there is only one country on the face of the earth where the citizens enjoy unlimited freedom of association for political purposes. this same country is the only one in the world where the continual exercise of the right of association has been introduced into civil life, and where all the advantages which civilization can confer are procured by means of it. in all the countries where political associations are prohibited, civil associations are rare. it is hardly probable that this is the result of accident; but the inference should rather be, that there is a natural, and perhaps a necessary, connection between these two kinds of associations. certain men happen to have a common interest in some concern—either a commercial undertaking is to be managed, or some speculation in manufactures to be tried; they meet, they combine, and thus by degrees they become familiar with the principle of association. the greater is the multiplicity of small affairs, the more do men, even without knowing it, acquire facility in prosecuting great undertakings in common. civil associations, therefore, facilitate political association: but, on the other hand, political association singularly strengthens and improves associations for civil purposes. in civil life every man may, strictly speaking, fancy that he can provide for his own wants; in politics, he can fancy no such thing. when a people, then, have any knowledge of public life, the notion of association, and the wish to coalesce, present themselves every day to the minds of the whole community: whatever natural repugnance may restrain men from acting in concert, they will always be ready to combine for the sake of a party. thus political life makes the love and practice of association more general; it imparts a desire of union, and teaches the means of combination to numbers of men who would have always lived apart.
politics not only give birth to numerous associations, but to associations of great extent. in civil life it seldom happens that any one interest draws a very large number of men to act in concert; much skill is required to bring such an interest into existence: but in politics opportunities present themselves every day. now it is solely in great associations that the general value of the principle of association is displayed. citizens who are individually powerless, do not very clearly anticipate the strength which they may acquire by uniting together; it must be shown to them in order to be understood. hence it is often easier to collect a multitude for a public purpose than a few persons; a thousand citizens do not see what interest they have in combining together—ten thousand will be perfectly aware of it. in politics men combine for great undertakings; and the use they make of the principle of association in important affairs practically teaches them that it is their interest to help each other in those of less moment. a political association draws a number of individuals at the same time out of their own circle: however they may be naturally kept asunder by age, mind, and fortune, it places them nearer together and brings them into contact. once met, they can always meet again.
men can embark in few civil partnerships without risking a portion of their possessions; this is the case with all manufacturing and trading companies. when men are as yet but little versed in the art of association, and are unacquainted with its principal rules, they are afraid, when first they combine in this manner, of buying their experience dear. they therefore prefer depriving themselves of a powerful instrument of success to running the risks which attend the use of it. they are, however, less reluctant to join political associations, which appear to them to be without danger, because they adventure no money in them. but they cannot belong to these associations for any length of time without finding out how order is maintained amongst a large number of men, and by what contrivance they are made to advance, harmoniously and methodically, to the same object. thus they learn to surrender their own will to that of all the rest, and to make their own exertions subordinate to the common impulse—things which it is not less necessary to know in civil than in political associations. political associations may therefore be considered as large free schools, where all the members of the community go to learn the general theory of association.
but even if political association did not directly contribute to the progress of civil association, to destroy the former would be to impair the latter. when citizens can only meet in public for certain purposes, they regard such meetings as a strange proceeding of rare occurrence, and they rarely think at all about it. when they are allowed to meet freely for all purposes, they ultimately look upon public association as the universal, or in a manner the sole means, which men can employ to accomplish the different purposes they may have in view. every new want instantly revives the notion. the art of association then becomes, as i have said before, the mother of action, studied and applied by all.
when some kinds of associations are prohibited and others allowed, it is difficult to distinguish the former from the latter, beforehand. in this state of doubt men abstain from them altogether, and a sort of public opinion passes current which tends to cause any association whatsoever to be regarded as a bold and almost an illicit enterprise. *a
a
[ this is more especially true when the executive government has a discretionary power of allowing or prohibiting associations. when certain associations are simply prohibited by law, and the courts of justice have to punish infringements of that law, the evil is far less considerable. then every citizen knows beforehand pretty nearly what he has to expect. he judges himself before he is judged by the law, and, abstaining from prohibited associations, he embarks in those which are legally sanctioned. it is by these restrictions that all free nations have always admitted that the right of association might be limited. but if the legislature should invest a man with a power of ascertaining beforehand which associations are dangerous and which are useful, and should authorize him to destroy all associations in the bud or allow them to be formed, as nobody would be able to foresee in what cases associations might be established and in what cases they would be put down, the spirit of association would be entirely paralyzed. the former of these laws would only assail certain associations; the latter would apply to society itself, and inflict an injury upon it. i can conceive that a regular government may have recourse to the former, but i do not concede that any government has the right of enacting the latter.]
