scattered at their homes, many at considerable distances. he must stay there, to muster all who came in. the messenger from danbury could ride no more, and there was no neighbor within call. in this emergency he turned to his[90] daughter sibyl, who, a few days before, had passed her sixteenth birthday, and bade her to take a horse, ride for the men, and tell them to be at his house by daybreak. one who even now rides from carmel to cold spring will find rugged and dangerous roads, with lonely stretches. imagination only can picture what it was a century and a quarter ago, on a dark night, with reckless bands of “cowboys” and “skinners” abroad in the land. but the child performed her task, clinging to a man’s saddle, and guiding her steed with only a hempen halter, as she rode through the night, bearing the news of the sack of danbury. there is no extravagance in comparing her ride with that of paul revere and its midnight message. nor was her errand less efficient than his. by daybreak, thanks to her daring, nearly the whole regiment was mustered before her father’s house at fredericksburgh, and an hour or two later was on the march for vengeance on the raiders. they were a motley company, some without arms, some half dressed, but all filled with a certain berserk rage. that night they reached redding, and joined arnold, wooster and silliman. the next morning they encountered the british at ridgefield. they were short of ammunition and were outnumbered by the british three to one. but they practised the same tactics that paul revere’s levies at lexington and concord found so effective. their scattering sharpshooter fire from behind trees and fences and stone walls, harassed the british sorely, and made their retreat to their ships[91] at compo resemble a rout. nor were instances of individual heroism in conflict lacking. arnold had his horse shot under him as, almost alone, he furiously charged the enemy, and the gallant wooster received a wound from which he died a few days later. there were far greater operations in the war than this, but there was scarcely one more expeditious, intrepid and successful. writing of it to gouverneur morris, alexander hamilton said: “i congratulate you on the danbury expedition. the stores destroyed there have been purchased at a pretty high price to the enemy. the spirit of the people on the occasion does them great honor—is a pleasing proof that they have lost nothing of that primitive zeal with which they began the contest, and will be a galling discouragement to the enemy from repeating attempts of the kind.… the people of new york considered the affair in the light of a defeat to the british troops.”
view of highroad and plains from site of colonel ludington’s house
it was not long before there was a still more serious menace than the danbury raid. in june, 1777, there were indications that the british were planning anew to gain possession of the hudson river, and thus unite their own northern and southern forces while dividing the eastern from the middle and southern colonies. colonel ludington and his regiment were therefore summoned to peekskill, to strengthen the defenses of the highlands, and it was not without some difficulty that he was enabled to respond to the call. some of his men had become half mutinous. they had been willing enough to[92] rush to danbury, but now, in the busy time of the early summer, they objected to leaving their farms when there was no enemy actually in sight. the same trouble was experienced by the other militia commanders. on this occasion the period of service at peekskill was short. but on july 1, washington wrote to clinton that the british were believed to be operating against ticonderoga and its dependencies; that howe was preparing to evacuate the jerseys to co?perate with the northern army, and that there was danger of a sudden attack upon the highlands and the passes of the hudson. he urged therefore, in the strongest manner, that all available militia should be called out to strengthen the garrisons at peekskill and other places on the river. the next day governor clinton reported the gist of this letter to the committee of safety, adding that in consequence thereof he had “issued orders to colonels brinckerhoff, ludington, umphrey & freeze of dutchess county to march their regiments to peek’s kill.” but the result was not altogether satisfactory. the men were ready enough for active service; but they demurred at waiting idly in the camp while their farms at home were suffering. on july 9, clinton, in a quandary, wrote from fort montgomery to the president of the convention:
the militia which i ordered to this post & who came in with great expedition almost to a man according to custom begin to be extreamly uneasy. they want to go home, their corn is[93] suffering, their harvest coming on, and they cant see that it is likely there will be any thing for them to do here suddenly. they have been frequently on the dunderbergh to look down the river & cant see a single vessel in it; what shall i do with them?
if i consent to their going home they will return when ordered again with great chearfulness. if i dont, they will go (many of them at least) without leave. i dont know what to do with them &, therefore, shall not do any thing, without your honor’s directions which i should be glad to have this afternoon.
as a result of this appeal, general putnam on july 11 issued an order to the effect that, “considering the busy season of the year, & how important it is to the public as well as to themselves that the militia be at home in their business at this time, and not being wanted, altho’ he cannot say how soon they may be,” the three regiments which first responded to the call, to wit, ludington’s, humphrey’s and brinckerhoff’s, were “dismissed with the general’s thanks for their alertness and for their good services, relying upon it that the zeal & ardor they have shewn in the great cause we are engaged in will prompt them to turn out without (sic) the utmost alacrity on all future occasions.”
