that the americans combat the effects of individualism by free institutions
despotism, which is of a very timorous nature, is never more secure of continuance than when it can keep men asunder; and all is influence is commonly exerted for that purpose. no vice of the human heart is so acceptable to it as egotism: a despot easily forgives his subjects for not loving him, provided they do not love each other. he does not ask them to assist him in governing the state; it is enough that they do not aspire to govern it themselves. he stigmatizes as turbulent and unruly spirits those who would combine their exertions to promote the prosperity of the community, and, perverting the natural meaning of words, he applauds as good citizens those who have no sympathy for any but themselves. thus the vices which despotism engenders are precisely those which equality fosters. these two things mutually and perniciously complete and assist each other. equality places men side by side, unconnected by any common tie; despotism raises barriers to keep them asunder; the former predisposes them not to consider their fellow-creatures, the latter makes general indifference a sort of public virtue.
despotism then, which is at all times dangerous, is more particularly to be feared in democratic ages. it is easy to see that in those same ages men stand most in need of freedom. when the members of a community are forced to attend to public affairs, they are necessarily drawn from the circle of their own interests, and snatched at times from self-observation. as soon as a man begins to treat of public affairs in public, he begins to perceive that he is not so independent of his fellow-men as he had at first imagined, and that, in order to obtain their support, he must often lend them his co-operation.
when the public is supreme, there is no man who does not feel the value of public goodwill, or who does not endeavor to court it by drawing to himself the esteem and affection of those amongst whom he is to live. many of the passions which congeal and keep asunder human hearts, are then obliged to retire and hide below the surface. pride must be dissembled; disdain dares not break out; egotism fears its own self. under a free government, as most public offices are elective, the men whose elevated minds or aspiring hopes are too closely circumscribed in private life, constantly feel that they cannot do without the population which surrounds them. men learn at such times to think of their fellow-men from ambitious motives; and they frequently find it, in a manner, their interest to forget themselves.
i may here be met by an objection derived from electioneering intrigues, the meannesses of candidates, and the calumnies of their opponents. these are opportunities for animosity which occur the oftener the more frequent elections become. such evils are doubtless great, but they are transient; whereas the benefits which attend them remain. the desire of being elected may lead some men for a time to violent hostility; but this same desire leads all men in the long run mutually to support each other; and if it happens that an election accidentally severs two friends, the electoral system brings a multitude of citizens permanently together, who would always have remained unknown to each other. freedom engenders private animosities, but despotism gives birth to general indifference.
the americans have combated by free institutions the tendency of equality to keep men asunder, and they have subdued it. the legislators of america did not suppose that a general representation of the whole nation would suffice to ward off a disorder at once so natural to the frame of democratic society, and so fatal: they also thought that it would be well to infuse political life into each portion of the territory, in order to multiply to an infinite extent opportunities of acting in concert for all the members of the community, and to make them constantly feel their mutual dependence on each other. the plan was a wise one. the general affairs of a country only engage the attention of leading politicians, who assemble from time to time in the same places; and as they often lose sight of each other afterwards, no lasting ties are established between them. but if the object be to have the local affairs of a district conducted by the men who reside there, the same persons are always in contact, and they are, in a manner, forced to be acquainted, and to adapt themselves to one another.
it is difficult to draw a man out of his own circle to interest him in the destiny of the state, because he does not clearly understand what influence the destiny of the state can have upon his own lot. but if it be proposed to make a road cross the end of his estate, he will see at a glance that there is a connection between this small public affair and his greatest private affairs; and he will discover, without its being shown to him, the close tie which unites private to general interest. thus, far more may be done by intrusting to the citizens the administration of minor affairs than by surrendering to them the control of important ones, towards interesting them in the public welfare, and convincing them that they constantly stand in need one of the other in order to provide for it. a brilliant achievement may win for you the favor of a people at one stroke; but to earn the love and respect of the population which surrounds you, a long succession of little services rendered and of obscure good deeds—a constant habit of kindness, and an established reputation for disinterestedness—will be required. local freedom, then, which leads a great number of citizens to value the affection of their neighbors and of their kindred, perpetually brings men together, and forces them to help one another, in spite of the propensities which sever them.
in the united states the more opulent citizens take great care not to stand aloof from the people; on the contrary, they constantly keep on easy terms with the lower classes: they listen to them, they speak to them every day. they know that the rich in democracies always stand in need of the poor; and that in democratic ages you attach a poor man to you more by your manner than by benefits conferred. the magnitude of such benefits, which sets off the difference of conditions, causes a secret irritation to those who reap advantage from them; but the charm of simplicity of manners is almost irresistible: their affability carries men away, and even their want of polish is not always displeasing. this truth does not take root at once in the minds of the rich. they generally resist it as long as the democratic revolution lasts, and they do not acknowledge it immediately after that revolution is accomplished. they are very ready to do good to the people, but they still choose to keep them at arm's length; they think that is sufficient, but they are mistaken. they might spend fortunes thus without warming the hearts of the population around them;—that population does not ask them for the sacrifice of their money, but of their pride.
it would seem as if every imagination in the united states were upon the stretch to invent means of increasing the wealth and satisfying the wants of the public. the best-informed inhabitants of each district constantly use their information to discover new truths which may augment the general prosperity; and if they have made any such discoveries, they eagerly surrender them to the mass of the people.
when the vices and weaknesses, frequently exhibited by those who govern in america, are closely examined, the prosperity of the people occasions—but improperly occasions—surprise. elected magistrates do not make the american democracy flourish; it flourishes because the magistrates are elective.
it would be unjust to suppose that the patriotism and the zeal which every american displays for the welfare of his fellow-citizens are wholly insincere. although private interest directs the greater part of human actions in the united states as well as elsewhere, it does not regulate them all. i must say that i have often seen americans make great and real sacrifices to the public welfare; and i have remarked a hundred instances in which they hardly ever failed to lend faithful support to each other. the free institutions which the inhabitants of the united states possess, and the political rights of which they make so much use, remind every citizen, and in a thousand ways, that he lives in society. they every instant impress upon his mind the notion that it is the duty, as well as the interest of men, to make themselves useful to their fellow-creatures; and as he sees no particular ground of animosity to them, since he is never either their master or their slave, his heart readily leans to the side of kindness. men attend to the interests of the public, first by necessity, afterwards by choice: what was intentional becomes an instinct; and by dint of working for the good of one's fellow citizens, the habit and the taste for serving them is at length acquired.
many people in france consider equality of conditions as one evil, and political freedom as a second. when they are obliged to yield to the former, they strive at least to escape from the latter. but i contend that in order to combat the evils which equality may produce, there is only one effectual remedy—namely, political freedom.
