if we would bring to the study of beccaria’s treatise the same disposition of mind with which he wrote it, we must enter upon the subject with the freest possible spirit of inquiry, and with a spirit of doubtfulness, undeterred in its research by authority however venerable, by custom however extended, or by time however long. it has been from too great reverence for the wisdom of antiquity that men in all ages have consigned their lives and properties to the limited learning and slight experience of generations which only lived for themselves and had no thought of binding posterity in the rules they thought suitable to their own times. beccaria sounded the first note of that appeal from custom to reason in the dominion of law which has been, perhaps, the brightest feature in the history of modern times, and is still transforming the institutions of all countries.
the object, therefore, of this chapter is chiefly[70] negative, being none other than to raise such mistrust of mere custom, and so strong a sense of doubt, by the contradictions apparent in existing laws and theories, that the difficulties of their solution may tempt to some investigation of the principles on which they rest.
that penology is still only in its experimental stage as a science, in spite of the progress it has made in recent times, is clear from the changes that are so constantly being made in every department of our penal system. we no longer mutilate nor kill our criminals, as our ancestors did in the plenitude of their wisdom; we have ceased to transport them, and our only study now is to teach them useful trades and laborious industry. yet whether we shall better bring them to love labour by compulsory idleness or by compulsory work, whether short imprisonment or long is the most effective discipline, whether seclusion or association is least likely to demoralise them, these and similar questions have their answers in a quicksand of uncertainty. this only may experience be said to have yet definitely proved, that very little relation exists in any country between the given quantity of crime and the quantity or severity of punishment directed to its prevention. it has taken thousands of years to establish this truth, and even yet it is but partially recognised over the world.
it would appear at first sight that there could be[71] little to say about crimes and punishments, so obvious and self-evident seem the relations that exist between them. many people still believe in an innate sense of justice in mankind, sufficient always to prevent wide aberrations from equity. is it, they might ask, conceivable that men should ever lose sight of the distinction between the punishment of guilt and the punishment of innocence?—that they should ever punish one equally with the other? yet there is no country in the world which in its past or present history has not involved the relations of a criminal in the punishment inflicted on him; and in savage countries generally it is still common to satisfy justice with vengeance on some blood-relation of a malefactor who escapes from the punishment due to his crime.
it would also seem to demand no great insight to perceive that a voluntary intention must be a universal attribute of a criminal action. no one would think of punishing a man who in his sleep killed another, although, if the injury to society be the measure of punishment, his crime is equivalent to intentional homicide. yet at athens an involuntary murderer was banished until he could, give satisfaction to the relatives of the deceased; and in china, though the penal code generally separates intentional from accidental crimes, anyone who kills a near relation by accident or commits certain kinds[72] of arson by accident undergoes different degrees of banishment and a fixed number of bamboo strokes.[40]
even inanimate objects or animals it has been thought through many ages reasonable to punish. in athens an axe or stone that killed anyone by accident was cast beyond the border; and the english law was only repealed in the present reign which made a cartwheel, a tree, or a beast, that killed a man, forfeit to the state for the benefit of the poor. the jewish law condemned an ox that gored anyone to death to be stoned, just as it condemned the human murderer. and in the middle ages pigs, horses, or oxen were not only tried judicially like men, with counsel on either side and witnesses, but they were hung on gallows like men, for the better deterrence of their kind in future.[41]
these customs had doubtless their defenders, and left the world not without a struggle. it must have cost some one, whosoever first questioned the wisdom of hanging animals or murdering a criminal’s relations, as much ridicule as it cost beccaria to question the efficacy of torture or the right of capital punishment. but the boldness of thought in that unknown reformer was probably lost sight of in the arrogance of his[73] profanity, and he doubtless paid with his own neck for his folly in defending the pig’s.
it may be said that all such absurdities are past; that the jews, the athenians, the chinese, the europeans of the middle ages can scarcely be cited as reasonable beings; that they had no rational theory of punishment, and that their errors have been long since discarded. but at least their example suggests that even in our own system there may be inconsistencies and blemishes which custom and authority hide from our eyes.
penal laws are the expression of the moral sentiments of mankind, and either are as variable as the other. in holland it was once a capital offence to kill a stork, and in england to cut down a man’s cherry-tree. for a roman lady to drink wine was as heinous a sin as adultery, for either of which she incurred the extreme sentence of the law. in athens idleness was for a long time punishable; though to a spartan an athenian fined for idleness seemed to be punished for keeping up his dignity. in mexico drunkenness was a graver crime than slander; for whilst the slanderer lost his ears or lips, the drunken man or woman was clubbed or stoned to death.
