advantages of the federal system in general, and its special utility in america.

happiness and freedom of small nations—power of great nations—great empires favorable to the growth of civilization—strength often the first element of national prosperity—aim of the federal system to unite the twofold advantages resulting from a small and from a large territory—advantages derived by the united states from this system—the law adapts itself to the exigencies of the population; population does not conform to the exigencies of the law—activity, amelioration, love and enjoyment of freedom in the american communities—public spirit of the union the abstract of provincial patriotism—principles and things circulate freely over the territory of the united states—the union is happy and free as a little nation, and respected as a great empire.

in small nations the scrutiny of society penetrates into every part, and the spirit of improvement enters into the most trifling details; as the ambition of the people is necessarily checked by its weakness, all the efforts and resources of the citizens are turned to the internal benefit of the community, and are not likely to evaporate in the fleeting breath of glory. the desires of every individual are limited, because extraordinary faculties are rarely to be met with. the gifts of an equal fortune render the various conditions of life uniform, and the manners of the inhabitants are orderly and simple. thus, if one estimate the gradations of popular morality and enlightenment, we shall generally find that in small nations there are more persons in easy circumstances, a more numerous population, and a more tranquil state of society, than in great empires.

when tyranny is established in the bosom of a small nation, it is more galling than elsewhere, because, as it acts within a narrow circle, every point of that circle is subject to its direct influence. it supplies the place of those great designs which it cannot entertain by a violent or an exasperating interference in a multitude of minute details; and it leaves the political world, to which it properly belongs, to meddle with the arrangements of domestic life. tastes as well as actions are to be regulated at its pleasure; and the families of the citizens as well as the affairs of the state are to be governed by its decisions. this invasion of rights occurs, however, but seldom, and freedom is in truth the natural state of small communities. the temptations which the government offers to ambition are too weak, and the resources of private individuals are too slender, for the sovereign power easily to fall within the grasp of a single citizen; and should such an event have occurred, the subjects of the state can without difficulty overthrow the tyrant and his oppression by a simultaneous effort.

small nations have therefore ever been the cradle of political liberty; and the fact that many of them have lost their immunities by extending their dominion shows that the freedom they enjoyed was more a consequence of the inferior size than of the character of the people.

the history of the world affords no instance of a great nation retaining the form of republican government for a long series of years, *r and this has led to the conclusion that such a state of things is impracticable. for my own part, i cannot but censure the imprudence of attempting to limit the possible and to judge the future on the part of a being who is hourly deceived by the most palpable realities of life, and who is constantly taken by surprise in the circumstances with which he is most familiar. but it may be advanced with confidence that the existence of a great republic will always be exposed to far greater perils than that of a small one.

r

[ i do not speak of a confederation of small republics, but of a great consolidated republic.]

all the passions which are most fatal to republican institutions spread with an increasing territory, whilst the virtues which maintain their dignity do not augment in the same proportion. the ambition of the citizens increases with the power of the state; the strength of parties with the importance of the ends they have in view; but that devotion to the common weal which is the surest check on destructive passions is not stronger in a large than in a small republic. it might, indeed, be proved without difficulty that it is less powerful and less sincere. the arrogance of wealth and the dejection of wretchedness, capital cities of unwonted extent, a lax morality, a vulgar egotism, and a great confusion of interests, are the dangers which almost invariably arise from the magnitude of states. but several of these evils are scarcely prejudicial to a monarchy, and some of them contribute to maintain its existence. in monarchical states the strength of the government is its own; it may use, but it does not depend on, the community, and the authority of the prince is proportioned to the prosperity of the nation; but the only security which a republican government possesses against these evils lies in the support of the majority. this support is not, however, proportionably greater in a large republic than it is in a small one; and thus, whilst the means of attack perpetually increase both in number and in influence, the power of resistance remains the same, or it may rather be said to diminish, since the propensities and interests of the people are diversified by the increase of the population, and the difficulty of forming a compact majority is constantly augmented. it has been observed, moreover, that the intensity of human passions is heightened, not only by the importance of the end which they propose to attain, but by the multitude of individuals who are animated by them at the same time. every one has had occasion to remark that his emotions in the midst of a sympathizing crowd are far greater than those which he would have felt in solitude. in great republics the impetus of political passion is irresistible, not only because it aims at gigantic purposes, but because it is felt and shared by millions of men at the same time.

