the laws contribute more to the maintenance of the democratic republic in the united states than the physical circumstances of the country, and the manners more than the laws

all the nations of america have a democratic state of society—yet democratic institutions only subsist amongst the anglo-americans—the spaniards of south america, equally favored by physical causes as the anglo-americans, unable to maintain a democratic republic—mexico, which has adopted the constitution of the united states, in the same predicament—the anglo-americans of the west less able to maintain it than those of the east—reason of these different results.

i have remarked that the maintenance of democratic institutions in the united states is attributable to the circumstances, the laws, and the manners of that country. *l most europeans are only acquainted with the first of these three causes, and they are apt to give it a preponderating importance which it does not really possess.

l

[ i remind the reader of the general signification which i give to the word "manners," namely, the moral and intellectual characteristics of social man taken collectively.]

it is true that the anglo-saxons settled in the new world in a state of social equality; the low-born and the noble were not to be found amongst them; and professional prejudices were always as entirely unknown as the prejudices of birth. thus, as the condition of society was democratic, the empire of democracy was established without difficulty. but this circumstance is by no means peculiar to the united states; almost all the trans-atlantic colonies were founded by men equal amongst themselves, or who became so by inhabiting them. in no one part of the new world have europeans been able to create an aristocracy. nevertheless, democratic institutions prosper nowhere but in the united states.

the american union has no enemies to contend with; it stands in the wilds like an island in the ocean. but the spaniards of south america were no less isolated by nature; yet their position has not relieved them from the charge of standing armies. they make war upon each other when they have no foreign enemies to oppose; and the anglo-american democracy is the only one which has hitherto been able to maintain itself in peace. *m

m

[ [a remark which, since the great civil war of 1861-65, ceases to be applicable.]]

the territory of the union presents a boundless field to human activity, and inexhaustible materials for industry and labor. the passion of wealth takes the place of ambition, and the warmth of faction is mitigated by a sense of prosperity. but in what portion of the globe shall we meet with more fertile plains, with mightier rivers, or with more unexplored and inexhaustible riches than in south america?

nevertheless, south america has been unable to maintain democratic institutions. if the welfare of nations depended on their being placed in a remote position, with an unbounded space of habitable territory before them, the spaniards of south america would have no reason to complain of their fate. and although they might enjoy less prosperity than the inhabitants of the united states, their lot might still be such as to excite the envy of some nations in europe. there are, however, no nations upon the face of the earth more miserable than those of south america.

thus, not only are physical causes inadequate to produce results analogous to those which occur in north america, but they are unable to raise the population of south america above the level of european states, where they act in a contrary direction. physical causes do not, therefore, affect the destiny of nations so much as has been supposed.

i have met with men in new england who were on the point of leaving a country, where they might have remained in easy circumstances, to go to seek their fortune in the wilds. not far from that district i found a french population in canada, which was closely crowded on a narrow territory, although the same wilds were at hand; and whilst the emigrant from the united states purchased an extensive estate with the earnings of a short term of labor, the canadian paid as much for land as he would have done in france. nature offers the solitudes of the new world to europeans; but they are not always acquainted with the means of turning her gifts to account. other peoples of america have the same physical conditions of prosperity as the anglo-americans, but without their laws and their manners; and these peoples are wretched. the laws and manners of the anglo-americans are therefore that efficient cause of their greatness which is the object of my inquiry.

i am far from supposing that the american laws are preeminently good in themselves; i do not hold them to be applicable to all democratic peoples; and several of them seem to be dangerous, even in the united states. nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the american legislation, taken collectively, is extremely well adapted to the genius of the people and the nature of the country which it is intended to govern. the american laws are therefore good, and to them must be attributed a large portion of the success which attends the government of democracy in america: but i do not believe them to be the principal cause of that success; and if they seem to me to have more influence upon the social happiness of the americans than the nature of the country, on the other hand there is reason to believe that their effect is still inferior to that produced by the manners of the people.

