on the 6th july, after an unusually long rest from the line, the 116th battalion relieved the p.p.c.l.i. in the neuville vitasse sector, situated about three miles south of arras. the accommodation here was very poor, and considerable time was spent in building shelters.
several important reconnaissances were made on this front, during which we lost lt. s. d. woodruff, killed; and 10 other ranks, wounded.
after spending 17 days in this area we were finally relieved by the 1st canadian infantry battalion and moved back in reserve once more.
on the evening of august 5th, at boves wood, the battalion was resting in bivouacs, after a series of long night marches from rear areas, which were conducted with so much secrecy as to almost warrant the suggestion that we were being transferred to the italian, or some other far distant front. only recently a printed order entitled “keep your mouth shut,” which dealt with the advisability of strict silence concerning all movements of troops or operations of a military nature, had been pasted in the pay book of every man in the corps; so that whenever anyone on the line of march was over[63]curious about our destination there was always the simple answer, “remember your pay book.”
that we were still in france was evident, and that we were likely to remain there, if not permanently, at least for the next few weeks, was made known that evening at a company commanders’ meeting, during which the c.o. announced the joyful news that the battalion would shortly be engaged in operations of a more comprehensive nature than night marching. there was evidently some method in our madness, and everyone was all attention, particularly since company commanders’ meetings had lately been showing signs of monotony.
very little was known, except that a battle of great importance was imminent, that australian, british and french troops would likely be engaged, and that there would be scarcely any time for final preparations, which we had always been accustomed to in the past. the german grand offensive, which began in march, had only partially succeeded, although the battles of the somme, messines and passchendaele had been neutralized by their recent gains.
the importance of carrying out, to the fullest extent, the training in open warfare which we had experienced during the summer, was particularly impressed.
the attack by our battalion was to be carried out on a frontage of one thousand yards, starting from the village of hourges, and although a definite final objective was suggested, entailing an advance of some five thousand[64] yards, there was nothing to prevent us from following through to twice or three times that distance, providing the circumstances proved favorable.
the general scheme for the battalion was as follows:—“a” company (capt. ritchie) would attack on the right, going through to what was known as the bade trench system, which they were to capture and consolidate. “c” company (capt. sutton) would follow “a” company, and working round the high ground on the left flank, would drive for the enemy defences north of hammon wood, thence push from the north edge of the wood to the left of our final objective, and deal with certain enemy batteries presumed to be there. “d” company (capt. baird) would follow “c” company and, passing through “a” company, would work around the northern slope of high ground and push for the eastern side of hammon wood. “b” company (capt. preston) was to follow in reserve until the bade system had been captured, when it would follow “d” company and mop up hammon wood, “a” company then coming into battalion reserve.
from a study of the map and intelligence provided it seemed that even with little opposition the turning movement to be made would be extremely difficult, and that the leaders of all units would be called upon to exercise their best judgment and skill in order to ensure success, especially in view of the fact that very little opportunity was to be given them for making a personal reconnaissance.
when it became generally known that the attack was imminent the spirits of the battalion ran high, and preparations for the great battle were pushed with all possible zeal.
the battalion moved from boves to gentelle wood, a distance of six kilometres, moving out at 11 p.m., and arriving at 6 a.m. the congestion of traffic was the worst imaginable, and in consequence it was only with the greatest difficulty that any movement forward by infantry was possible, there being only one road of approach.
with but little sleep, reconnoitring commenced almost at once, and in order to observe secrecy, small parties were sent forward to domart wood. the commanding officer, intelligence officer and company commanders only were able to reach the forward system and make a quick reconnaissance at close range. owing to the broken nature of the ground the assembly area was limited and positions for one company had to be found forward of the front line, held by the troops then holding that sector. all these areas were thoroughly reconnoitred and positions taped off, which was an extremely difficult and hazardous task due to the night activity of enemy machine guns, but thanks to the assistance of the commander of the australian outpost company then holding the line, who personally pointed out the most favorable positions, everything was completed satisfactorily.
at 9.30 p.m. on the night of august 7th the battalion[66] moved off to occupy the assembly positions. zigzag lanes had been cut through the standing corn on both sides of the road and along one of these we moved in single file with as little noise as possible. each man carried two water bottles, 48 hours’ rations and 170 rounds of ammunition in addition to his usual battle equipment. to drown the curses of the weary troops as well as the approach of the tanks it had been arranged with great forethought, for a flight of heavy bombing planes to operate during the night in this area. it was a bright moonlight night, and the movement forward proceeded uninterrupted; the battalion scouts, acting as guides, led their platoons, and the slow task of crossing the river over bridge 53 commenced. opened out to five paces interval, and trying to move quietly, made the march an exceptionally tedious one; however, the crossing was made successfully, and positions occupied under the personal supervision of those who had made the arrangements the night before.
it was by no means an easy position to attack from, as the leading company was facing south. the assembly was finally completed at 2.15 a.m., and word passed round that the zero hour would be at 4.20 a.m.; consequently there was still time to rest and to take up any minor details which might have been previously overlooked.
