i.
secularism means the moral duty of man in this life deduced from considerations which pertain to this life alone. secular education is by some confounded with secularism, whereas the distinction between them is very wide. secular education simply means imparting secular knowledge separately—by itself, without admixture of theology with it. the advocate of secular education may be, and generally is, also an advocate of religion; but he would teach religion at another time and treat it as a distinct subject, too sacred for coercive admixture into the hard and vexatious routine of a school. he would confine the inculcation of religion to fitting seasons and chosen instruments. he holds also that one subject at a time is mental economy in learning. secular education is the policy of a school—secularism is a policy of life to those who do not accept theology. secularity draws the line of separation between the things of time and the things of eternity. that is secular which pertains to this world. the distinction may be seen in the fact that the cardinal propositions of theology are provable only in the next life, and not in this. if i believe in a given creed it may turn out to be the true one; but one must die to find that out. on this side of the grave all is doubt; the truth of biblical creeds is an affair of hope and anxiety, while the truth of things secular becomes apparent in time. the advantages arising from the practice of veracity, justice, and temperance can be ascertained from human experience. if we are told to "fear god and keep his commandments," lest his judgments overtake us, the indirect action of this doctrine on human character may make a vicious timid man better in this life, supposing the interpretation of the will of god, and the commandments selected to be enforced, are moral; but such teaching is not secular, because its main object is to fit men for eternity. pure secular principles have for their object to fit men for time, making the fulfilment of human duty here the standard of fitness for any accruing future. secularism purposes to regulate human affairs by considerations purely human. its principles are founded upon nature, and its object is to render man as perfect as possible in this life. its problem is this: supposing no other life to be before us, what is the wisest use of this? as the rev. thomas binney puts it, "i believe * * that even * * if there were really no god over him, no heaven above, or eternity in prospect, things are so constituted that man may turn the materials of his little life poem, if not always into a grand epic, mostly into something of interest and beauty; and it is worth his while doing so, even if there should be no sequel to the piece." chalmers, archbishop whately, and earlier distinguished divines of the church of england, the most conspicuous of whom is bishop butler, have admitted the independent existence of morality, but we here cite mr. binney's words because among dissenters this truth is less readily admitted. a true secular life does not exclude any from supplementary speculations. not until we have fulfilled our duty to man, as far as we can ascertain that duty, can we consistently pretend to comprehend the more difficult relations of man to god. our duties to humanity, understood and discharged to the best of our ability, will in no way unfit us to "reverently meditate on things far beyond us, on power unlimited, on space unfathomed, on time uncounted, on 'whence' we came, and 'whither' we go."** the leading ideas of secularism are humanism, moralism, materialism, utilitarian unity; humanism, the physical perfection of this life—moralism, founded on the laws of nature, as the guidance of this life—materialism, as the means of nature for the secular improvement of this life—unity of thought and action upon these practical grounds. secularism teaches that the good of the present life is the immediate concern of man, and that it should be his first endeavour to raise it. secularism inculcates a morality founded independently upon the laws of nature. it seeks human improvement through purity and suitableness of material conditions as being a method at once moral, practical, universal, and sure.
* "how to make the best of both worlds," p. 11.
** f. w. newman.
ii.
the province of positivism is not speculation upon the origin, but study of the laws of nature—its policy is to destroy error by superseding it. auguste comte quotes, as a cardinal maxim of scientific progress, the words "nothing is destroyed until it is replaced," a proverbial form of a wise saying of m. necker that in political progress "nothing is destroyed for which we do not find a substitute." negations, useful in their place, are iconoclastic—not constructive. unless substitution succeeds destruction—there can be no sustained progress. the secularist is known by setting up and maintaining affirmative propositions. he replaces negations by affirmations, and substitutes demonstration for denunciation. he asserts truths of nature and humanity, and reverses the position of the priest who appears as the sceptic, the denier, the disbeliever in nature and humanity. statesmen, not otherwise eager for improvement, will regard affirmative proposals. lord palmerston could say—"show me a good and i will realize it—not an abuse to correct."
iii.