another occasion was quickly supplied by the british, with their activities at the north and their renewed menace against the highlands. on june 30, general howe evacuated new jersey, moved into[94] staten island, and prepared to advance up the hudson. on july 1, burgoyne with his army appeared before ticonderoga, and on july 6, the americans evacuated that fortress. washington, then at morristown, wrote on july 10 to the president of the continental congress: “in consequence of the probability that general howe will push against the highland passes to cooperate with general burgoyne, i shall, by the advice of my officers, move the army from hence to-morrow morning towards the north river.” though delayed somewhat by bad weather, he proceeded to sufferns, and thence to galloway’s, in orange county, new york, where he remained until he ascertained that howe was not going up the river, but was really making a feint to cover a swift dash upon philadelphia. accordingly, on july 23, washington’s army was set in motion toward the delaware, leaving the highlands to their local defenders. the inefficient and half treacherous gates presently superseded schuyler in command of the american army at the north after the disastrous affair at ticonderoga, and it is probable that washington doubted his ability to cope with burgoyne. at any rate, despite what he regarded as howe’s “unaccountable abandonment” of burgoyne, washington regarded the latter’s movements with much apprehension, and frequently warned clinton at the highlands to be on his guard against him. on july 31, he urged clinton to call out the militia to reinforce the garrisons, and clinton wrote[95] as follows to the committee of safety, a letter which throws much light upon the embarrassments from which he suffered:
the proportion to be furnished by this state is 500 and it shall be my first business to issue the necessary orders for march’g them to the respective stations for which they are intended.
i am nevertheless apprehensive that i shall find it extremely difficult to compleat even this small number. the continental pay and rations being far below the wages given for ordinary labor the difference becomes a tax rendered by personal service and as the train band list from the exemptions arising from age office & other causes consists chiefly of the middling & lower class of people this extraordinary tax is altogether paid by them.
add to this that unless a proportionate number is called out of each county which in most cases is inexpedient the county affording the most men is upon the same principle charged with a tax to which the other parts of the community do not contribute.
these reasons are so clear as to be generally understood and complained of by the militia and unless those exercising the legislative power of the state shall in their wisdom devise some plan in which those inconveniences will be obviated and the militia duty become more equal i am extremely apprehensive that any orders for calling detachments to the field for a limited time will not hereafter be so duly obeyed as the nature of military command and the good of the service absolutely requires. it wo’d be needless to[96] observe to you, gentlemen, that tho my office as governor gives me the command of the militia i am not vested with authority to promise even the ordinary continental pay and subsistance to any greater number of men than those required of me by his excellency the commander in chief, whose requisition entitles those who are called into actual service in consequence thereof to a compensation from the continent at large.
in consequence of this letter of clinton’s the committee of safety the same day ordered that “continental pay and rations be advanced on behalf of the continent, to all such militia as his excellency the governor shall think proper to call out.” colonel ludington was not included in the summons to the highlands, but was selected by clinton for other and, as it proved, actually more active service, in the borderland of westchester county. clinton wrote to him as follows, from kingston, on august 1, 1777:
the operations of the enemy ag’t the state to the northward as well as the exposed situation of some of the southern counties to the incursions of the enemy from that quarter, render it expedient to call into actual service, a very considerable proportion of the militia in the classing of the different regiments for these services your regiment & colo. fields’ with the other regiments of w. chester county are to furnish 310 men, including non commissioned officers & privates properly officered armed & accoutred, as you’l see by the inclosed order; and, as you are appointed to take the command of[97] this detachment, i desire that you will, immediately upon the receipt hereof, direct and forward to the commanding officers of the other regiments who are to furnish men towards this detachm’t, one of the inclosed resolutions & orders, and exert yourself in having them raised with all possible expedition and march them to such stations in w. chester county as will tend most to the protection of the inhabitants and best conduce to the public safety. taking your directions occasionally from the command’g officer at peeks kill.
the inclosed resolutions of the council of safety subjecting exempts to a proportion of the common burthen will, i hope, enable you to carry these orders into execution with greater ease, especially as every other regt. in the state will furnish an equal if not a greater number of men for the service.
i am &c.