at 4.20 a.m. sharp, one of the greatest barrages in the history of the war by artillery and machine guns opened out. it was truly a marvellous piece of work considering no previous registration had been made.[67] the difficulty of getting away from the assembly points commenced at zero, plus eight minutes, and the greatest credit is due to the unit commanders for leading their companies and platoons out as well as they did. the left company were obliged to make a left-about wheel round a hedge, out to a road which they covered, and from there deploy in artillery formation. the remainder followed rapidly, and at zero plus forty minutes, the whole battalion was clear of the jumping-off positions, including headquarters, which followed in rear of the reserve company. the enemy retaliation came down quickly, but was not very heavy, although the congestion around the assembly point resulted in some casualties there.
the dense fog and smoke made it very difficult to preserve direction, and the demuin road, with its tall trees, made an excellent landmark, previously noted, which enabled the 43rd, 58th and our own battalion to deploy towards their correct objectives. the enemy machine guns were then busy, and fighting commenced in earnest. “c” company, on the left, realizing the necessity of pushing on as rapidly as possible, made excellent time. “a” company got into the fight early, and suffered severe casualties, losing all their officers and about sixty other ranks before reaching their objective, and it was only through the prompt action of c. s. m. fenwick, who gathered the remnants of that company together, that they were enabled to do so.
the tanks were very much handicapped by the[68] dense fog, and lost direction, operating on the flanks, with the exception of two, which nearly ran down a number of our battalion when they went through us at the start.
very heavy fighting took place around enemy headquarters. machine guns were in abundance, and it was only after brilliant work on the part of the forward company that this nest was successfully dealt with, and a long stream of prisoners commenced leaving for the rear. the dash of our men was most marked, showing a marvellous difference from the old staid method of following the barrage shoulder to shoulder at the high port. enemy machine gun nests were difficult to locate, owing to the poor observation, and a great many of these were cut off and surrendered to the infantry following behind.
owing to a check which “a” company received at the hangard-dodo wood road, battalion headquarters soon found itself close to the battle and provided reinforcements to assist them in taking their final objective.
the advance had also been checked by machine gun fire immediately to the right centre and left of the bade trench, and under cover of our own fire these nests were rushed and put out of action, severe casualties being inflicted on the enemy, their guns being captured and some prisoners taken.
an isolated field gun was still in action behind a small hedge approximately to the front and left of bade trench; this was soon put out of action and the survi[69]vors of the crew captured. the advance was then continued and the bade system finally taken with a number of machine guns, which were remounted on the parados ready for action by 6.15 a.m.; battalion headquarters was immediately established here, and the composite company (“a” company, with headquarter reinforcements) moved forward to provide a covering fire for “c” and “d” companies in their advance on hammon wood.
meanwhile, on the left, the advance was going along well, a great many machine guns being captured without interfering with the progress of our men. close touch was kept on our left flank with the 58th battalion, and owing to the extremely poor visibility, it was considered advisable to make certain that our left flank was secure at demuin wood before committing all our left flank platoons to the assault on hammon wood; consequently one platoon went into demuin with the 58th battalion.
it was not known exactly what progress the right was making at this time, and with depleted ranks, it seemed at the moment that the number of infantry available for the advance on hammon wood was none too strong. as the advance progressed the enemy were seen on the high ground 500 yards to the right, still in action and apparently firing on “a” company in the bade trench. fire was immediately brought to bear on the rear of this party, and after a few rounds they were compelled to capitulate; again a large number of prisoners were sent to the rear. this enabled “b” company[70] to go up on the right and their appearance considerably heartened “c” company, so that the advance against hammon wood pushed forward rapidly from west and north. it was also realized that “d” company was making good progress, and were getting within reach of the woods.
an enemy field-battery of two guns, still in action, was dealt with on the high ground to the north of hammon wood re-entrant, together with a number of machine guns.
whilst “d” company progressed forward on the right a composite company of “c” and “b” companies pressed up the re-entrant from the north. the enemy artillery had evidently been reached before they had realized their danger; some of the gunners fought to a finish, firing through open sights on our men advancing until surrounded. a few rounds, together with the bold assault of infantry straight to the guns, was sufficient to prove to the enemy the futility of further resistance; consequently a record capture of enemy guns was made, and the survivors of the artillery group, who were numerous, came streaming from the dug-outs in which they had taken shelter, and were marched to the rear under their own officers. an eight-inch howitzer, a 5.9, and a 4.1 long-range battery were among the trophies captured, together with an artillery quartermaster’s stores, which contained all kinds of unknown material.
along the high ground to the south and east some enemy machine guns still held out. these were quickly[71] dealt with by “d” company, and hammon wood was cleared. our men now went well forward of the wood and commenced firing on parties of the enemy infantry seen on a hill about a hundred yards to the left. a temporary defence system was rapidly established, and the ground cleared in front of the 7th brigade, which was close behind and ready to push forward; and so by 7.30 a.m. our battalion had reached and consolidated its final objective, in which operations they captured 16 guns, 40 machine guns and about 450 prisoners.
our casualties were 2 officers, capt. a. w. baird, m.c., lt. j. anderson, and 30 other ranks killed; 10 officers and 148 other ranks wounded and missing.