it may therefore be asserted as a general proposition that nothing is more opposed to the well-being and the freedom of man than vast empires. nevertheless it is important to acknowledge the peculiar advantages of great states. for the very reason which renders the desire of power more intense in these communities than amongst ordinary men, the love of glory is also more prominent in the hearts of a class of citizens, who regard the applause of a great people as a reward worthy of their exertions, and an elevating encouragement to man. if we would learn why it is that great nations contribute more powerfully to the spread of human improvement than small states, we shall discover an adequate cause in the rapid and energetic circulation of ideas, and in those great cities which are the intellectual centres where all the rays of human genius are reflected and combined. to this it may be added that most important discoveries demand a display of national power which the government of a small state is unable to make; in great nations the government entertains a greater number of general notions, and is more completely disengaged from the routine of precedent and the egotism of local prejudice; its designs are conceived with more talent, and executed with more boldness.

in time of peace the well-being of small nations is undoubtedly more general and more complete, but they are apt to suffer more acutely from the calamities of war than those great empires whose distant frontiers may for ages avert the presence of the danger from the mass of the people, which is therefore more frequently afflicted than ruined by the evil.

but in this matter, as in many others, the argument derived from the necessity of the case predominates over all others. if none but small nations existed, i do not doubt that mankind would be more happy and more free; but the existence of great nations is unavoidable.

this consideration introduces the element of physical strength as a condition of national prosperity. it profits a people but little to be affluent and free if it is perpetually exposed to be pillaged or subjugated; the number of its manufactures and the extent of its commerce are of small advantage if another nation has the empire of the seas and gives the law in all the markets of the globe. small nations are often impoverished, not because they are small, but because they are weak; the great empires prosper less because they are great than because they are strong. physical strength is therefore one of the first conditions of the happiness and even of the existence of nations. hence it occurs that, unless very peculiar circumstances intervene, small nations are always united to large empires in the end, either by force or by their own consent: yet i am unacquainted with a more deplorable spectacle than that of a people unable either to defend or to maintain its independence.

the federal system was created with the intention of combining the different advantages which result from the greater and the lesser extent of nations; and a single glance over the united states of america suffices to discover the advantages which they have derived from its adoption.

in great centralized nations the legislator is obliged to impart a character of uniformity to the laws which does not always suit the diversity of customs and of districts; as he takes no cognizance of special cases, he can only proceed upon general principles; and the population is obliged to conform to the exigencies of the legislation, since the legislation cannot adapt itself to the exigencies and the customs of the population, which is the cause of endless trouble and misery. this disadvantage does not exist in confederations. congress regulates the principal measures of the national government, and all the details of the administration are reserved to the provincial legislatures. it is impossible to imagine how much this division of sovereignty contributes to the well-being of each of the states which compose the union. in these small communities, which are never agitated by the desire of aggrandizement or the cares of self-defence, all public authority and private energy is employed in internal amelioration. the central government of each state, which is in immediate juxtaposition to the citizens, is daily apprised of the wants which arise in society; and new projects are proposed every year, which are discussed either at town meetings or by the legislature of the state, and which are transmitted by the press to stimulate the zeal and to excite the interest of the citizens. this spirit of amelioration is constantly alive in the american republics, without compromising their tranquillity; the ambition of power yields to the less refined and less dangerous love of comfort. it is generally believed in america that the existence and the permanence of the republican form of government in the new world depend upon the existence and the permanence of the federal system; and it is not unusual to attribute a large share of the misfortunes which have befallen the new states of south america to the injudicious erection of great republics, instead of a divided and confederate sovereignty.