(g. c.)
colo. ludington.
the troops will be allowed continental pay & rations & a bounty to be raised agreeable to the within resolve from the fines levied on the exempts refusing service.
a few days later another alarm was caused by the uncertainty which attended the movements of the british fleet, which, after sailing from new york to the capes of the delaware as if to attack philadelphia, suddenly put to sea again and disappeared for a time. washington communicated his observations and suspicions to clinton, and clinton, on[98] august 5, countermanded his orders to ludington in the following letter:
by dispatches just rec’d from his excellency genl. washington dated at chester in pensylvania 1st aug’t, i am informed that the enemy’s fleet have left the capes of delaware & are steering eastward & his excellency is fully of opinion they intend (proceeding) up hudson’s river. from this intelligence & the great preparations making by the enemy at kings bridge for an expedition, i have not the least doubt but that their designs are against this quarter & by vigorous exertion they hope to join their two armies before ours can arrive to oppose them. his excellency is apprehensive of this also & has requested me to call out all the militia of this state to oppose the enemy till he can arrive with his army. you will, therefore, on receipt hereof with the utmost expedition march your regt. to fort montgomery compleatly armed and accoutred, leaving the frontier companies at home embodied & on duty to guard ag’t any small parties of tories or indians. i mean to repair to the fort with all expedition & take the command.
clinton then notified putnam at peekskill that he had ordered ludington’s and also field’s and brinckerhoff’s regiments to join him forthwith, and on august 9 reported this action to washington. but it was one thing to order and another thing to have the order fulfilled. the militia exhibited their former reluctance to go into camp unless the enemy[99] were actually in sight. this applies, however, to the other regiments rather than to colonel ludington’s. no complaint of his inactivity or his inability to furnish his quota of men appears. but on august 20, colonel humphrey reported that his regiment was unwilling to march northward, meaning, no doubt, to go up the river beyond the highlands to the aid of gates against burgoyne, as there was some desperate talk of doing; and john jay and gouverneur morris reported that gates’s army could hope for no militia reinforcements excepting from albany county, and that garrisons should be provided for the highland forts when the terms of enlistment of the militia should expire. this was the more essential as the regular garrisons had largely been sent north to aid gates. a little later, on september 4, colonel dirck brinckerhoff wrote from fishkill to clinton in answer to some strictures as follows:
sir,
you blame me in your letter for disobeying the orders i first receiv’d for all the militia to go to peekskill, but it was by consent of general putnam, that only part should go, and be reliev’d by the same number from time to time in such manner as i thought proper, which has strictly been done.
agreeable to your last i have order’d half the militia out, but it is allmost impossible to get them to go, on account of the exempts not going, aledging this is not a general alarum; therefore, should be glad of some further regulation[100] in that respect, and possitive orders from you how to act in that affair, i am sir,
your ob’t. hble. serv’t
dirck brinckerhoff.
to his excellency george clinton esq.
colonel ludington, meanwhile, was busy elsewhere, in another department of his public duties, of which we shall speak hereafter. at first commissioned to serve in westchester county, then ordered to the highlands, he seems to have been permitted to remain in westchester and lower dutchess counties, where some strong hand was sorely needed. but on september 15 came news of the battle of the brandywine, in which the stars and stripes was first unfurled in battle, but in which the americans were defeated. the news was ominous of the fall of philadelphia and of the martyrdom of valley forge, and it caused some consternation along the hudson. clinton at once ordered eleven new york militia regiments to reinforce the highlands, among them colonel ludington’s, which was to proceed at once to peekskill to serve under general putnam. for the first time ludington seems to have had some difficulty in complying with orders, for, on september 29, we find clinton writing to him, as well as to the other colonels of militia, expressing surprise at the circumstance that, although he had ordered the whole of the regiments to reinforce the garrisons, not more[101] than 300 men of six regiments had responded; and adding a peremptory command that one half of each regiment should go into service immediately for one month, and then be relieved by the other half.
there was indeed cause for these preparations, for the british were at last actually beginning their advance up the hudson in aid of the hard-pressed burgoyne, though all too late to save him. at the beginning of october the british fleet appeared in the hudson, and on october 4 a landing was made at tarrytown. of what occurred there, we have two contemporary accounts. one was given in the new york “journal” of may 11, 1778, by one of the garrison of fort montgomery, which, as we shall see, was presently captured by the british. “on saturday night,” says that narrator, “we had advice that a large number of ships, brigs, armed vessels, &c., had arrived at tarrytown, where they had landed a considerable body of men, supposed to be about one thousand, and had advanced toward the plains. colonel lutlington being posted there with about five hundred militia, they sent in a flag to him requiring him to lay down his arms and surrender himself and men prisoners of war. whilst he was parleying with the flag they endeavored to surround him, which he perceiving ordered his men to retreat. the british then returned to their shipping, and the next morning we had advice of their being under sail, and coming up as far as king’s ferry.” the “colonel lutlington” referred to was, of course, henry ludington.[102] by “the plains” it is to be supposed white plains was meant, that village being distant from tarrytown about seven miles.