"all science," says m. comte, "has prevision for its end, an axiom which separates science from erudition, which relates to events of the past without any regard to the future. no accumulation of facts can effect prevision until the facts are made the basis of reasonings. a knowledge of phenomena leads to prevision, and prevision to action;" or, in other words, when we can foresee what will happen under given circumstances, we can provide against it. it by no means follows that every secularist will be scientific, but to discern the value of science, to appreciate and promote it, may be possible to most. science requires high qualities of accurate observation, close attention, careful experiment, caution, patience, labour. its value to mankind is inestimable. one physician will do more to alleviate human suffering than ten priests. one physical discovery will do more to advance civilization than a generation of prayer-makers. "to get acquaintance with the usual course of nature (which science alone can teach us), is a kind of knowledge which pays very good interest."*
* athen?um, no. 1,637, march 12, 1850.
the value of this knowledge becomes more apparent the longer we live. there may be a general superintending providence—there may be a special providence, but the first does not interfere in human affairs, and the interpositions of the second are no longer to be counted upon. the age of prayer for temporal deliverance has confessedly passed away. but without disputing these points, it is clear that the only help available to man, the sole dependence upon which he can calculate, is that of science. nothing can be more impotent than the fate of that man who seeks social elevation by mere faith. all human affairs are a process, and he alone who acts upon this knowledge can hope to control results. loyola foresaw the necessity of men acting for human purposes, as though there were no god. "let us pray," said he, "as if we had no help in ourselves; let us labour as if there was no help for us in heaven." society is a blunder, not a science, until it ensures good sense and competence for the many. why this process is tardy, is that creedists get credit for hoping and meaning well. creedists of good intent, who make no improvement and attempt none, are very much in the way of human betterance. the spiritualist regards the world theoretically as a gross element, which he is rather to struggle against than to work with. this makes human service a mortification instead of pure passion. we would not deify the world, that is, set up the sensualism of the body, as spiritualism is set up as the sensualism of the soul. secularism seeks the material purity of the present life, which is at once the means and end of secular endeavour. the most reliable means of progress is the improvement of material condition, and "purity" implies "improvement," for there can be no improvement without it. the aim of all improvement is higher purity. all power, art, civilization and progress are summed up in the result—purer life. strength, intellect, love are measured by it. duty, study, temperance, patience are but ministers to this. "there is that," says ruskin, "to be seen in every street and lane of every city, that to be found and felt in every human heart and countenance, that to be loved in every road-side weed and moss-grown wall, which, in the hands of faithful men, may convey emotions of glory and sublimity continual and exalted."
iv.
it is necessary to point out that sincerity does not imply infallibility. "there is a truth, which could it be stamped on every human mind, would exterminate all bigotry and persecution. i mean the truth, that worth of character and true integrity, and, consequently, god's acceptance, are not necessarily connected with any particular set of opinions."* if you admit that mark and paul were honest, most christians take that to be an admission of the truth of all related under their names. yet if a man in defending his opinions, affirm his own sincerity, christians quickly see that is no proof of their truth, and proceed to disprove them. sincerity may account for a man holding his opinions, but it does not account for the opinions themselves. nothing is more common than uninformed, misinformed, mistaken, or self-deluded honesty. but sincere error, though dangerous enough, has not the attribute of crime about it—personal intention of mischief. "because human nature is frail and fallible, the ground of our acceptance with god, under the gospel, is sincerity. a sincere desire to know and do the will of god, is the only condition of obtaining the christian salvation. every honest man will be saved."** but sincerity, if the reader recurs to our definition of it, includes a short intellectual and moral education with respect to it. those worthy of the high descriptive "sincere," are those who have thought, inquired, examined, are in earnest, have a sense of duty with regard to their conviction, which is only satisfied by acting upon it. these processes may not bring a man to the truth, but they bring him near to it. the chances of error are reduced hereby as far as human care can reduce them. secularism holds that the protestant right of private judgment includes the moral innocency of that judgment, when conscientiously formed, whether for or against received opinion; that though all sincere opinion is not equally true, nor equally useful, it is yet equally without sin; that it is not sameness of belief but sincerity of belief which justifies conduct, whether regard be had to the esteem of men or the approval of god. sincerity, we repeat, is not infallibility. the conscientious are often as mischievous as the false, but he who acts according to the best of his belief is free from criminal intention. the sincerity commended by the fortuitous, insipid, apathetic, inherited consent, which so often passes for honesty, because too indolent or too cowardly to inquire, and too stupid to doubt. the man who holds merely ready-made opinions is not to be placed on the same level with him whose convictions are derived from experience. true sincerity is an educated and earnest sentiment. secularist is an active sentiment seeking the truth and acting upon it.
* dr. price.
** john foster's tracts on heresy,
v.