but if penal laws thus express the wide variability of human morality, they also contribute to make actions moral or immoral according to the penalties by which they enforce or prevent them. for not[74] only does whatever is immoral tend to become penal, but anything can be made immoral by being first made penal; and hence indifferent actions often remain immoral long after they have ceased to be actually punishable. thus the jews made sabbath-breaking equally immoral with homicide or adultery, by affixing to each of them the same capital penalty; and the former offence, though it no longer forms part of any criminal code, has still as much moral force against it as many an offence directly punishable by the law.
but perhaps the best illustrations of the tendency of actions to retain the infamy, attached to them by a past condition of fanatical punishments, are the cases of suicide and child-killing. could a greek of the classical period, or a cultivated historian like plutarch reappear on earth, nothing would strike him more vividly than the modern conception or recent treatment of these crimes. according to plutarch, lycurgus, the great spartan lawgiver, met his death by voluntary starvation, from the persuasion that even the deaths of lawgivers should be of use to mankind, and serve them with an example of virtue and greatness; and seneca held that it was the part of a wise man not to live as long as he could but as long as he ought. with what astonishment, then, would not plutarch or seneca read of recent european punishments for suicide—of lady hales[75] losing the estate she was jointly possessed of with her husband, the judge, because he drowned himself; of the stake and the cross-roads; of the english law which still regards suicide as murder, and condemns one of two men who in a mutual attempt at self-destruction survives the other to the punishment of the ordinary murderer! is it possible, he would ask, that an action which was once regarded as among the noblest a man could perform, has really come to be looked upon with any other feeling than one of pity or a sad respect?
the case of infanticide suggests similar thoughts. when we remember that both plato and aristotle commended as a valuable social custom that which we treat as a crime; when we recall the fact that the life of a spartan infant depended on a committee of elders, who decided whether it should live or perish, we shall better appreciate the distance we have travelled, or, as some would say, the progress we have made, if we take up some english daily paper and read of some high-minded english judge sentencing, at least formally, some wretched woman to death, because, in order to save her child from starvation or herself from shame, she has released it from existence. yet the feeling, of which such a sentence is the expression, is often extolled as one of the highest triumphs of civilisation; and the laws, as if there were no difference between adult and infant[76] life, glory in protecting the weakness of a child by their merciless disregard for the weakness of its mother.
but at least, it will be thought, we have by this time arrived at some principles about punishment which correspond with the eternal truths of equity. is not equality, for instance, one of the primary essentials of punishment? does it not stand as a penal axiom with almost the sanction of a moral law that all men should suffer equally for equal crimes? yet, if by equality be meant the same punishment, the same kind of labour, the same term of servitude, the same pecuniary fine—and this is the only thing it can mean—what more obvious than that the same punishment for rich and poor, for young and old, for strong and weak, for men and women, for educated and uneducated, will bring to the constitution of a penal code the utmost inequality the imagination can conceive? beccaria insists that the law can do no more than assign the same extrinsic punishment to the same crime; that is, the same punishment, regardless of all other external considerations; and he calls for the infliction of the same punishment on the nobleman as on the commoner. let it be so; but the same punishment is no longer an equal one; and hence from this very demand for equality springs the demand for its very opposite, for what bentham calls the equability of punishment; that is, consideration[77] for the different circumstances of individual criminals. so that the same nominal punishment not being the same real one, equality of punishment appears to be a chimera, and the law, which punishes, say, a distinguished officer less severely than it punishes a costermonger for the same crime, errs perhaps really less from actual equality than if it condemned both to precisely the same punishment.
again, proportion between crime and punishment seems to be another natural demand of equity. yet it is evident that it is only approximately possible, and will vary in every age and country according to the prevalent notions of morality. is imprisonment for a year, or imprisonment for life, or for how long, a fair and proportionate punishment for perjury? who shall decide? shall we submit it to the opinion of the judges? but has not romilly left on record the story of the two men tried by two different judges for stealing some chickens, who were sentenced respectively one to imprisonment for two months, and the other to transportation? shall we then give up all attempt at proportion and apply the same deterrent as equally efficacious against slight or grave offences? draco, when asked why he made death the punishment for most offences that were possible, is said to have replied, ‘small ones deserve it, and i can find no greater for the gravest.’ the same reasoning was for a long time that of our own law; and in japan,[78] where every wrong act was one of disobedience to the emperor, and accordingly of equal value, the same penalty of death for gambling, theft, or murder, obviated all difficulties with regard to a proportion which is easier to imagine than it is to define.