the second account, much more circumstantial and authoritative, is that of colonel ludington himself in his report to general putnam. he was at that time stationed at wright’s mills, between tarrytown and white plains, guarding the inhabitants from the depredations of tory and indian marauders. he wrote to general putnam as follows:
sir. i must acquaint you of my yousage in this place. i find the militia was to join and i have not had the assistance of one man. you must well remember you ordered capt dean and capt stephens. stephens i never have seen. dean i showed your order and rote a few days ago begging him to assist me scouting. i have inclosed his answer to me. you must not depend too much upon my little party, if i am to gard the inhabitants i must be reinforced speadily or shall be obliged to post my men in some better place of security
and am sir your obedient humble servant
henry ludington
3 oclock october 4th 1777
at rites mills
p. s. i beleive the inhabitants are entirely stript where they go.
[103]
honoured sir: in haste i am to acquaint you that they came up last night with 2 frigets and five or six royale and tenders and about 40 flat bottommed boats and landed about 3 thousand men under the command of governor tryon. they immediately took the heights above tarrytown and from thence kept the heights until they thought they had got above our party. but luckily we had got above them and paused at mr youngses where we thought best to move towards them where we were in open view of them and found them vastly superior to us in numbers and moved off to rights mills, having no asistance more than our little party belonging to our regiment. i found on our retreat before we got back to youngses they had sent forward a flag, but found that was in view of trapping us as they had flanking parties who we discovered in order to surround us. but after clearing the regiment i rode back and met the flag within a quarter of a mile of their main body. the purport of his errand was that governor tryon had sent him to acquaint me that if we would give up our arms and submit they would show us mersy or otherways they were determined to take us and strip the contre (country). sent in answer that as long as we had a man alive i was determined to oppose them and they might come on as soon as they pleased. we have not lost a man and the last move of the enemy was from youngses towards the plains.
n. b. the maj. is gone home on furlow
henry ludinton.
fac-simile of col. henry ludington’s signature.
[104]
this report is unquestionably authentic, although the “p. s.” has no address, date nor signature, and is on a separate sheet of paper from the letter and the “n. b.” but it is in henry ludington’s handwriting, precisely the same as the signed letter, and is on precisely the same kind of paper. doubtless, then, the “p. s.” was hurriedly written after the letter, the british attack having occurred between the two writings, and was enclosed with the letter without taking time to sign it in any way. the mss. were in the possession of the late douglas putnam, of harmar, ohio, a great-grandson of general putnam, and were left by him to his daughter, mrs. francke h. bosworth, of new york. it is interesting to observe that it was with his old chief, tryon, that ludington had on this occasion to deal again. he estimates the number of the british three times as high as does the other and less authoritative chronicler, and is probably more nearly correct. it may be assumed that the former statement that he had “about five hundred militia” was much exaggerated. his own official report of the day before shows his entire force at wright’s mills to have comprised “one colonel, 1 lt. colonel, 5 captains, 10 leutennants, no ensign, no chaplain, 1 adjutant, 1 quartermaster, 1 surgeon, no surgeons mate, 19 sergeants, 9 drummers and fifers, 182 present fit for duty, 19 sick present, 3 sick absent, 19 on command, 10 on furlough, total 233.” with such a mere handful, he certainly acquitted himself most[105] creditably against the vastly superior force of tryon.
