among those who call themselves socialists, two kinds of persons may be distinguished. there are, in the first place, those whose plans for a new order of society, in which private property and individual competition are to be superseded and other motives to action substituted, are on the scale of a village community or township, and would be applied to an entire country by the multiplication of such self-acting units; of this character are the systems of owen, of fourier, and the more thoughtful and philosophic socialists generally. the other class, who are more a product of the continent than of great britain and may be called the revolutionary socialists, propose to themselves a much bolder stroke. their scheme is the management of the whole productive resources of the country by one central authority, the general government. and with this view some of them avow as their purpose that the working classes, or somebody in their behalf, should take possession [93]of all the property of the country, and administer it for the general benefit.

whatever be the difficulties of the first of these two forms of socialism, the second must evidently involve the same difficulties and many more. the former, too, has the great advantage that it can be brought into operation progressively, and can prove its capabilities by trial. it can be tried first on a select population and extended to others as their education and cultivation permit. it need not, and in the natural order of things would not, become an engine of subversion until it had shown itself capable of being also a means of reconstruction. it is not so with the other: the aim of that is to substitute the new rule for the old at a single stroke, and to exchange the amount of good realised under the present system, and its large possibilities of improvement, for a plunge without any preparation into the most extreme form of the problem of carrying on the whole round of the operations of social life without the motive power which has always hitherto worked the social machinery. it [94]must be acknowledged that those who would play this game on the strength of their own private opinion, unconfirmed as yet by any experimental verification—who would forcibly deprive all who have now a comfortable physical existence of their only present means of preserving it, and would brave the frightful bloodshed and misery that would ensue if the attempt was resisted—must have a serene confidence in their own wisdom on the one hand and a recklessness of other people's sufferings on the other, which robespierre and st. just, hitherto the typical instances of those united attributes, scarcely came up to. nevertheless this scheme has great elements of popularity which the more cautious and reasonable form of socialism has not; because what it professes to do it promises to do quickly, and holds out hope to the enthusiastic of seeing the whole of their aspirations realised in their own time and at a blow.

the peculiarities, however, of the revolutionary form of socialism will be most conveniently [95]examined after the considerations common to both the forms have been duly weighed.

the produce of the world could not attain anything approaching to its present amount, nor support anything approaching to the present number of its inhabitants, except upon two conditions: abundant and costly machinery, buildings, and other instruments of production; and the power of undertaking long operations and waiting a considerable time for their fruits. in other words, there must be a large accumulation of capital, both fixed in the implements and buildings, and circulating, that is employed in maintaining the laborers and their families during the time which elapses before the productive operations are completed and the products come in. this necessity depends on physical laws, and is inherent in the condition of human life; but these requisites of production, the capital, fixed and circulating, of the country (to which has to be added the land, and all that is contained in it), may either be the collective property of those who use it, or may belong to [96]individuals; and the question is, which of these arrangements is most conducive to human happiness. what is characteristic of socialism is the joint ownership by all the members of the community of the instruments and means of production; which carries with it the consequence that the division of the produce among the body of owners must be a public act, performed according to rules laid down by the community. socialism by no means excludes private ownership of articles of consumption; the exclusive right of each to his or her share of the produce when received, either to enjoy, to give, or to exchange it. the land, for example, might be wholly the property of the community for agricultural and other productive purposes, and might be cultivated on their joint account, and yet the dwelling assigned to each individual or family as part of their remuneration might be as exclusively theirs, while they continued to fulfil their share of the common labors, as any one's house now is; and not the dwelling only, but any ornamental ground which the circumstances of the [97]association allowed to be attached to the house for purposes of enjoyment. the distinctive feature of socialism is not that all things are in common, but that production is only carried on upon the common account, and that the instruments of production are held as common property. the practicability then of socialism, on the scale of mr. owen's or m. fourier's villages, admits of no dispute. the attempt to manage the whole production of a nation by one central organization is a totally different matter; but a mixed agricultural and manufacturing association of from two thousand to four thousand inhabitants under any tolerable circumstances of soil and climate would be easier to manage than many a joint stock company. the question to be considered is, whether this joint management is likely to be as efficient and successful as the managements of private industry by private capital. and this question has to be considered in a double aspect; the efficiency of the directing mind, or minds, and that of the simple workpeople. and in order to state this question in its simplest form, we will [98]suppose the form of socialism to be simple communism, i.e. equal division of the produce among all the sharers, or, according to m. louis blanc's still higher standard of justice, apportionment of it according to difference of need, but without making any difference of reward according to the nature of the duty nor according to the supposed merits or services of the individual. there are other forms of socialism, particularly fourierism, which do, on considerations of justice or expediency, allow differences of remuneration for different kinds or degrees of service to the community; but the consideration of these may be for the present postponed.