analogy between crime and punishment is another idea which, except in the case of death for death, has been relegated from the practice of most criminal laws. yet the principle has in its favour the authority of moses, the authority of the whole world and of all time, that punishment should, if possible, resemble the crime it punishes in kind; so that a man who blinds another should be blinded himself, he who disfigures another be disfigured himself. thus in the old-world mythology, theseus and hercules inflict on the evil powers they conquer the same cruelties their victims were famous for; termenus having his skull broken because with his own skull he broke the heads of others; and busiris, who sacrificed others, being himself sacrificed in his turn. both montesquieu and beccaria also advocate analogy in punishment, and so does bentham to some degree; there being, indeed, few greater contrasts between the theories of the great english jurist and modern english practice than that the former should not have deprecated some suffering by burning as a penalty analogous to the crime of arson, and that he should have advised the transfixing of a forger’s hand or of a calumniator’s tongue[79] by an iron instrument before the public gaze as good and efficient punishments for forgery and slander.
these are some of the difficulties of the subject, which teach us the necessity of constant open-mindedness with regard to all ideas or practices connected with criminal law. but, would we further examine our established notions, we should consider a statement from hobbes which goes to the very root of the theory of punishment.
‘in revenges or punishments,’ says hobbes, ‘men ought not to look at the greatness of the evil past, but the greatness of the good to follow, whereby we are forbidden to inflict punishment with any other design than for the correction of the offender and the admonition of others.’ and over and over again the same thing has been said, till it has come to be a commonplace in the philosophy of law, that the object of punishment is to reform and deter. as was once said by a great legal authority, ‘we do not hang you because you stole a horse, but that horses may not be stolen.’[42] punishment by this theory is a means to an end, not an end in itself.
yet, supposing it were proved to-morrow that punishment fails entirely of the ends imputed to it; that, for example, the greater number of crimes are[80] committed by criminals who have been punished already; that for one chance of a man’s reformation during his punishment there are a hundred in favour of his deterioration; and that the deterrent influence of his punishment is altogether removed by his own descriptions of it; shall we suppose for a moment that society would cease to punish, on the ground that punishment attained none of its professed ends? would it say to the horse-stealer, ‘keep your horse, for nothing we can do to you can make you any better, nor deter others from trying to get horses in the same way?’
or to take a stronger case. a deserter from the ranks escapes to his home, breaks into it at night, robs an infirm father of all the savings he has provided for his old age, and in a struggle for their possession so injures him that he dies. must the law disclaim all indignation, all resentment, in the punishment it inflicts, and say to such a ruffian that it only deals hard with him in order to warn others by his example, and with the pious hope of making a good man of him in the future? if resentment is ever just, is it wrong to give it public expression? if it is natural and right in private life, why should it be a matter of shame in public life? if there is such a thing as just anger for a single man, does it become unjust when distributed among a million?
as a matter of fact the law affords a very clear[81] proof, that its real purpose is to administer retributive justice and that punishment has no end beyond itself, by its careful apportionment of punishment to crime, by its invariable adjustment between the evil a man has done and the evil it deals out to him in return. for what purpose punish offences according to a certain scale, for what purpose stay to measure their gravity, if merely the prevention of crime is the object of punishment? why punish a slight theft with a few months’ imprisonment and a burglary with as many years? the slight theft, as easier to commit, as more tempting accordingly, should surely have a harder penalty affixed to it than a crime which, as it is more difficult, is also less probable and less in need of strong counter-inducements to restrain it. that the law never reasons in this way is because it weighs offences according to their different degrees of criminality, or, in other words, because it feels that the fair retaliation for the burglary is not a fair retaliation for the theft.
if, moreover, the prevention of crime is the chief object of punishment, why wait till the crime is committed? why not punish before, as a certain turk in barbary is said to have done, who, whenever he bought a fresh christian slave, had him forthwith suspended by his heels and bastinadoed, that the severe sense of his punishment might prevent him from committing in future the faults that should[82] merit it?[43] why should we ever let a man out of prison who has once entered one? is he not then a hundred times more likely to violate the law than he was before; and is he ever more dangerous to society than when he has once suffered for the public example, and been released from the discipline that was intended to reform him? it is still true, as goldsmith said long ago, that we send a man to prison for one crime and let him loose again ready to commit a thousand. and so it is, that of the 74,000 souls who make up our criminal classes, whilst about 34,000 of them fill our prisons and reformatories, there is still an army of 40,000 at large in our midst, whom we class as known thieves, receivers of stolen goods, and suspected persons.[44]
a child’s simple philosophy of punishment therefore is after all the correct one, when it tells you without hesitation that the reason a man is punished for a bad action is simply ‘because he deserves it.’ the notion of desert in punishment is based entirely on feelings of the justice of resentment. so that the[83] primary aim of legal punishment is precisely the same as may be shown historically to have been its origin, namely, the regulation by society of the wrongs of individuals. in all early laws and societies distinct traces may be seen of the transition of the vendetta, or right of private revenge, from the control of the person or family injured by a crime to that of the community at large. the latter at first decided only the question of guilt, whilst leaving its punishment to the pleasure of the individuals directly concerned by it. even to this day in turkey sentences of death for murder run as follows: so-and-so is condemned to death at the demand of the victim’s heirs; and such sentences are sometimes directed to be carried out in their presence.[45] by degrees the community obtained control of the punishment as well, and thus private might became public right, and the resentment of individual injuries the retributive justice of the state.