it is incontestably true that the love and the habits of republican government in the united states were engendered in the townships and in the provincial assemblies. in a small state, like that of connecticut for instance, where cutting a canal or laying down a road is a momentous political question, where the state has no army to pay and no wars to carry on, and where much wealth and much honor cannot be bestowed upon the chief citizens, no form of government can be more natural or more appropriate than that of a republic. but it is this same republican spirit, it is these manners and customs of a free people, which are engendered and nurtured in the different states, to be afterwards applied to the country at large. the public spirit of the union is, so to speak, nothing more than an abstract of the patriotic zeal of the provinces. every citizen of the united states transfuses his attachment to his little republic in the common store of american patriotism. in defending the union he defends the increasing prosperity of his own district, the right of conducting its affairs, and the hope of causing measures of improvement to be adopted which may be favorable to his own interest; and these are motives which are wont to stir men more readily than the general interests of the country and the glory of the nation.

on the other hand, if the temper and the manners of the inhabitants especially fitted them to promote the welfare of a great republic, the federal system smoothed the obstacles which they might have encountered. the confederation of all the american states presents none of the ordinary disadvantages resulting from great agglomerations of men. the union is a great republic in extent, but the paucity of objects for which its government provides assimilates it to a small state. its acts are important, but they are rare. as the sovereignty of the union is limited and incomplete, its exercise is not incompatible with liberty; for it does not excite those insatiable desires of fame and power which have proved so fatal to great republics. as there is no common centre to the country, vast capital cities, colossal wealth, abject poverty, and sudden revolutions are alike unknown; and political passion, instead of spreading over the land like a torrent of desolation, spends its strength against the interests and the individual passions of every state.

nevertheless, all commodities and ideas circulate throughout the union as freely as in a country inhabited by one people. nothing checks the spirit of enterprise. government avails itself of the assistance of all who have talents or knowledge to serve it. within the frontiers of the union the profoundest peace prevails, as within the heart of some great empire; abroad, it ranks with the most powerful nations of the earth; two thousand miles of coast are open to the commerce of the world; and as it possesses the keys of the globe, its flags is respected in the most remote seas. the union is as happy and as free as a small people, and as glorious and as strong as a great nation.

why the federal system is not adapted to all peoples, and how the anglo-americans were enabled to adopt it.

every federal system contains defects which baffle the efforts of the legislator—the federal system is complex—it demands a daily exercise of discretion on the part of the citizens—practical knowledge of government common amongst the americans—relative weakness of the government of the union, another defect inherent in the federal system—the americans have diminished without remedying it—the sovereignty of the separate states apparently weaker, but really stronger, than that of the union—why?—natural causes of union must exist between confederate peoples besides the laws—what these causes are amongst the anglo-americans—maine and georgia, separated by a distance of a thousand miles, more naturally united than normandy and brittany—war, the main peril of confederations—this proved even by the example of the united states—the union has no great wars to fear—why?—dangers to which europeans would be exposed if they adopted the federal system of the americans.

when a legislator succeeds, after persevering efforts, in exercising an indirect influence upon the destiny of nations, his genius is lauded by mankind, whilst, in point of fact, the geographical position of the country which he is unable to change, a social condition which arose without his co-operation, manners and opinions which he cannot trace to their source, and an origin with which he is unacquainted, exercise so irresistible an influence over the courses of society that he is himself borne away by the current, after an ineffectual resistance. like the navigator, he may direct the vessel which bears him along, but he can neither change its structure, nor raise the winds, nor lull the waters which swell beneath him.

i have shown the advantages which the americans derive from their federal system; it remains for me to point out the circumstances which rendered that system practicable, as its benefits are not to be enjoyed by all nations. the incidental defects of the federal system which originate in the laws may be corrected by the skill of the legislator, but there are further evils inherent in the system which cannot be counteracted by the peoples which adopt it. these nations must therefore find the strength necessary to support the natural imperfections of their government.

the most prominent evil of all federal systems is the very complex nature of the means they employ. two sovereignties are necessarily in presence of each other. the legislator may simplify and equalize the action of these two sovereignties, by limiting each of them to a sphere of authority accurately defined; but he cannot combine them into one, or prevent them from coming into collision at certain points. the federal system therefore rests upon a theory which is necessarily complicated, and which demands the daily exercise of a considerable share of discretion on the part of those it governs.