putnam was at peekskill for the express purpose of guarding the passage up the river. he had there about 600 regulars and a much larger number of militia. governor george clinton was at fort montgomery, and his brother james clinton at fort clinton, with combined forces variously reported at from 600 to 1200 men, mostly militia. putnam had scout boats along the river, and an elaborate system of scouts on land. yet, says general de peyster, “the british clinton … took advantage of a fog, transferred his troops over to the western side of the river, to stony point, made a wonderful march across or rather around the dunderberg mountain, and carried forts clinton and montgomery by assault, performing the most brilliant british operation during the seven years’ war.” george clinton suffered heavy losses in troops, and narrowly escaped capture; the state capital, kingston, was exposed to the enemy’s advance; and putnam retired to the mountains, sending word to gates that he must prepare for the worst as he could not prevent the enemy from advancing up the river to the aid of burgoyne. “the enemy can go to albany with great expedition and without any opposition.” in the presence of this disaster two things were uncommonly fortunate for the american cause. one was that gates was not alone in the north, but had arnold, schuyler, and morgan with him to brace him up. the other was that[106] the british did not attempt to go on up to albany. after garrisoning fort montgomery, sir henry clinton returned to new york. on october 15, he sent an expedition, under general vaughan, up to kingston, and the next day burned that village, the state government having previously fled to poughkeepsie. other ravages, of looting and burning, were committed along the river, to the disgrace of the british arms. but there was some consolation to the stricken patriots in the news that the very day after the burning of kingston, burgoyne, beaten by arnold, schuyler, and morgan, surrendered to gates with all his army.
during the winter of 1777-78 colonel ludington was chiefly busied with other features of his public duties, and appeared little in the field. he was a valuable adviser to the state government on military affairs, and, realizing from experience the great difficulty of maintaining a satisfactory militia service in time of actual warfare, urged the formation of another regiment of regulars. on december 18, governor clinton referred to this project in a letter to general putnam. he urged the necessity of strengthening the defenses of the hudson river, and said that he expected the committee of safety at poughkeepsie in a few days. he would then lay before them the proposal for a new regiment of regulars and added, “i should be glad to have colo. ludington’s plan.” that winter, the winter of valley forge, was a hard one in which to raise recruits of[107] any kind, especially in view of the fact that the troops had received no pay for their services for a long time past. colonel ludington felt this keenly, and on being asked by clinton to furnish a certain number of men from his regiment for the new regiment of regulars, he wrote very frankly on the subject:
honoured sir, i am under the disagrable nesesity of acqainting you, that i find it to be out of my power to comply with your orders in regard of raising the coto (quota) of men aloted me to raise out of my regiment, and that for sundry reasons. in the first place, the money raised in the other regments by their asesments amounts to one hundread pounds bounty to each soldier by reason of the exempts being able and among whom are a number of quakers. but it is not the case in my regment, for, by the best computation we can make, we cannot raise more than 30 dolars a man, though i would not be understood that we have gone through with the asesments and that for this reason: the act for asesing the exempts expresly says that the officers who aseses the exempts shall be freeholders, and i have not such an officer in my regiment. we have met sundry times in order to try to raise the men and i yoused my best endevours that they should be raised, but i have not an officer that will asist the exempts. the officers tell me they posatively will not call their companies out until they get pay for their past servises in order to avoid service; on that account i have had their pay roles maid up in time and signed by the[108] general, and have weighted on the pay master for the money everry few days, and yesterday for the last time, and he then told he had no prospect in geting the money in sum months. that being the case i am sory i must tell your honour that i know not what further measures to take until i have sum further instructions in regard of the matter. it is my opinion that we shall never raise the men, unles the state asists us in raising a part of the bounty and the soldiers gets their wages for their past servises. sir, a few lines from your honour in regard of the above, by way of instructions, will mutch oblige your humble servant,
henry ludinton.
fredricksburgh february 20th 1778.
to his excelency george clinton esqr. governor.
p. s. sir, if there be a late act past in regard of raising the men and a bounty for them, please to convey the same as i have had no opportunity of acquainting my self with it. the returns of the regment you shall have next week, which should have had before now, had it not been for the neglect of sum of the captains not sending in their returns.
colonel ludington had, however, rather better success in holding his own regiment together than did some other colonels of militia, as the following return shows:
[109]
return of the regiment of militia of the county of dutchess and state of new york. command’d by collonel henry ludinton.
fredricksburgh precinct march 23rd 1778.
field officers. comm’d officers.
companies collonel. lieut’t coll’l. major. capt’ns. lieut’s. ensigns.
john crane’s 1 2 —
david waterbury’s 1 2 1
john haight’s 1 2 1
hezekiah meed’s 1 2 1
george lane’s 1 — 1
nathaniel scribner’s 1 2 1
joel meed’s 1 2 1
total strength of the regiment 7 12 6
staff officers. non comm’d.
companies adjutant. surgeon. quart’r master. serg’ts. drum’rs. rank and file.