the recognition of this regulation of resentment as the main object of punishment affords the best test for measuring its just amount. for that amount will be found to be just which is necessary; that is to say, which just suffices for the object it aims at—the satisfaction of general or private resentment. it must be so much, and no more, as will prevent individuals from preferring to take the law into their own hands[84] and seeking to redress their own injuries. this degree can only be gathered from experience, nor is it any real objection to it, that it must obviously be somewhat arbitrary and variable. both wladimir i., the first christian czar of russia, and wladimir ii. tried the experiment of abolishing capital punishment for murder; but the increase of murders by the vendetta compelled them to fall back upon the old modes of punishment.[46] some centuries later the empress elizabeth successfully tried the same experiment, without the revival of the vendetta, the state of society having so far altered that the relations of a murdered man no longer insisted on the death of his murderer. but had elizabeth abolished all legal punishment for murder—had she, that is, allowed no public vendetta of any kind—undoubtedly the vendetta would have become private again.
by the same rule, in the case of theft, the value of the thing stolen, with some equivalent for the trouble of its recovery, taken from the offender or made a lien on his earnings, appears to be all that justice can demand. sir samuel romilly, himself second to none as a lawyer, wrote seventy years ago: ‘if the restitution of the property stolen, and only a few weeks’ or even but a few days’ imprisonment were the unavoidable consequence of theft, no theft would ever be committed.’ yet the following sentences are taken[85] at random from authentic english sources: three months’ imprisonment for stealing a pipe, six months for stealing a penny, a twelvemonth for stealing an umbrella, five years’ penal servitude for stealing some stamps from a letter, seven years for stealing twopence. in such cases the principle of vindictiveness exceeds the limits of necessity, and therefore of justice; whilst the law loses all its dignity as the expression of unimpassioned resentment.
is it possible, then, so beforehand to apportion punishments to crimes that when a crime is committed it shall be but necessary to refer to a code and at once detect its appropriate punishment? or must the law be general in its language, and leave a wide margin to the discretion of the judge? beccaria would have the judicial function confined solely to the ascertainment of the fact of a crime, its punishment preordained by the law. on the other hand it is said, that it is impossible to anticipate every case that may arise; that no two cases are ever alike; that it is better to leave the nice adjustment of penalties to the wisdom and impartiality of a judge, and only limit his discretion by rules of a most expansive description.
the chinese penal code of 1647 is probably the nearest approach to beccaria’s conception, and nothing is more marvellous than the precision with which it apportions punishments to every shade of crime, leaving no conceivable offence, of commission or[86] omission, without its exact number of bamboo strokes, its exact pecuniary penalty, or its exact term or distance of banishment. it is impossible in this code to conceive any discretion or room for doubt left to the judicial officers beyond the discovery of the fact of an alleged crime. but what is practicable in one country is practicable in another; so that the charge so often urged against thus eliminating judicial discretion, that it is fair in theory but impossible in practice, finds itself at direct issue with the facts of actual life.
but although the laws of every country thus recognise in different degrees the retributive nature of punishment, by their constant attention to its apportionment to crime, there is another corollary of the desirability of a just proportion between the two, which has never been, nor is ever likely to be, accepted: namely, that from the point of view of the public interest, which in theory is the only legal view, it is no mitigation of a crime that it is a first offence, nor any aggravation of one that it is the second.
for since the observance of some regular proportion between crime and punishment, whatever that proportion may be, constitutes the first principle of an[87] equitable code; and since the most important thing in public morality is a fixed penal estimate for every class of crime; it is above all things desirable that the law should always adhere to such proportion and estimate, by concerning itself solely with the crime and not with the criminal. the injury to the public is precisely the same whether a criminal has broken the law for the first time or for the thousandth and first; and to punish a man more severely for his second offence than for his first, because he has been punished before, is to cast aside all regard for that due proportion between crime and punishment which is after all the chief ingredient of retributive justice, and to inflict a penalty often altogether incommensurate with the injury inflicted on the public.
for instance, the injury to the public is no greater the hundredth time a man steals a rabbit than it is the first. the public may be interested in the prevention of poaching, but it is not interested in the person of the poacher, nor in the number of times he may have broken the law. the law claims to be impersonal—to treat offences as they affect the state, not as they affect individuals; to act mechanically, coldly, and dispassionately. it has, therefore, simply to deal with the amount of injury done by each specific offence, and to affix to it its specific penalty, regardless of all matters of moral antecedents. the repetition of an offence may make its immorality the greater, but its[88] criminality remains the same, and this only is within the province of the law.