the federal laws undoubtedly constitute the most important part of the legislation of the united states. mexico, which is not less fortunately situated than the anglo-american union, has adopted the same laws, but is unable to accustom itself to the government of democracy. some other cause is therefore at work, independently of those physical circumstances and peculiar laws which enable the democracy to rule in the united states.

another still more striking proof may be adduced. almost all the inhabitants of the territory of the union are the descendants of a common stock; they speak the same language, they worship god in the same manner, they are affected by the same physical causes, and they obey the same laws. whence, then, do their characteristic differences arise? why, in the eastern states of the union, does the republican government display vigor and regularity, and proceed with mature deliberation? whence does it derive the wisdom and the durability which mark its acts, whilst in the western states, on the contrary, society seems to be ruled by the powers of chance? there, public business is conducted with an irregularity and a passionate and feverish excitement, which does not announce a long or sure duration.

i am no longer comparing the anglo-american states to foreign nations; but i am contrasting them with each other, and endeavoring to discover why they are so unlike. the arguments which are derived from the nature of the country and the difference of legislation are here all set aside. recourse must be had to some other cause; and what other cause can there be except the manners of the people?

it is in the eastern states that the anglo-americans have been longest accustomed to the government of democracy, and that they have adopted the habits and conceived the notions most favorable to its maintenance. democracy has gradually penetrated into their customs, their opinions, and the forms of social intercourse; it is to be found in all the details of daily life equally as in the laws. in the eastern states the instruction and practical education of the people have been most perfected, and religion has been most thoroughly amalgamated with liberty. now these habits, opinions, customs, and convictions are precisely the constituent elements of that which i have denominated manners.

in the western states, on the contrary, a portion of the same advantages is still wanting. many of the americans of the west were born in the woods, and they mix the ideas and the customs of savage life with the civilization of their parents. their passions are more intense; their religious morality less authoritative; and their convictions less secure. the inhabitants exercise no sort of control over their fellow-citizens, for they are scarcely acquainted with each other. the nations of the west display, to a certain extent, the inexperience and the rude habits of a people in its infancy; for although they are composed of old elements, their assemblage is of recent date.

the manners of the americans of the united states are, then, the real cause which renders that people the only one of the american nations that is able to support a democratic government; and it is the influence of manners which produces the different degrees of order and of prosperity that may be distinguished in the several anglo-american democracies. thus the effect which the geographical position of a country may have upon the duration of democratic institutions is exaggerated in europe. too much importance is attributed to legislation, too little to manners. these three great causes serve, no doubt, to regulate and direct the american democracy; but if they were to be classed in their proper order, i should say that the physical circumstances are less efficient than the laws, and the laws very subordinate to the manners of the people. i am convinced that the most advantageous situation and the best possible laws cannot maintain a constitution in spite of the manners of a country; whilst the latter may turn the most unfavorable positions and the worst laws to some advantage. the importance of manners is a common truth to which study and experience incessantly direct our attention. it may be regarded as a central point in the range of human observation, and the common termination of all inquiry. so seriously do i insist upon this head, that if i have hitherto failed in making the reader feel the important influence which i attribute to the practical experience, the habits, the opinions, in short, to the manners of the americans, upon the maintenance of their institutions, i have failed in the principal object of my work.

whether laws and manners are sufficient to maintain democratic institutions in other countries besides america

the anglo-americans, if transported into europe, would be obliged to modify their laws—distinction to be made between democratic institutions and american institutions—democratic laws may be conceived better than, or at least different from, those which the american democracy has adopted—the example of america only proves that it is possible to regulate democracy by the assistance of manners and legislation.

i have asserted that the success of democratic institutions in the united states is more intimately connected with the laws themselves, and the manners of the people, than with the nature of the country. but does it follow that the same causes would of themselves produce the same results, if they were put into operation elsewhere; and if the country is no adequate substitute for laws and manners, can laws and manners in their turn prove a substitute for the country? it will readily be understood that the necessary elements of a reply to this question are wanting: other peoples are to be found in the new world besides the anglo-americans, and as these people are affected by the same physical circumstances as the latter, they may fairly be compared together. but there are no nations out of america which have adopted the same laws and manners, being destitute of the physical advantages peculiar to the anglo-americans. no standard of comparison therefore exists, and we can only hazard an opinion upon this subject.