john crane’s 4 1 60
david waterbury’s 4 1 57
john haight’s 4 0 51
hezekiah meed’s 4 1 74
george lane’s 4 0 49
nathaniel scribner’s 4 2 58
joel meed’s 3 1 72
total strength of the regiment 26 6 421
colonel ludington and his regiment were again called to the defense of the hudson at fishkill in june, 1779, on the alarm caused by the british seizure of verplanck’s point, and a few days later returned to the vicinity of crom pond to resume the local police work which formed so large a part of their duties. there, before daylight of june 24, they were surprised by an attack of about two hundred british cavalry, which had made a dash all the way up from new york. nearly thirty of the militia were killed and wounded in the sharp skirmish which ensued. at the same time 130 british light infantry[110] came across from verplanck’s point and made a demonstration in aid of the cavalry. on another occasion a similar attack was made while the americans were at breakfast, close by the church, which at the time was used as an arsenal.
after these services the regiment was marched home to fredericksburgh and for a time disbanded. on this occasion colonel ludington wrote to clinton as follows:
honoured sir, i embrace this opportunity of acquainting you that according to colo. swartwout’s orders to me of yesterday i thought proper to discharge my regt who i must beg leave to acquaint you have acted with the greatest spirrit since they have been hear and have gon home with a full determination to turn out at a minute’s warning. in my last i wrote you to know the mode adopted for punishing those who have not turned out according to their being warned, for i am highly sensible that if they are not brought to a sevear punishment it will give offence to those who have dun their dutey. i must allso return your excellency thanks for recommending to me mr. mcclennen who has truley answered the character i have had of him as i have experienced his services in spiriting the militia in these parts and my regt in particular. i remain in the mean time
with respect your excellencys most obedient humble servt
henry ludinton.
fredh burgh juley 11, 1779.
to governor clinton.
[111]
later in the same year a radical reorganization of the militia forces was effected under the following orders:
poughkeepsie oct. 11th, 1779.
brigade orders.
agreeable to general orders of the 10th instant issued by his excellency the govr., 1078 men, including non commissioned officers, drums and fifes, are to be detached out of colo. comdt. swartwout’s brigade of militia to continue in service for the term of three months unless the particular service for which they are drawn out shall be sooner completed.
the detachments from the several regiments in this brigade to be as follows, viz.—
from colo. graham’s regt 196 men
colo. frear’s do 156
colo. hopkins do 192
colo. field’s do 117
colo. luddenton’s do 144
colo. van der burgh’s do 118
colo. brinckerhoff’s do 155
total 1078
the above detachment to be formed into two regiments under command of colos. graham and hopkins, in the following manner, viz.,
the detachments of colos. graham’s, frear’s, van der burgh’s and 69 men of colo. field’s regiments to be formed into one regiment under command of colo. graham.
the detachments of colos. hopkins, luddenton’s, brinckerhoff’s, and 48 men of colo. field’s[112] regts. to be formed into another regiment under command of colo. hopkins.
colo. graham’s field officers to be lieut. colo. birdsall and majr. hill,
captains. subalterns.
andw. heermans
james wilson
hustid colo. graham’s regt. john seton
andw. heermans junr.
john wilson
jonathan darling
and ?
lemuel conklin
hugh van kleeck colo. frear’s regt. montgomery
weeks
hendrickson
van der bogart
israel vail colo. van der burgh’s regt. tredwell
bently
hall
pierce colo. field’s regt. elliot
colo. hopkins field officers are lieut. colo. griffen and majr. paine.
captains. subalterns.
wheeler
waters
talmadge colo. hopkins regt. wm. chamberlain
elijah parks
elliot
parley
jonas parks
hoskin
geo. brinckerhoff
jno. van bunschoten colo. brinckerhoff’s regt. christian dubois
abraham shults
william swartwout
abraham hoogland
barnum colo. field’s regt. chandler
[113]
colo. luddenton and his officers being absent, he will with advice of his field officers nominate and furnish one captain and three subalterns, to join colo. hopkins’ regt.
the above detachments to be compleated and at the place of rendevous without delay, compleatly equipped, agreeable to genl. orders, to which the most strictest attention is to be paid.
by order of colo. comdr. jac. swartwout
hend. wyckoff mb
thereafter colonel ludington and his regiment were frequently engaged in important work, especially during the time of doubt and dread caused by the treason of arnold, and in the operations preliminary to washington’s epoch-making march from the hudson to the chesapeake. but those services belonged to the other phases of public duty to which reference has been made and of which fuller consideration must be reserved for another chapter.
