i think that in no country in the civilized world is less attention paid to philosophy than in the united states. the americans have no philosophical school of their own; and they care but little for all the schools into which europe is divided, the very names of which are scarcely known to them. nevertheless it is easy to perceive that almost all the inhabitants of the united states conduct their understanding in the same manner, and govern it by the same rules; that is to say, that without ever having taken the trouble to define the rules of a philosophical method, they are in possession of one, common to the whole people. to evade the bondage of system and habit, of family maxims, class opinions, and, in some degree, of national prejudices; to accept tradition only as a means of information, and existing facts only as a lesson used in doing otherwise, and doing better; to seek the reason of things for one's self, and in one's self alone; to tend to results without being bound to means, and to aim at the substance through the form;—such are the principal characteristics of what i shall call the philosophical method of the americans. but if i go further, and if i seek amongst these characteristics that which predominates over and includes almost all the rest, i discover that in most of the operations of the mind, each american appeals to the individual exercise of his own understanding alone. america is therefore one of the countries in the world where philosophy is least studied, and where the precepts of descartes are best applied. nor is this surprising. the americans do not read the works of descartes, because their social condition deters them from speculative studies; but they follow his maxims because this very social condition naturally disposes their understanding to adopt them. in the midst of the continual movement which agitates a democratic community, the tie which unites one generation to another is relaxed or broken; every man readily loses the trace of the ideas of his forefathers or takes no care about them. nor can men living in this state of society derive their belief from the opinions of the class to which they belong, for, so to speak, there are no longer any classes, or those which still exist are composed of such mobile elements, that their body can never exercise a real control over its members. as to the influence which the intelligence of one man has on that of another, it must necessarily be very limited in a country where the citizens, placed on the footing of a general similitude, are all closely seen by each other; and where, as no signs of incontestable greatness or superiority are perceived in any one of them, they are constantly brought back to their own reason as the most obvious and proximate source of truth. it is not only confidence in this or that man which is then destroyed, but the taste for trusting the ipse dixit of any man whatsoever. everyone shuts himself up in his own breast, and affects from that point to judge the world.
the practice which obtains amongst the americans of fixing the standard of their judgment in themselves alone, leads them to other habits of mind. as they perceive that they succeed in resolving without assistance all the little difficulties which their practical life presents, they readily conclude that everything in the world may be explained, and that nothing in it transcends the limits of the understanding. thus they fall to denying what they cannot comprehend; which leaves them but little faith for whatever is extraordinary, and an almost insurmountable distaste for whatever is supernatural. as it is on their own testimony that they are accustomed to rely, they like to discern the object which engages their attention with extreme clearness; they therefore strip off as much as possible all that covers it, they rid themselves of whatever separates them from it, they remove whatever conceals it from sight, in order to view it more closely and in the broad light of day. this disposition of the mind soon leads them to contemn forms, which they regard as useless and inconvenient veils placed between them and the truth.
the americans then have not required to extract their philosophical method from books; they have found it in themselves. the same thing may be remarked in what has taken place in europe. this same method has only been established and made popular in europe in proportion as the condition of society has become more equal, and men have grown more like each other. let us consider for a moment the connection of the periods in which this change may be traced. in the sixteenth century the reformers subjected some of the dogmas of the ancient faith to the scrutiny of private judgment; but they still withheld from it the judgment of all the rest. in the seventeenth century, bacon in the natural sciences, and descartes in the study of philosophy in the strict sense of the term, abolished recognized formulas, destroyed the empire of tradition, and overthrew the authority of the schools. the philosophers of the eighteenth century, generalizing at length the same principle, undertook to submit to the private judgment of each man all the objects of his belief.
who does not perceive that luther, descartes, and voltaire employed the same method, and that they differed only in the greater or less use which they professed should be made of it? why did the reformers confine themselves so closely within the circle of religious ideas? why did descartes, choosing only to apply his method to certain matters, though he had made it fit to be applied to all, declare that men might judge for themselves in matters philosophical but not in matters political? how happened it that in the eighteenth century those general applications were all at once drawn from this same method, which descartes and his predecessors had either not perceived or had rejected? to what, lastly, is the fact to be attributed, that at this period the method we are speaking of suddenly emerged from the schools, to penetrate into society and become the common standard of intelligence; and that, after it had become popular among the french, it has been ostensibly adopted or secretly followed by all the nations of europe?