it is the specific crime, not the fact that it is a second or third felony, which is injurious. neither a community nor an individual suffer more from the commission of a crime by a man who commits it for the second time than from its commission by a man who has never committed it before. if two brothers are each robbed of a pound apiece on two several occasions, the one who is robbed each time by the same criminal suffers no more than the one who is robbed each time by different criminals. still less is the public more injured in one case than in the other. therefore the former brother is entitled for his second loss to no more restitution than the other, nor has any more claim on society for the infliction of a severer punishment on his behalf than that inflicted for the second loss of his brother.
a few stories may be taken as illustrative of thousands to indicate the mischief and travesty of justice which arises from the neglect of this principle, and from the custom of making a legal inquiry into moral antecedents.
a farm labourer, with a wife and four children, and earning eleven shillings a week, was imprisoned in the county gaol for two months for the theft of a pound of butter. soon after his release sickness entered his home, and to supply his children’s wants[89] he again yielded to temptation and stole twelve duck’s eggs. for this he was sentenced to seven years’ penal servitude; or rather not for this theft, but because he had already incurred a severe punishment for a theft of some butter. the sentence was most perfectly lawful, but was it not perfectly unjust?
almost any number of the ‘times’ will illustrate the same thing. take the account of the middlesex sessions of february 24, 1880. there we find the case of a man and woman sentenced to seven and five years’ penal servitude respectively. what enormities had they committed? the man had stolen three-halfpence from somebody; and the woman, who was a laundress, had stolen two skirts, of the value of six shillings, from a vendor of sheep’s trotters. the man had incurred previously seven years’ penal servitude for a robbery with violence, and the woman had three times in her life been sentenced to imprisonment. but is it just that, because a man has been severely punished once, no rule nor measure shall be observed with him if he incur punishment again? and might not a vendor of sheep’s trotters have been satisfied, without a laundress becoming a burden to the state?
it will be said, of course, that the practice of giving increased sentences where there have been previous convictions prevails all over the world and in all[90] states of civilisation. but in that very fact lies the strength of the argument against it. by the roman law a third case of theft, however slight, exposed a man to death.[48] by the laws of st. louis the man who stole a thing of trifling value lost an ear the first time, a foot the second, and was hung the third. by the criminal code of sardinia in the fifteenth century, asses were condemned to lose one ear the first time they trespassed on a field not their master’s, and their second ear for a second offence. but enough of such instances. the practice is undoubtedly universal; but so at one time were ordeals and tortures. may not, then, the practice be, like them, part and parcel of a crude state of law, such as was unavoidable in its emergence to better things, but such as it is worth some effort to escape from?
there are, however, certain limitations even to the supposed universality of the custom. for the roman jurists did not consider a re-conviction as a circumstance in itself which justified aggravation of punishment; and all that can be gathered from some fragments in the pandects and code is, that some particular cases of repeated crimes were punished more severely than a first offence. but they were crimes of the same kind; and a man whose first crime[91] was a theft and whose second was an assault would not have incurred an aggravated penalty. it is the same to-day in the austrian, tuscan, and a few other codes: a second crime is only punished more severely as a second crime when it is of the same kind as the first, so that it would not suffice to prove simply a previous conviction for felony irrespective of the particular sort. there is also another limitation that has sometimes been recognised, for in the roman law the rule of an increased penalty fell to the ground, if three years elapsed without offence between the punishment for one crime and the commission of a second.[49]
if it be said that a second conviction makes it necessary for society to protect itself by stronger measures against a member who thus defies its power, it may be asked whether this is not an application of exactly the same reasoning to the crimes of individuals, which as applied to the crimes of all men generally led our ancestors so far astray in the distribution of their punishments. nothing could have been more plausible than their reasoning: ‘the punishment in vogue does not diminish the crime, therefore increase the punishment.’ but nothing could have[92] been less satisfactory than the result, for with the increase of punishment that of crime went hand in hand. the same reasoning is equally plausible in the case of individuals, with the same perplexing question resulting in the end: ‘how comes it that, in spite of the threatened greater punishment, the majority of criminals are yet old offenders?’
it is unhappily no mere theory, that the majority of crimes are committed precisely by those who risk most in committing them; by those, that is, who commit them with the aggravated penalty full in view. by the existing law (of which both the criminal code- and the penal servitude-commissioners have proposed the mitigation) anyone convicted of felony after a previous conviction for felony is liable to penal servitude for life, or to imprisonment with hard labour for four years, with one or more whippings. the minimum punishment for a second conviction of felony is seven years. yet, with the knowledge of such increased punishments before their eyes, with the full consciousness of their liabilities as old offenders, official statistics show that of both the male and female convicts in the english convict prisons considerably more than half have incurred previous convictions.[50] of the male convicts in 1878, 79 per cent.,[93] and of the female 89 per cent., were cases of reciduous crime. may it not, then, be argued from such a failure of the system to an error in the principle on which it rests? for is it not evident that the aggravated penalty does as little to deter as the original punishment does to reform?