in the formation and judgment of opinions we must take into account the consequences to mankind involved in their adoption. but when an opinion seems true in itself and beneficial to society, the consequences in the way of inconvenience to ourselves is not sufficient reason for refusing to act upon it. if a particular time of enforcing it seem to be one when it will be disregarded, or misunderstood, or put back, and the sacrifice of ourselves on its behalf produce no adequate advantage to society, it may be lawful to seek a better opportunity. we must, however, take care that this view of the matter is not made a pretext of cowardice or evasion of duty. and in no case is it justifiable to belie conscience or profess a belief the contrary of that which we believe to be true. there may in extreme cases be neutrality with regard to truth, but in no case should there be complicity in falsehood. so much with respect to this life. with respect to deity or another life, we may in all cases rely upon this, that in truth alone is safety. with god, conscience can have no penal consequences. conscience is the voice of honesty, and honesty, with all its errors, a god of truth will regard. "we have," says blanco white, "no revealed rule which will ascertain, with moral certainty, which doctrines are right and which are wrong—that is, as they are known to god."—"salvation, therefore, cannot depend on orthodoxy; it cannot consist in abstract doctrines, about which men of equal abilities, virtue, and sincerity are, and always have been, divided."—"no error on abstract doctrines can be heresy, in the sense of a wrong belief which endangers the soul." "the father of the universe accommodates not his judgments to the wretched wranglings of pedantic theologians, but every one who seeks truth, whether he findeth it or not, and worketh righteousness, will be accepted of him."*
* bishop watson's theological tracts. introductory.
thomas carlyle was the first english writer, having the ear of the public, who declared in england that "sincere doubt is as much entitled to respect as sincere belief."
vi.
going to a distant town to mitigate some calamity there, will illustrate the principle of action prescribed by secularism. one man will go on this errand from pure sympathy with the unfortunate; this is goodness. another goes because his priest bids him; this is obedience. another goes because the twenty-fifth chapter of matthew tells him that all such persons will pass to the right hand of the father; this is calculation. another goes because he believes god commands him; this is piety. another goes because he believes that the neglect of suffering will not answer; this is utilitarianism. but another goes on the errand of mercy, because it is an errand of mercy, because it is an immediate service to humanity; and he goes to attempt material amelioration rather than spiritual consolation; this is secularism, which teaches that goodness is sanctity, that nature is guidance, that reason is authority, that service is duty, and that materialism is help.
vii.
the policy of secular controversy is to distinguish and assert its own affirmative propositions. it is the policy of secularism not so much to say to error "it is false," as to say of truth "this is true." thus, instead of leaving to the popular theology the prestige of exclusive affirmation accorded to it by the world, although it is solely employed in the incessant re-assertion of error, secularism causes it to own and publish its denial of positive principle; when the popular theology proves itself to be but an organized negation of the moral guidance of nature and its tendencies to progress. a secularist sees clearly upon what he relies as a secularist. to him the teaching of nature is as clear as the teaching of the bible: and since, if god exists, nature is certainly his work, while it is not so clear that the bible is—the teaching of nature will be preferred and followed where the teaching of the bible appears to conflict with it. a secular society, contemplating intellectual and moral progress, must provide for the freest expression of opinion on all subjects which its members may deem conducive to their common objects. christianism, theism, materialism, and atheism will be regarded as open questions, subject to unreserved discussion. but these occasions will be the opportunity of the members, not the business of the society. all public proceedings accredited by the society should relate to topics consistent with the common principles of secularism. "in necessary things, unity: in doubtful things, liberty: in all things, charity."* the destruction of religious servitude may be attempted in two ways. it may be denounced, which will irritate it, or it may be superseded by the servitude of humanity. attacking it by denunciation, generally inflames and precipitates the persecution of the many upon the few; when the weak are liable to be scattered, the cowardly to recant, and the brave to perish.
viii.
the essential rule upon which personal association can be permanent, or controversy be maintained in the spirit in which truth can be evolved, is that of never imputing evil motives nor putting the worst construction on any act. free inquiry has no limits but truth, free speech no limits but exactness, policy (here the law of speech) no limits but usefulness. unfettered and uncompromising are they who pursue free inquiry throughout—measured and impassable may those become, who hold to a generous veracity. far both from outrage or servility—too proud to court and too strong to hate—are those who learn to discard all arts but that of the austere service of others, exacting no thanks and pausing at no curse. wise words of counsel to theological controversialists have been addressed in a powerful quarter of public opinion: "religious controversy has already lost much of its bitterness. open abuse and exchange of foul names are exploded, and even the indirect imputation of unworthy motives is falling-into disuse. another step will be made when theologians have learnt to extend their intellectual as well as their moral sympathies, to feel that most truths are double edged, and not to wage an unnecessary war against opinion which, strange, incongruous, and unlovely as they may at first appear, are built, perhaps, on as firm a foundation, and are held with equal sincerity and good faith, as their own."** this is advice which both sides should remember.
* maxim (much unused) of the roman catholic church.
** times leader of november 8, 1855.
ix.