the difference between the motive powers in the economy of society under private property and under communism would be greatest in the case of the directing minds. under the present system, the direction being entirely in the hands of the person or persons who own (or are personally responsible for) the capital, the whole benefit of the difference between the best administration and the worst under which the business can [99]continue to be carried on accrues to the person or persons who control the administration: they reap the whole profit of good management except so far as their self-interest or liberality induce them to share it with their subordinates; and they suffer the whole detriment of mismanagement except so far as this may cripple their subsequent power of employing labor. this strong personal motive to do their very best and utmost for the efficiency and economy of the operations, would not exist under communism; as the managers would only receive out of the produce the same equal dividend as the other members of the association. what would remain would be the interest common to all in so managing affairs as to make the dividend as large as possible; the incentives of public spirit, of conscience, and of the honor and credit of the managers. the force of these motives, especially when combined, is great. but it varies greatly in different persons, and is much greater for some purposes than for others. the verdict of experience, in the imperfect degree of moral cultivation which mankind [100]have yet reached, is that the motive of conscience and that of credit and reputation, even when they are of some strength, are, in the majority of cases, much stronger as restraining than as impelling forces—are more to be depended on for preventing wrong, than for calling forth the fullest energies in the pursuit of ordinary occupations. in the case of most men the only inducement which has been found sufficiently constant and unflagging to overcome the ever-present influence of indolence and love of ease, and induce men to apply themselves unrelaxingly to work for the most part in itself dull and unexciting, is the prospect of bettering their own economic condition and that of their family; and the closer the connection of every increase of exertion with a corresponding increase of its fruits, the more powerful is this motive. to suppose the contrary would be to imply that with men as they now are, duty and honor are more powerful principles of action than personal interest, not solely as to special acts and forbearances respecting which those sentiments have been [101]exceptionally cultivated, but in the regulation of their whole lives; which no one, i suppose, will affirm. it may be said that this inferior efficacy of public and social feelings is not inevitable—is the result of imperfect education. this i am quite ready to admit, and also that there are even now many individual exceptions to the general infirmity. but before these exceptions can grow into a majority, or even into a very large minority, much time will be required. the education of human beings is one of the most difficult of all arts, and this is one of the points in which it has hitherto been least successful; moreover improvements in general education are necessarily very gradual because the future generation is educated by the present, and the imperfections of the teachers set an invincible limit to the degree in which they can train their pupils to be better than themselves. we must therefore expect, unless we are operating upon a select portion of the population, that personal interest will for a long time be a more effective stimulus to the most vigorous and careful conduct of the industrial [102]business of society than motives of a higher character. it will be said that at present the greed of personal gain by its very excess counteracts its own end by the stimulus it gives to reckless and often dishonest risks. this it does, and under communism that source of evil would generally be absent. it is probable, indeed, that enterprise either of a bad or of a good kind would be a deficient element, and that business in general would fall very much under the dominion of routine; the rather, as the performance of duty in such communities has to be enforced by external sanctions, the more nearly each person's duty can be reduced to fixed rules, the easier it is to hold him to its performance. a circumstance which increases the probability of this result is the limited power which the managers would have of independent action. they would of course hold their authority from the choice of the community, by whom their function might at any time be withdrawn from them; and this would make it necessary for them, even if not so required by the constitution [103]of the community, to obtain the general consent of the body before making any change in the established mode of carrying on the concern. the difficulty of persuading a numerous body to make a change in their accustomed mode of working, of which change the trouble is often great, and the risk more obvious to their minds than the advantage, would have a great tendency to keep things in their accustomed track. against this it has to be set, that choice by the persons who are directly interested in the success of the work, and who have practical knowledge and opportunities of judgment, might be expected on the average to produce managers of greater skill than the chances of birth, which now so often determine who shall be the owner of the capital. this may be true; and though it may be replied that the capitalist by inheritance can also, like the community, appoint a manager more capable than himself, this would only place him on the same level of advantage as the community, not on a higher level. but it must be said on the other side that under the communist system the [104]persons most qualified for the management would be likely very often to hang back from undertaking it. at present the manager, even if he be a hired servant, has a very much larger remuneration than the other persons concerned in the business; and there are open to his ambition higher social positions to which his function of manager is a stepping-stone. on the communist system none of these advantages would be possessed by him; he could obtain only the same dividend out of the produce of the community's labor as any other member of it; he would no longer have the chance of raising himself from a receiver of wages into the class of capitalists; and while he could be in no way better off than any other laborer, his responsibilities and anxieties would be so much greater that a large proportion of mankind would be likely to prefer the less onerous position. this difficulty was foreseen by plato as an objection to the system proposed in his republic of community of goods among a governing class; and the motive on which he relied for inducing the fit persons to [105]take on themselves, in the absence of all the ordinary inducements, the cares and labors of government, was the fear of being governed by worse men. this, in truth, is the motive which would have to be in the main depended upon; the persons most competent to the management would be prompted to undertake the office to prevent it from falling into less competent hands. and the motive would probably be effectual at times when there was an impression that by incompetent management the affairs of the community were going to ruin, or even only decidedly deteriorating. but this motive could not, as a rule, expect to be called into action by the less stringent inducement of merely promoting improvement; unless in the case of inventors or schemers eager to try some device from which they hoped for great and immediate fruits; and persons of this kind are very often unfitted by over-sanguine temper and imperfect judgment for the general conduct of affairs, while even when fitted for it they are precisely the kind of persons against whom the average man is apt to [106]entertain a prejudice, and they would often be unable to overcome the preliminary difficulty of persuading the community both to adopt their project and to accept them as managers. communistic management would thus be, in all probability, less favorable than private management to that striking out of new paths and making immediate sacrifices for distant and uncertain advantages, which, though seldom unattended with risk, is generally indispensable to great improvements in the economic condition of mankind, and even to keeping up the existing state in the face of a continual increase of the number of mouths to be fed.

