on the evening of the 26th september we were off again in the direction of cambrai, and after a cold and tedious train journey we arrived at quéant about 1.30 a.m. on the 27th. the guides, who had been sent on in advance, seemed to have got lost, for they did not meet us at quéant station, and a certain amount of confusion ensued in consequence, before it was decided in which direction was situated a certain map location given us by brigade headquarters as our billetting area.
the rain poured down in buckets, and everyone was drenched to the skin by the time we reached our destination; however, the cooks got busy and a hot meal was served, soon after which we received orders to move forward. it should be mentioned here that major d. carmichael, d.s.o., m.c., second in command of the 58th battalion, and one of the outstanding officers of the 9th brigade, was transferred to us as officer commanding just after leaving “y” huts.
the roads were packed with transport and guns coming up from every direction, and we picked our way by overland routes to inchy, and from there to our new area, east of the canal du nord.
the kitchens were unable to move with us, and we[81] bivouacked in shell holes that night with no covering except waterproof sheets, and no hot dinner. about 3 a.m. the next morning the kitchens arrived, and the men gathered round them in small groups to try and get warm. it is surprising how good a thick bacon sandwich is with a ration of rum, about 5 o’clock in the morning!
about 7 a.m. the battalion moved forward, according to plan, closely following the 58th battalion, through bourlon wood, which had been captured only a few hours previously by the 4th division, and by 10 a.m. we were assembled behind a railway embankment to the east of bourlon, and in full view of the city of cambrai. up to this time we had encountered nothing more than scattered shell fire, and we had had no casualties.
from our embankment we watched some tanks coming out of action, and at 6.30 p.m. we received verbal instructions that the 58th battalion would attack the marcoing line, and that the 116th battalion, passing through the 58th, would attack and capture the village of st. olle, which is a small suburb of cambrai.
zero hour was set for 7 p.m., and in consequence there was no time to discuss any plan of operation beyond the fact that “a” company (capt. preston) and “b” company (capt. orr) would lead the attack. by the time we had reached our positions it was dark.
the attack by the 58th was successful, and we moved through their lines in the direction of st. olle. judging by the machine gun fire the village was strongly held,[82] and as no reconnaissance of the ground could be made, and only a very general direction maintained, it was decided that we would not proceed with the attack until daylight. battalion headquarters was established, and rations were brought forward and distributed to the companies under the very nose of the bosch, who could have wiped us out if he had only known; and so darkness has sometimes its advantages also. during the night it was possible to make some preparation, and at 6 a.m. the next morning “a” and “b” companies, with “c” company (capt. williams) and “d” company (capt. patterson) in support, resumed the attack.
the leading platoons had scarcely started when they were caught between cross belts of machine gun fire, coming from a small trench in front of st. olle and petit fontaine on the right, and after an hour’s fighting they had hardly made any headway at all, and had lost practically the whole of their effectives. news of this disaster was brought by lieutenant smith of “b” company, who rolled over the parapet of the trench just outside battalion headquarters in an exhausted condition. from all he said, it appeared that “a” and “b” companies had been annihilated; that captain preston and lieutenant palmer were both wounded and prisoners, and that lieutenant norton had been killed. this information was corroborated by private stankewicz, who had been taken prisoner with captain preston, but who later escaped to our lines.
under these distressing conditions it seemed almost[83] as if our gallant unit would fail, for the first time, to win its objective. a battery of our field artillery were in action about one thousand yards directly to our rear and a messenger was despatched at once to explain the situation to the battery commander, and, if possible, obtain his assistance.
fire was immediately brought to bear on the machine gun positions in the st. olle trench, and the work by this battery, in conjunction with our own lewis guns, was so effective that it was possible to work two platoons from “c” and “d” companies around the north-west of the village, and lt. bonner, who was placed in command of the operation, succeeded with consummate skill and bravery, in rushing the st. olle trench, destroying a large number of the enemy and capturing one hundred prisoners with ten heavy machine guns.
“d” company was then able to push through the village as far as the junction of the arras-cambrai and bapaume-cambrai roads, along which posts were immediately established, and the remnants of “a” and “b” companies were withdrawn to battalion headquarters.
if fritz had not been so concerned about his own safety at this time he might have found the retaking of st. olle a very easy matter, for after practically three days and nights without sleep the resisting powers of the gallant “umpty umps” were fast waning.
on account of the severe casualties the battalion was reduced to three companies, each one having an average[84] strength of ninety rifles, and orders were issued by the brigadier to make use of the battalion band and bugles, as the attack was to be continued on the first of october.
such things had happened to other units we knew, but we certainly did not relish the thought of losing our “music,” although the “music” itself, with the true battalion spirit, was game to the core. during the day major carmichael, with major pratt and lieutenant bonner, made a reconnaissance of the ground immediately between us and cambrai, and were very nearly put out of business by our own heavy artillery, which had started to register without warning, on the junction of the arras-cambrai and bapaume-cambrai roads.
all that night it poured with rain, but towards dawn the weather commenced to clear, and companies moved off from their positions around st. olle, “d” company leading, followed by “c”, “b” and headquarters. an intense artillery barrage was encountered whilst crossing the douai-cambrai road, and the battalion suffered quite a number of casualties. major carmichael was badly wounded in the face, and gave instructions to captain allen, the next senior officer, to take over the remnants of the battalion.
on our left we could see the 4th division advancing in artillery formation, lines of men in single file going steadily forward as if nothing could stop them; it was most inspiring, and everyone started cheering.
it seemed somehow that the germans were at last[85] beaten, and that the war would soon be over, but our feelings of jubilation were a little previous, for after progressing about a mile our leading companies were stopped by a withering fire coming from the right flank.
on observation we discovered a battery of field guns, and quickly changing front, we engaged them with lewis gun and rifle fire. by this means we managed to work up within close range, and most of the crews being killed or wounded the remainder disappeared over the brow of the hill. following up closely it was found that they had taken up a position in a small triangular wood, which we eventually surrounded and captured, together with about eighty prisoners, four machine guns, and the battery of field guns mentioned above.
“d” company and some sections of “c” company then advanced slightly, taking up positions in front of the wood and facing ramillies. whilst holding this line they came under very heavy fire, and a battery of “whizz-bangs” opened on them at point blank range. for an hour or two the situation was most uncomfortable. the battalion on our right had been held up, and the 4th division on our left had been forced to retire, leaving both our flanks in the air.
reorganization in our present precarious position was out of the question, and after hanging on for two hours we decided to withdraw behind the western slope of the hill, where we established ourselves in a line of rifle pits, and got in touch with our right and left flanks. by this time the men were thoroughly exhausted, and[86] news was gladly received that the 24th battalion would relieve us that evening.
our total casualties for the last four days’ fighting around cambrai were four hundred all ranks killed, wounded and missing.