"no society can be in a healthy state in which eccentricity is a matter of reproach." conventionality is the tyranny of the average man, and a despicable tyranny it is. the tyranny of genius is hard to be borne—that of mediocrity is humiliating. that idea of freedom which consists in the absence of all government is either mere lawlessness, or refers to the distant period when each man having attained perfection will be a law unto himself. just rule is indispensable rule, and none other. the fewer laws consistent with the public preservation the better—there is, then, as mr. mill has shown in his "liberty," the more room for that ever-recurring originality which keeps intellect alive in the world. towards law kept within the limits of reason, obedience is the first of virtues. "order and progress," says comte, which we should express thus:—order, without which progress is impossible; progress, without which order, is tyranny. the world is clogged with men of dead principles. principles that cannot be acted upon are probably either obsolete or false. one certain way to improvement is to exact consistency between profession and practice; and the way to bring this about is to teach that the highest merit consists in having earnest views and in endeavouring to realize them—and this whether the convictions be contained within or without accredited creeds. there will be no progress except within the stereotyped limits of creeds, unless means are found to justify independent convictions to the conscience. to the philosopher you have merely to show that a thing is true, to the statesman, that it is useful, but to a christian, that it is safe. the grace of service lies in its patience. to promote the welfare of others, irrespective of their gratitude or claims, is to reach the nature of the gods. it is a higher sentiment than is ascribed to the deity of the bible. the abiding disposition to serve others is the end of all philosophy. the vow of principle is always one of poverty and obedience, and few are they who take it—and fewer who keep it. if hate obscure for a period the path of duty, let us remember nothing should shake our attachment to that supreme thought, which at once stills human anger and educates human endeavour—the perception that "the sufferings and errors of mankind arise out of want of knowledge rather than defect of goodness."
x.
a leading object of secularism is the promotion of the material purity of the present life—"material purity," which includes personal as well as external condition. the question of spiritualism (without employing it and without disparaging it) it regards as a distinct question, and hence the methods by which secularists attempt "improvement" will be "material" as being the most reliable. the tacit or expressed aim of all freethinking, has ever been true thinking and pure thinking. it has been a continued protest against the errors theology has introduced, and the vicious relations it has conserved and sanctified. it is necessary to mark this, and it can be done by insisting and keeping distinctly evident that the aim of secularism is the purity of material influences. this precludes the possibility of secularism being charged either with conscious grossness or intentional sin. secularism concerns itself with the work of to-day. "it is always yesterday or to-morrow, and never to-day,"* is a fair description of life according to theologies. secularism, on the contrary, concerns itself with the things of "to-day."
to know
that which before us lies in daily life
is the prime wisdom.
* story of boots, by dickens.
the cardinal idea of the "popular theology" is the necessity of revelation. it believes that the light of nature is darkness, that reason affords no guidance, that the scriptures are the true chart, the sole chart, and the sufficient chart of man, and it regards all attempts to delineate a chart of nature as impious, as impracticable, and as a covert attack upon the biblical chart in possession of the churches. knowing no other guidance than that of the bible, and disbelieving the possibility of any other, theology denounces doubt, which inspires it with a sense of insecurity—it fears inquiry, which may invalidate its trust—and deprecates criticism, which may expose it, if deficient. having nothing to gain, it is reluctant to incur risk—having all to lose, it dreads to be disturbed-having no strength but in faith, it fears those who reason—and less from ill-will than from the tenderness of its position, it persecutes in self-defence. such are the restrictions and the logic of theology.
xi.
on the other hand, rationalism (which is the logic of nature) is in attitude and spirit quite the reverse. it observes that numbers are unconvinced of the fact of revelation, and feel the insufficiency, for their guidance, of that offered to them. to them the pages of nature seem clearer than those of the apostles. reason, which existed before all religions and decides upon all—else the false can never be distinguished from the true—seems self-dependent and capable of furnishing personal direction. hence rationalism instructed by facts, winning secrets by experiments, establishing principles by reflection, is assured of a morality founded upon the laws of nature. without the advantage of inductive science to assist discoveries, or the printing press to record corroborations of them, the pre-christian world created ethics, and socrates and epictetus, and zoroaster and confucius, delivered precepts, to which this age accords a high place. modern rationalists therefore sought, with their new advantages, to augment and systematize these conquests. they tested the claims of the church by the truths of nature. that freethought which had won these truths applied them to creeds, and criticism became its weapon of propagandism. its consciousness of new truth stimulated its aggression on old error. the pretensions of reason being denied as false, and rationalists themselves persecuted as dangerous, they had no alternative but to criticise in order to vindicate their own principles, and weaken the credit and power of their opponents. to attack the misleading dogmas of theology was to the early freethinkers well understood self-defence. in some hands and under the provocations of vindictive bigotry, this work, no doubt, became wholly antagonistic, but the main aspiration of the majority was the determination of teaching the people "to be a law unto themselves." they found prevailing a religion of unreasoning faith. they sought to create a religion of intelligent conviction, whose uniformity consisted in sincerity. its believers did not all hold the same tenets, but they all sought the same truth and pursued it with the same earnestness. it was this inspiration which sustained vanini, hamont, lewes, kett, legate, and wightman at the stake, and which armed servetus to prefer the fires of calvin to the creed of calvin, which supported annet in the pillory, and woolston and carlile in their imprisonments. it was no capricious taste for negations which dictated these deliberate sacrifices, but a sentiment purer than interest and stronger than self-love—it was the generous passion for unfriended truth.