but undoubtedly punishment, although in its origin and present intention vindictive, must exercise a certain preventive force against crime, and this preventive force can scarcely be estimated, for that which is prevented is, of course, not seen. but the efficiency of punishment as a deterrent is proportioned to its certainty, and there is a large element of uncertainty that can never be eliminated. for every malefactor there are two hopes: first, that he may escape detection or apprehension; secondly, that he may escape conviction. that his hopes of impunity are not without reason greater than his fears of punishment the following facts attest.
in a period of ten years, from 1867 to 1876, the total number of principal indictable offences committed in the metropolis against property—and these constitute the great majority of crimes—were 117,345. but the apprehensions for these offences were only 26,426, the convictions only 19,242. in other words,[94] the chances against apprehension for such crimes as burglary or larceny are four to one in favour of the criminal, whilst the chances against his conviction and punishment are fully as high as six to one. when we thus find that only 16 per cent. of such crimes receive any punishment, the remaining 84 per cent. escaping it altogether, and that only 22 per cent. are even followed by apprehension, we shall the more admire the general efficacy of our criminal machinery, in which prevention by punishment plays so small a part.[51]
but punishment bears much the same relation to crime in the country at large that it does in the metropolis. let one year be taken as a fair sample of all. the total number of indictable offences of all kinds reported to the police in 1877-8 was 54,065. for these offences only 24,062 persons were apprehended. of these latter only 16,820 were held to bail or committed for trial; and of these again 12,473 were convicted and punished.[52] so that, though the proportion of convictions to the number of prisoners who come to trial is about 75 per cent., the proportion of convictions, that is, of punishments, to the number of crimes committed is so low as 23 per cent. of the 54,065 crimes reported to the police in one year 41,592 were actually committed with impunity; and[95] thus the proportion which successful crime of all sorts bears to unsuccessful is rather more than as four to one.[53] so that there is evident truth in what a good authority has said: ‘few offences comparatively are followed by detection and punishment, and with a moderate degree of cunning an offender may generally go on for a long time with but feeble checks, if not complete impunity.’[54]
against this general uncertainty of punishment, which no severity in the law can affect or make up for, the only certainty of punishment dependent on the law is in the event of conviction. but even this certainty is of a very qualified nature, for it depends on sentiments of due proportion between a crime and its penalty, which in no two men are the same. every increase of severity in punishment diminishes its certainty, since it holds out to a criminal fresh hopes of impunity from the clemency of his judges, prosecutors, or jury.
but there is a still further uncertainty of punishment, for it is as well known in the criminal world as elsewhere that the sentence pronounced in court is not the real sentence, and that neither penal servitude for[96] five years nor penal servitude for life mean necessarily anything of the sort. the humanity of modern legislation insists on a remission of punishment, dependent on a convict’s life in the public works prisons, in order that the element of hope may brighten his lot and perchance reform his character. this remission was at first dependent simply on his conduct, which was perhaps too generously called good where it was hard for it to be bad; now it depends on his industry and amount of work done. yet the element of hope might be otherwise assured than by lessening the certainty of punishment, say, by associating industry or good conduct with such little privileges of diet, letter-writing, or receiving of visits, as still shed some rays of pleasure over the monotony of felon-life. it should not be forgotten, that the commission of 1863, which so strongly advocated the remissibility of parts of penal sentences, did so in despite of one of its principal members, against no less an authority than the lord chief justice, then sir alexander cockburn.[55] the very fact of the remissibility of a sentence is an admission of its excessive severity; for to say that a sentence is never carried out is to say that it need never have been inflicted.
the question, therefore, arises, does crime depend to any appreciable extent on imprisonment at all, or on the length or shortness of sentences?
the right to ask such a question derives itself from recent experience. in 1853 the country decided to shorten terms of penal servitude as compared with those of the then expiring system of transportation, for which they were to be substituted. four years later it was resolved to equalise terms of penal servitude with those formerly given of transportation, though transportation for seven years was still to have its equivalent in three of penal servitude. then came the garrotting year, 1862, in consequence of which the minimum term of penal servitude was raised to five years, whilst no sentence of penal servitude, after a previous conviction of felony, was to be for less than seven years. now again the tide has turned in favour of shorter sentences, and it is officially proposed to relinquish the latter minimum of servitude as too severe, and as leading in practice to sentences of simple imprisonment, which on the other hand are declared to be too slight.
in such a zigzag path has our penal legislation been feeling, and is still feeling, its way, with evident misgiving of that principle of repression, as false as it is old, that an increase of crime can only be met by an increase of punishment.
there seem to be three principal reasons why, under our present system, crime still keeps its general level, irrespective of all changes in our degrees of punishment.
