campaign of 1805—campaign of 1806–1807—peace of tilsit
austria looked with jealousy on this increase of power, and particularly on the change in the institutions of her neighbors. in assuming control of the italian and germanic states, napoleon gave the people his code and his methods; personal liberty, equality before the law, religious toleration, took the place of the unjust and narrow feudal institutions. these new ideas were quite as hateful to austria as the disturbance in the balance of power, and more dangerous to her system. russia and prussia felt the same suspicion of napoleon as austria did. all three powers were constantly incited to action against france by england, who offered unlimited gold if they would but combine with her. in the summer of 1805 austria joined england and russia in a coalition against france. prussia was not yet willing to commit herself.
the great army which for so many months had been gathering around boulogne, preparing for the descent on england, waited anxiously for the arrival of the french fleet to cover its passage. but the fleet did not come; and, though hoping until the last that his plan would still be carried out, napoleon quietly and swiftly made ready to transfer the army of england into the grand army, and to turn its march against his continental enemies.
never was his great war rule, “time is everything,” more thoroughly carried out. “austria will employ fine phrases 164in order to gain time,” he wrote talleyrand, “and to prevent me accomplishing anything this year; ... and in april i shall find one hundred thousand russians in poland, fed by england, twenty thousand english at malta, and fifteen thousand russians at corfu. i should then be in a critical position. my mind is made up.” his orders flew from boulogne to paris, to the german states, to italy, to his generals, to his naval commanders. by the 28th of august the whole army had moved. a month later it had crossed the rhine, and napoleon was at its head.
the force which he commanded was in every way an extraordinary one. marmont’s enthusiastic description was in no way an exaggeration:
“this army, the most beautiful that was ever seen, was less redoubtable from the number of its soldiers than from their nature. almost all of them had carried on war and had won victories. there still existed among them something of the enthusiasm and exaltation of the revolutionary campaigns; but this enthusiasm was systematized. from the supreme chief down—the chiefs of the army corps, the division commanders, the common officers and soldiers—everybody was hardened to war. the eighteen months in splendid camps had produced a training, an ensemble, which has never existed since to the same degree, and a boundless confidence. this army was probably the best and the most redoubtable that modern times have seen.”
the force responded to the imperious genius of its commander with a beautiful precision which amazes and dazzles one who follows its march. so perfectly had all been arranged, so exactly did every corps and officer respond, that nine days after the passage of the rhine, the army was in bavaria, several marches in the rear of the enemy. the weather was terrible, but nothing checked them. the emperor himself set the example. day and night he was on horseback in the midst of his troops; once for a week he did not take off his boots. when they lagged, or the enemy harassed them, he would gather each regiment into a circle, explain to it the position of the enemy, the imminence of a 165great battle, and his confidence in his troops. these harangues sometimes took place in driving snowstorms, the soldiers standing up to their knees in icy slush. by october 13th, such was the extraordinary march they had made, the emperor was able to issue this address to the army:
“soldiers, a month ago we were encamped on the shores of the ocean, opposite england, when an impious league forced us to fly to the rhine. not a fortnight ago that river was passed; and the alps, the neckar, the danube, and the lech, the celebrated barriers of germany, have not for a minute delayed our march.... the enemy, deceived by our man?uvres and the rapidity of our movements, is entirely turned.... but for the army before you, we should be in london to-day, have avenged six centuries of insult, and have liberated the sea.
“remember to-morrow that you are fighting against the allies of england.
“napoleon.”
four days after this address came the capitulation of ulm—a “new caudine forks,” as marmont called it. it was, as napoleon said, a victory won by legs, instead of by arms. the great fatigue and the forced marches which the army had undergone had gained them sixty thousand prisoners, one hundred and twenty guns, ninety colors, more than thirty generals, at a cost of but fifteen hundred men, two-thirds of them but slightly wounded.
but there was no rest for the army. before the middle of november it had so surrounded vienna that the emperor and his court had fled to brünn, seventy or eighty miles north of vienna, to meet the russians, who, under alexander i., were coming from berlin. thither napoleon followed them, but the austrians retreated eastward, joining the russians at olmütz. the combined force of the allies was now some ninety thousand men. they had a strong reserve, and it looked as if the prussian army was about to join them. napoleon at brünn had only some seventy or eighty thousand men, and was in the heart of the enemy’s country. alexander, flattered by his aides, and confident that he was able to defeat the french, resolved to leave his strong position at olmütz and seek battle with napoleon.