xii.
the intellectual, no less than the heroic characteristics of freethought have presented features of obvious unity. tindal, shaftesbury, voltaire, paine, aad bentham, all vindicated principles of natural morality. shelley struggled that a pure and lofty ideal of life should prevail, and byron had passionate words of reverence for the human character of christ.*
* thus we read, canto xv. stanza xviii., of don juan:—
was it not so, great locke? and greater bacon?
great socrates? and thou diviner still
whose lot it is by man to be mistaken,
and thy pure creed made sanctions of all ill?
redeeming world to be by bigots shaken,
how was thy toil rewarded?
to this stanza lord byron adds this note:—
"as it is necessary in these times to avoid ambiguity,
i say that i mean by "diviner still" christ.
if ever god was man—or man god—he was both.
i never arraigned his creed, but the use—or abuse—made of it."
the distrust of prayer for temporal help was accompanied by trust in science, and all saw in material effort an available deliverance from countless ills which the church can merely deplore. those who held that a future life was "unproven," taught that attention to this life was of primary importance, at least highly serviceable to humanity, even if a future sphere be certain. all strove for free inquiry—rationalism owed its existence to it; all required free speech—rationalism was diffused by it; all vindicated free criticism—rationalism established itself with it; all demanded to act out their opinions—rationalism was denuded of conscience without this right. in all its mutations, and aberrations, and conquests, freethought has uniformly sought the truth, and shown the courage to trust the truth. freethought uses no persecution, for it fears no opposition, for opposition is its opportunity. it is the cause of enterprise and progress, of reason and duty—and now seeking the definite and the practical, it selects for its guidance the principle that "human affairs should be regulated by considerations purely human."** these—the characteristics which the term secularism was designed to express—are therefore not inventions, not assumptions, but the general agreements of the freethought party, inherent, traditional, and historic. that which is new, and of the nature of a development, is the perception that the positivism of freethought principles should be extended, should be clearly distinguished and made the subject of energetic assertion—that the freethought party which has so loudly demanded toleration for itself, should be able to exercise it towards all earnest thinkers, and especially towards all coworkers—that those who have protested against the isolation of human effort by sectarian exclusiveness, should themselves set the example of offering, in good faith, practical conditions of unity, not for the glory of sects, or coteries, or schools, but for the immediate service of humanity.
** l. h. holdreth.
xiii.
the relation of secularism to the future demands a few words. to seek after the purity and perfection of the present life neither disproves another life beyond this, nor disqualifies man for it. "nor is secularism opposed to the future so far as that future belongs to the present world—to determine which we have definite science susceptible of trial and verification. the conditions of a future life being unknown, and there being no imaginable means of benefiting ourselves and others in it except by aiming after present goodness, we shall confessedly gain less towards the happiness of a future life by speculation than by simply devoting ourselves to the energetic improvement of this life."* men have a right to look beyond this world, but not to overlook it. men, if they can, may connect themselves with eternity, but they cannot disconnect themselves from humanity without sacrificing duty. secular knowledge relates to this life. religious knowledge to another life. secular instruction teaches the duties to man. religious instruction the duties to god apart from man. religious knowledge relates to celestial creeds. secular knowr-ledge relates to human duties to be performed. the religious teacher instructs us how to please god by creeds. the secular teacher how to serve man by sympathy and science.
* f. w. newman
archbishop whately tells the story of a lady at bath, who, being afraid to cross a tottering bridge lest it should ghre way under her, fortunately bethought herself of the expedient of calling for a sedan chair, and was carried over in that conveyance. some of our critics think that we shall resemble this ingenious lady. but those who fear to trust themselves to the ancient and tottering biblical bridge, will hardly get into the sedan chair of obsolete orthodoxy, and add the weight of that to the danger. they prefer going round by the way of reason and fearless private judgment.
xiv.
secularism, we have said, concerns itself with four rights:—
1. the right to think for one's self, which most christians now admit, at least in theory.
2. the right to differ, without which the right to think is nothing worth.
3. the right to assert difference of opinion, without which the right to differ is of no practical use.