we have thus far taken account only of the operation of motives upon the managing minds of the association. let us now consider how the case stands in regard to the ordinary workers.

these, under communism, would have no interest, except their share of the general interest, in doing their work honestly and energetically. but in this respect matters would be no worse than they now are in regard to the great [107]majority of the producing classes. these, being paid by fixed wages, are so far from having any direct interest of their own in the efficiency of their work, that they have not even that share in the general interest which every worker would have in the communistic organization. accordingly, the inefficiency of hired labor, the imperfect manner in which it calls forth the real capabilities of the laborers, is matter of common remark. it is true that a character for being a good workman is far from being without its value, as it tends to give him a preference in employment, and sometimes obtains for him higher wages. there are also possibilities of rising to the position of foreman, or other subordinate administrative posts, which are not only more highly paid than ordinary labor, but sometimes open the way to ulterior advantages. but on the other side is to be set that under communism the general sentiment of the community, composed of the comrades under whose eyes each person works, would be sure to be in favor of good and hard [108]working, and unfavorable to laziness, carelessness, and waste. in the present system not only is this not the case, but the public opinion of the workman class often acts in the very opposite direction: the rules of some trade societies actually forbid their members to exceed a certain standard of efficiency, lest they should diminish the number of laborers required for the work; and for the same reason they often violently resist contrivances for economising labor. the change from this to a state in which every person would have an interest in rendering every other person as industrious, skilful, and careful as possible (which would be the case under communism), would be a change very much for the better.

it is, however, to be considered that the principal defects of the present system in respect to the efficiency of labor may be corrected, and the chief advantages of communism in that respect may be obtained, by arrangements compatible with private property and individual competition. considerable improvement is already obtained [109]by piece-work, in the kinds of labor which admit of it. by this the workman's personal interest is closely connected with the quantity of work he turns out—not so much with its quality, the security for which still has to depend on the employer's vigilance; neither does piece-work carry with it the public opinion of the workman class, which is often, on the contrary, strongly opposed to it, as a means of (as they think) diminishing the market for laborers. and there is really good ground for their dislike of piece-work, if, as is alleged, it is a frequent practice of employers, after using piece-work to ascertain the utmost which a good workman can do, to fix the price of piece-work so low that by doing that utmost he is not able to earn more than they would be obliged to give him as day wages for ordinary work.