166
napoleon, 1805.
engraved in 1812 by massard, after bouillon.
167the position the french occupied can be understood if one draws a rough diagram of a right-angled triangle, brünn being at the right angle formed by two roads, one running south to vienna, by which napoleon had come, and the other running eastward to olmütz. the hypotenuse of this angle, running from northeast to southwest, is formed by napoleon’s army.
when the allies decided to leave olmütz their plan was to march southwestward, in face of napoleon’s line, get between him and vienna, and thus cut off what they supposed was his base of supplies (in this they were mistaken, for napoleon had, unknown to them, changed his base from vienna to bohemia), separate him from his italian army, and drive him, routed, into bohemia.
on the 27th of november the allies advanced, and their first encounter with a small french vanguard was successful. it gave them confidence, and they continued their march on the 28th, 29th, and 30th, gradually extending a long line facing westward and parallel with napoleon’s line. the french emperor, while this movement was going on, was rapidly calling up his reserves and strengthening his position. by the first day of december napoleon saw clearly what the allies intended to do, and had formed his plan. the events of that day confirmed his ideas. by nine o’clock in the evening he was so certain of the plan of the coming battle that he rode the length of his line, explaining to his troops the tactics of the allies, and what he himself proposed to do.
napoleon’s appearance before the troops, his confident assurance of victory, called out a brilliant demonstration from the army. the divisions of infantry raised bundles of 168blazing straw on the ends of long poles, giving him an illumination as imposing as it was novel. it was a happy thought, for the day was the anniversary of his coronation.
the emperor remained in bivouac all night. at four o’clock of the morning of the 2d of december he was in the saddle. when the gray fog lifted he saw the enemy’s divisions arranged exactly as he had divined. three corps faced his right—the southwest part of the hypotenuse. these corps had left a splendid position facing his centre, the heights of pratzen.
this advance of the enemy had left their centre weak and unprotected, and had separated the body of the army from its right, facing napoleon’s left. the enemy was in exactly the position napoleon wished for the attack he had planned.
it was eight o’clock in the morning when the emperor galloped up his line, proclaiming to the army that the enemy had exposed himself, and crying out: “close the campaign with a clap of thunder.” the generals rode to their positions, and at once the battle opened. soult, who commanded the french centre, attacked the allies’ centre so unexpectedly that it was driven into retreat. the emperor alexander and his headquarters were in this part of the army, and though the young czar did his best to rouse his forces, it was a hopeless task. the russian centre was defeated and the wings divided. at the same time the allies’ left, where the bulk of their army was massed in a marshy country of which they knew little, was engaged and held in check by davoust, and their right was overcome by lannes, murat, and bernadotte. as soon as the centre and right of the allies had been driven into retreat, napoleon concentrated his forces on their left, the strongest part of his enemy. in a very short time the allies were driven back into the canals and lakes of the country, and many men and nearly all 169the artillery lost. before night the routed enemy had fallen back to austerlitz.
of all napoleon’s battles, austerlitz was the one of which he was the proudest. it was here that he showed best the “divine side of war.”
the familiar note in which napoleon announced to his brother joseph the result of the battle, is a curious contrast to the oratorical bulletins which for some days flowed to paris. his letter is dated austerlitz, december 3, 1805:
“after man?uvring for a few days i fought a decisive battle yesterday. i defeated the combined armies commanded by the emperors of russia and germany. their force consisted of eighty thousand russians and thirty thousand austrians. i have made forty thousand prisoners, taken forty flags, one hundred guns, and all the standards of the russian imperial guard.... although i have bivouacked in the open air for a week, my health is good. this evening i am in bed in the beautiful castle of monsieur de kaunitz, and have changed my shirt for the first time in eight days.”
the battle of austerlitz obliged austria to make peace (the treaty was signed at presburg on december 26, 1805), compelled russia to retire disabled from the field, transformed the haughty prussian ultimatim which had just been presented into humble submission, and changed the rejoicings of england over the magnificent naval victory of trafalgar (october 21st) into despair. it even killed pitt. napoleon it enabled to make enormous strides in establishing a kingdom of the west. naples was given to joseph, the bavarian republic was made a kingdom for louis, and the states between the lahn, the rhine, and the upper danube were formed into a league, called the confederation of the rhine, and napoleon was made protector.
170
1806. battle of jena.
after the picture by meissonier in the collection of monsieur edmond simon.