4. the right to debate all vital opinion, without which there is no intellectual equality—no defence against the errors of the state or the pulpit.
it is of no use that the protestant concedes the right to think unless he concedes the right to differ. we may as well be catholic unless we are free to dissent. rome will concede our right to think for ourselves, provided we agree with the church when we have done; and when protestantism affects to award us the right of private judgment, and requires us to agree with the thirty-nine articles in the end—or when evangelical ministers tell us we are free to think for ourselves, but must believe in the bible nevertheless, both parties reason on the papist principle; both mock us with a show of freedom, and impose the reality of mental slavery upon us. it is mere irony to say "search the scriptures," when the meaning is—you must accept the scriptures whether they seem true or not. of the temper in which theological opinions ought to be formed, we have the instruction of one as eminent as he was capable. jefferson remarks, "in considering this subject, divest yourself of all bias, shake off all fears and servile prejudices, under which weak minds crouch: fix reason in her seat firmly; question with boldness, even the existence of god; because, if there be one, he must approve the homage of reason more than that of blindfolded fear. read the bible as you would tacitus or livy. those facts in the bible which contradict the laws of nature must be examined with care. the new testament is the history of a person called jesus. keep in your eye what is related. they say he was begotten by god, but born of a virgin (how reconcile this?); that he was crucified to death, and buried; that he rose and ascended bodily into heaven: thus reversing the laws of nature. do not be frightened from this inquiry by any fear, and if it ends in a belief that the story is not true, or that there is not a god, you will find other incitements to virtue and goodness. in fine, lay aside all prejudices on both sides, neither believe nor reject anything because others have rejected or disbelieved it your reason is the only oracle given you by heaven, and you are answerable, not for the rightness, but for the uprightness of your opinion; and never mind evangelists, or pseudo-evangelists, who pretend to inspiration."* it is in vain the christian quotes the pauline injunction, "prove all things; hold fast that which is good," if we are to hold fast to his good, which may be evil to us. for a man to prove all things needful, and hold fast to that which he considers good, is the true maxim of freedom and progress. secularism, therefore, proclaims and justifies the right to differ, and the right to assert conscientious difference on the platform, through the press, in civil institutions, in parliament, in courts of law, where it demands that the affirmation of those who reject christianity shall be as valid as the oath of those who accept it.
* "jefferson: memoirs." vol. ii. quoted by sir g. cockburn,
in his "confessions of faith, by a philosopher," pages 4 and
5.
xv.
yet some opponents have professed that secular cannot be distinguished from christian rights. is this so? the right to think for ourselves has been emphatically and reiteratedly declared to be a christian right:* it "belongs essentially to christianity." now christianity has no such right. it has the right to think the bible true, and nothing else.
* "six chapters on secularism," by dr. parker, cavendish
pulpit, manchester.
the christian has no right to think christianity untrue, however untrue it may appear. he dare not think it false. he dare no more think it false than the catholic dare differ from the dictum of the church, or the mahomedan differ from the text of the koran, or the hindoo differ from the precepts of the brahmin. therefore, the christian's right to think for himself is simply a compulsion to believe. a right implies relative freedom of action; but the christian has no freedom. he has no choice but to believe, or perish everlastingly. the christian right to think for himself is, therefore, not the same as the secular right. we mean by the right to think, what the term right always implies—freedom and independence, and absence of all crime, or danger of penalty through the honest exercise of thought and maintenance of honest conclusions, whether in favour of or against christianity. our assertion is that "private judgment is free and guiltless." the christian is good enough to say, we have "a right to think, provided we think rightly." but what does he mean by "rightly?" he means that we should think as he thinks. this is his interpretation of "rightly." whoever does not fall in with his views, is generally, in his vocabulary, a dishonest perverter of scripture. now, if we really have the right to differ, we have the right to differ from the minister or from the bible, if we see good reason to do so, without being exposed to the censure of our neighbours, or disapprobation of god. the question is not—does man give us the right to think for ourselves? but, does god give it to us? if we must come to a given opinion, our private judgment is unnecessary. let us know at once what we are to believe, that we may believe it at once, and secure safety. if possible disbelief in christianity will lead to eternal perdition, the right of private judgment is a snare. we had better be without that perilous privilege, and we come to regard the roman catholic as penetrative when he paints private judgment as the suggestion of satan, and the roman catholic no less merciful than consistent when he proscribes it altogether. we must feel astonishment at him who declares the secular right to be essentially a christian right, when it is quite a different thing, is understood in an entirely different sense, and has an application unknown and unadmitted by christianity. this is not merely loose thinking, it is reckless thinking.
xvi.