it appears to me, in the first place, that a careful distinction must be made between the institutions of the united states and democratic institutions in general. when i reflect upon the state of europe, its mighty nations, its populous cities, its formidable armies, and the complex nature of its politics, i cannot suppose that even the anglo-americans, if they were transported to our hemisphere, with their ideas, their religion, and their manners, could exist without considerably altering their laws. but a democratic nation may be imagined, organized differently from the american people. it is not impossible to conceive a government really established upon the will of the majority; but in which the majority, repressing its natural propensity to equality, should consent, with a view to the order and the stability of the state, to invest a family or an individual with all the prerogatives of the executive. a democratic society might exist, in which the forces of the nation would be more centralized than they are in the united states; the people would exercise a less direct and less irresistible influence upon public affairs, and yet every citizen invested with certain rights would participate, within his sphere, in the conduct of the government. the observations i made amongst the anglo-americans induce me to believe that democratic institutions of this kind, prudently introduced into society, so as gradually to mix with the habits and to be interfused with the opinions of the people, might subsist in other countries besides america. if the laws of the united states were the only imaginable democratic laws, or the most perfect which it is possible to conceive, i should admit that the success of those institutions affords no proof of the success of democratic institutions in general, in a country less favored by natural circumstances. but as the laws of america appear to me to be defective in several respects, and as i can readily imagine others of the same general nature, the peculiar advantages of that country do not prove that democratic institutions cannot succeed in a nation less favored by circumstances, if ruled by better laws.

if human nature were different in america from what it is elsewhere; or if the social condition of the americans engendered habits and opinions amongst them different from those which originate in the same social condition in the old world, the american democracies would afford no means of predicting what may occur in other democracies. if the americans displayed the same propensities as all other democratic nations, and if their legislators had relied upon the nature of the country and the favor of circumstances to restrain those propensities within due limits, the prosperity of the united states would be exclusively attributable to physical causes, and it would afford no encouragement to a people inclined to imitate their example, without sharing their natural advantages. but neither of these suppositions is borne out by facts.

in america the same passions are to be met with as in europe; some originating in human nature, others in the democratic condition of society. thus in the united states i found that restlessness of heart which is natural to men, when all ranks are nearly equal and the chances of elevation are the same to all. i found the democratic feeling of envy expressed under a thousand different forms. i remarked that the people frequently displayed, in the conduct of affairs, a consummate mixture of ignorance and presumption; and i inferred that in america, men are liable to the same failings and the same absurdities as amongst ourselves. but upon examining the state of society more attentively, i speedily discovered that the americans had made great and successful efforts to counteract these imperfections of human nature, and to correct the natural defects of democracy. their divers municipal laws appeared to me to be a means of restraining the ambition of the citizens within a narrow sphere, and of turning those same passions which might have worked havoc in the state, to the good of the township or the parish. the american legislators have succeeded to a certain extent in opposing the notion of rights to the feelings of envy; the permanence of the religious world to the continual shifting of politics; the experience of the people to its theoretical ignorance; and its practical knowledge of business to the impatience of its desires.

the americans, then, have not relied upon the nature of their country to counterpoise those dangers which originate in their constitution and in their political laws. to evils which are common to all democratic peoples they have applied remedies which none but themselves had ever thought of before; and although they were the first to make the experiment, they have succeeded in it.

the manners and laws of the americans are not the only ones which may suit a democratic people; but the americans have shown that it would be wrong to despair of regulating democracy by the aid of manners and of laws. if other nations should borrow this general and pregnant idea from the americans, without however intending to imitate them in the peculiar application which they have made of it; if they should attempt to fit themselves for that social condition, which it seems to be the will of providence to impose upon the generations of this age, and so to escape from the despotism or the anarchy which threatens them; what reason is there to suppose that their efforts would not be crowned with success? the organization and the establishment of democracy in christendom is the great political problem of the time. the americans, unquestionably, have not resolved this problem, but they furnish useful data to those who undertake the task.