the philosophical method here designated may have been engendered in the sixteenth century—it may have been more accurately defined and more extensively applied in the seventeenth; but neither in the one nor in the other could it be commonly adopted. political laws, the condition of society, and the habits of mind which are derived from these causes, were as yet opposed to it. it was discovered at a time when men were beginning to equalize and assimilate their conditions. it could only be generally followed in ages when those conditions had at length become nearly equal, and men nearly alike.
the philosophical method of the eighteenth century is then not only french, but it is democratic; and this explains why it was so readily admitted throughout europe, where it has contributed so powerfully to change the face of society. it is not because the french have changed their former opinions, and altered their former manners, that they have convulsed the world; but because they were the first to generalize and bring to light a philosophical method, by the assistance of which it became easy to attack all that was old, and to open a path to all that was new.
if it be asked why, at the present day, this same method is more rigorously followed and more frequently applied by the french than by the americans, although the principle of equality be no less complete, and of more ancient date, amongst the latter people, the fact may be attributed to two circumstances, which it is essential to have clearly understood in the first instance. it must never be forgotten that religion gave birth to anglo-american society. in the united states religion is therefore commingled with all the habits of the nation and all the feelings of patriotism; whence it derives a peculiar force. to this powerful reason another of no less intensity may be added: in american religion has, as it were, laid down its own limits. religious institutions have remained wholly distinct from political institutions, so that former laws have been easily changed whilst former belief has remained unshaken. christianity has therefore retained a strong hold on the public mind in america; and, i would more particularly remark, that its sway is not only that of a philosophical doctrine which has been adopted upon inquiry, but of a religion which is believed without discussion. in the united states christian sects are infinitely diversified and perpetually modified; but christianity itself is a fact so irresistibly established, that no one undertakes either to attack or to defend it. the americans, having admitted the principal doctrines of the christian religion without inquiry, are obliged to accept in like manner a great number of moral truths originating in it and connected with it. hence the activity of individual analysis is restrained within narrow limits, and many of the most important of human opinions are removed from the range of its influence.
the second circumstance to which i have alluded is the following: the social condition and the constitution of the americans are democratic, but they have not had a democratic revolution. they arrived upon the soil they occupy in nearly the condition in which we see them at the present day; and this is of very considerable importance.
there are no revolutions which do not shake existing belief, enervate authority, and throw doubts over commonly received ideas. the effect of all revolutions is therefore, more or less, to surrender men to their own guidance, and to open to the mind of every man a void and almost unlimited range of speculation. when equality of conditions succeeds a protracted conflict between the different classes of which the elder society was composed, envy, hatred, and uncharitableness, pride, and exaggerated self-confidence are apt to seize upon the human heart, and plant their sway there for a time. this, independently of equality itself, tends powerfully to divide men—to lead them to mistrust the judgment of others, and to seek the light of truth nowhere but in their own understandings. everyone then attempts to be his own sufficient guide, and makes it his boast to form his own opinions on all subjects. men are no longer bound together by ideas, but by interests; and it would seem as if human opinions were reduced to a sort of intellectual dust, scattered on every side, unable to collect, unable to cohere.
thus, that independence of mind which equality supposes to exist, is never so great, nor ever appears so excessive, as at the time when equality is beginning to establish itself, and in the course of that painful labor by which it is established. that sort of intellectual freedom which equality may give ought, therefore, to be very carefully distinguished from the anarchy which revolution brings. each of these two things must be severally considered, in order not to conceive exaggerated hopes or fears of the future.
i believe that the men who will live under the new forms of society will make frequent use of their private judgment; but i am far from thinking that they will often abuse it. this is attributable to a cause of more general application to all democratic countries, and which, in the long run, must needs restrain in them the independence of individual speculation within fixed, and sometimes narrow, limits. i shall proceed to point out this cause in the next chapter.