it has been asserted that the second right, "the right to differ," is also a christian right. "christianity recognizes the claim to difference of opinion. christians are not careful to maintain uniformity at the expense of private judgment." this is omitting a part of the truth. christians often permit difference of opinion upon details, but not upon essentials, and this is the suppression made. the christian may differ on points of church discipline, but if he differ upon the essential articles of his creed, the minister at once warns him that he is in "danger of the judgment." let any minister try it himself, and his congregation will soon warn him to depart, and also warn him of that higher power, who will bid him depart "into outer darkness, where there will be wailing and gnashing of teeth." with respect to the third right, "the right of asserting difference of opinion," this is declared to be not peculiar to secularism; that "christian churches, chapels, literature and services, are so many confirmations of the statement that christians claim the right of speaking what they think, whether it be affirmative or negative." yes, so long as what they speak agrees with the bible. this is the christian limit; yet this is the limit which secularism expressly passes and discards. it is the unfettered right which makes secularism to differ from christianity, and to excel it.
xvii.
the right of private judgment, always in set terms conceded to us, means nothing, unless it leads to a new understanding as to the terms in which we are to be addressed. in the "bible and the people," it is described as "an insolence to ignore christianity."* we do not understand this language. it would be insolence to deity to ignore a message which we can recognize as coming from him, but it may rather imply reverence for god to reject the reports of many who speak in his name. were we to require christians to read our books or think as we think, they would resent the requirement as an impertinence; and we have yet to learn "that it is less an impertinence when christians make these demands of us." if christians are under no obligation to hold our opinions, neither are we under obligation to hold theirs.
* no. i. vol. i., p. 8. edited by the rev. brewin grant.
by our own act, or at their solicitation, we may study "sacred" writings, but at dictation, never! so long as secularists obey the laws enacted for the common security, so long as they perform the duties of good citizens, it is nothing to christians what opinions they hold. we neither seek their counsel nor desire their sentiments—except they concede them on terms of equality. the light by which we walk is sufficient for us; and as at the last day, of which christians speak, we shall there have, according to their own showing, to answer for ourselves, we prefer to think for ourselves; and since they do not propose to take our responsibility, we decline to take their doctrines. where we are to be responsible, we will be free; and no man shall dictate to us the opinions we shall hold. we shall probably know as well as any christian how to live with freedom and to die without fear. it is in vain for christians to tell us that newton and locke differed from us. what is that to us unless newton and locke will answer for us? the world may differ from a man, but what is the world to him, unless it will take his place at the judgment-day? who is paul or apollos, or matthew or mark, that we should venture our eternal salvation on his word, any more than on that of a mahomedan prophet, or a buddhist priest? where the danger is our own, the faith shall be our own. secularism is not an act conceived in the spirit of pride, or vanity, or self-will, or eccentricity, or singularity, or stiff-neckedness. it is simply well-understood self-defence. if men have the right of private judgment, that right has set them free; and we own no law but reason, no limits but the truth, and have no fear but that of guilt. we may say we believe in honour, which is respecting the truth—in morality, which is acting the truth—in love, which is serving the truth—and in independence, which is defending the truth.
xviii.
confucius declared that the foundation of all religion was reverence and obedience.* the religious sentiment is the intentional reverence of god. the christian is ever persuaded that there is only one way of doing this, and he arrogantly assumes that he has that way. whereas the ways are as diverse as human genius. let those who deny that secular truth meets the emotional part of their nature, settle what is the nature of the emotions they desiderate. the miser wants money—the sensualist wants the cook—the scholar wants knowledge—and the mother desires the life, growth, and happiness of her child. but what can man want in a rational sense which nature and humanity may not supply? do we not meet the demand of the many when we show that secularism is sufficient for progress; that it is moral, and therefore sufficient for trust; that it builds only upon the known, and is therefore reliable? it is the highest and most unpresumptuous form of unconscious worship. it is practical reverence without the arrogance of theoretical homage. we at least feel confident of this, that the future, if it come, will not be miserable. there may be a future—this remains to awaken interest and perennial curiosity. if nature be conscious, it will still design the happiness of man, which it now permits—this assurance remains, stilling fear and teaching trust.
* sir john bowring.
xix.
