amongst aristocratic nations all the members of the community are connected with and dependent upon each other; the graduated scale of different ranks acts as a tie, which keeps everyone in his proper place and the whole body in subordination. something of the same kind always occurs in the political assemblies of these nations. parties naturally range themselves under certain leaders, whom they obey by a sort of instinct, which is only the result of habits contracted elsewhere. they carry the manners of general society into the lesser assemblage.
in democratic countries it often happens that a great number of citizens are tending to the same point; but each one only moves thither, or at least flatters himself that he moves, of his own accord. accustomed to regulate his doings by personal impulse alone, he does not willingly submit to dictation from without. this taste and habit of independence accompany him into the councils of the nation. if he consents to connect himself with other men in the prosecution of the same purpose, at least he chooses to remain free to contribute to the common success after his own fashion. hence it is that in democratic countries parties are so impatient of control, and are never manageable except in moments of great public danger. even then, the authority of leaders, which under such circumstances may be able to make men act or speak, hardly ever reaches the extent of making them keep silence.
amongst aristocratic nations the members of political assemblies are at the same time members of the aristocracy. each of them enjoys high established rank in his own right, and the position which he occupies in the assembly is often less important in his eyes than that which he fills in the country. this consoles him for playing no part in the discussion of public affairs, and restrains him from too eagerly attempting to play an insignificant one.
in america, it generally happens that a representative only becomes somebody from his position in the assembly. he is therefore perpetually haunted by a craving to acquire importance there, and he feels a petulant desire to be constantly obtruding his opinions upon the house. his own vanity is not the only stimulant which urges him on in this course, but that of his constituents, and the continual necessity of propitiating them. amongst aristocratic nations a member of the legislature is rarely in strict dependence upon his constituents: he is frequently to them a sort of unavoidable representative; sometimes they are themselves strictly dependent upon him; and if at length they reject him, he may easily get elected elsewhere, or, retiring from public life, he may still enjoy the pleasures of splendid idleness. in a democratic country like the united states a representative has hardly ever a lasting hold on the minds of his constituents. however small an electoral body may be, the fluctuations of democracy are constantly changing its aspect; it must, therefore, be courted unceasingly. he is never sure of his supporters, and, if they forsake him, he is left without a resource; for his natural position is not sufficiently elevated for him to be easily known to those not close to him; and, with the complete state of independence prevailing among the people, he cannot hope that his friends or the government will send him down to be returned by an electoral body unacquainted with him. the seeds of his fortune are, therefore, sown in his own neighborhood; from that nook of earth he must start, to raise himself to the command of a people and to influence the destinies of the world. thus it is natural that in democratic countries the members of political assemblies think more of their constituents than of their party, whilst in aristocracies they think more of their party than of their constituents.
but what ought to be said to gratify constituents is not always what ought to be said in order to serve the party to which representatives profess to belong. the general interest of a party frequently demands that members belonging to it should not speak on great questions which they understand imperfectly; that they should speak but little on those minor questions which impede the great ones; lastly, and for the most part, that they should not speak at all. to keep silence is the most useful service that an indifferent spokesman can render to the commonwealth. constituents, however, do not think so. the population of a district sends a representative to take a part in the government of a country, because they entertain a very lofty notion of his merits. as men appear greater in proportion to the littleness of the objects by which they are surrounded, it may be assumed that the opinion entertained of the delegate will be so much the higher as talents are more rare among his constituents. it will therefore frequently happen that the less constituents have to expect from their representative, the more they will anticipate from him; and, however incompetent he may be, they will not fail to call upon him for signal exertions, corresponding to the rank they have conferred upon him.
independently of his position as a legislator of the state, electors also regard their representative as the natural patron of the constituency in the legislature; they almost consider him as the proxy of each of his supporters, and they flatter themselves that he will not be less zealous in defense of their private interests than of those of the country. thus electors are well assured beforehand that the representative of their choice will be an orator; that he will speak often if he can, and that in case he is forced to refrain, he will strive at any rate to compress into his less frequent orations an inquiry into all the great questions of state, combined with a statement of all the petty grievances they have themselves to complain to; so that, though he be not able to come forward frequently, he should on each occasion prove what he is capable of doing; and that, instead of perpetually lavishing his powers, he should occasionally condense them in a small compass, so as to furnish a sort of complete and brilliant epitome of his constituents and of himself. on these terms they will vote for him at the next election. these conditions drive worthy men of humble abilities to despair, who, knowing their own powers, would never voluntarily have come forward. but thus urged on, the representative begins to speak, to the great alarm of his friends; and rushing imprudently into the midst of the most celebrated orators, he perplexes the debate and wearies the house.
all laws which tend to make the representative more dependent on the elector, not only affect the conduct of the legislators, as i have remarked elsewhere, but also their language. they exercise a simultaneous influence on affairs themselves, and on the manner in which affairs are discussed.
there is hardly a member of congress who can make up his mind to go home without having despatched at least one speech to his constituents; nor who will endure any interruption until he has introduced into his harangue whatever useful suggestions may be made touching the four-and-twenty states of which the union is composed, and especially the district which he represents. he therefore presents to the mind of his auditors a succession of great general truths (which he himself only comprehends, and expresses, confusedly), and of petty minutia, which he is but too able to discover and to point out. the consequence is that the debates of that great assembly are frequently vague and perplexed, and that they seem rather to drag their slow length along than to advance towards a distinct object. some such state of things will, i believe, always arise in the public assemblies of democracies.
propitious circumstances and good laws might succeed in drawing to the legislature of a democratic people men very superior to those who are returned by the americans to congress; but nothing will ever prevent the men of slender abilities who sit there from obtruding themselves with complacency, and in all ways, upon the public. the evil does not appear to me to be susceptible of entire cure, because it not only originates in the tactics of that assembly, but in its constitution and in that of the country. the inhabitants of the united states seem themselves to consider the matter in this light; and they show their long experience of parliamentary life not by abstaining from making bad speeches, but by courageously submitting to hear them made. they are resigned to it, as to an evil which they know to be inevitable.
we have shown the petty side of political debates in democratic assemblies—let us now exhibit the more imposing one. the proceedings within the parliament of england for the last one hundred and fifty years have never occasioned any great sensation out of that country; the opinions and feelings expressed by the speakers have never awakened much sympathy, even amongst the nations placed nearest to the great arena of british liberty; whereas europe was excited by the very first debates which took place in the small colonial assemblies of america at the time of the revolution. this was attributable not only to particular and fortuitous circumstances, but to general and lasting causes. i can conceive nothing more admirable or more powerful than a great orator debating on great questions of state in a democratic assembly. as no particular class is ever represented there by men commissioned to defend its own interests, it is always to the whole nation, and in the name of the whole nation, that the orator speaks. this expands his thoughts, and heightens his power of language. as precedents have there but little weight-as there are no longer any privileges attached to certain property, nor any rights inherent in certain bodies or in certain individuals, the mind must have recourse to general truths derived from human nature to resolve the particular question under discussion. hence the political debates of a democratic people, however small it may be, have a degree of breadth which frequently renders them attractive to mankind. all men are interested by them, because they treat of man, who is everywhere the same. amongst the greatest aristocratic nations, on the contrary, the most general questions are almost always argued on some special grounds derived from the practice of a particular time, or the rights of a particular class; which interest that class alone, or at most the people amongst whom that class happens to exist. it is owing to this, as much as to the greatness of the french people, and the favorable disposition of the nations who listen to them, that the great effect which the french political debates sometimes produce in the world, must be attributed. the orators of france frequently speak to mankind, even when they are addressing their countrymen only.