[98]
in the first place, our public works prisons, however excellent for their material results, are so many schools of crime, where for the one honest trade a man learns by compulsion he acquires a knowledge of three or four that are dishonest. ‘i have become acquainted,’ says a released convict, ‘with more of what is bad and evil, together with the schemes and dodges of professional thieves and swindlers, during the four years i served the queen for nothing, than i should have done in fifty years outside the prison walls.’ ‘the association rooms at dartmoor are as bad as it is possible for anything to be … they are really class-rooms in the college of vice, where all are alike students and professors. the present system in most instances merely completes the man’s vicious and criminal education, instead of in the slightest degree reforming him.’[56] it has been attempted in various ways to obviate this difficulty, by diminishing opportunities of companionship; but the real demoralisation of prison life is probably due less to the actual contact of bad men with one another than to the deadened sense of criminality which they derive from the feeling of numbers, just as from the same cause the danger of drowning is forgotten on the ice. prisoners in gangs lose all shame of crime, just as men in armies forget their native horror of murder.
in the second place, a large proportion of the habitual criminal class is formed of weak-minded or imbecile persons, notorious for the repeated commission of petty thefts, crimes of violence and passion, and confessed to be ‘not amenable to the ordinary influences of self-interest or fear of punishment.’[57] it is now proposed to separate this class of prisoners from others; but is punishment operative on them at all? is not their proper place an asylum?
in the third place, there is the discharge from prison; and truly, if the prevention of crime be a main object of society, it is just when a man is released from prison that, from a social point of view, there would seem most reason to send him there. for even if, whilst in prison, he has learned no dishonest means of livelihood, how shall he, when out of it, set about obtaining an honest one? if temptation was too strong for him when all doors were open to him, is it likely to be less strong when most are closed? will it not be something like a miracle, if, with two pounds paid to him on his discharge and his railway fare paid home, he eat for any considerable time the bread of honesty, and sleep the sleep of the just?
that these causes do to a great extent defeat the preventive effect of our penal laws, is proved by the tale of our criminal statistics, which reveal the fact that most of our crime is committed by those who[100] have once been punished, and that of general crime about 77 per cent. is committed with impunity. but if so large a proportion of crimes pass unpunished altogether, it is evident that society depends much less for its general security upon its punishments than is commonly supposed. might it not, therefore, still further relax such punishments, which are really a severe tax on the great majority of honest people for the repression of the very small proportion who constitute the dishonest part of the community?[58]
for if punishment is weak to prevent crime, it is strong to produce it, and it is scarcely open to doubt that its productive force is far greater than its preventive. our terms of imprisonment compel more persons to enter a career of crime than they prevent from pursuing one, that being often the only resource left for those who depend on a criminal’s labour. whether in prison or the workhouse, such dependents become a charge to society; nor does it seem reasonable, that if one man under sore temptation steals a loaf, a hundred other men who do no such thing must contribute to keep, not only the prisoner himself, but his family too, in their daily bread for so long a time as it pleases the law to detain him from earning his and their necessary subsistence.
since, therefore, there is more to fear from a punished than from an unpunished criminal, there is the less reason to regret the general impunity of crime. there is indeed a large class of crimes for the prevention of which more would be done, by leaving them to their natural consequences, and to the strong power against them which the general interests and moral feelings of mankind will always enforce, than by actual punishment. it is particularly crimes of dishonesty which are best punished by the mere fact of their discovery. by the norwegian law if an offender holds any official place he is punished, not by fine or imprisonment, but by the loss of his office and all the privileges connected with it.[59] and if we imagine a country without any legal penalty at all for theft or dishonesty, thieves and their tribe would soon find their proper punishment, by that process of social shifting, which would drive them to the most deleterious or dangerous occupations of life even more effectually than it so drives them at present. the less dependence is placed on the penal sanctions of crime, the stronger do the moral restraints from it become.
it is against crimes affecting the person that punishments are most desirable and their vindictive character most justly displayed. personal violence calls for personal detention or personal chastisement;[102] and the principle of analogy in punishment is most appropriate in the case of a man who maltreats his wife or abuses his strength against any weakness greater than his own. punishment in such cases is a demand of natural justice, whether anyone is affected by the example or not, and whether or not the man himself is improved by it. not only is it the best means of enforcing that personal security which is one of the main functions of the state, but it is an expression of that sense of moral reprobation which is so necessary to the good order of society.