but there is a far more complete remedy than piece-work for the disadvantages of hired labor, viz., what is now called industrial partnership—the admission of the whole body of laborers to a participation in the profits, by distributing among [110]all who share in the work, in the form of a percentage on their earnings, the whole or a fixed portion of the gains after a certain remuneration has been allowed to the capitalist. this plan has been found of admirable efficacy, both in this country and abroad. it has enlisted the sentiments of the workmen employed on the side of the most careful regard by all of them to the general interest of the concern; and by its joint effect in promoting zealous exertion and checking waste, it has very materially increased the remuneration of every description of labor in the concerns in which it has been adopted. it is evident that this system admits of indefinite extension and of an indefinite increase in the share of profits assigned to the laborers, short of that which would leave to the managers less than the needful degree of personal interest in the success of the concern. it is even likely that when such arrangements become common, many of these concerns would at some period or another, on the death or retirement of the chief's [111]pass, by arrangement, into the state of purely co-operative associations.

it thus appears that as far as concerns the motives to exertion in the general body, communism has no advantage which may not be reached under private property, while as respects the managing heads it is at a considerable disadvantage. it has also some disadvantages which seem to be inherent in it, through the necessity under which it lies of deciding in a more or less arbitrary manner questions which, on the present system, decide themselves, often badly enough but spontaneously.

it is a simple rule, and under certain aspects a just one, to give equal payment to all who share in the work. but this is a very imperfect justice unless the work also is apportioned equally. now the many different kinds of work required in every society are very unequal in hardness and unpleasantness. to measure these against one another, so as to make quality equivalent to quantity, is so difficult that communists generally propose that all should work by turns at [112]every kind of labor. but this involves an almost complete sacrifice of the economic advantages of the division of employments, advantages which are indeed frequently over-estimated (or rather the counter considerations are under-estimated) by political economists, but which are nevertheless, in the point of view of the productiveness of labor, very considerable, for the double reason that the co-operation of employment enables the work to distribute itself with some regard to the special capacities and qualifications of the worker, and also that every worker acquires greater skill and rapidity in one kind of work by confining himself to it. the arrangement, therefore, which is deemed indispensable to a just distribution would probably be a very considerable disadvantage in respect of production. but further, it is still a very imperfect standard of justice to demand the same amount of work from every one. people have unequal capacities of work, both mental and bodily, and what is a light task for one is an insupportable burthen to another. it is necessary, therefore, that there [113]should be a dispensing power, an authority competent to grant exemptions from the ordinary amount of work, and to proportion tasks in some measure to capabilities. as long as there are any lazy or selfish persons who like better to be worked for by others than to work, there will be frequent attempts to obtain exemptions by favor or fraud, and the frustration of these attempts will be an affair of considerable difficulty, and will by no means be always successful. these inconveniences would be little felt, for some time at least, in communities composed of select persons, earnestly desirous of the success of the experiment; but plans for the regeneration of society must consider average human beings, and not only them but the large residuum of persons greatly below the average in the personal and social virtues. the squabbles and ill-blood which could not fail to be engendered by the distribution of work whenever such persons have to be dealt with, would be a great abatement from the harmony and unanimity which communists hope would [114]be found among the members of their association. that concord would, even in the most fortunate circumstances, be much more liable to disturbance than communists suppose. the institution provides that there shall be no quarrelling about material interests; individualism is excluded from that department of affairs. but there are other departments from which no institutions can exclude it: there will still be rivalry for reputation and for personal power. when selfish ambition is excluded from the field in which, with most men, it chiefly exercises itself, that of riches and pecuniary interest, it would betake itself with greater intensity to the domain still open to it, and we may expect that the struggles for pre-eminence and for influence in the management would be of great bitterness when the personal passions, diverted from their ordinary channel, are driven to seek their principal gratification in that other direction. for these various reasons it is probable that a communist association would frequently fail to exhibit the attractive picture of mutual [115]love and unity of will and feeling which we are often told by communists to expect, but would often be torn by dissension and not unfrequently broken up by it.