it is therefore chimerical to suppose that the spirit of association, when it is repressed on some one point, will nevertheless display the same vigor on all others; and that if men be allowed to prosecute certain undertakings in common, that is quite enough for them eagerly to set about them. when the members of a community are allowed and accustomed to combine for all purposes, they will combine as readily for the lesser as for the more important ones; but if they are only allowed to combine for small affairs, they will be neither inclined nor able to effect it. it is in vain that you will leave them entirely free to prosecute their business on joint-stock account: they will hardly care to avail themselves of the rights you have granted to them; and, after having exhausted your strength in vain efforts to put down prohibited associations, you will be surprised that you cannot persuade men to form the associations you encourage.
i do not say that there can be no civil associations in a country where political association is prohibited; for men can never live in society without embarking in some common undertakings: but i maintain that in such a country civil associations will always be few in number, feebly planned, unskillfully managed, that they will never form any vast designs, or that they will fail in the execution of them.
this naturally leads me to think that freedom of association in political matters is not so dangerous to public tranquillity as is supposed; and that possibly, after having agitated society for some time, it may strengthen the state in the end. in democratic countries political associations are, so to speak, the only powerful persons who aspire to rule the state. accordingly, the governments of our time look upon associations of this kind just as sovereigns in the middle ages regarded the great vassals of the crown: they entertain a sort of instinctive abhorrence of them, and they combat them on all occasions. they bear, on the contrary, a natural goodwill to civil associations, because they readily discover that, instead of directing the minds of the community to public affairs, these institutions serve to divert them from such reflections; and that, by engaging them more and more in the pursuit of objects which cannot be attained without public tranquillity, they deter them from revolutions. but these governments do not attend to the fact that political associations tend amazingly to multiply and facilitate those of a civil character, and that in avoiding a dangerous evil they deprive themselves of an efficacious remedy.
when you see the americans freely and constantly forming associations for the purpose of promoting some political principle, of raising one man to the head of affairs, or of wresting power from another, you have some difficulty in understanding that men so independent do not constantly fall into the abuse of freedom. if, on the other hand, you survey the infinite number of trading companies which are in operation in the united states, and perceive that the americans are on every side unceasingly engaged in the execution of important and difficult plans, which the slightest revolution would throw into confusion, you will readily comprehend why people so well employed are by no means tempted to perturb the state, nor to destroy that public tranquillity by which they all profit.
is it enough to observe these things separately, or should we not discover the hidden tie which connects them? in their political associations, the americans of all conditions, minds, and ages, daily acquire a general taste for association, and grow accustomed to the use of it. there they meet together in large numbers, they converse, they listen to each other, and they are mutually stimulated to all sorts of undertakings. they afterwards transfer to civil life the notions they have thus acquired, and make them subservient to a thousand purposes. thus it is by the enjoyment of a dangerous freedom that the americans learn the art of rendering the dangers of freedom less formidable.
if a certain moment in the existence of a nation be selected, it is easy to prove that political associations perturb the state, and paralyze productive industry; but take the whole life of a people, and it may perhaps be easy to demonstrate that freedom of association in political matters is favorable to the prosperity and even to the tranquillity of the community.
i said in the former part of this work, "the unrestrained liberty of political association cannot be entirely assimilated to the liberty of the press. the one is at the same time less necessary and more dangerous than the other. a nation may confine it within certain limits without ceasing to be mistress of itself; and it may sometimes be obliged to do so in order to maintain its own authority." and further on i added: "it cannot be denied that the unrestrained liberty of association for political purposes is the last degree of liberty which a people is fit for. if it does not throw them into anarchy, it perpetually brings them, as it were, to the verge of it." thus i do not think that a nation is always at liberty to invest its citizens with an absolute right of association for political purposes; and i doubt whether, in any country or in any age, it be wise to set no limits to freedom of association. a certain nation, it is said, could not maintain tranquillity in the community, cause the laws to be respected, or establish a lasting government, if the right of association were not confined within narrow limits. these blessings are doubtless invaluable, and i can imagine that, to acquire or to preserve them, a nation may impose upon itself severe temporary restrictions: but still it is well that the nation should know at what price these blessings are purchased. i can understand that it may be advisable to cut off a man's arm in order to save his life; but it would be ridiculous to assert that he will be as dexterous as he was before he lost it.