171at the beginning of 1806 napoleon was again in paris. he had been absent but three months. eight months of this year were spent in fruitless negotiations with england and in an irritating correspondence with prussia. the latter country had many grievances against napoleon, the sum of them all being that “french politics had been the scourge of humanity for the last fifteen years,” and that an “insatiable ambition was still the ruling passion of france.” by the end of september war was declared, and napoleon, whose preparations had been conducted secretly, it being given out that he was going to compiègne to hunt, suddenly joined his army.
the first week of october the grand army advanced from southern germany towards the valley of the saale. this movement brought them on the flanks of the prussians, who were scattered along the upper saale. the unexpected appearance of the french army, which was larger and much better organized than the prussians, caused the latter to retreat towards the elbe. the retreating army was in two divisions; the first crossing the saale to jena, the second falling back towards the unstrut. as soon as napoleon understood these movements he despatched part of his force under davoust and bernadotte to cut off the retreat of the second prussian division, while he himself hurried on to jena to force battle on the first. the prussians were encamped at the foot of a height known as the landgrafenberg. to command this height was to command the prussian forces. by a series of determined and repeated efforts napoleon reached the position desired, and by the morning of the 14th of october had his foes in his power. advancing from the landgrafenberg in three divisions, he turned the prussian flanks at the same moment that he attacked their centre. the prussians never fought better, perhaps, than at jena. the movements of their cavalry awakened even napoleon’s admiration, but they were surrounded and outnumbered, and the army was speedily broken into pieces and driven into a retreat.
while napoleon was fighting at jena, to the right at 172auerstadt, davoust was engaging brunswick and his seventy thousand men with a force of twenty-seven thousand. in spite of the great difference in numbers the prussians were unable to make any impression on the french; and brunswick falling, they began to retreat towards jena, expecting to join the other division of the army, of whose route they were ignorant. the result was frightful. the two flying armies suddenly encountered each other, and, pursued by the french on either side, were driven in confusion towards the elbe.
on october 25th the french were at berlin. their entry was one of the great spectacles of the campaign. one particularly interesting incident was the visit paid to napoleon by the protestant and calvinist french clergy. there were at that time twelve thousand french refugees in berlin, victims of the revocation of the edict of nantes. they were received with kindness by napoleon, who told them they had good right to protection, and that their privileges and worship should be respected.
jena brought napoleon something like one hundred and sixty million francs in money, an enormous number of prisoners, guns, and standards, the glory of the entry of berlin, and a great number of interesting articles for the napoleon museum of paris, among them the column from the field of rosbach, the sword, the ribbon of the black eagle, and the general’s sash of frederick the great, and the flags carried by his guards during the seven years’ war. but it did not secure him peace. the king of prussia threw himself into the arms of russia, and napoleon advanced boldly into poland to meet his enemy.
the poles welcomed the french with joy. they hoped to find in napoleon the liberator of their country, and they poured forth money and soldiers to re?nforce him. “our entry into varsovia,” wrote napoleon, “was a triumph, 173and the sentiments that the poles of all classes show since our arrival cannot be expressed. love of country and the national sentiment are not only entirely conserved in the heart of the people, but it has been intensified by misfortune. their first passion, their first desire, is again to become a nation. the rich come from their chateaux, praying for the re?stablishment of the nation, and offering their children, their fortunes, and their influence.” everything was done during the months the french remained in poland, to flatter and aid the army.
the campaign against the russians was carried on in old prussia, to the southeast of the gulf of dantzic. its first great engagement was the battle of eylau on february 8, 1807. this was the closest drawn battle napoleon had ever fought. his loss was enormous, and he was saved only by a hair’s-breadth from giving the enemy the field of battle. after eylau the main army went into winter quarters to repair its losses, while marshal lefebvre besieged dantzic, a siege which military critics declare to be, after sebastopol, the most celebrated of modern times. dantzic capitulated in may. on june 14th the battle of friedland was fought. this battle on the anniversary of marengo, was won largely by napoleon’s taking advantage of a blunder of his opponent. the french and the russian armies were on the opposite banks of the alle. benningsen, the russian commander, was marching towards k?nigsberg by the eastern bank. napoleon was pursuing by the western bank. the french forces, however, were scattered; and benningsen, thinking that he could engage and easily rout a portion of the army by crossing the river at friedland, suddenly led his army across to the western bank. napoleon utilized this unwise movement with splendid skill. calling up his re-enforcements he attacked the enemy solidly. as soon as the russian centre was broken, defeat was inevitable, for the retreating army was driven into the river, and thousands lost. many were pursued through the streets of friedland by the french, and slaughtered there. the battle was hardly over when napoleon wrote to josephine:
174
meeting of frederick william iii., king of prussia, napoleon, and alexander i., emperor of russia, at tilsit. the figure on the left is frederick william; that on the right is alexander.
engraved by gügel, after a drawing by wolff. the meeting occurred june 26, 1807, in the pavilion which had been erected for that purpose on the river nieman.