other and numerous sources of discord are inherent in the necessity which the communist principle involves, of deciding by the general voice questions of the utmost importance to every one, which on the present system can be and are left to individuals to decide, each for his own case. as an example, take the subject of education. all socialists are strongly impressed with the all-importance of the training given to the young, not only for the reasons which apply universally, but because their demands being much greater than those of any other system upon the intelligence and morality of the individual citizen, they have even more at stake than any other societies on the excellence of their educational arrangements. now under communism these arrangements would have to be made for every citizen by the collective body, since individual parents, supposing them to [116]prefer some other mode of educating their children, would have no private means of paying for it, and would be limited to what they could do by their own personal teaching and influence. but every adult member of the body would have an equal voice in determining the collective system designed for the benefit of all. here, then, is a most fruitful source of discord in every association. all who had any opinion or preference as to the education they would desire for their own children, would have to rely for their chance of obtaining it upon the influence they could exercise in the joint decision of the community.

it is needless to specify a number of other important questions affecting the mode of employing the productive resources of the association, the conditions of social life, the relations of the body with other associations, &c., on which difference of opinion, often irreconcilable, would be likely to arise. but even the dissensions which might be expected would be a far less evil to the prospects of humanity than a delusive unanimity produced by the prostration of [117]all individual opinions and wishes before the decree of the majority. the obstacles to human progression are always great, and require a concurrence of favorable circumstances to overcome them; but an indispensable condition of their being overcome is, that human nature should have freedom to expand spontaneously in various directions, both in thought and practice; that people should both think for themselves and try experiments for themselves, and should not resign into the hands of rulers, whether acting in the name of a few or of the majority, the business of thinking for them, and of prescribing how they shall act. but in communist associations private life would be brought in a most unexampled degree within the dominion of public authority, and there would be less scope for the development of individual character and individual preferences than has hitherto existed among the full citizens of any state belonging to the progressive branches of the human family. already in all societies the compression of individuality by the majority is a great and growing [118]evil; it would probably be much greater under communism, except so far as it might be in the power of individuals to set bounds to it by selecting to belong to a community of persons like-minded with themselves.

from these various considerations i do not seek to draw any inference against the possibility that communistic production is capable of being at some future time the form of society best adapted to the wants and circumstances of mankind. i think that this is, and will long be an open question, upon which fresh light will continually be obtained, both by trial of the communistic principle under favorable circumstances, and by the improvements which will be gradually effected in the working of the existing system, that of private ownership. the one certainty is, that communism, to be successful, requires a high standard of both moral and intellectual education in all the members of the community—moral, to qualify them for doing their part honestly and energetically in the labor of life under no inducement but their share in [119]the general interest of the association, and their feelings of duty and sympathy towards it; intellectual, to make them capable of estimating distant interests and entering into complex considerations, sufficiently at least to be able to discriminate, in these matters, good counsel from bad. now i reject altogether the notion that it is impossible for education and cultivation such as is implied in these things to be made the inheritance of every person in the nation; but i am convinced that it is very difficult, and that the passage to it from our present condition can only be slow. i admit the plea that in the points of moral education on which the success of communism depends, the present state of society is demoralizing, and that only a communistic association can effectually train mankind for communism. it is for communism, then, to prove, by practical experiment, its power of giving this training. experiments alone can show whether there is as yet in any portion of the population a sufficiently high level of moral cultivation to make communism succeed, and to give to the next generation among themselves the education necessary to keep that high level permanently if communist associations show that they can be [120]durable and prosperous, they will multiply, and will probably be adopted by successive portions of the population of the more advanced countries as they become morally fitted for that mode of life. but to force unprepared populations into communist societies, even if a political revolution gave the power to make such an attempt, would end in disappointment.