a proposition must be plain to be adopted by the understanding of a people. a false notion which is clear and precise will always meet with a greater number of adherents in the world than a true principle which is obscure or involved. hence it arises that parties, which are like small communities in the heart of the nation, invariably adopt some principle or some name as a symbol, which very inadequately represents the end they have in view and the means which are at their disposal, but without which they could neither act nor subsist. the governments which are founded upon a single principle or a single feeling which is easily defined are perhaps not the best, but they are unquestionably the strongest and the most durable in the world.

in examining the constitution of the united states, which is the most perfect federal constitution that ever existed, one is startled, on the other hand, at the variety of information and the excellence of discretion which it presupposes in the people whom it is meant to govern. the government of the union depends entirely upon legal fictions; the union is an ideal nation which only exists in the mind, and whose limits and extent can only be discerned by the understanding.

when once the general theory is comprehended, numberless difficulties remain to be solved in its application; for the sovereignty of the union is so involved in that of the states that it is impossible to distinguish its boundaries at the first glance. the whole structure of the government is artificial and conventional; and it would be ill adapted to a people which has not been long accustomed to conduct its own affairs, or to one in which the science of politics has not descended to the humblest classes of society. i have never been more struck by the good sense and the practical judgment of the americans than in the ingenious devices by which they elude the numberless difficulties resulting from their federal constitution. i scarcely ever met with a plain american citizen who could not distinguish, with surprising facility, the obligations created by the laws of congress from those created by the laws of his own state; and who, after having discriminated between the matters which come under the cognizance of the union and those which the local legislature is competent to regulate, could not point out the exact limit of the several jurisdictions of the federal courts and the tribunals of the state.

the constitution of the united states is like those exquisite productions of human industry which ensure wealth and renown to their inventors, but which are profitless in any other hands. this truth is exemplified by the condition of mexico at the present time. the mexicans were desirous of establishing a federal system, and they took the federal constitution of their neighbors, the anglo-americans, as their model, and copied it with considerable accuracy. *s but although they had borrowed the letter of the law, they were unable to create or to introduce the spirit and the sense which give it life. they were involved in ceaseless embarrassments between the mechanism of their double government; the sovereignty of the states and that of the union perpetually exceeded their respective privileges, and entered into collision; and to the present day mexico is alternately the victim of anarchy and the slave of military despotism.

s

[ see the mexican constitution of 1824.]

the second and the most fatal of all the defects i have alluded to, and that which i believe to be inherent in the federal system, is the relative weakness of the government of the union. the principle upon which all confederations rest is that of a divided sovereignty. the legislator may render this partition less perceptible, he may even conceal it for a time from the public eye, but he cannot prevent it from existing, and a divided sovereignty must always be less powerful than an entire supremacy. the reader has seen in the remarks i have made on the constitution of the united states that the americans have displayed singular ingenuity in combining the restriction of the power of the union within the narrow limits of a federal government with the semblance and, to a certain extent, with the force of a national government. by this means the legislators of the union have succeeded in diminishing, though not in counteracting the natural danger of confederations.

it has been remarked that the american government does not apply itself to the states, but that it immediately transmits its injunctions to the citizens, and compels them as isolated individuals to comply with its demands. but if the federal law were to clash with the interests and the prejudices of a state, it might be feared that all the citizens of that state would conceive themselves to be interested in the cause of a single individual who should refuse to obey. if all the citizens of the state were aggrieved at the same time and in the same manner by the authority of the union, the federal government would vainly attempt to subdue them individually; they would instinctively unite in a common defence, and they would derive a ready-prepared organization from the share of sovereignty which the institution of their state allows them to enjoy. fiction would give way to reality, and an organized portion of the territory might then contest the central authority. *t the same observation holds good with regard to the federal jurisdiction. if the courts of the union violated an important law of a state in a private case, the real, if not the apparent, contest would arise between the aggrieved state represented by a citizen and the union represented by its courts of justice. *u

t

[ [this is precisely what occurred in 1862, and the following paragraph describes correctly the feelings and notions of the south. general lee held that his primary allegiance was due, not to the union, but to virginia.]]