175“friedland, 15th june, 1807.
“my dear: i write you only a few words, for i am very tired. i have been bivouacking for several days. my children have worthily celebrated the anniversary of marengo. the battle of friedland will be just as celebrated and as glorious for my people. the whole russian army routed, eighty guns captured, thirty thousand men taken prisoners or killed, with twenty-five generals; the russian guard annihilated; it is the worthy sister of marengo, austerlitz, and jena. the bulletin will tell you the rest. my loss is not large. i successfully out-man?uvred the enemy.
“napoleon.”
friedland ended the war. directly after the battle napoleon went to tilsit, which for the time was made neutral ground, and here he met the emperor of russia and the king of prussia, and the map of europe was made over.
the relations between the royal parties seem to have been for the most part amiable. napoleon became very fond of alexander i. at tilsit. “were he a woman i think i should make love to him,” he wrote josephine once. alexander, young and enthusiastic, had a deep admiration for napoleon’s genius, and the two became good comrades. the king of prussia, overcome by his losses, was a sorrowful figure in their company. it was their habit at tilsit to go out every day on horseback, but the king was awkward, always crowding against napoleon, beside whom he rode, and making his two companions wait for him to climb from the saddle when he returned. their dinners together were dull, and the emperors, very much in the style of two careless, fun-loving youths, bored by a solemn elderly relative, were accustomed after dinner to make excuses to go home early but later to meet at the apartments of one or the other, and to talk together until after midnight.
176
napoleon receiving queen louise of prussia, july 6, 1807.
by gosse. versailles gallery.
177just before the negotiation were completed, queen louise arrived, and tried to use her influence with napoleon to obtain at least magdeburg. napoleon accused the queen to las cases of trying to win him at first by a scene of high tragedy. but when they came to meet at dinner, her policy was quite another. “the queen of prussia dined with me to-day,” wrote napoleon to the empress on july 7th. “i had to defend myself against being obliged to make some further concessions to her husband; ...” and the next day, “the queen of prussia is really charming; she is full of coquetterie towards me. but do not be jealous; i am an oilcloth, off which all that runs. it would cost me too dear to play the galant.”
the intercessions of the queen really hurried on the treaty. when she learned that it had been signed, and her wishes not granted, she was indignant, wept bitterly, and refused to go to the second dinner to which napoleon had invited her. alexander was obliged to go himself to decide her. after the dinner, when she withdrew, napoleon accompanied her. on the staircase she stopped.
“can it be,” she said, “that after i have had the happiness of seeing so near me the man of the age and of history, i am not to have the liberty and satisfaction of assuring him that he has attached me for life?...”
“madame, i am to be pitied,” said the emperor gravely. “it is my evil star.”
by the treaty of tilsit the map of the continent was transformed. prussia lost half her territory. dantzic was made a free town. magdeburg went to france. hesse-cassel and the prussian possessions west of the elbe went to form the kingdom of westphalia. the king of saxony received the grand duchy of warsaw. finland and the danubian principalities were to go to alexander in exchange for certain ionian islands and the gulf of cattaro in dalmatia.
178of far more importance than this change of boundaries was the private understanding which the emperors came to at tilsit. they agreed that the ottoman empire was to remain as it was unless they saw fit to change its boundaries. russia might occupy the principalities as far as the danube. peace was to be made, if possible, with england, and the two powers were to work together to bring it about. if they failed, russia was to force sweden to close her ports to great britain, and napoleon was to do the same in denmark, portugal, and the states of the pope. nothing was to be done about poland by napoleon.
according to popular belief, the secret treaty of tilsit included plans much more startling: the two emperors pledged themselves to drive the bourbons from spain and the braganzas from portugal, and to replace them by bonapartes; give russia turkey in europe and as much of asia as she wanted; end the temporal power of the pope; place france in egypt; shut the english from the mediterranean; and to undertake several other equally ambitious enterprises.