importance of what precedes with respect to the state of europe

it may readily be discovered with what intention i undertook the foregoing inquiries. the question here discussed is interesting not only to the united states, but to the whole world; it concerns, not a nation, but all mankind. if those nations whose social condition is democratic could only remain free as long as they are inhabitants of the wilds, we could not but despair of the future destiny of the human race; for democracy is rapidly acquiring a more extended sway, and the wilds are gradually peopled with men. if it were true that laws and manners are insufficient to maintain democratic institutions, what refuge would remain open to the nations, except the despotism of a single individual? i am aware that there are many worthy persons at the present time who are not alarmed at this latter alternative, and who are so tired of liberty as to be glad of repose, far from those storms by which it is attended. but these individuals are ill acquainted with the haven towards which they are bound. they are so deluded by their recollections, as to judge the tendency of absolute power by what it was formerly, and not by what it might become at the present time.

if absolute power were re-established amongst the democratic nations of europe, i am persuaded that it would assume a new form, and appear under features unknown to our forefathers. there was a time in europe when the laws and the consent of the people had invested princes with almost unlimited authority; but they scarcely ever availed themselves of it. i do not speak of the prerogatives of the nobility, of the authority of supreme courts of justice, of corporations and their chartered rights, or of provincial privileges, which served to break the blows of the sovereign authority, and to maintain a spirit of resistance in the nation. independently of these political institutions—which, however opposed they might be to personal liberty, served to keep alive the love of freedom in the mind of the public, and which may be esteemed to have been useful in this respect—the manners and opinions of the nation confined the royal authority within barriers which were not less powerful, although they were less conspicuous. religion, the affections of the people, the benevolence of the prince, the sense of honor, family pride, provincial prejudices, custom, and public opinion limited the power of kings, and restrained their authority within an invisible circle. the constitution of nations was despotic at that time, but their manners were free. princes had the right, but they had neither the means nor the desire, of doing whatever they pleased.

but what now remains of those barriers which formerly arrested the aggressions of tyranny? since religion has lost its empire over the souls of men, the most prominent boundary which divided good from evil is overthrown; the very elements of the moral world are indeterminate; the princes and the peoples of the earth are guided by chance, and none can define the natural limits of despotism and the bounds of license. long revolutions have forever destroyed the respect which surrounded the rulers of the state; and since they have been relieved from the burden of public esteem, princes may henceforward surrender themselves without fear to the seductions of arbitrary power.

when kings find that the hearts of their subjects are turned towards them, they are clement, because they are conscious of their strength, and they are chary of the affection of their people, because the affection of their people is the bulwark of the throne. a mutual interchange of good-will then takes place between the prince and the people, which resembles the gracious intercourse of domestic society. the subjects may murmur at the sovereign's decree, but they are grieved to displease him; and the sovereign chastises his subjects with the light hand of parental affection.

but when once the spell of royalty is broken in the tumult of revolution; when successive monarchs have crossed the throne, so as alternately to display to the people the weakness of their right and the harshness of their power, the sovereign is no longer regarded by any as the father of the state, and he is feared by all as its master. if he be weak, he is despised; if he be strong, he is detested. he himself is full of animosity and alarm; he finds that he is as a stranger in his own country, and he treats his subjects like conquered enemies.

when the provinces and the towns formed so many different nations in the midst of their common country, each of them had a will of its own, which was opposed to the general spirit of subjection; but now that all the parts of the same empire, after having lost their immunities, their customs, their prejudices, their traditions, and their names, are subjected and accustomed to the same laws, it is not more difficult to oppress them collectively than it was formerly to oppress them singly.

whilst the nobles enjoyed their power, and indeed long after that power was lost, the honor of aristocracy conferred an extraordinary degree of force upon their personal opposition. they afford instances of men who, notwithstanding their weakness, still entertained a high opinion of their personal value, and dared to cope single-handed with the efforts of the public authority. but at the present day, when all ranks are more and more confounded, when the individual disappears in the throng, and is easily lost in the midst of a common obscurity, when the honor of monarchy has almost lost its empire without being succeeded by public virtue, and when nothing can enable man to rise above himself, who shall say at what point the exigencies of power and the servility of weakness will stop?