u

[ for instance, the union possesses by the constitution the right of selling unoccupied lands for its own profit. supposing that the state of ohio should claim the same right in behalf of certain territories lying within its boundaries, upon the plea that the constitution refers to those lands alone which do not belong to the jurisdiction of any particular state, and consequently should choose to dispose of them itself, the litigation would be carried on in the names of the purchasers from the state of ohio and the purchasers from the union, and not in the names of ohio and the union. but what would become of this legal fiction if the federal purchaser was confirmed in his right by the courts of the union, whilst the other competitor was ordered to retain possession by the tribunals of the state of ohio?]

he would have but a partial knowledge of the world who should imagine that it is possible, by the aid of legal fictions, to prevent men from finding out and employing those means of gratifying their passions which have been left open to them; and it may be doubted whether the american legislators, when they rendered a collision between the two sovereigns less probable, destroyed the cause of such a misfortune. but it may even be affirmed that they were unable to ensure the preponderance of the federal element in a case of this kind. the union is possessed of money and of troops, but the affections and the prejudices of the people are in the bosom of the states. the sovereignty of the union is an abstract being, which is connected with but few external objects; the sovereignty of the states is hourly perceptible, easily understood, constantly active; and if the former is of recent creation, the latter is coeval with the people itself. the sovereignty of the union is factitious, that of the states is natural, and derives its existence from its own simple influence, like the authority of a parent. the supreme power of the nation only affects a few of the chief interests of society; it represents an immense but remote country, and claims a feeling of patriotism which is vague and ill defined; but the authority of the states controls every individual citizen at every hour and in all circumstances; it protects his property, his freedom, and his life; and when we recollect the traditions, the customs, the prejudices of local and familiar attachment with which it is connected, we cannot doubt of the superiority of a power which is interwoven with every circumstance that renders the love of one's native country instinctive in the human heart.

since legislators are unable to obviate such dangerous collisions as occur between the two sovereignties which coexist in the federal system, their first object must be, not only to dissuade the confederate states from warfare, but to encourage such institutions as may promote the maintenance of peace. hence it results that the federal compact cannot be lasting unless there exists in the communities which are leagued together a certain number of inducements to union which render their common dependence agreeable, and the task of the government light, and that system cannot succeed without the presence of favorable circumstances added to the influence of good laws. all the peoples which have ever formed a confederation have been held together by a certain number of common interests, which served as the intellectual ties of association.

but the sentiments and the principles of man must be taken into consideration as well as his immediate interests. a certain uniformity of civilization is not less necessary to the durability of a confederation than a uniformity of interests in the states which compose it. in switzerland the difference which exists between the canton of uri and the canton of vaud is equal to that between the fifteenth and the nineteenth centuries; and, properly speaking, switzerland has never possessed a federal government. the union between these two cantons only subsists upon the map, and their discrepancies would soon be perceived if an attempt were made by a central authority to prescribe the same laws to the whole territory.

one of the circumstances which most powerfully contribute to support the federal government in america is that the states have not only similar interests, a common origin, and a common tongue, but that they are also arrived at the same stage of civilization; which almost always renders a union feasible. i do not know of any european nation, how small soever it may be, which does not present less uniformity in its different provinces than the american people, which occupies a territory as extensive as one-half of europe. the distance from the state of maine to that of georgia is reckoned at about one thousand miles; but the difference between the civilization of maine and that of georgia is slighter than the difference between the habits of normandy and those of brittany. maine and georgia, which are placed at the opposite extremities of a great empire, are consequently in the natural possession of more real inducements to form a confederation than normandy and brittany, which are only separated by a bridge.

the geographical position of the country contributed to increase the facilities which the american legislators derived from the manners and customs of the inhabitants; and it is to this circumstance that the adoption and the maintenance of the federal system are mainly attributable.