repression by the law seems likewise the only means of preventing that large class of actions which affect the general character and tone of a country, whilst they injuriously affect no individual in particular. the protection of creatures too feeble to protect themselves justifies, under this head, the legal punishment of cruelty to animals. it is idle to say that the law can do nothing against the average moral sense of the community, for the law is often at first the only possible lever of our moral ideas. were it not for the law we should still bait bulls and bears, and find amusement in cock-throwing; and till the law includes hares and pigeons within the pale of protection drawn so tenderly round bulls and bears, no moral sense is likely to arise against the morbid pleasures of coursing and pigeon-shooting.
that the punishments of long custody by which we[103] now defend our lives and properties are out of all proportion to the real needs of social existence is indicated by such a fact as that no increase of crime used to attend the periodical release of prisoners which was for long, if it is not still, customary in russia at the beginning of each reign. neither in india, when on the queen’s assumption of the title of empress, a pardon was granted to about one-tenth of the prison population, did any increase of crime ensue, as, according to all criminal reasoning, it should have done, if the safety of society depends on the custody of the criminal class.[60] in sweden a low rate of crime seems to be a direct consequence of a low scale of punishment. of those condemned to travaux forcés, which may vary from a period of two months to a period for life, 64 per cent. are condemned for one year, and only 3 per cent. are condemned for seven years;[61] whilst sentences to the latter period in england form between 50 and 60 per cent. of the sentences to penal servitude.
but if the custody of the criminal class has been overrated as a preventive of crime, or regarded as the sole preventive instead of one amongst many, it does not follow that crime on that account must be left to itself. it only follows that we should trust to punishment less and to other agencies more in our war with[104] crime, and that we should seek to check the latter at its source, not in its full stream, by attending to the improvement of the general conditions of life. it is quite certain, for instance, that the spread of education, of which beccaria wrote in terms of such despair, means the diminution of crime; and as the majority of crimes are committed between the ages of twenty and forty, it may be predicted that from the present year onwards the great act of 1870 will bear increasing fruit in lowering our criminal statistics. more too may be hoped for from the electric light than from any multiplication of prisons.
there are a few obvious remedies by which the inducements to crime might be easily diminished. in 1808 sir samuel romilly brought in a bill, to provide persons tried and acquitted of felony with compensation, at the discretion of the judge, for the loss they incurred by their detention and trial. this was objected to, on the ground that the payment of such compensation out of the county rates would discourage prosecutions; and the only justice done to men falsely accused from that day to this is the authorisation given to goal-governors in 1878 to provide prisoners, who have been brought from another county for trial at the assizes and have been acquitted, with means of returning to their own homes. something more than this is required to save a man so situated from falling into real crime.
one thing that might be done, which would also serve at the same time to keep a prisoner’s family from want, the main source of crime, would be the formation of a prisoners’ fund, for his and their benefit. for this there is a precedent in a quite recent act. for the act, which abolished the forfeiture of a felon’s property, enabled the crown to appoint an administrator of it, for the benefit of the persons injured by the crime and the felon’s family, the property itself and its income reverting ultimately to the convict or to his representatives. there could, however, be no objection in justice to the forfeiture of a proportionate part of every felon’s property, such forfeiture to be dedicated to the formation of a fund, out of which assistance should be given, both to the families of prisoners during their custody and to the prisoners themselves on their discharge.[62] such a fund might be still further increased by the substitution of a lien on a man’s wages or income for many minor offences now punished, but not prevented, by imprisonment.
by the present english law a person convicted of more offences than one may be sentenced for each offence separately, the punishment of each one in[106] succession taking effect on the expiration of the other. by this law (which the criminal code commissioners propose to alter) imprisonment may be spread over the whole of a lifetime. on this point the chinese law again offers a model, for it enacts that when two or more offences are proved against a man, they shall all be estimated together, and the punishment of all the lesser offences be included in that of the principal charge, not in addition to it so also if the offences are charged at different times, and the punishment of one has been already discharged, there is no further punishment for the other subsequent charges, unless they be charges of greater criminality, in which case only the difference between the punishments can be legally incurred.[63] but this of course presupposes a definite scale of crimes and punishments.
such are some of the problems connected with penology, which best illustrate the imperfection of its hitherto attained results. only one thing as yet seems to stand out from the mist, which is, that closely associated as crime and punishment are both in thought and speech, they are but little associated in reality. the amount of crime in a country appears to be a given quantity, dependent on quite other causes than the penal laws directed to its repression. the efficiency of the latter seems proportioned[107] to their mildness, not to their severity; such severity being always spoiled by an inevitable moderation in practice. the conclusion, therefore, would seem to be, that a short simple code, with every punishment attached to every offence, with every motive for aggravation of punishment stated, and on so moderate a scale that no discretion for its mitigation should be necessary, would be the means best calculated to give to penal laws their utmost value as preventives of crime, though experience proves that as such preventives their place is a purely secondary one in a really good system of legislation.