as long as family feeling was kept alive, the antagonist of oppression was never alone; he looked about him, and found his clients, his hereditary friends, and his kinsfolk. if this support was wanting, he was sustained by his ancestors and animated by his posterity. but when patrimonial estates are divided, and when a few years suffice to confound the distinctions of a race, where can family feeling be found? what force can there be in the customs of a country which has changed and is still perpetually changing, its aspect; in which every act of tyranny has a precedent, and every crime an example; in which there is nothing so old that its antiquity can save it from destruction, and nothing so unparalleled that its novelty can prevent it from being done? what resistance can be offered by manners of so pliant a make that they have already often yielded? what strength can even public opinion have retained, when no twenty persons are connected by a common tie; when not a man, nor a family, nor chartered corporation, nor class, nor free institution, has the power of representing or exerting that opinion; and when every citizen—being equally weak, equally poor, and equally dependent—has only his personal impotence to oppose to the organized force of the government?

the annals of france furnish nothing analogous to the condition in which that country might then be thrown. but it may more aptly be assimilated to the times of old, and to those hideous eras of roman oppression, when the manners of the people were corrupted, their traditions obliterated, their habits destroyed, their opinions shaken, and freedom, expelled from the laws, could find no refuge in the land; when nothing protected the citizens, and the citizens no longer protected themselves; when human nature was the sport of man, and princes wearied out the clemency of heaven before they exhausted the patience of their subjects. those who hope to revive the monarchy of henry iv or of louis xiv, appear to me to be afflicted with mental blindness; and when i consider the present condition of several european nations—a condition to which all the others tend—i am led to believe that they will soon be left with no other alternative than democratic liberty, or the tyranny of the caesars. *n

n

[ [this prediction of the return of france to imperial despotism, and of the true character of that despotic power, was written in 1832, and realized to the letter in 1852.]]

and indeed it is deserving of consideration, whether men are to be entirely emancipated or entirely enslaved; whether their rights are to be made equal, or wholly taken away from them. if the rulers of society were reduced either gradually to raise the crowd to their own level, or to sink the citizens below that of humanity, would not the doubts of many be resolved, the consciences of many be healed, and the community prepared to make great sacrifices with little difficulty? in that case, the gradual growth of democratic manners and institutions should be regarded, not as the best, but as the only means of preserving freedom; and without liking the government of democracy, it might be adopted as the most applicable and the fairest remedy for the present ills of society.

it is difficult to associate a people in the work of government; but it is still more difficult to supply it with experience, and to inspire it with the feelings which it requires in order to govern well. i grant that the caprices of democracy are perpetual; its instruments are rude; its laws imperfect. but if it were true that soon no just medium would exist between the empire of democracy and the dominion of a single arm, should we not rather incline towards the former than submit voluntarily to the latter? and if complete equality be our fate, is it not better to be levelled by free institutions than by despotic power?

those who, after having read this book, should imagine that my intention in writing it has been to propose the laws and manners of the anglo-americans for the imitation of all democratic peoples, would commit a very great mistake; they must have paid more attention to the form than to the substance of my ideas. my aim has been to show, by the example of america, that laws, and especially manners, may exist which will allow a democratic people to remain free. but i am very far from thinking that we ought to follow the example of the american democracy, and copy the means which it has employed to attain its ends; for i am well aware of the influence which the nature of a country and its political precedents exercise upon a constitution; and i should regard it as a great misfortune for mankind if liberty were to exist all over the world under the same forms.

but i am of opinion that if we do not succeed in gradually introducing democratic institutions into france, and if we despair of imparting to the citizens those ideas and sentiments which first prepare them for freedom, and afterwards allow them to enjoy it, there will be no independence at all, either for the middling classes or the nobility, for the poor or for the rich, but an equal tyranny over all; and i foresee that if the peaceable empire of the majority be not founded amongst us in time, we shall sooner or later arrive at the unlimited authority of a single despot.