the most important occurrence which can mark the annals of a people is the breaking out of a war. in war a people struggles with the energy of a single man against foreign nations in the defence of its very existence. the skill of a government, the good sense of the community, and the natural fondness which men entertain for their country, may suffice to maintain peace in the interior of a district, and to favor its internal prosperity; but a nation can only carry on a great war at the cost of more numerous and more painful sacrifices; and to suppose that a great number of men will of their own accord comply with these exigencies of the state is to betray an ignorance of mankind. all the peoples which have been obliged to sustain a long and serious warfare have consequently been led to augment the power of their government. those which have not succeeded in this attempt have been subjugated. a long war almost always places nations in the wretched alternative of being abandoned to ruin by defeat or to despotism by success. war therefore renders the symptoms of the weakness of a government most palpable and most alarming; and i have shown that the inherent defeat of federal governments is that of being weak.

the federal system is not only deficient in every kind of centralized administration, but the central government itself is imperfectly organized, which is invariably an influential cause of inferiority when the nation is opposed to other countries which are themselves governed by a single authority. in the federal constitution of the united states, by which the central government possesses more real force, this evil is still extremely sensible. an example will illustrate the case to the reader.

the constitution confers upon congress the right of calling forth militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions; and another article declares that the president of the united states is the commander-in-chief of the militia. in the war of 1812 the president ordered the militia of the northern states to march to the frontiers; but connecticut and massachusetts, whose interests were impaired by the war, refused to obey the command. they argued that the constitution authorizes the federal government to call forth the militia in case of insurrection or invasion, but that in the present instance there was neither invasion nor insurrection. they added, that the same constitution which conferred upon the union the right of calling forth the militia reserved to the states that of naming the officers; and that consequently (as they understood the clause) no officer of the union had any right to command the militia, even during war, except the president in person; and in this case they were ordered to join an army commanded by another individual. these absurd and pernicious doctrines received the sanction not only of the governors and the legislative bodies, but also of the courts of justice in both states; and the federal government was constrained to raise elsewhere the troops which it required. *v

v

[ kent's "commentaries," vol. i. p. 244. i have selected an example which relates to a time posterior to the promulgation of the present constitution. if i had gone back to the days of the confederation, i might have given still more striking instances. the whole nation was at that time in a state of enthusiastic excitement; the revolution was represented by a man who was the idol of the people; but at that very period congress had, to say the truth, no resources at all at its disposal. troops and supplies were perpetually wanting. the best-devised projects failed in the execution, and the union, which was constantly on the verge of destruction, was saved by the weakness of its enemies far more than by its own strength. [all doubt as to the powers of the federal executive was, however, removed by its efforts in the civil war, and those powers were largely extended.]]

the only safeguard which the american union, with all the relative perfection of its laws, possesses against the dissolution which would be produced by a great war, lies in its probable exemption from that calamity. placed in the centre of an immense continent, which offers a boundless field for human industry, the union is almost as much insulated from the world as if its frontiers were girt by the ocean. canada contains only a million of inhabitants, and its population is divided into two inimical nations. the rigor of the climate limits the extension of its territory, and shuts up its ports during the six months of winter. from canada to the gulf of mexico a few savage tribes are to be met with, which retire, perishing in their retreat, before six thousand soldiers. to the south, the union has a point of contact with the empire of mexico; and it is thence that serious hostilities may one day be expected to arise. but for a long while to come the uncivilized state of the mexican community, the depravity of its morals, and its extreme poverty, will prevent that country from ranking high amongst nations. *w as for the powers of europe, they are too distant to be formidable.

w

[ [war broke out between the united states and mexico in 1846, and ended in the conquest of an immense territory, including california.]]

the great advantage of the united states does not, then, consist in a federal constitution which allows them to carry on great wars, but in a geographical position which renders such enterprises extremely improbable.

no one can be more inclined than i am myself to appreciate the advantages of the federal system, which i hold to be one of the combinations most favorable to the prosperity and freedom of man. i envy the lot of those nations which have been enabled to adopt it; but i cannot believe that any confederate peoples could maintain a long or an equal contest with a nation of similar strength in which the government should be centralized. a people which should divide its sovereignty into fractional powers, in the presence of the great military monarchies of europe, would, in my opinion, by that very act, abdicate its power, and perhaps its existence and its name. but such is the admirable position of the new world that man has no other enemy than himself; and that, in order to be happy and to be free, it suffices to seek the gifts of prosperity and the knowledge of freedom.