if practical trial is necessary to test the capabilities of communism, it is no less required for those other forms of socialism which recognize the difficulties of communism and contrive means to surmount them. the principal of these is fourierism, a system which, if only as a specimen of intellectual ingenuity, is highly worthy of the attention of any student, either of society or of the human mind. there is scarcely an objection or a difficulty which fourier did not forsee, and against which he did not make provision beforehand by self-acting contrivances, grounded, however, upon a less high principle of distributive justice than that of communism, since he admits inequalities of distribution and individual ownership of capital, but not the arbitrary disposal of it. the great problem which he grapples with is how to make labor attractive, since, if this [121]could be done, the principal difficulty of socialism would be overcome. he maintains that no kind of useful labor is necessarily or universally repugnant, unless either excessive in amount or devoid of the stimulus of companionship and emulation, or regarded by mankind with contempt. the workers in a fourierist village are to class themselves spontaneously in groups, each group undertaking a different kind of work, and the same person may be a member not only of one group but of any number; a certain minimum having first been set apart for the subsistence of every member of the community, whether capable or not of labor, the society divides the remainder of the produce among the different groups, in such shares as it finds attract to each the amount of labor required, and no more; if there is too great a run upon particular groups it is a sign that those groups are over-remunerated relatively to others; if any are neglected their remuneration must be made higher. the share of produce assigned to each group is divided in fixed proportions among three elements—labor, capital, and talent; the part assigned to talent being awarded by the suffrages of the group itself, and it is hoped that among the variety of human [122]capacities all, or nearly all, will be qualified to excel in some group or other. the remuneration for capital is to be such as is found sufficient to induce savings from individual consumption, in order to increase the common stock to such point as is desired. the number and ingenuity of the contrivances for meeting minor difficulties, and getting rid of minor inconveniencies, is very remarkable. by means of these various provisions it is the expectation of fourierists that the personal inducements to exertion for the public interest, instead of being taken away, would be made much greater than at present, since every increase of the service rendered would be much more certain of leading to increase of reward than it is now, when accidents of position have so much influence. the efficiency of labor, they therefore expect, would be unexampled, while the saving of labor would be prodigious, by diverting to useful occupations that which is now wasted on things useless or hurtful, and by dispensing with the vast number of superfluous distributors, the buying and selling for the whole community being managed by a single agency. the free choice of individuals as to their manner of life would be no further interfered with than would [123]be necessary for gaining the full advantages of co-operation in the industrial operations. altogether, the picture of a fourierist community is both attractive in itself and requires less from common humanity than any other known system of socialism; and it is much to be desired that the scheme should have that fair trial which alone can test the workableness of any new scheme of social life.[9]

the result of our review of the various difficulties of socialism has led us to the conclusion that the various schemes for managing the productive resources of the country by public instead of private agency have a case for a trial, and some of them may eventually establish their claims to preference over the existing order of things, but that they are at present workable [124]only by the élite of mankind, and have yet to prove their power of training mankind at large to the state of improvement which they presuppose. far more, of course, may this be said of the more ambitious plan which aims at taking possession of the whole land and capital of the country, and beginning at once to administer it on the public account. apart from all consideration of injustice to the present possessors, the very idea of conducting the whole industry of a country by direction from a single centre is so obviously chimerical, that nobody ventures to propose any mode in which it should be done; and it can hardly be doubted that if the revolutionary socialists attained their immediate object, and actually had the whole property of the country at their disposal, they would find no other practicable mode of exercising their power over it than that of dividing it into portions, each to be made over to the administration of a small socialist community. the problem of management, which we have seen to be so difficult even to a select population well prepared beforehand, would be thrown down to be solved as best it could by aggregations united only by locality, or taken indiscriminately from [125]the population, including all the malefactors, all the idlest and most vicious, the most incapable of steady industry, forethought, or self-control, and a majority who, though not equally degraded, are yet, in the opinion of socialists themselves as far as regards the qualities essential for the success of socialism, profoundly demoralised by the existing state of society. it is saying but little to say that the introduction of socialism under such conditions could have no effect but disastrous failure, and its apostles could have only the consolation that the order of society as it now exists would have perished first, and all who benefit by it would be involved in the common ruin—a consolation which to some of them would probably be real, for if appearances can be trusted the animating principle of too many of the revolutionary socialists is hate; a very excusable hatred of existing evils, which would vent itself by putting an end to the present system at all costs even to those who suffer by it, in the hope that out of chaos would arise a better kosmos, and in the impatience of desperation respecting any more gradual improvement. they are unaware that chaos is the very most unfavorable position for setting out in the construction of a kosmos, and that many ages of conflict, [126]violence, and tyrannical oppression of the weak by the strong must intervene; they know not that they would plunge mankind into the state of nature so forcibly described by hobbes (leviathan, part i. ch. xiii.), where every man is enemy to every man:—

"in such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently no culture of the earth, no navigation, no use of the commodities that may be imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time, no arts, no letters, no society; and, which is worst of all, continual fear and danger of violent death; and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short."

if the poorest and most wretched members of a so-called civilised society are in as bad a condition as every one would be in that worst form of barbarism produced by the dissolution of civilised life, it does not follow that the way to raise them would be to reduce all others to the same miserable state. on the contrary, it is by the aid of the first who have risen that so many others have escaped from the general lot, and it is only by better organization of the same process that it may be hoped in time to succeed in raising the remainder.