in surveying the position of christianism in great britain there is found to exist a large outlying class, daily increasing, who for conscientious reasons reject its cardinal tenets. hence arises the question:—are good citizenship and virtuous life on secular principles, possible to these persons? secularism answers, yes. to these, excluded by the letter of scripture, by the narrowness of churches, by the intrinsic error and moral repulsiveness of doctrine, secularism addresses itself; to these it is the word of recognition, of concert and morality. it points them to an educated conscience as a security of morals, to the study of nature as a source of help, and seeks to win the indifferent by appeals to the inherent goodness of human nature and the authority of reason, which christianism cannot use and dare not trust. if, however, the secularist elects to walk by the light of nature, will he be able to see? is the light of nature a fitful lamp, or a brief torch, which accident may upset, or a gust extinguish? on the contrary, the light of nature may burn steady, clear, and full, over the entire field of human life. on this point we have the testimony of an adversary, who was understood to address us, a testimony as remarkable for its quality as for its felicity of expression:—"there is the ethical mind, calm, level, and clear; chiefly intent on the good ordering of this life; judging all things by their tendency to this end, and impatient of every oscillation of our nature that swings beyond it. there is nothing low or unworthy in the attachment which keeps this spirit close to the present world, and watchful for*its affairs. it is not a selfish feeling, but often one intensely social and humane, not any mean fascination with mere material interests, but a devotion to justice and right, and an assertion of the sacred authority of human duties and affections. a man thus tempered deals chiefly with this visible life and his comrades in it, because, as nearest to him, they are better known. he plants his standard on the present, as on a vantage ground, where he can survey his field, and manoeuvre all his force, and compute the battle he is to fight. whatever his bearings fervours towards beyond his range, he has no insensibility to the claims that fall within his acknowledged province, and that appeal to him in the native speech of his humanity. he so reverences veracity, honour, and good faith, as to expect them like the daylight, and hears of their violation with a flush of scorn. his word is a rock, and he expects that yours will not be a quicksand. if you are lax, you cannot hope for his trust; but if you are in trouble, you easily move his pity. and the sight of a real oppression, though the sufferer be no ornamental hero, but black, unsightly, and disreputable, suffices perhaps to set him to work for life, that he may expunge the disgrace from the records of mankind. such men as he constitute for our world its moral centre of gravity; and whoever would compute the path of improvement that has brought it thus far on its way, or trace its sweep into a brighter future, must take account of their steady mass. the effect of this style of thought and taste on the religion of its possessor, is not difficult to trace. it may, no doubt, stop short of avowed and conscious religion altogether; its basis being simply moral, and its scene temporal, its conditions may be imagined as complete, without any acknowledgment of higher relations."*
* professor martineau, in octagon chapel, norwich, 1856.
xx.
nature is. that which is, is the primary subject of study. the study of nature reveals the laws of nature. the laws of nature furnish safe guidance to humanity. safe guidance is to help available in daily life—to happiness, self-contained—to service, which knows how "to labour and to wait." for authority, nature refers us to experience and to reason. for help, to science, the nearest available help of man. science implies disciplined powers on the part of the people, and concert in their use, to realize the security and sufficiency necessary to happiness. happiness depends on moral, no less than on physical conditions. the moral condition is the full and fearless discharge of duty. duty is devotion to the right. right is that which is morally expedient. that is morally expedient which is conducive to the happiness of the greatest numbers. the service of others is the practical form of duty; and endurance in the service of others, the highest form of happiness. it is pleasure, peace, security, and desert.
xxi.
we believe there is sufficient soundness in secular principles to make way in the world. all that is wanted is that advocates of them shall have clear notions of the value of method in their work. to the novice in advocacy policy seems a crime—at least, many so describe it. unable himself to see his way, the tyro fights at everything and everybody equally; and too vain to own his failure, he declares that the right way. not knowing that progress is an art, and an art requiring the union of many qualities, he denies all art, cries down policy, and erects blundering into a virtue. compare the way which havelock reached lucknow, and the way in which sir colin campbell performed the same feat, and you see the difference between courage without, and courage with strategy. it was because magnitudes existed, which were inaccessible and incapable of direct measurement, that mathematics arose. finding direct measurement so often impossible, men were compelled to find means of ascertaining magnitude and distance indirectly. hence mathematics became a scientific policy. mathematics is but policy of measurement—grammar but the policy of speech—logic but the policy of reason—arithmetic but the policy of calculation—temperance but the policy of health—trigonometry but the policy of navigation—roads but the policy of transit—music but the policy of controlling sound—art but the policy of beauty—law but the policy of protection—discipline but the policy of strength—love but the policy of affection. an enemy may object to our having a policy, because it suits his purpose that we should be without one; but that a friend should object to our having a policy is one of those incredible infatuations which converts partisans into unconscious traitors. the policy adopted may be a bad policy, and no policy at all is idiotcy. if a policy be bad, criticise and amend it; but to denounce all policy is to commit your cause to the providence of bedlam. if, therefore, throughout all intelligent control of nature and humanity, policy is the one supreme mark of wisdom, why should it be dishonourable to study the policy of opinion? he who consistently objects to policy, would build railway engines without safety valves, and dismiss them from stations without drivers; he would abolish turnpike roads and streets, and leave us to find our way at random; he would recommend that vessels be made without helms, and sail without captains, that armies fight without discipline, and artillery-men should fire before loading, and when pointing their guns, should aim at nothing. in fine, a man without policy, honestly and intelligently opposed to policy, would build his house with the roof downwards, and plant his trees with their roots in the air; he would kick his friend and hug his enemy; he would pay wages to servants who would not work, govern without rule, speak without thought, think without reason, act without purpose, be a knave by accident, and a fool by design.
